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ABSTRACT

This thesis will offer evidence for satire in Niccold

Machiavelli's The Prince (published in 1532), in three areas
of inquiry.

^

The first is Machiavelli's life and character, from

which his intent and motivation for writing a satire, rela

tive to the Medici family in Florence and the political
climate of his era, can be discovered.

Second, I will offer evidence from Machiavelli's other

major writings, principally The Discourses On the First Ten
Books of Titus Livius and The History of Florence, to demon
strate that Machiavelli satirized the ^new prince' by refut

ing or distorting the democratic principles he advocated in
his other works.

Third, I will demonstrate the rhetorical elements of
satire in The Prince that correspond with those devices

commonly associated with the genre satire.

Rather than organize this thesis around general princi
ples or topics, I have approached The Prince methodically.
Chapter by chapter, to better demonstrate the development of

Machiavelli's satire, which evolves incrementally from the
first to the last chapter.
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INTRODUCTION

In less than two decades (2013), the world community of
scholars will observe the 500th Anniversary of Niccold

Machiavelli's The Prince,^ a work that has provoked both ire
and approbation throughout the intervening centuries.

On

that occasion, new interpretations and commentary on what

Isaiah Berlin refers to as "the question of Machiavelli"^
will likely appear, further expanding "a bibliography that

is vast and growing faster than ever."^

The spectrum of

opinion and analysis surrounding the Prince is a controver
sial clamor of conflicting theories from which a consensus
seems improbable in the near future.

If we are to resolve

the question of Machiavelli, it will be necessary to probe
"

\

■

■

beyond the literal interpretation of that work offered in
the past, from which a wealth of contradictory evidence and
justification have been found.

From the early part of the sixteenth century,
Machiavelli was "condemned" for his "political immorality

and cynicism,"'* an indelible mark against his reputation
that finds expression in the term ^Machiavellian,' in refer
ence to the political theory proffered by a man who "was

(and is) popularly misunderstood to have ajdvocated atheism,
treachery, and criminality as preferable to other means of
statecraft."^

Taken at his word in the Prince, Machiavelli

did advocate atheism, treachery, and criminality, and his

precepts have always found a receptive audience among the

unscrupulous.

Thomas Cromwell had considerable influence

with King Henry VIII, for example, and Cromwell took his

inspiration from "a thin manuscript volume, recently pro
cured for him at Florence, whose rubrics referred to ^cruel
ty and clemency, and whether it is better to be loved than
feared'... and similar matters" which tended to inform his

counsel to the King:
...the great art of the politician was
to penetrate the disguise which princes

usually throw over their real inclina
tions, and to devise expedients by which
the prince may gratify his appetites
without appearing to outrage morality
and religion. The little book also
contained an exposition of the weakness

of the papacy more convincing to
Cromwell's practical mind than all of
Luther's thunder, and some happy sugges
tions for the combination of hypocrisy
and terrorism. But chiefly Cromwell ,
sucked from it the one heresy likely to

appeal to Henry:

the more than divine

right of tyrants, the absolute sover
eignty and unlimited independence of the

omnipotent; amoral state.®
The Elizabethan scholars and dramatists took note of

Machiavelli's ideas, reflected in "the ^murderous Machiavel'
of the famous 400 odd references in Elizabethan litera

ture,"'and in France, the "infiltration of Machiavelli's
ideas*' was thought, by Alberico Gentillet, to have arrived
"under the corrupt influence of the Italian queen mother,

Catherine de' Medici."^

Gentillet thought, however, that

the Prince was a form of "satire,"' and "the printer of the
first edition of the Prince [in 1532] ...sought Church

protection against those who ^do not know that those who
instruct in the use of herbs and medicine, also instruct in

poisons, in order to know how to guard against them,'"^° or,
stated another way, that the Prince was intended to educate

the unwary regarding the providence of princes.

views did not prevail in majority opinion.

But these

Soon after its

publication, the Prince earned Machiavelli a reputation as a
"toady" of princes, particularly of the Medici, or so
thought the "restorers of the short-lived [second] Floren

tine republic," (1527-1530)" who no longer trusted in
Machiavelli's republican credentials.

By the year 1559,

"all of Machiavelli's works were condemned by the Roman

Church and placed on the Index.""
In the seventeenth century, Machiavelli was "denounced"

primarily by the Jesuits, and by the eighteenth century,

"clerics, philosophers, historians, and statesmen all in

veighed against him and with equal vigor."" Frederick of
Prussia wrote his Anti-Machiavelli "rejecting the advice

given by the Florentine secretary,"" which, as De Lamar
Jensen observes, would have earned the commendation of

Machiavelli, for "what could be more astute or more in tune
with The Prince than a denunciation of it!""

Voltaire, who

"helped" Frederick write "his Anti-Machiavel" would have

agreed that a "repudiation of Machiavelli would be the first
step of any tyrant.""
For Rousseau, "Machiavelli's notorious ^immorality'

simply doe's not arise since The Prince is a satire on princ
es written by a convinced republican:

^He proposed to teach

kings; but it was the people he really taught.

His Prince

is the book of republicans,'"" and "the history of the
Borgias is a warning to citizens to be on their guard.""
Rousseau "reinvoke[s] the standards of Roman republican

virtue," and thus "Machiavelli leads away from the Enlight
enment, not to it.""
Following the French Revolution, "it became fashion

able" to examine the "works of Machiavelli" who was "only
seeking the good of his native land by eliminating both
national despots and foreign oppressors."

The French "re

vised" their previous notions about "Cesare Borgia" and

"Machiavelli," which gave rise to "the birth of the precious

notion of historical relativity."^"
The great eighteenth century satirist, Jonathan Swift,
may have borrowed liberally from Machiavelli in his Works.

F.P. Lock makes the point that Machiavelli "provided...

practical political analysis for Swift to draw on in apply
ing his political ideals to the contemporary situation,"

from the "Discourses
"The Prince."

the "Art of War," the "History," and

Lock observes that both men shared "common

attitudes to the nexus of corruption, degradation, and the
need for reform that connect their analysis of contemporary
society.

The rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century

ushered in a new perspective on Machiavelli.

"Herder sug

gested that Machiavelli's motivation was a desire for the
national independence of Italy," a view accepted by Hegel,

Fichte, and Ranke as well.

The Italians who championed this

view following the unification of Italy, in 1871, included
Pasquale Villari, Oreste Tommasini and Francesco De
Sanctis.^^

Machiavelli became a "saint of the Italian Risor

gimento,"^^ Italy redeemed from the ashes of antiquity.
Felix Gilbert challenged this notion, however, faulting the

assumption that Machiavelli's desire to unify Italy "meant
the same thing" to him "as it did to the nationalist patri

ots of the nineteenth century."^
The twentieth century view of Machiavelli, "as a scien
tist—as a true analyst of political situations and events,

and formulator of general patterns and laws of political
behavior... has gained wide popularity among political
scientists and also among a substantial number of histori

ans," a Machiavelli who "possessed a detached, impartial,
scientific mind,"^^ a "founder of a modern school of politi
cal science, emphasizing power and how it is gained and

held, not what should be done to fulfill a providential
scheme."^®

Frederick Meinecke, in his Doctrine of Raison d'

Etat and the emergence of "Realpolitik

viewed the "very

essence of the development of the modern state" as "the

struggle for and against Machiavellianism."^' As Meinecke
understood, there were "sinister aspects of reason of

state... when triitti iiia justice are treated simply as ele
ments in the empirical situation, to be weighed against
material advantages, then the gates are opened to forces of
active evil which traditional morality had opposed... the

sources of a new dualism which plagues modern civiliza
tion,

Following World War I, many scholars "took up their
pens to combat the leviathan," including G.P. Gooch and

Jacques Maritain, who argued against the "myth" of
Machiavelli's "realism," and for the "reassertion of moral

courage and political justice" respectively.^' As Maritain

remarks, if "absolute Machiaveilianism triumphs over man
kind," it will be because of corruption "within a denigrat

ing civilization."^"
The notion that Machiavelli's Prince may be a satire,
however/ has not been fully explored, to my knowledge, by

Machiavelli scholars.

Rousseau and Gentillet acknowledged

that the work was not what it pretended to be.

Eric

Whelpton makes the point that we "cannot determine" whether
Machiavelli was "himself a Machiavellian," or "whether he

did not write The Prince as a satire on the errors of ty

rants instead of as a paean in praise of Cesare Borgia,"
having been "put on the rack for expressing his ideas too

freely," and having "served the republic of Florence with

great loyalty."^' Felix Gilbert and Quentin Skinner argue
that Machiavelli satirized and parodied "the humanists and

humanist literature.

Mark Hulliung observes, however, that

"Gilbert and Skinner stop short of communicating what
Machiavelli's

satire' ultimately meant; that the world-view

composed of Christian and Stoic values is to be not simply
criticized but actively crushed and replaced by an alterna

tive world view,
altogether.

which is to miss the point of his satire

Christian and Stoic values had already been

replaced to a large extent by the corrosive influence of
corruption, as evidenced in the actions and character of the

princes who ^^uled Italy in his time.

If Machiavelli

"crushed" traditional "Christian and Stoic values" in his

satire, it was to make the point that if the present trends

continued; Italy would be ruined.
The late Professor Garrelpt Mattingly, however, offered

a satirical perspective on Machiavelli's Prince in his

essay, "Machiavelli's Prince;

Political Science or Politi

cal Satire," that has been described as "a bold foray into

the region of Machiavelli studies, and from it [Mattingly]
emerged somewhat less bashed-up than most of us who have
ventured onto that dark and bloody ground of learning where

muddled armies clash by night.

Mattingly finds that the

Prince "imitates, almost parodies... the handbook of advice

to princes,

but more importantly, he suggests that it was

also "meant as a satire, as a taunt and challenge to the

Medici and a Tocsin to the people of Florence."'®

As a

result of his insight and scholarship, then, the battle

ground of Maohiavelli studies should be less "muddled" today

for his efforts.

In his inimitable way, Professor Mattingly

argues from the more obvious contradictions contained in the
Prince, those positions and pronouncements that not only

defy Machiavelli/s political principles, but his life and
character as well.

His essay thus constitutes a hallmark

contribution to future studies, in which the devious
Maohiavelli—long suspected but largely ignored—may at last
come to light.
Maohiavelli's intent in writing a satire was to issue a

critique of corruption and the men whose actions and influ
ence defined the quality of the times.

Many aspects of his

character and experience in political affairs suggest his
motivation for targeting the modern princes, who threatened

liberty and freedom across the Italian Peninsula.
Maohiavelli's preference for ancient modes and order rather
than modern practices is clearly stated in his works that
followed the Prince.

When considered together, the fraudu

lent nature of the Prince is exposed, in which he not only

mocks the aspirations of Italian princes, but his own polit
ical principles as well.
If truth is concealed in the artful rhetorical devices

of satire, it is made plain in its essence, in which the
satirist "perceives some absurdity inherent in the logic of
some position," and "draws the absurdity out and isolates

it, so that all can see it."^' I would argue that
8

Machiavelli attempted to isolate and magnify, for the bene
fit of those who understood, the abuse of power he witnessed

in his time, a reality he masked in the benign concept of

^effectual truth,' and ridiculed in the guise of sincerity—

a little pasquinade intended to amuse the few, but which
has, rather, adorned the pages of history and confounded the

many.

As Machiavelli cautioned in his play Clizia:
Oh you, whose lofty souls
Have barkened to our true though humble story.
Its message monitory
Recorded henceforth in your memory's rolls.

You now may know which goals
May rightly be pursued, and which to flee.
That we may go to heaven;
And 'neath the comic leaven
Were other truths too numerous for me

To tell now; so, kind audience, we pray
You reap the fruit you merit from our play.
Niccolo Machiavelli'38

PART I:

Chapter I.

Citizen Machiavelli and the Magnificent Medici

Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici

A satirical interpretation of the Prince is most com

pelling when one considers Machiavelli's life and character,
from which his motivation for turning to satire as a means

of voicing his political concerns can be discovered.

He

might have chosen to write a scathing diatribe against the
growing problem of political corruption (although at great

personal risk), or concentrated his efforts solely on the
Discourses on the First Ten Books on Titus Livius (hereafter
referred to as the Discourses), in which he instructed his

fellow Italians on the merits of democratic principles and
how to found and maintain a republic as an antidote to the
rising tide of tyranny—modeled on the Republic of Rome.

He

turned away from that work, however, to focus his attention
on the Medici who symbolized the ambition of modern princes
generally, the object of his contempt, who had contributed
so much to the loss of liberty and the destruction of peace
across the Peninsula.

The Medici not only destroyed the republican government

he had served faithfully for fourteen years, but humiliated
Machiavelli with imprisonment as well.

In the political

climate of 1513, however, the year he wrote the Prince, he
could not have attacked the tyranny of the Medici openly,
and thus he chose the path of his great predecessors,
Phaedrus, Horace, Juvenal, and others, who, because the

10

times were not amenable to their views, voiced their griev

ances in works that disguised their true motives.
The first hint that Machiavelli provides regarding the
true nature of the Prince is his dedication to the Medici.

Had he only intended a polite recognition of that family as
the first citizens of Florence, the dedication might be

considered extraneous to the body of the Prince and thus of

no particular significance in an interpretation of the work.
Two considerations stand in the way of that view, however.
The first is that Machiavelli's desire for employment from

the Medici is implied, which is not consistent with his

political views and character, thus raising the question of
his sincerity, which in turn reflects on the sincerity of
the work as a whole.

The second is that the Medici became an integral part
of the Prince as the designated beneficiaries of
Machiavelli's knowledge and advice, for the express purpose

of Giuliano or Lorenzo becoming the new prince, destined to

save Italy.

Yet neither Medici demonstrated sufficient

ability to merit Machiavelli's confidence in meeting such
expectations.

Nor was Machiavelli one to be fooled by

appearances, as a seasoned statesman with keen powers Of
observation.'

Machiavelli's dedication, then, was central to his

design—a unifying device that personalized his message and
enabled him to justify his precepts as necessary and urgent
11 ■

to the immediate circximstances of Italy.

Without it, his

satire would have lost much of the flavor and luster that

makes it such a pleasure to read, for lurking behind every

page is the image of the heroic Medici, including Cardinal
Giovanni who became Pope Leo X, taunted by Machiavelli to

emulate rascals of every stripe, in all manner of villainy;
a family that hardly needed instruction in the abuse of
power or how to acquire it.
Giuliano is the first Medici associated with the dedi

cation.

He was the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and

brother of Cardinal Giovanni.

Bearing the title Duke of

Nemours, he is described as having "much less ambition" than

his brother, the pope,^ who relied on Giuliano to run the
government of Florence on his behalf; "no longer able to
exercise direct rule on the Arno, he was obliged to choose a

Medici to serve as the visible head of the city."^

Giuliano

was soon removed as the pope's representative, however, "by

a lack of aptitude for dealing with Florentine affairs,"'*
and was permitted "to follow him to Rome and, apart from
occasionally evolving an ambitious plan for his brother, he

permitted Giuliano to live the obscure existence he pre
ferred."

In the opinion of Ferdinand Schevill, Giuliano

"was unfitted by temperament to play a political role in a
country so chaotic as Italy; and except for the fact that he

was a giracious aristocrat with many friends in the literary
and artistic circles... he cannot be said to have been much

12

of an asset to his family,"^ nor did he demonstrate requi
site ability in military affairs.
When Cardinal Giovanni became pope, Francesco Vettori,
the Florentine ambassador to Rome, remained in his position.
He and Machiavelli had become friends as diplomats serving

the Republic of Florence.

It is clear from the correspon

dence between them that Machiavelli first intended to dedi

cate the Prince to Giuliano.

In a letter to Vettori (Decem

ber 10, 1513), Machiavelli referred to this "little work of
mine that I have spoken of, whether it is good to give it or

not to give it, whether it would be good to take it myself
or whether I should send it there.

Not giving it would make

me fear that at the least Giuliano will not read it, and

that this rascal Ardinghelli will get himself honor from

this latest work of mine."®

Scholars are in general agree

ment that Machiavelli first intended that the work be dedi

cated to Giuliano, whether or not he ever had any intention

of actually presenting it to him.

There is no evidence that

it was presented to Giuliano before his death in March,
1516, nor is there evidence that Machiavelli ever had "kind

words, if not favors, from Giuliano."'
Precisely when the dedication was changed to Lorenzo
de' Medici, Duke of Urbino and grandson of Lorenzo the

Magnificent, is not known.

Roberto Ridolfi estimates that

the earliest possible date for the change is September,

1515, and no later than September, 1516,* as Lorenzo re
13

ceived the title of Duke of Urbino October 8, 1516, and the

dedication "does not address him with the title of Dvike, and

uses Magnificence, not Excellence."' L. Arthur Burd sug
gests that Machiavelli may have "selected Lorenzo" before
Giuliano's death, having discovered that Giuliano did not
intend to devote himself to a military career and when he

became better acquainted with his character...,"^" but for
the purpose of satire, Giuliano was a perfect candidate for
his dedication and until his death, there was no particular

reason to change it, precisely for the reasons given by
Burd.

Lorenzo was chosen to represent Leo as a member of the

ruling family of Florence, as Giuliano had been, "designated

by the unwritten law of succession."" In a letter to
Vettori, August, 1513, Machiavelli describes Lorenzo in most
excellent terms, alluding to qualities of humility and

decorum; "though we see there much splendor and liberality,
nonetheless he does not abandon his life as a citizen.

Thus, in all his movements, outside and inside, nothing is
seen that offends anybody or is to be censored; at which

everybody appears to be much pleased."

In his closing

remarks, however, we are provided with a sideward glance
into Machiavelli's humorous and often caustic observations

as he observes of Lorenzo, "And although I know from many

you can learn this same thing, I have chosen to describe it,
SO that from my account of it you can get that pleasure that

14

comes to all the rest of us, who continually experience

it^iii2

Thus, Machiavelli probably viewed Lorenzo in much the

same way as did many of his contemporaries; although he is
remembered by historians as the father of Catherine, who
married King Henry II of France, he is not distinguished by

any noteworthy accomplishments.

The Florentines had no

particular fondness for him; "Unpopular in the city because
of his behavior," he lived "the last years of his life...
surrounded by a few trusted advisors like a prince, and

would have liked to make himself absolute master" if Pope

Leo had not "held in check" his behavior."

Further, Roberto

Ridolfi describes him as a "degenerate" in whom Machiavelli

had "no hope" of gaining "affection" or "favor."*'*

The

astute Machiavelli would not have failed to perceive
Lorenzo's true character, and the implications of his rule
for the future governing of Florence.
Lorenzo "had himself elected captain general of the

Florentines in May, 1515,"" and "thereafter he had become
increasingly authoritarian, requiring councils to meet in
the Medici palace rather than in public places of govern
ment, rejecting the advice of the more moderate and experi
enced citizens while surrounding himself with young dandies

as subservient as courtiers.""

With an eye toward a "uni

fied state," Pope Leo and Lorenzo attacked the Duke of
Urbino in 1516, the same duke that had sheltered Giuliano

during the long Medici exile (1494-1512).
15

Giuliano begged

[Leo] not to attack the duke "before his death.

Lorenzo

took Urbino easily, but "less than a year later... the Duke
returned with Spanish troops... the short but arduous cam

paigns in the mountainous districts of Urbino cost the
Florentines and the Pope a great deal of money... and re
sulted in Lorenzo's being so badly wounded by arquebus, that

he was gradually to waste away in body and will,"'® although
his "enemies" would charge that his death, in 1519, was the
result of his "numerous vices."'®

Most scholars do not question Lorenzo's ability, that
merit which qualifies him as a credible liberator of Italy.

Quite the contrary.

Some critics have devised a meahs of

explaining the highly charged rhetoric of chapter twentysix, the exhortation to seize Italy, by linking the composi

tion of that chapter to the later dedication to Lorenzo.
The added benefit of this interpretation is that it elimi
nates the need to reconcile Giuliano's lack of interest and

ability in undertaking such an enterprise.

At least of

Lorenzo, it can be said that he craved power; "for many

critics, a gap of some years between the composition of the
first twenty-five chapters and the writing of the last

chapter supports the conviction that Machiavelli had one set
of purposes in mind when he wrote the body of the work in
1513 and then, in different circumstances and for quite

different purposes, altered its character by adding the
passionate last chapter with its call for liberation and
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redemption."^" Mario Martelli makes the point that "the
sections of the text... that call fpr liberation... could

only have been written with Lorenzo—and not his Uncle

Giuliano—in mind, and that the only moment in which such an
appeal would have been justified by circumstances was the
second half of 1518, when, according to some contemporary

accounts, Lorenzo contemplated the transformation of his
still largely unofficial rule in Florence into a formal
principate.
There is no evidence to support the notion that chapter
twenty-six Was written separately and after 1513, however,
to accommodate Machiavelli's dedication to Lorenzo.

The

problem that these critics are really addressing is how to
reconcile chapter twenty-six, "the opposite of a scientific

or detached work"^^ because of its biblical language and
emotional demagoguery, with a scientific treatise, which the
Prince is thought to be by most scholars.

And if chapter

twenty-six was an integral part of the work from the begin

ning, and there is no documentation to suggest otherwise,
then Machiavelli's intent would appear to be consistent in
both dedications.

To these Medici, then, Machiavelli dedicated his
Prince.

In Giuliano, and then Lorenzo, he placed his confi

dence for seizing and uniting Italy.

Even if we grant the

desirability of such action, which is improbable given

Machiavelli's distaste for "the rule of priests"^ (repre
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sented in Pope Leo as head of the family), the enterprise
demanded extraordinary military virtue, leadership ability,
and political acumen.

As Garrett Mattingly observes, howev

er, "Who could really believe that the lazy, insipid
Giuliano or his vicious successor were the liberators Italy

awaited?"^

The effect of the dedication, therefore, was to

mock and ridicule the ineptness of Giuliano and the arrogant

and pretentious nature of Lorenzo, and in this aspect
Machiavelli was quite brutal, for he not only revealed his

contempt for the Medici, but effectively associated them
with the tyrannical qualities of his new prince.
Before turning to the subject of Machiavelli's charac

ter and background (and that of the Medici in so far as one
had an effect upon the other), I would make the point that

when the Prince is read as satire, the problems concerning
inclusion of chapter twenty-six are resolved, and the work
flows from the dedication forward as one entity, each part

dependant on its precedent, a perfect crescendo of irony
upon irony that virtually explodes in condemnation, a su
preme mockery of pretense to power in the great abyss of
corrupt Italian political life.
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Chapter II.

Machiavelli and the Republic of Florence

Allan Gilbert suggests that Machiavelli's desire to
serve the Medici can be explained by observing the operative
modes of American political parties.

"What blame at present

would be laid upon a career diplomat who retained his posi
tion when a Republican regime in Washington gave way to a

Democratic one?

Machiavelli's situation was similar,"^

In

fact, Machiavelli's situation was entirely dissimilar,

unless one can imagine the Democrats returning to Washington
in the train of foreign arms, flying the papal banner, and

prepared to alter the constitution to the benefit of their
faction.

The tendency of historians to minimize this impor

tant issue, the issue of Machiavelli's convictions, iis

puzzling unless, of course, it must be minimized to justify
his apparent lack of conviction, if being a republican meant
anything at all to him, in his hasty capitulation to the
Medici with no.evidence of conscionable objection.
Nor was the return of the Medici, in 1512, without
extreme violence.

Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, in accor

dance with the terms generated in the Congress of the League

of Mantua (August, 1512), was to be reinstated as ruler in
Florence, with the aid of the Holy League and Pope Julius

11," the author of Machiavelli's long misfortunes,"^ who
wanted to "subdue the Florentines... determined not to rest

while the city remained under the rule of Soderini," Gon

faloniere of the republic.^

Soderini refused to join the
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League in ousting the French from Italy.

With the fall of

Prato, just ten miles from Florence, the republic was forced
to admit defeat.

The ensuing carnage was described by

Machiavelli as "an appalling spectacle of horrors,"^ all the
more so as Machiavelli's militia, the principle defenders of

Prato, ran "as though the enemy had jumped on their backs.

The Spaniards went on an unholy rampage, "killing priests at
their alters, ransacking churches, burning monasteries,
breaking into convents," while "the people of Prato were
tortured to disclose the hiding places of their treasure

chests; then they were killed, stripped of their clothes,
and their naked bodies flung into ditches or wells already
chocked with limbs."®

Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici wit

nessed the carnage' and commented in a report to Pope Julius
that the sack was "... not without some bloodshed as could

not be avoided... the capture of Prato so speedily and

cruelly achieved, although it has given me some pain, will
at least have the good effect of serving as an example and a
deterrent to others."®
"Cardinal Giovanni made a ceremonial entrance into

Florence on September 14..." and within two days, was ap

proached by his partisans "to change the government."' On
September 16, "a parliament was called, and with the Medi
cean mercenaries holding all the entrances to the piazza and
letting only Medician adherents pass... a balia to ^reform'

the state was accepted by acclamation."^" The balia, or
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parliament, was "so thoroughly detested by the advocates of
a free regime" that is had been "outlawed in the days of

Savonarola..""

Force Was required to return to this "ban

ished institution," and the committees consisted of forty-

five members (later increased to sixty-five), all trusty
Medicians hand-picked by the Cardinal," which "went about
its business of destroying the republic with the greatest
good will," including the abolition of "numerous character
istic features of the constitution, more particularly the
democratic Grand Council... and Machiavelli's militia... not

because it had proved a poor prop of the State, but that it
represented a concession to popular principles.
Machiavelli was responsible for having persuaded the repub
lic to establish a militia to protect the liberty of Flor

ence "from conquest in a voracious political world."" In
his own words, "For that liberty I believe you will have
such regard as they always have had who are born free and

hope to live free.""
From a historical perspective, the events of 1512
define a long struggle for power going back many centuries.

The political ideals that divided the Florentines emerged
from "... two myths of origin that were in theory incompati

ble but in fact intertwined in the popular imagination:

the

myth of an imperial past and the myth of a republican past.
The latter was associated with the city's link to republican

Rome, the former with its almost miraculous restoration by
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the Emperor Charlemagne."^^

The myth of a republican past

was advanced early in the fifteenth-century by "several

Florentine humanists, principally Leonardo Bruni and Coluc

cio Salutati."^®

They offered "the notion that Florence had

enjoyed at its foundation a republican form of government...
a colony of pre-imperial, republican Rome, and from this
they concluded that its first government had been by repre
sentation rather than despotic."

Further, as a "government

responsible to the people," the "Florentine constitution,
which stressed ius and libertas was not the product of
generations of political struggle, but the simple birthright

of all citizens of the city.
The imperial myth was "chronologically older and also
the more popular... fused with the related notion of a

return to the past, especially of empire as a recurring
phenomenon and therefore in some sense, a continuous enti

ty."^* "Colonized by the Romans in the time of Julius
Caesar," Florence was destroyed by Totila, and then "rebuilt

by the Romans," assisted by Charlemagne, "thus associating
independent Florence with Charlemagne," which "probably
reflected the rise of Angevine power in Italy during the

previous two centuries."

In the fourteenth century, the

"Second Charlemagne prophecies" appeared, "predicting a new
Empire under a new French King Charles," which "foresaw that

the King would descend into Italy, renew its political and
cultural life, and eventually conquer the holy land," fol

lowed, in "the fifteenth century," by the "Brigette Prophe

cy," which "substantially repeats these assertions, and, in
a postscript to one manuscript, declares that this war of
liberation will occur between 1460 and 1470."^'
Preference for the imperial myth, in Florence, "was

exploited by the Medici who demonstrated their enthusiasm
for an imperialistic rather than a republican culture by
their sponsorship of various festivals that took place in

the city on great feast days."^"

Further, Medici ambition to

"dominate Italy" through unification "in the form of a

Tuscan Empire" dates back to "Cosimo de' Medici,

grandfa

ther of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and great-grandfather of
Cardinal Giovanni, restored to power in 1512.

If the myth

of imperialism embraced prophecies Of empire and kings, the

republican myth, in contrast, is reflected in Machiavelli's
view that the Romans of the republic "were enemies to the
very name of King and lovers of glory and of the common good
of their country.

The two myths coalesced to some extent as the Medici
began to consolidate their power during the fifteenth^cent
ury; "Despite a constitution that appeared to allow for

representative government, decisions affecting the life of
the city were, in the first half of the century, always (and

increasingly) the prerogative of the citizens whose finan

cial affairs had flourished."^

The form of government that

proceeded from a republican foundation had, as its end, the
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notion of common benefit, liberty, and faith in the citizens

to govern, while that which proceeded from the imperial
ideal sought consolidation of power and the promotion of

self-interest to achieve its end, empire.

Thus, while the

"Medici supporters... could comprehend a party love founded

on self-interest,"^ which leads to factionalism and strife,
Machiavelli contends that "it is not the well being of
individuals that makes cities great, but the well being of
the community; and it is beyond question that it is only in

republics that the common good is looked to properly in that
all that promotes it is carried out; and, however much this

or that private person may be the loser on that account,
there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good

can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in conse
quence." (II. 2, 275)—Machiavelli "always inclined with all
his heart to the popular state, and this inclination he long
nourished on the deeds of Republican Rome, the only Rome he
ever loved.

In Citizen Machiavelli, Mark. Hulliung makes the point
that "today, almost no one doubts [Hans] Baron's contention

that Machiavelli was fundamentally a republican in his

political outlook."^®

Garrett Mattingly refers to Alberico

Gentili, as far back as the reign of Elizabeth I, "An Ital
ian who lectured on the civil law at Oxford," who said of

Machiavelli, "He has been much calumniated and deserves our

sympathy.

He was, indeed, a praiser of democracy (Democrat
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iae la.uda.tor) and its most zealous champion.

Born, educat

ed, and honored with office in a republic, he was a supreme

foe of tyrants.

It was his purpose not to instruct tyrants

but to reveal their secret machinations, stripping them bare

before their suffering people... he aimed to instruct the

people under the pretext of instructing the prince, hoping

that thus his teaching might be tolerated."^'
Perhaps Machiavelli's most important contribution to
modern political thought is the Discourses, which provide an
important link from the Roman republic to the present in the
evolution of republican government.

In his introduction to

the Discourses, Bernard Crick describes Machiavelli as one

whose "main substantial preoccupation, indeed his good
obsession, was with the condition for republican government.

The republic to him was the best of all possible worlds, and
he tried to show that it had to be and could be, not merely

should be, remarkably tolerant of internal conflicts and
dissent.

Not merely does he have a coherent theory of the

condition for republican rule, but in many vital respects it
is more fully worked out than Aristotle—and there is no
rival in between."^®

Machiavelli's republicanism should not be viewed as a
quiescent intellectual construct, however, for he demon

strated his commitment by fully participating in the gov

ernment of the republic.

The Machiavelli were "an old

Florentine family, noted for their devotion to the republic.
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In the two centuries before Niccold was born, they had given

Florence twelve gonfaloniere and fifty'^four priors
Mattingly refers to Francesco Machiav^lli, who said in a
public speech, "It is freedom that makes cities and their
citizens great.
desolation.

This is well known.

Tyranny makes only

For Tyrants must always fear good citizens and

try to exterminate them."^° Mattingly contends that "Niccolo
made this assertion one of the central theses of his Dis

courses, thus prolonging the family tradition in which he
was brought up nearly one hundred years later.
Another Machiavelli, Girolamo, is mentioned by Niccold

in the History, in connection with the corrupt government
(of Cosimo) in 1458:

"So when the government had been^ taken

over and the balia and then the chief magistrates elected

according to the desire of the few, in order with terror to

give a beginning to the government which they had set up by
force, they banished Messer Girolamo Machiavelli with some
others, and also deprived many of their offices.

Thus

Messer Girolamo, who did not keep the rules of his banish
ment, was declared a rebel, and as he went traveling around

Italy, stirring up the princes against his own city, he was
arrested in Lunigiana through the treachery of one of those

lords; being taken to Florence, he was put to death in
prison.
Machiavelli married Marietta di Ludovico Corsini in

August, 1501.

They had six children, four sons and two
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daughters.

Two of his sons were involved in liberation

enterprises.

Ludovico was killed defending Florence in the

long siege of 1530,^^ which ended the heroic but short~lived
Republic of Florence, reconstituted in 1527 following the

sack of Rome by the imperial forces of Charles V of Spain,
and the subsequent expulsion of the Medici from Florence.

Another son, Piero, together with Gerolamo Muzio, "proposed
liberation projects to the Medici dukes of Tuscany," which
were impossible to implement "in pre-1494 terms, but had to

be seen in the perspective of great powers."^
Machiavelli's republicanism, then, was well established
within the traditions of his family, a tradition that had

historical significance in the city of Florence.

Evidence

of his own devotion to the democratic principles that define
that tradition resides in his enthusiastic and selfless

years of service to the government of the Republic of Flor
ence, from 1498 to 1512, as secretary of the Second Chan

cery.

A chronological review of his many activities in

that capacity is not pertinent to the question of his intent
in writing the Prince, but certain points should be made
I

with regard to his participation in that government.
The first is that Machiavelli did not participate in
the government of the Medici, terminated in 1494, nor that

of the Savonarolan period, which ended with the friars'
execution in 1498.

In fact, nothing is known about his

life, prior to 1498, with the exception of certain informa
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tion regarding his education, found in a diary kept by his

father, Bernardo.^®

If it mattered little to Machiavelli

what master he served, one would expect to find him seeking

employment in some capacity in the city prior to 1498, at
almost thirty years of age.

As Nicolai Rubinstein suggests,

"it is unlikely that he would have been elected in June 1498

by the Great Council to the post of Second Chancellor, if he
had been known as an adherent of or sympathizer with the
Medici.

The more so as he had no professional qualities to

recommend him for this post, as was, for instance, the case
of Alessandro Braccesi, his predecessor as Second Chancel

lor, who was a notary and had served in the Chancery at
least since 1479."^'

As there is no evidence to affirm that

Machiavelli attempted to gain employment from the Medici,
and reason to doubt that he would have been inclined to do

so, it seems probable that he did not.

Despite Savonarola's theocratic inclinations, he was a

"democratic champion,"^* who, "in a succession of fiery ser
mons... declared in favor of the democratic principle as
represented in the Grand Council" which resulted in a new

constitution in 1494.^^

Savonarola, however, looked to King

Charles VIII of France (whose invasion of the peninsula in

1494 precipitated the slow decline of Italy over the next
half-century) as the savior of Italy, to "reform the church

which lies prostrate on the ground," and "to cure the ills

of Italy," which resonates a lot like the Florentine myth of
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imperialism and its prophecies of a savior king, although
Savonarola was not a monarchist.

Schevill alludes to this

prospect when he suggests that Savonarola might "have re
duced this imaginary Charlemagne to the simpleton that he
was," had his "inner voices" not interfered with his ap

praisal of Charles VIII.

Machiavelli may, as Allan Gilbert

observes, have realized Sayonarola's "capacity as a politi
cal thinker and practical statesman" while he "deplored his

partisan violence, his egotism, his reliance on histrionic

effect, [and] his mixture of the ecclesiastical with the

political.""*^

Machiavelli would indeed have disliked the

Frate's partisanship which lead, in his opinion, to disorder
and ruin in a republic.

His tolerance of conflict and

dissent, as indicated by Bernard Crick aboye, should be
understood within the context of lawful restraint, for in
the larger framework of Italian city-states, Machiavelli
warns that warring factions turn to arms, "overthrow the

laws," and "those who are deprived of their offices [then]

turn to foreign arms.""*^

In discussing party strife in

Florence, Machiavelli states that "the enmities in Florence

were always those of factions and therefore always danger

ous."'*^

Thus, Savonarola's factionalism and theocratic

tendencies offer sufficient cause for Machiavelli not to

have become involved in the partisan disputes of that peri

od, which ultimately led to Savonarola's death, although the
inauguration of the new government, in 1498, opened the door
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of opportunity for him.
I

.

■

As I mentioned above, another important consideration
was the creation of Machiavelli's militia, for which he
fought hard in principle.

It was customary in Italy to

fight battles with mercenary and/or auxiliary troops, as he
criticizes at great length in his works.

"The idea of a

citizen army was so alien to the Florentine mind after a

lapse of nearly two centuries, as to appear extravagant and
fantastic,

yet Machiavelli succeeded in securing funding

for the militia in April, 1503.''^

He was "the first to make

political theory of the national militia, the first to give
it practical application with regular levies and stable

ordinances under the control of a government official."'^
Machiavelli was made secretary of the Nine, who were in

charge of the newly formed militia, and Cardinal Francesco
Soderini (brother of Piero Soderini, gonfalonieri) wrote to

Machiavelli in praise of his efforts; "We do not believe
that in Florence anything as worthy and well-founded as this
has been done for some long time in defense of its new
freedom, ^a divine gift not a product of men.'

In the

spring of 1509, with Machiavelli "substantially in charge,

the Florentine militia, combined with mercenary forces,
recovered Pesa after fifteen years of turmoil for the Repub

lic of Florence.

There was great celebration over the

victory in Florence, an honorable triumph for Machiavelli.
In Schevill's judgment, the "Florentine republic reached its
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apogee" the day Pisa surrendered, and "the statement applies

with equal force to the publiq career of Niccold
Machiavelli.

That the militia failed, in 1512, when

confronting the Spaniards at Prato, was undoubtedly a grave
disappointment for Machiavelli, but it should be recalled
that the Spaniards were seasoned veterans of war, while the

militia was comprised primarily of peasant stock, "a serious
flaw" in the opinion of Schevill, as it "cut down" the

number of men, and "excused from a primary obligation of

patriotism the very people who were the masters of state and

its leading beneficiaries."^®

Machiavelli's interest in

military affairs never diminished over the years.

In 1521,

he wrote The Art of War, the only one of his major works
that was published during his lifetime.
There was one Medici to whom Machiavelli might have
dedicated the Prince with probity—Giovanni delle Bande

Nere, great-great-grandson of Giovanni di Bicci (as was Pope
Leo).

From a secondary line Of the Medici family, Giovanni

was married to Lorenzo the Magnificent's granddaughter.
Suggesting that the people of Florence wanted Giovanni as

their general,'^ Machiavelli lavishly praised him in 1526 for
his warrior ability, praise he was not willing to grant to
Giuliano or Lorenzo, whose military ability was significant

ly inferior.

Of Giovanni, Machiavelli writes "I believe

anyone who believes that among the Italians there is no
leader whom the soldiers would more gladly follow, and whom
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the Spanish more fear and respect; everybody also thinks
that Lord Giovanni is bold, prompt, has great ideas, is a
maker of great plans.

When Machiavelli wrote the Prince,

in 1513, Giovanni was only fifteen years old.

However,

after the death of Lorenzo (1519), he was twenty-one, and in

1521, had "distinguished himself" in the battle at Vauri.^^
Machiavelli could have changed the dedication once again
following Lorenzo's death, calling upon this young Medici of

great promise, had he really intended that anyone from that
family should be called upon as liberator of Italy.

It is

ironic that this Medici, Giovanni, is the ancestor of those

Medici who later became the grand-dukes of Tuscany under
Spanish hegemony.
Machiavelli's missions as a Florentine diplomat extend
ed to the courts of kings, princes, popes, and condotteri in

the field.

In his position as envoy, he was sent to "ob

serve and report" his findings.^

In 1500, he made his first

trip to France, followed by others in 1504, 1510 and 1511.
He was sent to Cesare Borgia's camp in 1502, where he wit
nessed "the bloody vengeance taken by Cesare on his mutinous

captains at the town of Sinigaglia,

and visited Borgia

once again in 1503, following the death of his father. Pope
Alexander VI, which precipitated Cesare's demise.

In 1507,

he traveled to Germany to the court of Maximilian I, Holy

Roman Emperor.

In Montefiascone, Machiavelli "recorded

without comment" the words of Pope Julius II, who "talked of
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delivering Italy from servitude and out of the hands of the

French," strange words from Pope Julius," who had himself
contributed so much to bringing theni into the Country, and
was indeed ^the fatal instrument of the ills of Italy.

On a visit to Rome, in 1503, Machiavelli was given to under

stand that he should "pretend not to see" Cardinal Giovanni

de' Medici," which he observed.
During the Savonarola period and the republican govern
ment which followed (1494-1512), the Medici were in exile.
Piero de Medici's surrender of Florence, in 1494, to Charles

VIII, which humiliated and angered the Florentines, ulti

mately led to the Medici fall from power.

During his exile,

Piero "renjained in Italy... offering his services to the

republic's enemies, making repeated attempts to reinstate
himself in Florence by force, joining forces with Cesare
Borgia... who hoped that by re-establishing the Medici in
Florence he would make a valuable ally for himself in Tus

cany," although the "Florentines were not in the least dis

posed to favor a Medician restoration under Piero's leader

ship."" Piero drowned in the Gargliano River while serving
with French forces, "the worthless Piero [who] had never

ceased to harass the republic either by joining with its

enemies or by plots of his own devising.""
After Piero's death, the "Medici interests" passed to
Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano.

The cardinal spent most of

his time in Rome, while Giuliano ''found shelter and hospi
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tality at the court of Guidobaldo de Montefeltre,
Urbino, as mentioned above.

in

With the return of the Medici

to Florence in 1512, Machiavelli's career came to a close,

nor could he have expected more, for "if he were under the
illusion of still living in times when his good sense and

the style of his writings could bring him praise and favor,

[he] was soon to be disillusioned," for the Medici could
"not forget the coldness he had shown them—as indeed he was
obliged to do-^-as exiles in the courts of Rome and France.

Besides, they had their own creatures to reward.""
Unlike the families of Francesco Guicciardini and

Francesco Vettori, Machiavelli had no past association with

the Medici from which he might expect consideration for

continued employment, which they obtained.

Peiro Soderini

fled the city under duress, but Machiavelli remained.
Perhaps he thought his reputation as statesman would protect
him from his adversaries, the Medici faction and others

opposed to the republic.

Of this uncertain time,

Machiavelli does not inform us of his expectations.
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Chapter III.

Machiavelli:

Honest and Good

On November 10, 1512, the Signoria restricted

Machiavelli to Florentine territory for one year.

His

dismissal "was to mean blame, punishment, revenge... ," for
he was fined one thousand gold florins, "a huge sum," which

he managed to find with the help of "three friends."*
Machiavelli had not sought wealth or personal advantage
while in office.
come.

His expenses had often exceeded his in

On one of his missions to France, he "lacked funds

even to send urgent letters by special messenger,"^ and
while at Imola, his private "capital was diminishing, as he
had to spend for his own honor, and that of the republic,

more than he^earned."^

As Garrett Mattingly reminds us, "He

has left proof of his devotion ih the record of his activi

ties and in the state papers in which he spun endless
schemes for the defense and aggrandizement of the republic,
and constantly preached the same to his superiors... after

fourteen years in high office, in a place where the opportu

nities for dipping into the public purse and into the pock
ets of his compatriots and of those foreigners he did busi
ness with were practically unlimited... Machiavelli retired

from public life as poor as when he had entered it... if

this was not a unique feat in his day, it was a very rare
one.

Most profound, however, is Machiavelli's own testimony

to his character, shared with Francesco Vettori in a letter,
35

December 10, 1513; "And of my honesty, there should be no

doubt, because having always preserved my honesty, I should

hardly now learn to break it; and he who has been honest and

good for forty-three years, as I have, cannot change his

nature; and as witness to my honesty and goodness, I have my
poverty.
On November 17, 1512, Machiavelli was forbidden to "set

foot for twelve months in that palazzo where he had done so
much for fourteen years," although he was required to return

to settle "accounts" regarding pay for the battalions which

had fought at Prato.®

His former position in government was

taken by Nicolo Michelozzi, "former secretary of the Medici
who now served and spied on the Signoria... for their bene

fit."' Could Machiavelli possibly have desired such employ
ment, as a subservient lackey to the Medici?

Except for the

pressure of need, collusion with the Medici seems altogether
improbable, and need had not caused him to flinch in his

principles or accommodate himself or his family at the ex
pense of his integrity for the previous fourteen years.
Machiavelli, who advised Cardinal Giovanni to "adopt a

wise and politic magnanimity" toward those who had confis
cated property from the Medici in 1494 (advice that was not

heeded),* who had seen the "Great Council abolished" and
with it the "system of magistrates and all the popular
liberties," and, above all, who saw the "nine in charge of
the militia" dismissed and the "military organization" he
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had "created... dissolved,"® this Machiavelli, scholars ask
us to believe, then began, in his leisure, to contemplate a
little manuscript calling upon the oppressors of Florence to

extend their oppression to all of Italy!

There is no logi-^

cal reason for Machiavelli to abandon every defining notion
/

we have about him as a man or as a political servant of the

Republic of Florence that he loved. "... he is not among
those who exert themselves to flatter and court the new

powers, nor among those who, as he will shortly write,

prostitute themselves to the people and the Medici... .'"i®
Considering the events that transpired through Decem
ber, 1512, it is difficult to imagine that Machiavelli put
forward the principles he expounds in the Prince with sin

cerity and earnest desire for service in such a government.
His imprisonment which followed should serve to eradicate

any lingering doubt, but scholars tend to dismiss that as

well, having accepted the Prince as a work of integrity
unencumbered by the other reality, so often ignored, that

the Prince "has to contend not only against Machiavelli's

life but against his writings as, of course, everyone who
wants to use The Prince as a centerpiece in an exposition of

Machiavelli's political thought has recognized."'^
Machiavelli's arrest and imprisonment prompted the last
defining experience, the last direct association he had with

the Medici government before he began, in his exile, to

write the Discourses on republican government, and the
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Prince, perhaps the most concise repository of tyrannical
precepts ever written, a reflection of the times and the

vile contempt for liberty and freedom that had destroyed the
Republic of Florence.
Machiavelli's arrest resulted from a conspiracy plot
against Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano de' Medici, perpe

trated by two Florentines, Pietro Paolo Boscoli and Agostino
Capponi.

Many Florentines at that time probably still

remembered the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478, which resulted in

the death of Giuliano, the brother of Lorenzo the Magnifi
cent, who barely escaped-death himself.

Even Machiavelli

may have had faint memories of that event, which occurred
when he was nine years old.

Unfortunately for Machiavelli,

his implication in the present conspiracy would occasion new
trials and difficulties.

The plot was discovered in February, 1513, when "a

paper containing a list of eighteen or twenty names, written
by Pietro Paolo Boscoli, a well-known enemy of the Medici,

[was] found by chance in the house of the Lenzi family, who

were related to the Soderini; it [was] taken to the Otto di
Balia; Boscoli and his friend Agostino Capponi [were] ar
rested."'^

The liet contained "names of some friends whom

they knew or considered to be enemies of the Medici... the
only ones they had approached were Niccolo Valari and

Giovanni Folchi, who received them coldly... the Eight did
not hesitate to have all the people mentioned in the list
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arrested.

The seventh name was Niccolo Machiavelli.

Niccolo Valari was godfather to one of Machiavelli's child

ren/'* and he and Machiavelli had served in government to

gether in 1502.*^

Machiavelli dedicated his Tercets On
\"

Ingratitude Or Envy to Giovanni Folchi (written between 1507
and 1515)

Machiavelli, then, had close acquaintance with

three of the four conspirators mentioned above.

Only Capponi and Boscbli admitted their guilt, stating

"they had wanted to assassinate the Cardinal or, according

to others, Giuliano."*' Machiavelli may have had no interest
in entering into a conspiracy against the Medici, but clear
ly Boscoli, who created the list of names, had reason to
think that he might have.

The arresting officers did not find Machiavelli at
home, and it is a matter of speculation whether he was
warned and thought of "hiding", or was simply away at the
i

.

■

,

,

time; "A proclamation was issued ^calling for anyone who
knew him' to denounce him within the hour under pain of

being declared a rebel and forfeiting his goods."**
Machiavelli came forward, and was placed under arrest;

"They could find nothing against him except some acquain
tance with Boscoli, his friendship with Valori and Folschi,

and certain jibes with which he probably repaid the Medici

for some of the harm they had done him in recent months."*'
Nevertheless, Machiavelli was subjected to the pain and
humiliation of torture which, if not to be relied upon for
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discovering the truth, does measure the resolve, courage,

and strength of its victim.

"Four drops on the rope were

usually enough to subdue any body and spirit, and if they

did not suffice, the torture went on even though their hands
were dislocated and their flesh torn.

Niccolo had six

drops

He was returned to

and he confessed nothing.

his cell, to wait.

On February 22,

just before dawn," his friends,

Boscoli and Capponi, were led to the scaffold, to the sound
of funeral hymns.

On March 7, the trials ended.

Valori

and Folschi were "sentenced to two years imprisonment in the

dungeons of Volterra,

and Machiavelii was fined.^

He wait

ed, "needing only the money to buy back his freedom."^
In the meantime. Pope Julius died February 21, and

Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici was elected pope on March 11,
taking the name of Leo X.

The celebrations continued in

Florence for five days, each Florentine "thinking of the

honour and profit which could be expected in public and
private affairs from a pope who was a fellow-citizen and

lavish in spending and giving."^

In the spirit of the occa

sion, "the prisons were opened," and Machiavelii was set

free, his "fine and prison sentence being entirely remit
ted."^®

Virtually no scholars question Machiavelii's innocence
in this conspiracy.

approached.

It is not known whether or not he was

The fact that he withstood torture, however,
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does not prove or disprove his guilt or innocence, and the

appearance of his name on the list of potential conspirators

raises questions that, unfortunately, cannot be answered.
Had this been the only conspiracy implicating Machiavelli,
one could more readily dismiss it, but there was another, in

1522, against Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, the illegitimate

son of Giuliano (who was stabbed to death in the Pazzi
conspiracy, 1478)

who later became Pope Clement VII fol

lowing the death of Pope Leo, in May, 1521, and Leo's suc
cessor, Pope Adrian VI, who died in 1523.

Cardinal Giulio granted the opportunity for Florentines
to submit proposals for the reform of their government.

"It

was a clever way of investigating people's thoughts and
discovering what ambitions were fermenting in certain Flor

entine minds,

or perhaps his intentions were sincere;

reflecting a concern for the future governing of Florence,

as no legitimate heirs remained in the Medici line.^'
Meanwhile, many proposals had been submitted to the

Cardinal.

Among them was a plan formerly presented to Pope

Leo by Machiavelli, A Discourse on Remodeling the Government

of Florence, written about 1526,^" which involved "a return
to the popular state to be governed by the Medici during the
cardinal's lifetime, and thereafter to be free.

As late

as 1522, then, Machiavelli continued as an advocate of

Florentine liberty, despite his failure to persuade Le(j5 to
adopt such a plan.

Further, he had obtained his commission
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from Pope Leo, in 1520, to write the History, reflecting a
modicum of favor from the Medici which, if Machiavelli

really.desired it, one would expect he would not compromise
with the flagrant pursuit of republican principles.

Yet, he

continued to press for such reforms.

When it became evident that Giulio was evading reform,
a conspiracy to assassinate him was planned and subsequently
discovered, a conspiracy that "was to be one of the expedi

tious ways of reforming the state.

Zanobi Buondelmonte

(to whom Machiavelli's Discourses are dedicated, with Cosimo
Rucellai) and Luigi Alamanni, "Machiavelli's two greatest

friends," were the primary conspirators, although several
others were involved.

"It was a gloomy prospect for

Niccolo, who was one of their friends and a reputed former

conspirator against the Medici.

Worse still, Buondelmonte

was supposed to have mentioned his name to one of the accom

plices, among those of several citizens, whom it was suggest

ed should be invited to join the plot."^' The accomplice ad
vised against it, because in his view, as "Machiavelli was a
poor man and known not to be a great friend of the Medici,

he would not be able to do the things they wanted without

arousing suspicion."^'' It is not known whether Machiavelli
ever knew of the plot, but it would seem that if anyone
could be said to have understood Machiavelli's mind and his

inclinations, it would have been these old republican
friends of many years.
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Buondelmonte and Alamanni fled.

conspirators were beheaded.

Two of the other

In 1526, it was learned by the

Medici government that Machiavelli might have been implicat
ed in this conspiracy, by mention of his name, but "a lot of
water had flowed under the Arno bridge in the meantime,
and nothing was ever proven.

In any case, Machiavelli was more inclined, it seems to
me, to use his literary gifts to attack his enemies, which
is evident not only in his satire in the Prince, but also in
his sonnets to Giuliano de' Medici, written perhaps in the

spring or summer of 1513, when Machiavelli emerged from

prison.

Machiavelli began his correspondence with Francisco

Vettori at this time, in which he makes reference to

Giuliano.

In his first letter (March 13), he informed

Vettori that he was released from prison ••amid the universal

rejoicing of this city, even though I hoped for it because
of your doings and those of Pagolo, for which I thank you.
I won't go over the long story of my misfortune, but will

merely say Luck has done everything to cause me this trou
ble.

Yet, thanks be to God!

It is over.

I hope I won't

run intd it again, both because I shall be more careful and
because the times will be more liberal and not so suspi

cious."^®

The words ••even thbugh" suggest that Machiavelli

did not attribute his release to the efforts of the

Vettoris, and his statement "I shall be more careful" inti

mates that he was, perhaps, not careful enough in the past,
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either in his associations, or in his remarks regarding the

Medici government if, in fact, he was not involved in the
conspiracy.
In his second letter, (March 18), however, Machiavelli
thanks Giuliano de' Medici for his release, although the
occasion and influence to open the prison doors resided in
Pope Leo, not Giuliano; "I thank you as much as I can and

pray to God that to your profit and benefit he will give me
power to do something that will please you, because I can

say that all of life that is left me, I consider I owe to
the Magnificent Giuliano and your PagolQ.

Giuliano was

not responsible for Machiavelli's release however; "On his

elevation to the papacy [Pope Leo] was inspired to publish

an amnesty, by which Machiavelli and all other suspects were
set free.

Thus was the ex-secretary officially cleared of

specific charges but his person remained under a cloud."'*
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Giuliano made

any attempt to facilitate Machiavelli's release from prison,
nor is there reason to think that he would, given the nature
of the conspiracy for which he was incarcerated.

As the

amnesty was made public, Machiavelli could not have mistaken
the circumstances of his release.

The Vettoris may have attempted to intercede on
Machiavelli's behalf, in which case his gratitude to them is

well deserved.

To Giuliano, however, his grateful apprecia

tion smacks of sarcasm, particularly if the Vettori appeals
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to him found no response.

Therefore, when Machiavelli

remarks that he prays that God "will give me power to do
something that will please you," having little in his bag

gage but his wits, he may have had the sonnets in mind—-the

means by which he might entertain Vettori with a proper

acknowledgement of the role Giuliano had played in the
humiliation Machiavelli suffered, even if that role was one

of silent acquiescence.

The sonnets are probably the first

satire he directed toward the Medici, although they are not

generally acknowledged as such; and they echo typical
Machiavellian condescension and redress with keen subtlety.

As Jonathan Swift once remarked, with regard to a satirist's
intent:

I have a mind to be very angry, and let
my anger break out in some manner that
will not please them at the end of my
pen

The sonnets were ostensibly written while Machiavelli

was in prison, which Roberto Ridolfi argues were not only

written in prison, but may have helped in his release.^
Allan Gilbert disagrees, however, as the sonnets were not
discovered until 1828 and, therefore, "their real date can

only be inferred."

Further, Gilbert observes that while

they may have been written "before Giuliano's death,.,

obviously they were not intended to be sent to him.""*^
Machiavelli's sonnets to Giuliano are tailed sonnets,

which are "satirical," a "fourteenth century vogue... in
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which a couplet was added after the second tercet," as
demonstrated in Milton's 'On the New Forces of Conscience

under the Long Parliament' [which] adds six lines... to
allow him through insistence and perseverance to raise his
scornful voice even more loudly... than he could manage in a
conventional fourteen lines.

Because they are tailed

sonnets, then, Machiavelli betrays his intent in form.
The first (of three) has been described as a "comic

poem," and "not to be relied on for accuracy."'*^

Machiavelli

would have seemed unfeeling indeed, if he had actually
written this sonnet on the day that Agostino Capponi and
Pietro Paolo Boscoli were executed, the confessed conspira
tors in the plot Machiavelli was accused of, as the content

suggests.

His sardonic humor is apparent when he asks

Giuliano to (now) turn his pity (for them) toward himself.
■

X

I HAVE, GIULIANO, ON MY LEGS A SET OF FETTERS

With six pulls of the cord on my shoulders; my
other miseries I do not intend to recount to you,
since so the poets are treated!

5

These broken walls generate lice so swollen that
they look like flies; never was there such a

stench at Roncesvalles, or in Sardinia among those
groves,

9

As in my so dainty hospice; with noise such as if
I

truly jove oh earth were thundering, and all
■

.
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■
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Mongibello.

12

One is chained up and another is unironed with a

pounding of locks, keys and bars; another shrieks
he is too high above the ground!
15

What gave me most torment was that, sleeping near

dawn, I heard them chanting the words:

"We are

praying for you."
18

Now let them go away, I beg, if only your pity may
turn itself toward me, good father, and loosen
these cruel bonds.

The comedy that Machiavelli refers to in the second
sonnet may have been written "toward 1504... a work called
Le Mashere [the Masks] in imitation of Aristophane's

Clouds,"*^ which is no longer extant due to an unfortunate
decision made by Machiavelli's nephew, Gitiliano de' Ricci,
who served as his "literary executive" after his death.
Ricci found "among his uncles manuscripts... a damaged,

imperfect draft of a ragionamento in a comic vein, reminis
cent of The Clouds and other Aristophanic comedies... so
full of reckless accusations, of both ecclesiastics and

laymen alike, that he decided not to copy it... the people

thus slandered were still alive in 1504.""^'

Further, "under

fictitious names he works over and badly treats many citi

zens,""*® which may well have included references to the
Medici, a compelling reason for Ricci to destroy it.

The

fact that Machiavelli demonstrated slander against citizens
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and ecclesiastics in a comic vein in this work offers early
evidence for Machiayelli's proclivity to express himself
with humor and satire.

Dazzo is in reference to "Andrea Dazze... a pupil of

the first chancellor, Marcello Virgilio [who] was trying
desperately to keep afloat in the rather stagnant waters of
Florentine letters.
■ .II •

LAST NIGHT, BESEECHING THE MUSES THAT WITH

their sweet cither and sweet songs they would, to
console me, visit your magnificence and make my
excuses.

5

One appeared who embarrassed me, saying:
you, who dare to call me?"

"Who are

I told her my name;

and she, to torture me, hit me in the face and
closed my mouth for me,

9

saying:

"You are not Niccolo but Dazzo, since you

have your legs and your heels bound and you sit
here chained like a madman."

12

I wished to give her my arguments; she replied to
me and said:

"Go like a fool with that comedy of

yours in rags."

15

Give her proofs> Magnificent Giuliano, in the name

of high God, that I am not Dazzo, but am myself.^"
Machiavelli's third sonnet to Giuliano does not refer

to the days of his incarceration, but to a gift of thrushes
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which "here become in his imagination/ his poor present to

Giuliano,"^^ although it might be closer to the mark if one
thought of the birds in the context of a bribe, from a poor
Machiavelli shut away in his exile at his farm, for which he
has the Medici to thank in his leisure.

As Allan Gilbert explains, "the Italian word mordere

means to bite both literally and figurativelyj the latter
sense, to speak evil of, is now obsolete for English bite

except in backbite.

Machiavelli plays with the two senses

throughout the poem."^
In lines fifteen and sixteen, Machiavelli is perhaps

warning Giuliano that he should not judge his sonnet by
appearances.
Ill

I SEND YOU, GIULIANO, SOME THRUSHES, NOT

because the gift is good or fine, but that for a
bit Your Magnificence may recollect your poor
Machiavelli.

5

And if you have near you somebody who bites, you
can hit him in the teeth with it, so that when he

eats his bird, to rend others he may forget.

9

But you say;

"Perhaps they will not have the

effect you speak of, because they are not good and
are not fat; backbiters will not eat them."
12

I will answer such words that I am thin, even I,

as my enemies are aware; and yet they get off me
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some good mouthfuls.

15

Won't Your Magnificence give up your opinion, and
feel and touch, and judge by the hands and not by

the eyes?'^
The sonnets are important because they reflect
Machiavelli's impulse to convey, through satire, his con

tempt for the Medici.

The political reality of Florence

provided fertile ground for satire, between the opposing
forces of republican ideals and the relentless pursuit of

power symbolized in the Medici.

Thus, when Machiavelli

appeals to his superior/ Giuliano (whom he could not have
considered superior in the least), the irony of the sonnets

is apparent, yet they constitute but a humble prelude to his
greater satiridal work, the Prince.

Machiavelli's anger,

like the "fury'' of Juvenal, "is appropriate only to great,

obvious and widespread evils, the very putrification of

society,

the Italy Machiavelli described as "besmirched

with filth.

As Garrett Mattingly expressed it, "Indeed

the satirist seems to put forth his greatest powers chiefly

when goaded by anger, hatred, and savage indignation.

If

Machiavelli wrote The Prince out of fullness of these emo

tions rather than out of the dispassionate curiosity of the

scientist, or out of the base willingness to toady to the .
destroyer of his country's liberty, then one can understand

why his words bite and burn like acid, and why the whole

style had a density and impact unique among his writings."^®
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Machiavelli's writings are consistent with his charac

ter and the political views represented in his service to
the Republic of Florence, with the exception of the Prince—
and when the Prince is recognized as satire, it proves to be

the strongest statement of all made by Machiavelli, in
defense of the democratic principles he believed in.

From

the defeat of the republic, his dismissal from office, the

dark days of his imprisonment, and his exile, one can dis
cover ample cause to motivate him to voice his contempt, not
only for those responsible for his own misfortune and that
of Florence, but for the misfortune that had befallen Italy

generally.

His humor often disguised the agony that he

suffered, but he could not hide it from himself:

I hope, and hope increases my torment:
I weep and weeping feeds the weary
heart; I laugh and my laughter does not
touch my soul. I burn and no one sees
my passion; I fear what I see and what I

'

hear; everything gives me fresh pain;
Thus hoping, I weep and laugh and burn,
and I fear what I hear and see.

If criticism is the "common purpose" of satire,^® it is
fueled by the "passion to make known,

although, unfortu

nately, "satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do
generally discover everybody's face but their own; which is
the chief reason for that kind of reception it meets in the

world, and that so very few are offended with it."®°
Pope Leo made Florence "an annex of the papacy"" fol
lowing his election, and Wasted no time in his efforts "to
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make the House of Medici once more a dominating influence in

Italian politics [and] also to drive the foreigners from
Italian soil, "those same Spaniards who were so instrumental
in returning his family to its former position of power in
Florence."

He intended to form central Italy into a single

state by uniting the duchies of Ferrera and Urbino, and by
joining to them the cities of Parma, Modena, and Piacenza.
This new unified state was meant eventually to be placed
under the rule of the Medici, perhaps under that of the

Pope's nephew, Lorenzo... ."

After driving out the Span

iards from the Kingdom of Naples, through "diplomacy rather

than by war," that kingdom "would subsequently be given to
Giuliano de' Medici who, after his brother's election as
Pope, had been recalled from Florence to be created gonfal
oniere of the Church and who seemed prepared to embark on

greater enterprises,"® although, as discussed above, the
Pope soon realized Giuliano had no aptitude for such enter
prises.

No longer in a position to participate in or influence
the political affairs of Florence, Machiavelli began to

write, turning first to the subject of republics, motivated
perhaps by the need to discover the causes which, over an
extended period of time, had created the climate in which
the Medici succeeded in elevating themselves to a position
of authority, which threatened the liberty of all Floren
tines.

The existence of the Discourses and the nature of
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that work offer significant evidence for the notion that

Machiavelli did not forsake his republican principles to
embrace a new doctrine of absolute power in the Prince which

was indeed not new at all, but as old as the first glimmer
of covetous hoarding, most certainly older than the Italian

Renaissance; more ancient than the Roman Empire which fell
from the weight of its own ambition.
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Chapter IV.

The Dedicatory Letter

How gentle is deception
When carried to fruition as intended.
For it defies perception
And soothes the blissful dupes we have befriended
Oh draught of heaven blended,
You show the quickest way to true contentment.
And with your magic power
You comfort those whose wealth we would devour

And vanquish, by your devious presentment.
Stone walls, and arm'd resentment.
Niccolo Machiavelli^

In his dedicatory letter, Machiavelli justified himself
with regard to his intent in approaching the Medici.

He

gives the appearance of sincerity with the gift of his
knowledge and experience (although his political beliefs and

principles are misrepresented throughout the Prince to
accommodate his satire), but his intent in the dedication

was to gain the confidence of the Medici, his prey.

With

pretended innocence, exaggerated sentiments, and rhetoric

designed to trap the unwary, Machiavelli cleverly manipulat
ed his intended victims.

His profuse flattery of the

Medici, although fraudulent, was also his best defense

should his motives be questioned.

Nevertheless, it took

considerable daring on his part to satirize his enemies,
particularly while reaffirming his devotion to republican

principles at the same time, in the Discourses.

Thus,

Machiavelli was remarkable not only for the genius that
inspired the Prince, emphasizing the Medici above all oth

ers, but for his courageous spirit that brayed infamy in
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order to be heard:

NicGold Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo de'
Medici:

1

,

It is customary most of the time for
those who desire to acquire favor with a

Prince to come to meet him with things
that they care most for among their own

or with things that they see please him
most. Thus, one sees them many times
being presented with horses, arms, cloth
of gold, precious stones and similar
ornaments worthy of their greatness.

Thus, since I desire to offer myself to
your Magnificence with some testimony of
my homage to you, I have found nothing
in my belongings that I care so much for
and esteem so greatly as the knowledge
of the actions of great men, learned by
me from long experience with modern

things and a continuous reading of an
cient ones. Having thought out and
examined these things with great dili
gence for a long time, and now reduced
them to one small volume, I send it to
your Magnificence.
2.

And although I judge this work undeserv

ing of your presence, yet I have much
confidence that through your humanity it
may be accepted, considering that no

greater gift could be made by me than to
give you the capacity to be able to
understand in a very short time all that
I have learned and understood in so many
years and with so many hardships and
dangers for myself. I have not orna
mented this work, nor filled it with

i fulsome phrases nor with pompous and
magnificent words, nor with blandishment
or superfluous ornament whatever, with

which it is customary for many to de
scribe and adorn their things. For I
wanted it either not to be honored for

anything or to please solely for the

variety of the matter arid the gravity of
the subject. Nor do I want it to be
thought presumption if a man from a low

and mean state dares to discuss and give
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rules for the governments of princes.
For just as those who sketch landscapes
place themselves down in the plain to
consider the nature of mountains and

high places and to consider the nature

of low places place themselves high atop
mountains, similarly, to know well the
nature of peoples one needs to be

prince, and to know well the nature of

princes one needs to be of the people.
3.

Therefore, your Magnificence, take this
small gift in the spirit in which I send
it. If your Magnifiqence considers and
reads it diligently, you will learn from
it my extreme desire that you arrive at
the greatness that fortune and your
other qualities promise you. And if
your Magnificence will at some time turn
your eyes from the summit of your height
to these low places, you will learn how
undeservedly 1 endure a great and con

tinuous malignity of fortune.^
The indirect satire of the Prince is apparent in the

dedication, which, "instead of meeting the foe upon the
field [as in direct satire]... may pretend to be neutral and

undermine him by suave and diplomatic ways.

It may masquer

ade as a friend or as one of his own defenders and insidi

ously destroy his faith in himself."^

Wearing the mask of

deceit, the satirist conceals his or her true intent, pro
tected from the danger of reprisal.

One miist "be careful

not to assume that everything the poet says about himself is

true to his actual character," for "there may be little
similarity" between the two/

With "pretended innocence,"

the satirist becomes a "disinterested arbiter judiciously
weighing pros and cons... a friendly onlooker [who] cries
out encouragements, even seizes weapons and offers [self] as
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an ally,"® an apt description of Machiavelli's dedication to
the Medici.

In arguing against the notion that Machiavelli is a
"scientific historian," Allan Gilbert reflects on

Machiavelli the "artist" with the "political mind," who
desired that the results distilled from his observations and

study be useful, that his readers profit from the example of
the Roman republic... the men and women on the comic

stage."®

Thus, the Machiavelli of "the Prince and the

Discourses, as well as in Mandragola and the verses on
Ambition is a poet with a difference, wearing the mask—
indeed for some readers too effectively disguised—of his
torian and political observer, so the reader must needs be

alert, for the more dispassionate Niccold appears, the more

political his words become."' Thus, while Gilbert does not"
argue that the Prince is, in all respects, a satire, he
acknowledges the element of deception in Machiavelli's

writings, and the art of deception is nowhere more apparent
among his works than in the Prince, in which his dedication

sets the stage much like a prologue to one of his plays.
Machiavelli justifies his approach to the Medici in the

first paragraph of the dedication by establishing his pur
pose and credentials, thus masking his true intent.

His

alleged purpose is to "acquire favor," to "offer" himself

with some testimony of my homage to you."
however, is his gift of the Prince.
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His testimony,

Therefore, in effect he

honors the Medici with a book that recommends dishonorable

practices, and compounds the irony by expressing a desire to

participate in such a government himself, in the den of his
enemies, at a time when he was most suspect to them.
His purpose is further elaborated in paragraph two, in

which he states, "no greater gift could be made by me than

to give you the capacity to be able to understand in a very
short time all that I have learned and understood in so many
years and with so many hardships and dangers for myself."
To fully comprehend Machiavelli's intent in this passage, I
refer to chapter twenty-two of the Prince, in which he
defines his notion of three kinds of brains;

"one that

understands by itself, another that discerns what others

understand, and the third that understands neither by itself
nor through others; the first is most excellent, the second

excellent, and the third useless... ."

(Ch. 22, 92)

When Machiavelli suggests that he can give the Medici
the "capacity to be able to understand," he defines them as

having the second kind of brain, which is blatantly uncom
plimentary given their status and position, a mockery of
their political acimen.

What Machiavelli could not say is

that, in reality, the Medici brain was of the third rank,
for he could never give them the capacity to understand the
value pf popular government, organized on the model of the^
Roman republic, as presented in the Discourses.

From the

time of Cosimo, the Medici ruthlsssTy corrupted the consti

58

tution of Florence, for the benefit of themselves and their

faction.

It would have been useless, indeed, for

Machiavelli to attempt to persuade them to accept his views
as represented in that work.

He could, however, make them
/

understand the precepts of the Prince, to better refine

those attributes they and others like them already posses

sed, and with pretended innocence, expose their tyranny and
corrupt practices by appearing to justify them.

His imper

tinence in the assumption that his brain is of the first

order, sharing his knowledge with the inferior brain of the
Medici, is cleverly concealed.
Machiavelli's reference to Pandolfo Petrucci as an

illustration of the second kind of brain, (Ch. 22, 92) then,
ranks the Medici with his kind, a petty tyrant who rose to

power with the aid of Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan (II
Moro), who was Petrucci's principal adviser and benefactor.®
Although Machiavelli refers to Petrucci as the "prince
of Siena" in the Prince, (Ch. 22, 92) he calls him

"Pandolfo, the tyrant of Siena" in the Discourses.^

As

Garrett Mattingly observes, in the Prince, Machiavelli

"never quite uses the word [tyrant] except ^n illustrations
from classical antiquity, but he seems to delight in dancing
all around it until even the dullest of his readers could

not mistake his meaning."'"
Machiavelli's discussion of brains, in the Prince, is
offered in the context of choosing ministers, the employment
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the Medici are to imagine he desires, for "governing through

the chancellors was an old Medician art"" which fit appro
priately with Machiavelli's experience as head of the second
Chancery.

/'

,

,

Of course, "Machiavelli cannot refer, not even in

the Epistle Dedicatory, to the fact that he once had honor
able employment in which he loyally served.

For he was a

loyal servant of the republican regime in Florence, and this

fact by itself might compromise him in the eyes of his

prince."" Indeed, Machiavelli faced almost insurmountable
problems in convincing the Medici of his sincerity, and all
the more so with the intent to satirize "his prince," for
the dangers were great.

If the Medici ever read the Prince

and recognized the satire, perhaps they did not react for
the reasons suggested by Garrett Mattingly;

"A rasher

ruling family than the Medici might have answered the chal
lenge by another round of torture and imprisonment or by a
quiet six inches of steel under the fifth rib.

But brother

Giovanni and brother Giovanni's familiar spirit, cousin

Giulio, though in fact they were aiming at exactly the kind
of despotism that Machiavelli predicted, hoped to achieve it

with a minimiam of trouble by preserving for the time being
the forms of the republic.

It would not do, by punishing

the author, to admit to the pertinence of his satire.

the Medici did nothing.

So

But they were not a stupid family,

and they cannot have been very pleased."" In any case, $:he
Medici would have appeared comically naive to have taken
60

into their confidence as adviser an exiled, suspected con
spirator, prominent in a former government opposed to their

own faction.

Nor would that suit the historical reality of

Florence, where victorious factions often mobbed, maimed or

killed the defeated officials, confiscated their property,
and banished their families.

Machiavelli was fortunate that

his own dismissal by the Medici only resulted in a fine and
his exile, given their cause to distrust him.
Phaedrus observes that "no one likes to revisit the

place which has brought him injury,"''^ and Machiavelli re
minds us that one should beware of anyone who does.

In the

Discourses, he states, "a republic should take care not to
give any administrative post of importance to a,nyone to whom
notable wrong has been done," (III. 17> 454) to avoid the

opportunity for revenge.

In reference to Claudius Nero, he

remarks, "If the passions aroused by such offenses could
have so great an effect on a Roman citizen at a time when

Rome was as yet free from corruption, one can well imagine
how great an effect injuries are likely to have on a citizen
of some other city which is not constituted as Rome then

was," (III. 17, 454-5) as was Florence.
Machiavelli also states in the Discourses that "...

malice is not to be placated with gifts," (III. 30, 487)
especially with a gift as impudent as the Prince.

These

statements from the Discourses reflect on Machiavelli's

intent in dedicating the Prince to the Medici, as he had

61

been offended by them, and warns that it would be imprudent

to involve anyone like himself in "any administrative post
of importance," although that is precisely what he pretends
to desire from the Medici.

In Machiavelli's masterful construction of the Prince,

he cleverly protected himself by appealing specifically to

the Medici while, at the same time, he exposed the growing
threat to liberty and freedom in Italy from all those seek

ing princely status by corrupt and vile means in ambitious

enterprises that depended for success on an equally corrupt

population, in which the Medici only represented one example
of such native tyrants.

Just as he did in his plays,

Machiavelli endeavored to "root out ...corruption and boldly

hold it up for our scorn"^^ in the Prince.

Perhaps the

greatest irony of all is that we have not only failed to
share Machiavelli's contempt for the corrupt practices of
his time, which he took considerable risk to reveal in the

Prince, but we have gone to great lengths to justify them.^*
As Machiavelli well knew, men are easily deceived.
70)

(Ch. 18,

He exploited the desire Of the Medici to expand their

power by recommending those practices that betrayed his own

beliefs, just as Horace "with fine subtlety... puts in

Tieresia's mouth words that are the very opposite of all his

own beliefs,"" the art of deception ever nurtured by the
great dissemblers.

Machiavelli establishes his credentials in paragraph
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one of the dedication when he refers to his "knowledge of
the actions of great men, learned by me from long experience

with modern things and a continuous reading of ancient
ones,"

The Medici were, of course, very much aware of

Machiavelli's Credentials.

By emphasizing "knowledge,"

however, his experience is equated with his study of the
■

^'

.

/

ancients as a secondary consideration, a source rather than
a statement that speaks for itself.

Machiavelli informed

Vettori that the Medici, "through this thing, if it were
read, would see that for the fifteen years while I have been

studying the art of state, I have not slept or been play^

ing."^*

Indeed, Machiavelli learned a great deal from his

observation of the princes in his time, from "his long
experience of modern things," but there is little evidence

in the Prince of a practical application of those things he
learned from a "continuous reading" of the ancients, with

regard tp liberty and justice.^'
One must turn to the Discourses to discover those

principles of governing that he found admirable in antiqui
ty.

In that regard, certain distinctions can be made be

tween the two works, including the dedicatory sentiment in
each, for the tone and emphasis in the Discourses is so far
removed from that of the Prince, it is difficult to recon

cile them as companion works.^

Machiavelli dedicated the Discourses to his republican
friends, Zanobi Buondelmonte and Cosimo Rucellai, which
■

/
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marks an immediate distinction between the two works, having
dedicated his book on tyranny, the Prince, to the tyrants of
Florence, the Medici.

At first glance, there appears to be

a striking similarity in the way Machiavelli begins both

dedications.

To Buondelmonte and Rucellai, he states, "I am

sending you a present which, if it does not come up to the
obligations I owe you, is at any rate the best that Niccolo
Machiavelli is able to send you.

For in it I have set down

all that I know and have learned from a long experience of,
and from constantly reading about, political affairs.

In

the Prince Machiavelli finds nothing he values so much as

"the actions of great men," learned "from long experience
with modern things, and a continuous reading of ancient

ones."^^

In comparing the two statements, one finds that the

emphasis in the Discourses is on "political affairs," while
in the Prince, it is on "great men," with a specific refer
ence to the "ancients" as a source of his knowledge.

The

distinction between the two is not as trivial as it may
appear.

Rather, it reflects Machiavelli's purpose for

writing a satire on the modern era, if one considers his
remarks in the preface to books one and two of the Discours
es, with regard to antiquity.

'

In book one, Machiavelli states that he is "impelled by

the natural desire I have always had to labour regardless of
anything, on that which I believe to be for the common

benefit of all, I have decided to enter upon a new way, as
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^ '

yet untrodden by anyone else,"^ to examine the wisdom of the
ancients and, because those who read about historical "inci

dents" never think of "imitating" them, to compare "ancient
and modern events... so that those who read what I have to

say may the more easily draw those practical lessons which

one should seek to obtain from the reading of history."^
Further, in the preface to book two of the Discourses,
Machiavelli offers his argument for praising the past more
than the present.
Hence, I am not sure but that I desire
to be reckoned among those who thus

deceive themselves if in these my dis
courses I have praised too much the days
of the ancient Romans and have found

fault with our own. Indeed, if the
virtue which then prevailed and the
vices which are prevalent today were not
as clear as the sun, I should be more

reserved in my statements lest I should
fall into the very fault for which I am
blaming others. But as the facts are
there for everyone to see, I shall make
so bold as to declare plainly what I
think of those days and our own, so that
the minds of young men who read about
what I have written may turn from the
one and prepare to imitate the other
whenever fortune provides them with the
occasion for doing so.
Although there is no preface to book three, Machiavelli

states in the first Chapter that he will discuss the actions

of "particular men" and their contribution "to the greatness
of Rome... I begin, then, with Brutus, the father Of Rome's
liberties.

His emphasis in the Discourses, then, is on "particular
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men" and the city's greatness as opposed to the idea of
great men seeking personal glory and preeminence in the
Prince.

In the Discourses, he offers "practical lessons" on

political affairs concerned with the common benefit, compar

ing "ancient land modern events" from which he concludes that
the "virtue" land "wisdom" of the past, particularly that
which he discerns from the actions of the Roman republic,
i

are regrettably absent in the present era.
The notion that Machiavelli was a scientist who re

mained neutral in moral and ethical concerns or who, as an
author of real politic, divorced morality and ethics from

politics, is disputed by his remarks concerning duty in his

conclusion to! the preface of book two; "For it is the duty
of a good manS to point out to others what is well done, even
though the malignity of the times or of fortune has not

permitted you to do it yourself, to the end that, of the
many who haveithe capacity, someone more beloved of heaven,

may be able tb do it."^ The words "duty" and "good man"
I

express moral|and ethical sentiment, and he conveys a sense
of hope that some individual will emerge to teach the value

of virtue and!wisdom, learned from the study of antiquity so
that, when fortune provides the opportunity, that example

will be imitated.

Machiavelli admired leaders like "Moses,

Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and repub
.i

.

■

.

■

'•

■

lies who assuijied authority that they might formulate laws to
the common good." (I. 9, 133)

Those who "read history" and

i

.!

'

'
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■

"make use of the records of ancient deeds... would prefer to

conduct himself in his fatherland rather as;Scipio did than
as Caesar did, or, if he be a prince, as did Agisilaus,
Timoleon and Dion, rather than as did Nabis, Phalaris and

Dionysius, for he could not but see how strongly the latter
are dismissed with scorn, and how highly the former are
praised."

And of those who become prince in a republic,

"after Rome became an Empire, how much more praise is due to

those emperors who acted, like good princes, in accordance
with the laws... [who] had no need of soldiers to form a
■

/

praetorian guard... for their defense lay in their habits,
the goodwill of the people, and the affection of the sen
ate," (I. 10, 135-6) unlike those in Rome who "looked upon

[virtue]" as a "capital crime," from which example one "will
thus happily learn how much Rome, Italy, and the world owed
to Caesar." (I. 10, 138)
Unlike the man "more beloved of heaven" whom

Machiavelli awaits in the Discourses, Mho will teach others

what is "well done" from the examples of antiquity, his new
prince typifies the practices in modern Italy, where "there
is no observance either of religion or of the laws, or of

military traditions."^*

In fact, Machiavelli subverts the

wisdom and virtues of the past in the Prince, so critical to

his idea of good government in the Discourses, by appearing
to transform virtue and vice into their opposites to accom

modate the modern practices he recommends both in his pre
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cepts, and in his choice of exemplars-'-primarily that of
■

:
■

Cesare Borgia.

.

\

'

■

,

I
■

,

In praising Borgia, he praises the modes and

orders of the modern age; "for I don't know what better

teaching I could give to a new prince than the example of
his actions," (Ch. 7. 27) an appropriate illustration of the
"actions of great men" that Machiavelli referred to in his

dedication of the Prince.

Both the Borgia and the Medici

represented the rise of private individuals who advanced

their interests by pernicious methods.

Gesare was violent

and ruthless, a man of "foul reputation,"'® the "exemplar" of
Machiavelli's instruction in the Prince regarding "how to go
beyond morals, laws, and customs in order to gratify one's
awn will," by the use of force and deceit.'*

The Medici acquired their power and influence by fraud
ulent means, from behind the facade of custom, tradition,
and constitutional convention.

Over several decades, begin

ning with the government of Cosimo in 1434, they gradually
achieved prominence and control of the government of Flor

ence during which time Italy declined, mired in corruption."
In the Prince, then, Machiavelli emphasizes great men,

whose object it is to further their own greatness and per
sonal glory (exemplified in the Borgia and the Medici),
while in the Discourses, he refers to particular men who
contribute to the city's greatness (a republican ideal), and
his first example of a particular man is Brutus, who assas
sinates a man of the other class, Julius Caesar.
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(III. 1,

390)

Further, Machiavelli expands on the theme of Brutus by

including a chapter on conspiracies, the longest chapter in
the Discourses, in which he gives "excellent lessons on the

methods of conducting conspiracies."^^ In significant ways,
Cesare Borgia was reminiscent of Julius Caiesar, and the sort

of new prince that Machiavelli might have a modern day
Brutus do away with, to preserve the liberty of Italy.

In

grandiose imitation of Caesar, Borgia "took as his model his

illustrious namesake from the days of ancient Rome, Julius
Caesar," his aim "to win absolute power for himself alone,
his banner arrogantly emblazoned with "aut Caesar aut nihil"
(all or nothing)
Although there are numerous references to modern exam

ples throughout the Discourses, only passing mention is made

of Cesare Borgia, who should have figured prominently in
both works, having received so much praise from Machiavelli

in the Prince.

That he is ignored in the Discourses, even

in discussions of military virtue,^® is not surprising,
however, if one accepts the Prince as a satirical work, for
he not only personified all that was evil and corrupt in
modern Italy, but chose to imitate, from the examples of

antiquity, a man Machiavelli also found contemptible, Julius
Caesar, who, when he became "head of the [Marian] faction,"

manipulated the people in such a way as to gain personal
advantage and power. (I. 17, 158)

As Bernard Crick ob

serves, Julius Caesar "was, in a word, a tyrant, [and]
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therefore detestable and traditionally the proper object of
assassination.""

Nor does Machiavelli refer to the Medici at length in
the Discourses, a significant omission in a work devoted to
the study of republics if one recalls that the Medici were

the first citizens of Florence (a city having at least the
appearance of a republic), and called upon as the saviors of

Italy in the Prince, which greatly expands the importance

Machiavelli assigned to that family.

In fact, Machiavelli

indicates considerable lack of enthusiasm for the Medici by
making only scant reference to them in the Discourses, and
then, for the most part, holding them up as negative exam

ples.'*
By directing attention to the Medici and the Borgia in

the Prince, however, Machiavelli provided the focal point
for his satire, as primary exemplars of modern corruption.
Those who knew him and were familiar with his admiration of
ancient virtue and wisdom would have understood his intent

to satirize the modern age, particularly with those examples
before them.

The artifice employed by Machiavelli in his dedication

to the Medici becomes yet more apparent when it is compared
to the remainder of his dedication of the Discourses to his

republican friends, for in the latter, he conveys a tone of
sincerity rather than flattery, the reflection of a work
that is in harmony with his life, his character, and the
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expectations-of those who knew him best.
And believe me:when I say that I have in
this just one consolation. It is that
when I reflect on the many mistakes I
have made in other circumstances, I know
that I have made no mistake at any rate
in this, that I have chosen to dedicate
these my discourses to you in preference
to all others; both because, in my doing
so, I seem to be showing some gratitude
for benefits received, and also because
I seem in this to be departing from the
usual practice of authors, which has
always been to dedicate their works to
some prince, and, blinded by ambition

and avarice, to praise him for all his
virtuous qualities when they ought to
have blamed him for all manner of shame
ful deeds.

In this paragraph, Machiavelli may have made a direct
reference to the Prince when he remarks that one should not

praise a prince for "virtuous qualities" when, in fact, his
"deeds" are "shameful" and "blameworthy."

"ambition" and greed.

One does so from

If Machiavelli was accusing himself

of making the mistake of dedicating the Prince to the

Medici, he dignifies the Discourses in doing so, for he

negates the substance of the Prince when he suggests that
one should not falsely attribute virtue to those qualities

deserving blame (precisely his satire/ particularly flagrant
in chapters fifteen through eighteen).; At the same time,

Machiavelli falsely attributes blame to himself, for greed
and ambition that were foreign to his character.

He was not

the sort of man to seek personal gain, yet his admission

gives the impression that his attempts to seek favor with
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the Medici were sincere.

Thus, he maintained the mask of

innocence while, at the same time, he hinted at the true

nature of the Prince, further elaborated in his concluding
remarks;

So, to avoid this mistake, I have chosen
not those who are princes, but those
who, on account of their innumerable

good qualities deserve to be; not those

who might shower on me rank, honours,
and riches, but those who, though un
able, would like to do so. For, to
judge aright, one should esteem men
because they are generous, not because
they have the power to be generous; and

in like manner, should admire those who
know how to govern a kingdom, not those

who, without knowing how, actually gov
ern one.

There are, indeed, writers who

praise Hiero the Syracusan though but a
private person, in preference to
Perseus, the Macedonian though he was a
king, because Hiero to become a prince
lacked but a principality, whereas the
other had no kingly attributes save his
kingdom. Entertain yourselves, then,
with what you were anxious to get, whe
ther it be good or bad; and should you
be so mistaken as to find my views ac
ceptable, I shall not fail to follow

this up with the rest of the history, as
I promised at the start.

Farewell.40

Roberto Ridolfi makes the point that "the dedicatory
letter he wrote [in the Discourses] is perhaps the most
important document we have for his state of mind at this

time, and it surprises me that other biographers have not
understood it for what it is; a protest against the man who
had so long despised his talent and held his book of the
Prince to be of no account.

One can almost read between the

lines the name of Lorenzo himself Where the author declares
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that he did not wish to dedicate this other book of his to

any prince, but to private citizens who for their infinite

good qualities would greatly deserve to be [[princes]]."^'
Ridolfi singles out Lorenzo as the target of Machiavelli's

protest, but Machiavelli did not simply protest one particu
lar Medici.

He certainly had that family in mind when he

wrote his dedication of the Discourses, but not to the
exclusion of modern princes generally, and it is doubtful

that he would miss any opportunity to chastise their ambi
tion in one literary form or another.

If the Prince is

understood as satire, his "state of mind" would appear to be
no different when he wrote the Discourses than when he wrote

the Prince, for he is critical of tyranny in both works,

although by different routes.

If he attributed lunacy to a

prince "who does what he likes" in the Discourses, (I. 58,
256) he provides us with an unforgettable portrait of that
madman in the Prince.

There were immediate and unfavorable Reactions to the

Prince, which may have prompted him to "reflect on the many
mistakes I have made in other circumstances,

for there

were many who read his manuscript then, as now, who did not

appreciate the work as satire.

"Everyone hated him because

of The Prince: the rich thought that his Prince was a docu

ment written to teach the Duke ^how to take away all their
property, from the poor all their liberty, the Piagnoni

regarded him as a heretic, the good thought him sinful, the
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wicked thought him more wicked or capable than themselves,
so that all hated him.

Yet, "the ardent republicans

among Machiavelli's friends, like Zanobi Buondelmonte, were

not alienated by the Prince."''^

Had they not understood

Machiavelli's intention, they would have considered him a
traitor for appealing to that family, having encouraged them
to observe oppressive and tyrannical practices.

As late as

1527, "Buondelmonte and Alammani began working at once to
bring their old friend back to the service of the restored

republic."'*®

These passionate patriots who, finding no

remedy for the liberty of Florence but the sword, conspired
against the Medici in 1522, could hardly have viewed
Machiavelli as a dispassionate observer of political af

fairs; Buondelmonte, it will be recalled, wanted to invite
Machiavelli to join them in that affair.'*'

If the Prince was

an unfortunate mistake for Machiavelli, it was because he
proved too clever for his own good.

Daniel Defoe suffered the consequences of his own
cleverness;when he carried the "pretense of innocence too

far in his irony.""*®

In his The Shortest-Way With the Dis

senters (1702), Defoe, "to discredit the highfliers [the

High-Church Tories]" wrote "as if from their viewpoint but
reducing their arguments to absurdity,""*® with the result
that "the uncovering of Defoe's hoax alienated both sides,"
apd he wound up in the pillory.®"

Machiavelli used a similar tactic in the Prince, writ
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ing from the viewpoint of a new prince, which resonated in
the Medici, Borgia, Petrucci, and others, while reducing
their tyrannical methods to the absurd when contrasted with

the ancient examples of virtue and wisdom that inspired the
Discourses.

The pretense of innocence is "an important characteris

tic of all successful irony... the facts seem their own
satire... we have the pleasure, invisibly aided by the

satirists' hand, of detecting the prey and bringing it down
ourselves... we may flatter ourselves that we have seen

through the deceptions by which he appears to have been

taken in.

And when we no longer subscribe to this delusion

we are not apt to be enraged, for we have now penetrated the

ingenious trickery of a very clever fellow.

The cleverer he

was to have almost fooled even us for so long, the cleverer

we are in having been able to join his sport.

The whole

process of understood irony is a delightful massage to our

vanity."^'
Unfortunately, Machiavelli never reveals that the
Prince was a satire, nor could he.

The times were too

dangerous while he was alive, the Medici too powerful.

Regrettably, his pretended innocence was altogether convinc

ing to those who were influenced by the times, who repre
sented the very state of mind he satirized, for those who
misinterpreted the Prince had become so accustomed to the

ways of the powerful, even Machiavelli could be imagined as
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a lackey of the Medici.

And the greater irony is that the

corruption he criticized in the Prince was given new and

lasting legitimacy with the appearance of reasoned justifi
cations by numerous commentators, justifications for that

which constitutes the heart of his satire, and reflects
I

Machiavelli's true originality.
One means by which the aura of innocence can be

achieved, acknowledged by Machiavelli in the Discourses, is

in the value of playing the fool.

Citing the example of

Junius Brutus, he recommends that "it is a very good notion

at times to pretend to be a fool," by "pretending to be
stupid," in part "to escape observation and that [one] might
get a better opportunity of downing the kings and liberating
[one's] country," whenever given the "chance."

(III. 2,

390-1) That is, if one is "ill content with a prince," and
lacking sufficient forces to make war openly, one should

"use every endeavor to acquire the prince's friendship... by

becoming obsequidus to his wishes and taking pleasure in
everything in which he takes pleasure" which provides for
safety and the "opportunity for fulfilling your inten

tions... to play the fool, as Brutus did, and to act more or

less like a lunatic, admiring, talking about, attending to,
and doing things in which they have not the slightest inter

est in order to ingratiate themselves with the prince."
(III. 2, 391-2)

In this sense, the Prince is an artful representation
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of Machiavelli's notion of pretending the fool.

In an

attempt to gain the confidence of the Medici, Machiavelli

humbled himself and assumed a chameleon quality, becoming
"obsequious" to the wishes of the Medici, ,in compliance with
their ambition.

His recommendations were not new to the

Medici and other modern princes, however, and by instructing
them in how to proceed, he actually exposed them for what
they were-—dishonest, faithless, and immoral tyrants.

In

regard to the Medici, he not only encouraged them to advance
their personal interests in and around Florence but extended

that interest to the entire Italian Peninsula, in his call

for liberation and unity in the closing chapter of the
Prince.

Thus, Machiavelli's Satire contains "cosmic iro

ny... entwined in human fate," which "may inspire the in

sights that shape a satirist's entire design."®^

Like

Brutus, Machiavelli said things "against his opinion," but,

unlike Brutus, he had no real hope of getting "tied up with
them" (III. 2, 392) "Machiavelli was writing under the rule

of the Medici which forced him to disguise his love of
liberty,

and even as late as the 1520's, while he was

writing his History, Donate Giannotti relates that

Machiavelli expressed the following concerns:
I cannot write this history from the
time When Cosimo took over the govern
ment up to the death of Lorenzo just as
I would write if I were free from all
reasons for caution. The actions will

be true, and I shall not omit anything;
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merely I shall leave out discussing the
universal causes for events. For in
stance, I shall relate the events and
the circumstances that came about when

Cosimo took over the government; I shall
leave untouched any discussion of the

way and of the means and tricks with
which one attains such power; and if
anyone nevertheless wants to understand

Cosimo; let him observe well what I
shall have his opponents say, because

!

what I am not willing to say as coming
from myself, I shall have his opponents

say.^
Allan Gilbert notes that "even in such speeches, Machiavelli
sometimes substituted for his first draft softer, second

thoughts.'®
In oppressive societies, it is often dangerous to

openly criticize those in power without great personal risk.
Phaedrus' poetry contained "enough suggestion of criticism

of existing evils" that it "did him harm,"" and Juvenal took
care to name "only names from the past."''' Machiavelli
states in the Discourses that writers were not permitted "to
speak freely" of Julius Caesar, but if "anyone desires to

know what writers would have said, had they been free, he
has but to look at what they say of Cataline.

For Caesar is

more blameworthy of the two in that he who has done wrong is

more blameworthy than he who has desired to do' wrong.""
Clearly, Machiavelli understood the need for caution

when writing about the Medici, if Donato Giannotti is credi
ble in that regard, and had cause to fear them—nor could he
have been so naive as not to have understood what the liedici
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thought about him and his republican sentiments.

With the

exception of his comedies, Pope Leo did not, in fact, "es

teem Machiavelli..v highly."^'
Another indication of the Medici dislike for

Machiavelli can be traced to Piero Ardinghelli, secretary to
Pope Leo, whom Machiavelli comically referred to in his

letter to Francisco Vettori (December 10, 1513) as "this
rascal Ardinghelli" who "will get himself honor from this
latest work of mine," in reference to the Prince.^
Ardinghelli wrote to Giuliano on behalf of Cardinal Giulio
de' Medici, in response to discussions that Machiavelli was

rumored to have had with Pagolo Vettori, concerning how

Giuliano should govern his new state should it materialize;"

"Cardinal de' Medici questioned me yesterday very closely if
I knew whether Your Excellency had taken into his service

Niccold Machiavelli, and as I replied that I knew nothing of
it nor believed it. His Lordship said to me these words:
do not believe it either, but as there has been word of it
from Florence, I would remind him that it is not to his

profit or to ours.

This must be an invention of Paplo

[Pagolo] Vettori: ... write to him on my behalf that I
advise him not to have anything to do with Niccold.'"®^
Roberto Ridolfi offers the opinion that "If it were not
clearly expressed in the unadorned eloquence of these docu

ments, it would be difficult to believe in so implacable a

hatred!

If one considers the reality of the relationship
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between Machiavelli and the Medici, however, rather than the
imagination of it, there is no basis whatever to assume that

the Medici ever had anything but distrust and dislike for
Machiavelli.

As for Piero Ardinghelli, Machiavelli mentions

him once again in a letter to Lodovico Alamanni, in Rome,
December 17, 1517.

In closing, he writes," Give my regard

to Messer Piero Ardinghelli, because I forgot to ask you

to."^

In this playful innuendo, Machiavelli seems to sug

gest a less than congenial attitude toward Ardinghelli,
which Alamanni was expected to appreciate or Machiavelli
would likely not have bothered to amuse him with it.

In addition to playing the fool in the Prince, one
could say that Machiavelli played to fools as well.

Lois

Spatz makes the point that in Aristophane's Clouds, "members

of the audience... are not only spectators of a comedy but
judges of the value of the play and the divinity of the

Clouds... manipulated by a chorus skilled in rhetoric to
decide both on the basis of noraos (aesthetic standards) and
physis (advantage to themselves).

nately wise men and fools."®®

They are called alter

So, too, can the readers of

Machiavelli's satire be characterized.

The wise discern the

critical air of his intent, as he hoped the audience of his
play, Mandragola, would discover:
The sole reward he may hope to reap
Is for all to stand aside and snicker.

Decrying what they see and hear.®®
In like sense, Dante also distinguishes the wise:
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^

O you whose intellects keep their sanity.
Do you mark well the doctrine shrouded o'er

By the strange verses with their mystery/'
Machiavelli's satire was best understood by those "who

knew the thinker and his thoughts,"®* and who shared his
grievances, as when he states that it is his "intent to

write something useful to whoever understands it," (Ch. 15,
p. 61) for "If Machiavelli's friends were meant to read the

manuscript of the Prince and if they took it at face value—
an objective study of how to be a successful tyrant offered
as advice to a member of the species—they can hardly have

failed to be deeply shocked."®' But the evidence indicates
that he was not abandoned by his circle of friends, as
discussed above.

Unlike the wise, however, fools fail to recognize that
"not always are words what they seem to be.

things deceives... .

The look of

Ashley Brown and John L. Kimmey make

the point that, "Satire flourishes in homogeneous society
where satirist and audience share the same view as to how

normal people can be expected to behave, and in times of

relative stability and contentment, for satire cannot deal
with serious evil and suffering.

In an age like our own, it

cannot flourish except in intimate circles as an expression
of private feuds; in public life the evils and sufferings
are so serious that satire seems trivial and the only possi
ble kind of attack is prophetic denunciation."'^

Machiavelli

did not deliver a diatribe, however, and the subtlety of his
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satire missed the mark, so to speak, in the upheaval that
defined his times:

[He] came into the world at a moment
when political corruption was general
throughout Europe, but more predominant
in Italy than elsewhere on account of
the greater number of persons taking
part in public life. Hence the evil
effects of this corruption infected
every section of society in our country.

Our culture enhanced the criminality of
the vices and misdeeds of a statecraft

no longer ruled by the blind and ungov~
erned passions of the Middle Ages, but
the product of refined calculation and
cunning, full of cruelty and deyoid of
scruples. With us, medieval institu
tions rapidly fell into decay, leaving
individual members of the community
deprived of all guidance save that of
their own instincts.'^

In the corrupt climate of his age, then, Machiavelli's

Prince was more likely to be taken at face value, and per^
haps the same could be said for our own century.
If the wise discerned his intent to criticize, fools

were easily manipulated by his satire for, like the fools in
his comedies, "the distinction between wise man and fool

presumes a cosmos in which everything does have its proper
place, its fixed limits and determinations.

The fool does

not know this; he is a fool precisely because he has no
sense of the proper limit to, and of the appropriate context
of, things, words, and acts.

He is, therefore, out of

harmony with the nature of things... an aberration,"'^ or, as
Machiavelli himself states it, "It is no marvel if in a

crazy time, the crazy come out well."''*
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So crazy were the

times, that Pope Leo presided over the Roman Catholic Church

which had become so corrupt, Martin Luther precipitated the
Protestant Reformation on his watch; while Luther hammered

his Ninety-five Theses on the door of All Saints Church in

Wittenburg, Leo revelled in having gained, once again, the
duchy of Urbino for the aggrandizement of his family.
Thus, just as Phaedrus wrote for an intelligentsia that
could "discern even hidden meanings,

Machiavelli wrote for

a circle of friends. Utilizing a literary mode that would be
understood by them, yet one that would protect him from his
adversaries.

Horace chose "to forego publication and re

strict his readership to an elite circle of friends,"'^ which

inay ^ave, been Machiavelli's intent as well, when he first
circulated the manuscript.

The irony in satire is "a kind

of ^double talk' which insiders understand,"^ and the great
er the degiree of distortion, the greater the need for a
"select audience... otherwise, as happened to Swift with The

Modest Proposal, the readers may think that the distortion

is the j work of a lunatic, a mai> whose own values have been
disturbed.

Beneath its surface of detachment irbny conceals

a passion of the deepest involvement,"'® which may account
for the sense of detachment that has mislead scholars in the

assumption that Machiavelli was but a clinical observer of
political affairs.

Machiavelli makes the point in his History that "tyran
nical and wicked" rulers fear those who understand their
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ways, and "do not want anybody" to "censure" them,'' for
which Machiavelli's Prince is all the more brilliant in his

implicit censorship of the Medici while praising, with all
manner of flattery, their person and their vices.

The

Prince must indeed have appeared comic to those who knew

Machiavelli, both for the Medici model of political corrup
tion (yet anointed as the saviours of Italy), and for his
absurd vindication of tyrannical practices, what Henry

Fielding describes as the general "mischief [brought] on
mankind" by the aspirations of "great men," in his The Life
of Jonathan Wild the Great; as "when the mighty Caesar, with
wonderful greatness of mind, had destroyed the liberties of

his country, and with all means of fraud and force [had]
placed himself at the head of his equals... [and] corrupted
and enslaved the greatest people whom the sun ever

saw... .

In this work, Fielding's praise of Jonathan Wild

constitutes "a comment on [the reader's] sense of values in
choosing to bestow a quite spurious glorification on such an
utter rogue. Its mode of proceeding is ironic.

It pretends

to glorify Wild as a hero, an example of true greatness," an
"ironic eulogy of a criminal, by which the destructive evil

of his ways may be made clear,

and this is precisely what

Machiavelli did in his treatment of Cesare Borgia in the
Prince.

Machiavelli's ironic portrayal of Borgia pretended

to glorify him as an example of greatness, but in describing
his modes of proceeding, particularly with regard to the
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elimination of his enemies, he also exposed Borgia as a
criminal, as well as the failure of his enterprise, and the
evil of his ways.

Machiavelli often repeats words or phrases "several

times in close proximity, and such density of usage can

alert us to the importance of that word in that context,"*^ a
rhetorical device he employed in his dedication of the
Prince, providing an indication (or marker) of the humor he
has invested, albeit in a very sly fashion, in his flatter

ing epistle.

The word in question is magnificent (or mag

nificence) which he repeats seven times.

It first appears

in the title; "Niccolo Machiavelli to the Magnificent

Lorenzo de' Medici" (reminiscent of II Magnifico, his grand
father), followed by two appearances in the first paragraph,
one in the second, and three in the third and last para
graphs.

Granting that the word magnificent reflects common

usage, including that found in handbooks for princes, his
redundancy nevertheless calls our attention to it.

In the first place, he seems to be overextending his
sense of humility by placing exaggerated emphasis on the
magnificence of the Medici, a magnificence he could not have

admired, for traditionally the City of Florence had always

been wary of those fellow citizens who sought elevated ^
status or inequality.

Secondly, if Machiavelli seemed to be emulating the
literary custom of superfluous embellishment common to the
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traditional handbooks for princes, one should note that such
works were presented to legitimate princes and kings, not to
those who, like Cosimo de' Medici, ''lack [ed] nothing of

being prince but the title.
'1

In the second paragraph, however, Machiavelli gives
full play to his use of the word magnificent; "I have not

ornamented this work, nor filled it with fullsome phrases
nor with pompous and magnificent words, nor with any blan
dishment or superfluous ornament whatever, with which it is
customary for many to describe their things."

Although he

announces that he is not going to "ornament" the work with

magnificent words, he proceeds to not only use the word, but

to virtually crowd his little dedication with it, and the
resulting effect is not only a tone of false humility and
insincerity, but ridicule as well.
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Machiavelli's dedica
tion bears some similarity to the Proem of Savonarola's

political tract, De Regimine Principum, written in 1494, a
work that extols the "Consiglio Grande [Grand Council] as
the proper government for Florence... handed as a major idea
on the Florentine constitution to Machiavelli and the later

Florentine theorists... and since the pamphlet is the theory

of vivere libero, not the practice of Savonarola which may
destroy it for its own purposes, we may guess that they were

not wholly hostile eyes."^^

J.H. Whitfield observes:
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In his Proem, Savonarola proposes to
discuss the new government of Florence
in a manner appropriate to his modest
station, without superfluous adornment
of style, and for the common good... in
the Discorse', Machiavelli will make,
with conviction, the claim to be writing
for the coitimon good, but meanwhile in
the Prince, and in a very famous passage
(since it governs the whole style of the
book) he repeats these Savonarolan
statements> that of omission of super
fluous ornaments as well as that of

modesty of station, and in language

which might even be reminiscence:*®
In fact, Machiavelli calls attention to this passage by
repeating the word ornament twice, and it is the same pas
sage in which he states that he will use no magnificent
words, quoted above from the second paragraph.

If

Whitfield's proposition is correct—that Savonarola/s state

ments may have served as a "model" for Machiavelli*'—it is
indeed ironic (and very clever) that he should have incorpo
rated language into his dedication to the Medici from a

political tract in opposition to the Medici and tyranny
generally.

Strongly anti-Medician, Savonarola "did not aim

at monarchy in Florence, but away from one, and that the
whole conclusion of his matter, and of his treatise, is to
\

be the necessity of democratic government to avoid the rise
again of tyranny &-la-Medici."**
If Machiavelli intended to reflect the language of
Savonarola's treatise in his Prince, it serves as a satiri
cal marker, designed to entertain the informed who were

familiar with the political writings of the Frate, and it
87

probably came as no surprise that Machiavelli neglected to

say he was writing for the common good as did Savonarola,
who feared the "rise again" of Medici tyranny.

In the

Prince, Machiavelli not only sanctions the Medici tyranny,
he pleads to participate in it.
The tone of feigned humility that permeates the dedica

tion is intended to reflect Machiavelli's modest station,
the result of his dismissal from office by the Medici.

In

paragraph two, he deems "this work undeserving of your
presence... nor do I want it to be thought presumption if a
man from a low and mean state dares to discuss and give

rules for the governments of princes."

In a famous passage

from the same paragraph, he refers to the nature of princes
and that of the people; "For just as those who sketch land^

scapes place themselves down in the plain to consider the

nature o!f mountains and high places, and to consider the
nature of low places place themselves high atop mountains,

similarly, to know well the nature of peoples one needs to

be a prince, and to know well the nature of princes, one
needs to be of the people."

MachiaVelli creates the illu

sion of humility by placing himself, as one of the multi

tude, virtually at the feet of the Medici, but this passage
is a thinly veiled fabrication on his part, for to consider

the nature of a prince from a distance has everything to do
with appearances and little to do with reality.

In the

History, Machiavelli remarks that "so much more at a dis
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tance than nearby the things that make a show are feared,"®'
for appearances often deceive until it is too late to apply
a remedy.

In the Prince, Machiavelli likens appearances to

consumption, "easy to cure and difficult to recognize" in
the early stages, but when it is far enough advanced to be

recognized, it is "difficult to cure," just as "in the

affairs of state... because when one recognizes from afar
the evils that arise in a state (which is not given but to
onfe who is prudent), they are soon healed; but when they are
left to grow because they were not recognized, to the point

that everyone recognizes them, there is no longer any remedy
for them." (Ch. 3, 12)

Machiavelli offers the example of Cosimo de' Medici, in
the Discourses, whose reputation "began to arouse alarm for

the security of [Florence's] government; with the result
that his fellow-citizens thought it dangerous to touch him,

and still more dangerous to let him alone."

(I 33, 192)

Failure to recognize such evils results from the art of

deceptive appearances.

"Men in general judge more by their

eyes than by their hands because seeing is given to every

one, touching to few.

Everyone sees how you appear, few

touch what you are... ," and thus the prince should "appear

all mercy, all faith, all honesty, all humanity,all reli-r

gion," (Ch. 18, 70) to better achieve his design, although
he need not actually have those qualities.

The people,

then, cannot know the true nature of a prince from a dis
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tance, as Machiavelli suggests, for that is given only to
those who can touch.

As his satire unfolds, however, he

will expose the true nature of princes, and in that sense
touching will be given to all.
Conversely, a new prince who elevates himself above the

level of his fellow citizens succeeds precisely because he
does understand their nature having touched them, so to
speak (and for his own self interest) with his wealth and
his influence, making them his partisans, as did the Medici
in Florence.

Thus, when Machiavelli states that "to know

well the nature of the people one needs to be a prince," he

alludes to the corrupt means by which the new prince at

tained his position.

In order for such a man to triumph,

however, the people must also be corrupt; "If anyone, then,

wants to seize supreme power in a republic and to impose on
it a bad form of government, it is essential that he should
find there a material which has in course of time become
disordered and that this disorder shall have been introduced

little by little and in one generation after another,"
(III. 8, 429) as in his example of Spurius Cassius, whose

ambition became suspect to the people because they were not
corrupt, and thus they "closed the way to tyranny." (III. 8,
I

•

^
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Despite Machiavelli's attempt to segregate the natures

of the prince and the people in his dedicatory remarks, for
the purpose of exposing the means by which a private indi
I
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vidual rises to princely status, he did in fact think their
natures "pretty much the same, or, if one be better than the

other, it is the populace... due to the greater or less
respect which they have for the laws under which both are
living," and "a prince who contemns the laWs [as would be
consistent with the nature of a tyrant], will be more un

grateful, fickle, and imprudent than the populace."

Thus,

"the nature of the masses, then, is no more reprehensible
than is the nature of the princes, for all do wrong and to
the same extent when there is nothing to prevent them doing
wrong."

Further, there is more "inconstancy and changeabil

ity in behaviour" in the prince, and Machiavelli argues

against the "common opinion which asserts that the populac
es, when in power, are variable, fickle, and ungrateful...
were the accusation made against both the masses and the

prince, it would be true, but if princes be excepted, it is
false." (I. 48, 254)

Yet, as though the people were in

power which they were not, Machiavelli incorporates that

"common opinion" into his assessment of the populace in the
Prince, "that they are ungrateful, fickle," and variable as
"pretenders and dissemblers," "evaders of danger," as well

as "eager for gain," (Ch. 17, 66) without making the same
accusations against the prince, who is in power, but "ex
cepted" by Machiavelli.

In fact, he praises faithlessness,

deception, and gain in the policies and personal character

istics of the new prince which, in its irony, reflects the ;
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seductive distortion he creates in the Prince.

Although Machiavelli almost treats the populace as a

non-entity in the Prince, susceptible to manipulation by the
new prince but of little more account, he does not fail to

issue a warning to the prince, implied within the context of

variability, charged against the people:

"While you do them

good, they are yours, offering you their blood, property,

lives, and children... when the need for them is far away;
but when it is close to you, they revolt," (Ch. 17, 66)
which prompted Garrett Mattingly to observe, "the only

lesson for princes would seem to be: ^Run for your life!'"®®
In the last paragraph, Machiavelli begins, "Therefore,
Your Magnificence, take this small gift in the spirit with
which I send it."

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. notes that

**animo refers to the ^spirit' with which human beings defend
themselves, [and] never to a capacity for self-detachment

(anima, [or] soul, does not occur in The Prince)

It is

quite provocative to imagine that Machiavelli may have in
tended the word "spirit" to imply that his little gift was,

in reality, a contrived defense against his enemies, the
Medici, and the power they represented.

Mansfield also

provides a second interpretation; spirit "can also mean
^mind' in the sense of ^intent', but not in the sense of
^intellect,'

and as I do not think it was Machiavelli's

intent to grovel at the feet of the Medici, begging for his

part in the destruction of liberty not only in Florence, but
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in all of Italy, he could only have intended to raise his

voice in denunciation of the "great, obvious, and widespread

evils"'^ that lead free cities to slavery.

In the Italy of

his time, Machiavelli blamed the "princes," those "who have

done everything to bring us here,"^ described in chilling
detail, in his Prince.

And when Machiavelli expresses his "extreme desire," in
which the word ^extreme' exaggerates his point, that Lorenzo
(and formerly Giuliano) should "arrive at the greatness that

fortune and your other qualities promise you," in his clos
ing paragraph, he omits virtue, nor can fortune be consid

ered a human quality.

In fact, he is alluding to "fortunate

astuteness," that oblique term he uses to describe the

attribute of those who become "prince of their Fatherland,"
in a "civil principality" where "neither all virtue nor all
fortune [are] necessary to attain it," a form of principali

ty in which "his citizens, always and in every quality of

time, have need of himself and of the state," (Ch. 9, 39-42)
the promise of Medici principality.
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PART II:

Chapter V.

The Prince

Comic Writer

Therefore if I sometimes will laugh or sing,
It is because I have no other way
to conceal my distressful suffering
Petrarch'

so then if sometimes I laugh or sing
I do it because I have just this one way
for expressing my anxious sorrow.
Machiavelli^
Machiavelli had a wonderful sense of humor and extraor

dinary wit, as those who are familiar with his plays would
undoubtedly acknowledge, and his ability and inclination to

write a political satire, such as the Prince, would likely
come as no surprise to those who are so informed.

Scholars,

however, who have focused primarily (if not exclusively) on
V

.

,

his political works have resisted a satirical interpretation
of the Prince, with very few exceptions, despite the fact
that viewing it as satire "not only clears up puzzles and
resolves contradictions; it gives a new dimension and mean

ing to passages unremarkable before."' For the most part,
however, consideration of the Prince as satire has been

excluded from the debate regarding the mystery of

Machiavelli (prompted by those puzzles and contradictions
that abound in his works) and a satisfactory resolution to

the problem of interpretation has not found general agree
ment among scholars after nearly five centuries.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. remarks that "although
/
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Machiavelli sch^olars permit themselves most of the human

indulgences, there is one rule of sobriety they observe with

monastic strictness; never laugh!

If they laugh just once,

it may be because the preacher told a joke, and if he told a

joke, how can he be a preacher?""^

Thus, Machiavelli's

political views might be compromised in some way by admit

ting to his humor and wit, if not his chicanery.

Perhaps

the Prince will never be recognized as satire without admit
ting to those attributes, but the fact remains that his

sense of the comic is evident in many of his writings.
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. refers to a passage in the Dis

courses, in which Machiavelli, "In one of his objections to
the modern reliance on cavalry, compares this situation to a

spirited horse ridden by a cowardly man, or a cowardly horse
ridden by a spirited man... This remark becomes more and
more funny the longer one thinks about it.

In another

example from the Discourses, in commenting on the good
effects of encouraging words in battle, Machiavelli advises
I
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that, "if on a well disciplined army such remarks have a

great effect, on a disorderly and ill-disciplined army they
have a still greater effect, for the whole is swayed^ as it
were, by the wind."

(III. 14, 446)

We have an occasional glimpse of his humor in the

History, as well.

In the chapter following his discussion

of papal nepotism, he refers to the election of Peter of

Marrone, as Pope Celestine, who "being... altogether holy,
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after six months he renounced the papacy."®

And in his

1

discussion of Antonio Tassino of Ferrara, who served Duke

Galeazzo of Milan as Chamberlain to the Duchess, his wife,
Machiavelli explains that, "Either because he was handsome
or because of some secret ability, after the death of the
Duke he rose to such influence with the Duchess that he

almost ruled the state."'

Machiavelli's playful nature is often in evidence in

his letters as well.

Writing to Lodovico Alamanni, December

17, 1517, he remarks, "I have just read Orlando Furioso by

Ariosto, and truly the poem is fine throughout, and in many
places is wonderful.

If he is there, give him my regards,

and tell him I am only sorry that, having spoken of so many
fine poets, he has left me out like a dog, and has done to

me in his Orlando what I shall not do to him in my Ass."*
Machiavelli is referring to his poem The Golden Ass, which
Tommasini maintains is properly titled The Ass.'

While on a mission to the Franciscan friars in Carpi,

in the spring of 1521, Machiavelli made the most of his poor
circximstances by sharing his comic observations in a letter
/

to his friend, Francesco Guicciardini, written in response
to one received from Guicciardini "while sitting on the
privy seat... thinking of the absurdities of this world.
To ease the idle hours, Machiavelli speculated as to "how I
can sow so much discord among them that either here or
elsewhere they may start hitting each other with their
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sandals,"" and he pleads with Guicciardini to send a letter
by servant everyday;

... you would give me light on some

things quite to my purpose,.. you would
make me more esteemed by those in the
house, seeing the messages come thick.
And I can tell you that on the arrival
of this arbalester with the letter, and
making a bow down to the earth, and with

; his saying that he was sent especially
and in haste, everybody rose up with so
>

many signs of respect and such noise
that everything was turned upside down,
and I was asked by several about the
news and I, that its reputation might

grow, said that the Emperor was expected
at Trent, and that the Swiss had sum

moned new diets, and that the King of
France wanted to go in person to speak
with that king, but that his councilors
advised him against it; so that they all
stood with open mouths and with theiri
caps in their hands; and while I write I
have a circle of them around me, and
seeing me write at length they are as

tonished, and look on me as inspired;
and I, to make them wonder more, some

times hold my pen still and swell up,
and then they slaver at the mouth; but

if they could see what I am writing,
they would marvel at it more.

Your

lordship knows that these friars say
that when one is confirmed in grace, the
Devil has no more power to tempt him.
So I have no more fear that these friars

will make me a hypocrite, because I
believe I am very well confirmed.""

There is a compelling tone of anguish throughout this
letter, despite its humor, for clearly he misses his former

position in the government of Florence,

reveling in the

significant and often urgent affairs of state.

That he

viewed his misfortune in comic relief reflects his true

character, as he who ridiculed others did not exempt him
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self.

And this letter testifies to his ability to mask his

agony with comic absurdity as, I would argue, he did in the
Prince, written at a time when his personal loss was inex
tricably joined to the misfortune of Florence as well.

If

the absurd notions he championed in the Prince are not

recognized as such by us, his readers, it is because how we

look determines what we see, and in every corrupt age, we
can be fooled by "the false semblance of good and the false
semblance of renown." (I. 10, 135)

Nor did Machiavelli lack the skill to employ subtle and
clever rhetorical devices.

Writing to Giucciardini in Au

gust, 1527, he described a farm in Tuscany; "I shall begin
everything from Finochieto,"" which was the "name of the
farm" and the "diminutive of finocchio (fennel), proverbial
ly the last thing to come to the dining table.""

James B.

Atkinson makes the point that Machiavelli"is not above

manipulating language," and acknowledges his use of "poly
ptoton, a reiteration of words derived from the same root,
but with different endings or forms," as well as his use of

puns."
Machiavelli's works are entertaining, even when the

subject matter is grave; "No paragraph in The Prince and The
Discourses has been understood until you have found some
thing funny in it.

If you are not in more or less constant

amusement when reading Machiavelli's books, you should

consider yourself bewildered,"" as for example in his refer
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ence to the people under a ^prince' in a "civil principali
ty" as "his citizens," in chapter nine. (Ch. 9, 42)

Failure

to recognize Machiavelli's humor has created scholarly
problems as well.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. illustrates the

point by referring to MachiaveHi's discussion of a Publius
Ruberius in the Discourses:

In example, Machiavelli cites the tu
mults over the Terentillian law, pro
posed to limit the power of the consuls,
and remarks that on one occasion they
were stopped when ^one Publius Ruberius,
a grave citizen of authority, came out
of the Senate and with words partly
loving, partly menacing, pointed out to
them the danger to the city,' and got
the plebs to swear not to depart from
the wish of the consul.

Now the trouble

is that the grave citizen's name accord
ing tp Livy was Publius Valerius, not
Publius Ruberius, and Machiavelli in
fact names him correctly in the next
sentence. Walker, the pre-Straussian
Commentator, looked high and low in the
annals of the Roman republic to find
^Publius Ruberius,' and reports his
failure, Strauss offhandedly suggested
translating ^publius Ruberius' into
Italian, by which it becomes ^public
rohher.' iWo post-Straussian commenta
tors, Bertelli and Puppo, who are well

acquainted with Walker's commentary and
not afraid to borrow from it, pass over
this difficulty in silence."

Thus, Machiavelli's humor seems everywhere apparent,

even in the letters he wrote from the "gloomy court of
Cesare Borgia" at Imola, to his colleagues in Florence,
letters that "made everyone die laughing!

Unfortunately,

these are lost, and judging by the others he wrote to
friends, it is a serious loss to Italian literature.""
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That

Machiavelli used humor, then, a!s a means of criticizing and
exposing the nature of a corrupt society should not surprise
anyone.

In Mandragola, he revealed "the baseness of Italian

society,"^' and in his comedies generally, he sought "to
teach lessons useful to life... by holding up a mirror to

domestic life."^°

So, too, in the Prince, he unmasked the

greed and ambition prevalent in political life, the destruc

tive influence of power in the service of self-interest;
"Satire offers considerable evidence that the good often
suffer, the wicked prosper, and lions prefer eating lambs to

lying down with them."^^

If there is, levity to be found in

such circumstances, trust the satirist to provide that as
well.

The greater the danger, the more the poet must trust

in his own cleverness.
loud.

We, his readers, may not laugh out

We may hot laugh at all.

But no matter how perverse

the satire, if the poet's intent is understood, and his wit

is equal to the task, we will be entertained^—and perhaps
enlightened as well.

Like the ever-laughing Sage
In a Jest I spend my Rage
(Tho' it must be understood
I would hang them if I cou'd:)
Jonathan Swift'22
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Chapter VI.

Kinds of Principalities

Machiavelli originally titled his work "De Principati
bus (of Principalities),

and it is not known exactly when

the title was changed to the Prince,

All of the early

printed editions give the title "II Principe," but it was

not published in Machiavelli's lifetime.

Therefore, one

cannot "say with absolute certainty what title he would
finally have given it."^

Ivan Cloulas suggests that "the

character most often referred to is in fact Cesare Borgia.
In his honor posterity would change the book's title to The
Prince."^

While Machiavelli referred to the work as On

Princedoms, however, in a letter to Vettori (December 10,
1513)r and again, generalized in book two of the Discourses

On the First Ten Books of Titius Livius in reference to "my

treatise on principalities," he calls it "The Prince" by the
time he had written Book Three of the Discourses

There

fore it is reasonable to surmise that perhaps posterity did
not title Machiavelli's work The Prince but Machiavelli

himself, if not officially.

At any rate, in the earlier

manuscript form, he titled it Of Principalities, and it was
by that title that readers first became familiar with his
work.

L. Arthur Burd remarks that it is not "easy to see why
such importance should have been attached to the question

[of the title],"® but for an interpretation of the Prince as
satire, it is a significant consideration, for it appears to
101

be a work concerned with principalities generally under, the

original title, Of Principalities.

Yet, it soon becomes

clear that Machiavelli is concerned with only one kind of
principality, that which is acquired by a new prince of the
sort, described by Garrett Mattingly as those princes "who
have newly acquired their principalities and do not owe them
either to inheritance or to the free choice of their coun

trymen,

The short and ugly word for this kind of prince is

^tyrant'... Opinions about relative merits of republics and
monarchies varied during the Renaissance, depending mainly

upon where one lived, but about tyrants there was only one
opinion... ^If we consult the laws of any well-constituted
republic, we should find them to decree no greater reward to
anyone than to the man who kills the tyrant'... so said the
Italian Renaissance with almost unanimous voice."'

Machiavelli thus does not go directly to his target by
beginning his work with a discussion of the new prince.

Rather, he begins by generalizing about principalities, as
the title Of Principalities vjould lead one to expect of the
work.

Had he not done so, having dedicated the work to the

Medici, the parallels between the Medici and the new prince

would have been all too obvious, defeating the literary
advantage of satire, which masks intent when there is reason
for caution.

Chapter one, "How many are the kinds of principalities

and in what modes are they acquired," (Ch. 1, 5) is remark
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able for its brevity (one short paragraph), in which he

presents the subject in mere perfunctory statements.

As

Machiavelli did not write a preface to the Prince, his
introductory paragraph seems all the more abrupt.

Further,

the lengthy title is in Latin, which lends an even greater

import to his brief narrative, symbolizing the learning,
dignity, and air of antiquity.

Although it was not uncommon

for Machiavelli to give "Latin titles to his vernacular
works,

in the Prince he gives Latin titles to the chapters

as well, a practice he did not observe in the Discourses,

despite the fa;ct that both works were begun at about the
same time, and are viewed by many scholars as "interdepen

dent aspects of an organically unified outlook,"® or, as
Machiavelli might describe it, "... one soul in two bodies,
or rather two souls in one body, in order not to make a
mistake."^"

Superficially, this discrepancy between the two works

does not seem an important one, merely reflecting a varia
tion in form.

Machiavelli may, however, have intentionally

used Latin chapter titles in the Prince to amplify, in the
minds of those who understood his intent, his view of the

clear departure of modern practices from ancient modes of
proceeding.

That is, Latin was "the language of traditional

learning.""

Thus, his chapter headings allude to the tradi

tions and ancient wisdom he admired, while the body, written
in the vernacular, reflects the vulgar and corrupt present
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in which "one comes across nothing but extreme misery,
infamy, and contempt, for there is no observance either of

religion or of the laws, or military traditions... and so
much the more are these vices detestable when they are more
prevalent among those who sit in the judgement seat, pre

scribe rules for others, and expect from them adoration."'^
The symbolism of Machiavelli's Latin chapter titles,
then, is the key, which not only suggests the ancients in

terms of practices, but in literary form as well.

Petrarch,

who is often quoted in Machiavelli's works, examined the
"literature of the ancients" for "their style and their
ethical value, for what they could teach about human nature
and human society,

that which inspired the great poets of

the Italian Renaissance, and Machiavelli as well.

Felix Gilbert offers Machiavelli's Latin chapter head
ings as evidence for his assertion that "Machiavelli endeav
ored to adapt the form of his book to the conventional
literary form of this genre... like the works of [his]
predecessors," the "humanist prince-literature," in which he
"was consciously refuting his predecessors and that his
intention has left its mark on The Prince."^*

The similari

ties between the traditional handbook for princes and
Machiavelli's Prince are quite apparent, although I would
suggest that his refutation was not aimed solely at the

humanists in the interest of power politics.

Rather, he

took aim at the broad spectrum of political life that formed
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his experience, the people and events that contributed to

his cynicism, from which emerged an explosion of contempt.
As Garrett Mattingly observes, "The Prince imitates, almost

parodies, one of the best known and most respected literary
forms of the three preceding centuries, the handbook of
advice to princes... In some ways, Machiavelli's little

treatise Was just like all the other mirrors of Princes; in
other ways it was a diabolical burlesque of them all, a

political Black Mass."^^
Leo Strauss refers to the Prince as combining "a tradi
tional surface with a revolutionary center," in which at
first sight. The Prince belongs to the traditional genre of

Mirrors of Princes, which are primarily addressed to legiti
mate princes; and the most familiar case of the legitimate
prince is the undisputed heir,

Machiavelli almost opens The

Prince by following custom in calling the hereditary prince

the ^natural prince.'

Strauss is referring to Chapter Two

on hereditary principalities, (Ch. 1, 5-6) in which
Machiavelli abruptly dismisses the general topic of heredi
tary principalities while, as Strauss observes, adhering to

the traditional form of the genre of handbooks for princes.

He effectively preserves just enough of the form to give the
appearance of a traditional handbook.

Why would he bother

with such trivia, or trouble himself to frame his new revo

lutionary ideas in a traditional genre?

He was not reluc

tant to state, in his preface to Book I of the Discourses,
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that "I have decided to enter upon a new way, as yet untrod
den by anyone else," a remark that would have provided a
provocative introduction to the Prince.

The traditional handbook for princes reflected an old
■

■ ■

I

■

literary form which "occupied the center of the stage in the

intellectual discussions of his day."

it

Begun in antiquity,

"developed into a complete and compact literary form,

that of the ^mirror of princes,/ which survived until the
nineteenth century."

During the second half of the fif
'

teenth century... it re-emerged as a favorite topic of

discussion."" At issue was the medieval concept of the
prince, as "intermediary between God and man,'"* and the
Humanists view, which "abandoned religious motives in polit
ical theory," and "founded their arguments on historical
example instead of abstract theoretical deduction.""
Ferdinand Schevill reminds us that if Machiavelli

thought the "ideology of Christianity... dead," this was not
true in the "rest of Europe... at the very time that

Machiavelli propounded his doctrine of the state as power,
Erasmus set forth a diametrically opposed and strictly
pacifist view in his Plea of Peace and his Education of a

Christian Prince," while Sir Thomas More "projected, in his
i

Utopia, an ideal society patterned on apostolic Christiani

ty."^®

The shock value of the Prince, then, can be attribut

ed both to its substance, and to Machiavelli's clever adap
tation of the traditional handbook for princes, that which
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made the Prince "so provocative [with] its transformation of

a Christian and humanist genre, the moralistic ^mirror of

princes' literature, into a platform for expounding the

thesis of power politics,"^' what J.R. Hale refers to as "a
bomb in a prayerbook.

As a vehicle for satire, the handbook for princes was a
perfect choice, for certain expectations of tradition accom

panied it as a literary form, which intensified the degree
of distortion achieved by Machiavelli, between the ideal and
■

the reality.

■

•

V

He could not have accomplished the effect of a

"bomb in a prayerbook" with the same blush of humor had he
chosen another literary mode.

^

In yet another context, Machiavelli makes sport of
prince-literature when he discusses the "character Of

Cosimo" in the History; "If when writing of the things done
by Cosimo, I have imitated those who write the lives of

princes, not those who write general histories, nobody
should be astonished; since he was a man rare in our city, I

have been obliged with an unusual method to praise him."^'
That is, to categorize him as a prince; a subtle criticism.

In the History, Machiavelli commends Cosimo for his corrupt
ing influence; "But after he was forty years old, he lived
very happily, so that not merely those who sided with him in

public affairs but also those who had charge of his property
in all Europe shared in his prosperity.

From this very

great riches came to many families in Florence... and in
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addition to these, all who depended on his advice and for
tune grew rich,

creating inequality in Florence, which

ultimately leads to acquiring "sole authority,

tional disunity.

and fac

By using his wealth and influence, Cosimo

aided both "individuals" and the "people," and while being
"compassionate, helpful, liberal, and loved by everybody"

are all "methods that bring men flying to the principate,"
the people don't realize it, and do "not lend [their] ears
to such accusations."^®

If Machiavelli's Prince is a burlesque of the original
prince-literature, it was not simply an effort to satirize
the genre itself but, rather, in the spirit of the Latin

satirists, "to set up in the reader's mind a contrast be

tween the circumstances where such passages were appropriate
and the ridiculous and often sordid situations to which they

applied them.""
In Chapter Two, Machiavelli also dismisses the subject
of hereditary principalities with considerable economy.

Machiavelli's target, in the Prince, is new principalities,
acquired by a new prince.

In the first three chapters,

however, he maintains the appearance of a comprehensive

analysis of principalities generally, at least with his
chapter titles.

In Chapter Three, Machiavelli discusses new

acquisitions added to an old principality, "so that taken as
a whole it can be called almost mixed," (Ch. 3, 7) to make

way for the principality that is altogether new.
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In Chapter Three, Machiavelli remarks that there is a

certain "instability" brought about by the "natural diffi

culty that exists in all new principalities," (Ch. 3, 7-8)
even when they are acquired by an established prince.

To

illustrate the point, Machiavelli turns to King Louis XII of
France, citing the mistakes he made in his acquisitions of
Milan and Naples, in effect demonstrating how it could be
better accomplished another time!

Leo Strauss remarks, "the

primary example in Chapter Three is the policy of conquest
practiced by King Louis XII of France; but the country in
which he tried to acquire new territory was Italy...
Machiavelli discusses the difficulties obstructing foreign
conquests in Italy, a subject important to the liberator of

Italy.

By discussing the mistakes the French King committed
/

in attempting to make lasting conquests in Italy,
Machiavelli undoubtedly gives advice to foreign conquerors
as to how to go about making conquests in his own father
land.

If we grant that Machiavelli did indeed give such

advice, what was his purpose?

Strauss explains it as "the

reverse side, if the odious side, of advice as to how to
defend Italy against foreign domination or as to how to

liberate Italy,"^® certainly a convoluted approach to a
straight forward problem.

Keeping in mind that the Prince

is a satire, however, there are two possible explanations.

The first is that by instructing the French as to how to
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invade Italy successfully, Machiavelli contradicts his

exhortation to "free" Italy "from the barbarians," in Chap
ter Twenty-six.

(Ch. 26, 101)

Contradictions of this sort

create confusion in the text, as he intended.

The Second explanation is less obvious.

Throughout the

Prince, Machiavelli takes on the qualities of the new prince
himself.

That is, he offers advice that accords with his

impressions of modern princes generally, although he disap
proves of their ambition and character.

Therefore, in

suggesting the ways that Louis XII might successfully invade
Italy, he commits the error—a most grievous one—of those

princes who have invited foreigners into the country to aid
them in their enterprises.

He is not so obvious as to

invite the French, but his counsel hints at that objective.

It is probably not a coincidence that he chose the example
of the French, in Chapter Three, who descended on Italy;at
the request of Ludovico Sforza, which launched four decades
of war and chaos, thus constituting a subtle criticism.

Machiavelli faults Louis, however, for "making the
Church great by adding so much temporal greatness to the

spiritual one that gives it so much authority," (Ch. 3, 14)
which directs our attention to the Medici who are, after
■

■

.

■

■

,

.

■

■

all, the intended liberators of Italy in the Prince,

■

■

Fur

ther, to emphasize his point, Machiavelli refers to his

conversation virith the Cardinal of Rouen, who remarked that
the "Italians do not understand war," to which Machiavelli

'

110

■ (

replied, "the French do not understand the state, because if
they understood, they would not have let the Church come to

such greatness," (Ch. 3, 16) which not only upset the bal
ance of power among the Italian states, but contributed to

the ruin of France in Italy as well.
Further, Machiavelli was opposed to the power of the
Church "because he did not like the rule of priests, who had

ruined both the religion of Christ and his other religion,
the state... as a Florentine and an Italian he hated the

temporal power of the Church.

Yet, through his appeal to

the Medici in the Prince to seize and unite Italy, he invit
ed the expansion of the temporal power of the Church through
Pope Leo X; "Now the Church was led by a Florentine, who

united the power of the Florentine State with his ecclesias

tical power, he had a young brother and a young nephew, both
seeking to rule, and he himself was marvelously ^favored by
heaven and by fortune,

Medici.

as Roberto Ridolfi describes the

While Ridolfi finds Pope Julius II an undesirable

model for the Prince, in part for having been "the destroyer
of Florentine freedom,

and the fact that Machiavelli did

not like the rule of priests, he curiously accepts the
Medici model, whose re-constituted rule was the ultimate

destroyer of Florentine liberty and the republic, and who

now occupied the throne of papal authority, the first neces
sity for expanding Medici power.
The sense of urgency that Machiavelli expresses in
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Chapter Twenty-six, then, with such remarks as "one should

not let this opportunity pass," (Ch, 26, 105) and "I do not

know what time has be^n more apt for it," (Ch. 26, 102) with
regard to seizing Italy and liberation, suggest the extent

of Machiavelli's satire which targets the temporal (and
corrupt) power of the Church, and the abuse of that power by

the Borgia Pope and others before him, whose nepotism al
lowed their family members to reach heights otherwise inac

cessible to them.

To further amplify his point, Machiavelli

deliberately mentions that he had the conversation with the

Cardinal of Rouen "when Valentino (for so Cesare Borgia, son
of Pope Alexander, was called by the people) was occupying
the Romagna." (Ch. 3, 16)

If the French did not "understand

the state..^ or they would not have let the Church come to

such greatness," (Ch. 3, 16) mention of Cesare Borgia empha
sizes his point, which extends to the ambition of the

Medici, as well.

Thus, while Borgia is developed in suc

ceeding chapters as the primary model for the Prince,

Machiavelli makes first mention of him in what I would argue

admits to his true assessment of that family, deserving of
blame for advancing the secular power of the Church, and

using that power to install a family member as a new prince
in Italy.

The Medici were blameworthy, as well, for harbor

ing similar ambitions.

Pope Leo is conspicuously absent in the Prince, al
though the Medici power was dependent on his influence.

112

^

Machiavelli cleverly focused (in his dedication) on Giuliano
and Lorenzo, but the Church is implied, particularly in
Chapter Twenty-six, in which Machiavelli calls on Leo to
redeem Italy, "supported by God and by the Church of which

it is now prince."

(Ch. 26, 102-3) Pope Leo is only men

tioned once by name, however, in the Prince, in Chapter
Eleven on ecclesiastical principalities in which Machiavelli
expresses the hope that he will continue to bring the Church
to greatness.

(Ch. 11, 47)

But that is precisely what

Machiavelli opposed, "a Church come to such greatness." (Ch.
3, 16)

As was the case with Cesare Borgia in the Romagna,

neither Giuliano or Lorenzo had the slightest hope to
achieve princely power beyond Florence without the aid of
Vatican resources and political influence.
Nor did Machiavelli have faith in the Church to unite

Italy in coitonon cause, for the Church lacked "power|' and

"virtue."

He accuses the Church of causing "weakness" in

Italy, and illustrates his point with the example of the
Swiss, "who are the only people who today, with respect both
to religion and to military institutions, live as the an-^
cients did," and were the Court of Rome to take "the author

ity it has in Italy" to the Swiss "territories," it would

"cause" more "disorder in that country" than any other event
at any time whatsoever has been able to hiring about." (I.
12, 145-6)

If Machiavelli had so little faith in the abili

ty of the Church to unite Italy, it is ironic that he called
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on the Medici, then, to lead Italy's liberation.

Only in

satire can Machiavelli's appeal to that family be under
stood, for not only was he opposed to priestly rule and

increasing the power of the Church, but he blamed the Church

for its inability to ward off aggressors and for Italy's
state of disarray.

Nor were there secure foundations in

states acquired by popes on behalf of their sons and rela

tives, for the fortune and authority of such princes were
tied to that of the pope, the most ill-conceived of founda

tions owing to their relatively brief reign (as exemplified

in the Borgia), and thus deserving of blame, not praise.
Machiavelli was aware of Pope Leo's grandiose ambitions
for his family before he wrote the Prince, evidenced in his
correspondence with Francesco Vettori who, from his close

association with the pope in Rome, learned of Leo's plans
and attempted to dissuade him from them.

Machiavelli re

ceived a letter from Vettori (July 12, 1513), in which
Vettori refers to the "contradiction between Leo's ambition

for the Church and those for his family."

John M. Najamey

makes the point that "this letter contains the first mention

in the correspondence of the idea of installing Giuliano and
Lorenzo in territorial states of their own," in reference to

Pope Leo's "purpose... to maintain the Church in the pres
tige... in which he found it, not to allow any loss of
territory... unless what is lost be given to members of his

family, namely Giuliano and Lorenzo, to whom he plans in any
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case to give territories [[over which they can rule]]."^
While Vettori was convinced that Leo would ultimately lose
Parma and Piacenza (reacquired in May, 1513), due to forth

coming agreements among the major powers, and he argued his
) reasons before the pope "on more than one occasion," none

theless, the pope "followed his own plan," and was "ulti
mately unable to realize his objectives in Lombardy... It
would have been wiser, if his purpose was indeed ;*to main

tain the Church in the prestige in which he found it,' to
forget about Parma and Piacenza and not to put himself in a

situation in which he might have to yield, as a result
either of military defeat or an embarrassing concession,

territories whose prompt teacquisition he himself had made

the first and most urgent aim of his pontificate,"^^ all of
which calls into question Machiavelli's remark concerning
Pope Leo, in the Prince, having "found this pontificate most
powerful... he with his goodness and infinite other virtues,

can make it very great and venerable." (Ch. 11, 47)

If, in

fact, Machiavelli was in agreement with Vettori, his words

concerning Leo in the Prince are a mockery, for Leo's ac

tions were imprudent, impetuous, and highly questionable as
to motive.

As Vettori suggests, "The pope was thus under

mining his own objectives," whose policies (Leo's) were
"similar" to those "pursued by nearly all the popes since
the previous century and that his relatives in Florehce

hardily thought of anything else... so little did Vettori
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think of the idea that he did not even wish to speculate
about what territories the pope had in mind for this pro

ject, ^because in this matter he will switch his plans as

circumstances require'... a final confirmation of the ga^
between Leo's stated purpose and his actions, between the

ends he said he was pursuing and the means he claimed to be

using in that pursuit."^®

Vettori's views, it seems to me,

reflect those one might expect from the republicans of

Florence, including Machiavelli, who anticipated with dis
dain the Medicean efforts to expand their power, as evi
denced by the conspiracies against that family.
While Machiavelli's response to Vettori's letter is not
extant, he seems to have given full impetus to the notion of
Leo's nepotism in the Prince, and in his letter to Vettori
(January 31, 1514 or 1515), in which he also makes reference

to Cesare Borgia." The date that appears on the original
copy of this letter is January 31, 1514.
and generally accepted date is 1515.

The alternative

Machiavelli's mention,

of Reggio and Modena as cities to be governed by the Medici
suggest the later date as the correct one, although the text

of this letter seems more appropriate to the year 1514, upon

Machiavelli's completion of the Prince,

Perhaps the letter

was altered by Machiavelli himself at a later date, to

accommodate the acquisition of Reggio and Modena by the pope
(1514), which further enhances the opportunity taken by
Machiavelli, in the letter in question, to advance his
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counsel concerning the governing of a new Medicean state.'®
And perhaps, in the larger view, it is possible that

Machiavelli used this letter as a means of protecting him
\

,

self by rendering added credulity and sincerity to his
intent in the Prince, not for Vettori's benefit, who under

stood, but for the benefit of others who might become famil
iar with the correspondence between them.
Machiavelli, given his

In fact,

familiarity with ancient literati,

may have borrowed the idea from Horace that letters can

serve the intent of the satirist,''" and in this regard,
Machiavelli's letter is both pertinent and revealing.
Just as he did in the Prince, Machiavelli presumes to
instruct Giuliano in the governance of a new "sovereignty,"
and he advises that Giuliano, "if he is going to govern it
well, he needs to understand well the nature of the sub

ject."'"

As he did in the Prince, Machiavelli established

the mask of innocence by pretending sincerity.

The inter

esting (and comic) aspect of this letter, however, is that

he gives practical and personalized application of his

precepts from the prince in the example of Francesco
Vettori's brother, Pagolo, who hopes for appointment from
the Medici as governor in their new, unified state;

"your

Pagolo has been here with the Magnificent [Giuliano], and in

the course of his discussions with me on his liopes, he said
His Lordship has promised to make him governor of orie of

those cities of which he is now taking the sovereignty."'*'
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Machiavelli gives the example of Gesare Borgia and Remirro
de Oreo, to make a mockery of what the appointment could

mean for Vettori's brother, Pagolo:
Duke Valentino, whose works I should

always imitate if I were prince... make
Messer Remirro President in Romagna;
that decision made those people united,
fearful of his authority, fond of his
power, and trustful in it; and all the
love they felt for him, which was great,
considering his newness, resulted from
this decision. I believe this thing can
easily be demonstrated, because it is
true; and if it should happen to your
Pagolo, this would be a step in making
him known not merely to the Magnificent
but to all Italy; and with honor and

profit to his Lordship, he could give
reputation to himself, to you, and to
your family. I spoke of it with him; it
pleased him, and he will consider making
use of it. I have thought it well to
write about it, so that you will know
our discussions and, wherever it is
necessary, can pave the way to this
thing.

Urging the Medici to follow the example of Cesare

Borgia is but to repeat a familiar theme from the Prince,
but in associating Pagolo with the fate of Remirro,
Machiavelli makes a joke of Pagolo's aspirations and ridi
cules his own recommendations at the same time, for Remirro
was sacrificed at the behest of his prince, Duke Valentino.
As Ivan Cloulas describes the event, "the people of Cesena

found [Remirro's] headless body lying in the middle of the

piazza.

He was dressed in his rich suit and purple mantle.

His head, with its black beard, was impaled on a pike, while
beside the corpse lay the bloodstained execution block and
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blade," from which "Machiavelli drew a moral... the reason

for his death is not known, save that the Prince willed it

SO, which shows that he can make and unmake men at his will,

according to their merits," as he recorded in a dispatch

from Cesena, December 26, 1502."^
Machiavelli gave yet another explanation in the Prince,
however.

In Chapter Seven, he notes that, in order to

"reduce" the Romagna to "peace and obedience to a kingly

arm," Cesare installed Remirro, "a cruel and ready man, to
whom he gave the fullest power," and then "to purge the

spirits of that people and gain them entirely to himself...

to show that if any cruelty had b^en committed, this had not
come from him but from the harsh nature of his minister,"
(Ch. 7, 29-30) he had him hacked to pieces.

The reference

to Remirro, then, with regard to Pagolo Vettori, is meant to
be a humorous one, a hint of the reputation that Pagolo can
expect from the new prince, which would make him "known not

merely to the Magnificent but to all Italy," whose actions
(and fate) would reflect on his family,as well, including
Francesco Vettori.

Machiavelli makes no mention of

Remirro's untimely death in the letter, of course, which he

leaves to be inferred by Vettori, and savored as the great

irony of his recommendations to Giuliano and Pagolo.
If Cesare was loved by the people of Cesena for killing

Remirro, he was "hated, feared, and despised" everywhere
else, "even by most of the faction who had stood by the old
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pope [Alexander VI

Machiavelli does not state that he

was loved in the Prince or the Discourses, as he does in

this letter, but he does observe, in one of his dispatches,

that Cesare was "universally feared."'*®

And in the Discours

es, he observes that those princes who have "become tyrants

in their own country" will find the people desire to "avenge
themselves against the persons who have become the cause of

their servitude," as did Clearchus, who "cut to pieces all
the nobles to the immense satisfaction of the popular party,

and in this way satisfied one of the demands of the popu
lace, namely, the demand for vengeance." (I. 16, 156)
Machiavelli, recognizing

that such methods are useful tools

for tyranny, then, appropriately applied them in the Prince.

There is, of course, a third explanation for Remirro's
death, not referred to by Machiavelli in the Prince.

He was

"condemned to death for embezzlement, accused of exporting

huge quantities of wheat he was suppose to bring back."

As

Ivan Cloulas points out, however, "What really earned him
the death penalty was that he had treacherously plotted with

the condottiere to trap II Valentino,"'*' at Sinigaglia.
Cesare put down the plot in ruthless fashion, having discov
ered it from Remirro after his arrest."**

Rather than make

the point that Cesare was threatened by Remirro, an assoc

iate of long standing, however, he encourages the new prince
to betray others at will.

If the prince avoids hatred and

contempt, he "will find no danger in his other infamies,"
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(Ch. 19, 71-2) but ^'infamies" of the sort he recommends in

the Prince breed hatred and contempt.

Even when Machiayel11 touches on the topic of conspira
cy, he advises that the prince will prevail "provided he has
ordered and lived as I said, as long as he does not forsake
himself, he will always withstand every thrust as I said

Nabis the Spartan did." (Ch. 19, 72) Nabis, however, was

killed in a conspiracy,^' which Machiavelli records in some
detail in the Discourses. (III. 6, 414-15)
I '

'

'

Therefore,
■

Machiavelli not only demonstrates a difference in emphasis
in the Prince and in the Discourses but often leaves it for

the reader to discern, from what he does not say, the mes
sage he is trying to convey in the former work which, in
this case, is that the prince has much to fear.

As in his

letter to Vettori associating Pagolo with the fate of
Remirro, what is left unspoken has yet its own voice, and

Machiavelli took great delight in flirtatious implication
concerning the comically grave in his writings.

One of the mechanisms used in verbal irony is to "[re
fer] vaguely to important people as nonentities or subordi

nates,"®" which describes the manner in which Machiavelli
refers to Ludovico Sforza, in Chapter Three.

In his discus

sion of how Louis XII lost Milan, Machiavelli remarks, "So

it was that, if one Duke Ludovico stirring up commotion at
the border was enough to make France lose Milan the first

time... ," (Ch. 3, 9) Machiavelli treats Sforza as an insig
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nificant interloper, although it was Sforza's state that
Louis XII seized when he took Milan.

If this humorous

remark eludes the modern reader, it must certainly have

amused Machiavelli's contemporaries, who understood Sforza's
unscrupulous rise to power followed by his demise at the
hands of the French, his former allies.

Because Sforza

exemplified the new prince in many significant ways, as both
ruthless and cunning, it seems remarkable that Machiavelli

makes no other mention of him in the Prince.

Perhaps he

refrained from doing so because "no contemporary Italian
with as much as a touch of patriotism can have viewed the
catastrophe of the Moor with any other feeling than that a

traitor had received his reward,

strong emotions that

Machiavelli wisely avoided to preserve credulity in his sat
ire.

Machiavelli makes a distinction, in Chapter Three,

between states that are acquired of the same province and
language, and those that are not.

The former "may be held

with greater ease," and he cites the examples of "Burgundy,
Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been with France

for so long a time." (Ch. 3, 9) Brittany, however, had only

been "with France" since 1491, acquired through the marriage
of Anne of Brittany to King Charles VIII, further preserved
for France by the marriage of Anne to Louis XII, after the

death of Charles VIII.

In fact, Brittany was not actually

incorporated into France until 1547.
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The "ease" that

Machiavelli refers to, then, with which Brittany was held,

had more to do with a marriage alliance than with language
or geography.

In Machiavelli's First Decennale, a poem

written in 1504, he writes of the agreement made between

Pope Alexander VI and Louis XII, that made the marriage
possible:
So because by himself alone the Pope had
no strength to do Anything great, he set
out to win the new king's favor. Granted
his divorce, and gave him Brittany, and

in return the king promised him the

lordship and the states of Romagna.^'
In reference to the errors made by Louis and faith kept
by princes, however, Machiavelli dismisses out of hand the
agreement made between Alexander and Louis by simply stat
ing, "And if some others should bring up the faith that the

king had pledged to the pope, to undertake that enterprise
for him in return for dissolving his marriage and for the
hat of Rouen, I reply with what I will say below on the

faith of princes and how it should be observed," (Ch. 3, IS
IS) a reference to Chapter Eighteen.

Although Machiavelli

faults Alexander for not keeping faith in that chapter/^ he
does not expound on the agreement between Alexander and

Louis in the Prince, because the initial terms of the agree
ment were kept.

Louis obtained his divorce from Jeanne of

France to marry Anne of Brittany, and Georges d' Amboise was

granted the position he sought as Cardinal.

In return,

Alexander not only secured the aid promised by Louis in his
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Romagna enterprise, but also Louis' word that he "would do

what he could to promote Cesare's marriage to the princ

ess,"^' Carlotta of Aragon, a marriage objected to by her
father, Federigo, King of Naples, and by herself as well.'®
Further, Cesare acquired the "counties of Valence, and

Die in the Dauphine."

Valence was "made,a duchy," granting

title to Cesare, in 1498.

He made a trip to France to

receive his property and honors with such pomp and ostenta
tious splendor that the "chronicler Brantome" said of it,

"There is little doubt that he [Louis] and his courtiers
laughed at such a grand display for the petty duke of Va

lence," upon his arrival at the king's chateau."

Added to

the agreement between Alexander and Louis was the provision
that the county of Asti would be granted to Cesare, when
Louis reached Milan.

So adamant was Louis in keeping his part of the bar

gain, having been granted his annulment December 17,'* that
when Carlotta failed to respond to Cesare, he sought yet
another bride for the fledgling prince.

His second endeavor

failed as well, refused by his niece, the "daughter of Jean
de Foix."

Alexander feared the "his son would soon be the

laughingstock of all Europe," but Alain d' Albret offered
the hand of his daughter, Charlotte, "whose brother, Jean,
was King of Navarre, which proved agreeable to all parties."

As Ivan Cloulas observes, "since the ultimate goal of this

marriage was to ensure that the king receive the pope's help
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in the coming Italian wars, Louis had a clause added to the

effect that the duke, together with his relatives, friends,

and allies, would aid him in the conquest of Naples and the
duchy of Milan; in return he promised the Vatican the assis

tance of the royal armies if the pope requested,"^® which
Cesare used to his great advantage in his future enterpris
es. '

'

Thus, the marriage of Louis XII to Anne, Queen of

Brittany, and the preservation of Brittany for France,
devolved upon favor received from the pope, which ultimately
led to an agreement with far reaching consequence for the

Italian Peninsula, beneficial to both the Borgias and the
King of France; an agreement which the short-^sighted Louis
failed to see would promote the power of the Church, seed of

the kings own demise.

By trivializing the importance of

their agreement, Machiavelli touched on "irony by under
statement, the appearance of representing something as much

less serious than it really is," which "requires a select
and responsive audience to recognize its peculiar direction

of meaning."®"

With regard to states acquired "in a province disparate

in language, customs, and orders," as was the difficulty
that confronted Louis XII in Italy, (Ch. 3, 9) Machiavelli
faults the king for having made five errors:

"he had elimi

nated the lesser powers; increased the power of a power in

Italy; brought in a very powerful foreigner; did not come to
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live there; did not put colonies there*" (Ch. 3, 15)
In considering that Louis should have come to Italy to
live, "one of the greatest and quickest remedies for whoever

acquires it," (Ch. 3, 16) could Machiavelli really have
imagined that the king of France would make his residence in

Milan?

Or the head of any other great power, such as

Maximillian I?

The suggestion is absurd, and meant to be

so.

Machiavelli also mentions living there as an option in
Chapter Five, concerning administration of those cities or

principalities acquired which are accustomed to liberty and
freedom, but he does not elaborate on the benefits that

would accrue from doing so, perhaps because there are none,
as he "should expect to be destroyed by it," (Ch. 5, 21) for
those accustomed to liberty never forget it, that which "no

force crushes, no time wears away, and no gain counter-bal

ances.'"^^

As the Florentines would recall, Charles VIII of

France, "resided in the Medici palace"® after his triumphant
entrance into Florence in 1494, "as though he were a con

quering hero."®

The young republic responded to his demands

with aplomb, demonstrated in the courage of Peiro di Gino

Capponi, who warned the king, "If you sound your trumpets,
we will ring our bells," words that became a Florentine

proverb,®^ symbolizing the will to fight foreign oppression.
Machiavelli ends Chapter Eight with the advice that a

prince should live with his subjects, a chapter that is
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devoted to the subject of crime, injury, and cruelty.
Machiavelli might have recommended that the prince live with

his subjects to promote the welfare and security of all but,

unlike the Discourses, that is not the emphasis he wishes to
convey in the Prince.

Rather, he Offers his notion of liv

ing there in the context of securing the welfare of a ty
rant, as is the sum of his advice throughout the Prince,
having more concern for the security of the new prince than

the security of his subjects—and in this he is wholly con
sistent.

Machiavelli's treatment of colonies in Chapter Three is
also transparent and revealing.

He had great respect for

the Roman practice of colonizing, which offered "protection
on Rome's boundaries," and provided "a garrison there at no

expense to themselves," but, as he notes in the History,
this "great and wonderful provision of ancient republics and

principalities" that "filled empty places with inhabitants,
and kept men well distributed within the provinces" result
ing in the rise of cities "has vanished" in "present
times.

And in the Discourses, he states that in the conduct of
'

'

•

'

■

!

■

war, the Romans, "when they had won, the enemy, to prevent

them devastating the surrounding country, came to terms; and
the Romans confiscated some of his lands, which they handed

over either for private use or to a colony which they placed
on the enemies frontiers for the protection of Rome's bound
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aries, with the advantage both to the colonies who had the
land and to the Roman public who had a garrison there at no
expense to themselves." (II. 6, 292)

In the Prince, however, his tone is markedly different;

"Tiie other, better remedy is to send colonies that are, as
it were, fetters of the state, to one or two places, because

it is necessary either to do this or to hold them with many
men-at-arms and infantry." (Ch. 3, 10)

He is not suggesting

here that colonies function as protection for the bound
aries, or that they serve to inhabit desolate places from
which cities might rise and flourish.

Rather, he implies

that colonies, as an extension of the state, restrain the

subject people—a better remedy than holding them by mili
tary means.

He neglects to explain how colonies, small in

number, will succeed in holding the people in check.

He

refers to the despoiled, in this case his fellow Italians,
as those "from whom one takes fields and houses in order to

give them new inhabitants-—who are a very small part of that
state." (Ch. 3, 10)

By representing the despoiled as "a

very small part of the state," he diminishes the importance
of their loss.

Jonathan Swift used diminution as a satiri

cal device, in A Tale of a Tub, when he wrote, "Last week I
saw a woman flayed, and you would hardly believe how much it
altered her person for the worse.

Had Machiavelli not had

reason for caution in writing his satire, his own penchant

for quick-witted humor would likely have graced the pages of
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the Prince in a more overt manner than he managed under the
circumstances—but the humor is there nonetheless.

Machiavelli observes that "those whom [the new prince]
offends, since they remain dispersed and poor, can never
hurt him." (Ch. 3, lO)

This is untrue, of course, for it is

from the ranks of malcontents that conspiracies are formed,

who may call in outsiders to avenge their complaints.

He

emphasizes the point by repeating this assertion; "and those
who are offended can do no hurt, since they are poor and

dispersed, as was said." (Ch. 3, 10)

Yet, as he states in

the Discourses, a prince should always beware of the veng
ence of those he has despoiled.

(III. 6, 400)

One does find similarity, however, in the Discourses

and the Prince, in what Machiavelli has to say about puni
tive colonization, despoiling and dispersing the people, and
in connection with avoiding a middle path.

In the Discours

es, he cites the action taken by the Roman Senate against
rebellious Latium, which considered each town individually,
rendering either pardon or punishment for their rebellion.
The latter was administered "by demolishing the towns...
sending colonies there, and taking the inhabitants back to

Rome or so dispersing them that they could no longer do harm

either by appeal to arms or by their machinations," (II. 23,
348) in which case the possibility for revenge is indeed
reduced.

Leaving the despoiled "poor and dispersed," howev

er, as he stated in the Prince, (Ch. 3, 10) would not have
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the same effect, in providing security for the prince.
The other similarity that is distorted in the Prince is

the notion of avoiding a middle path or middle course.

In

both works, he recommends that the middle path is least

desirable.

"Men should either be caressed or eliminated,"

(Ch. 3, 10-11) as he states in the Prince, and in the Dis
courses, with reference to Latium, he remarks that the

Romans, to their credit, never "adopt[ed] a middle course as
I have said... and other rulers should imitate them in

this," (II. 23, 348)

The fact is, however, Machiavelli did

recommend a middle path in the Prince, rather than an ex

treme.

Leaving the despoiled homeless and poor did not

eliminate them, and those he has injured, though despoiled,
"still have arms." (II. 24, 353)

Nor did the prince "ca

ress" the others, whom he merely left alone.

operative is fear.

The real

"They are afraid to err from fear that

what happened to the despoiled might happen to them," and so
they should "be quiet."

(Ch. 3, 10)

Failure to win them

over, however, could prove costly to the prince.

Machiavelli also advances his argument for colonies by
criticizing the use of arms.

"But when one holds a state

with men-at-arms in place of colonies, one spends much more
since one has to consume all the income of that state in

guarding it.

So the acquisition turns to loss... ," (Ch. 3,

11) with no profit to the prince.

"... And one offends much

more because one hurts the whole state as one's army moves
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around for lodgings.

Everyone feels this hardship, and each

becomes one's enemy:

and these are enemies that can hurt

one since they remain, though defeated, in their homes."

(Ch. 3, 11)

If the people are defeated, however, and in

their homes, how Will they "hurt" an invading army?
the people who will be hurt by such practices.

It is

A prince who

has so little discipline over his troops that "all the
income of that state is consimed in guarding it" is impru
dent and unwise.

The methods of such a prince do, however,

bring Cesare Borgia to mind.

In passing through Tuscany, Gesare's troops left terri

ble carnage.

In 1502, Machiavelli wrote (in a dispatch from

Imola), "^they have devoured everything here except the

stones... here in the Romagna they are behaving just as they
■

■'

■

■

/

■,

did in Tuscany last year, [of their passage then, Landucci
noted in his diary that none of the foreign armies that had

crossed Tuscany in the past seven years had behaved so

abominably as these Italians under the papal banner] and

they show no more discipline and no less confusion than they
did then.'

There is no subsequent indication that

Machiavelli ever changed his mind."®' Machiavelli criticizes

such practices in his remarks concerning men-at-arms, in
Chapter Three, but the irony of his criticism is not appar

ent, until he unveils Cesare Borgia as his model prince,
particularly when he states, "I shall never hesitate to cite

Cesare Borgia and his actions," (Ch. 13, 55) whom he never
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criticizes in the Prince, and in the Discourses, he ignores.
Machiavelli also faults Louis XII for having "eliminat
ed the lesser powers," (Ch. 3, 15) in part by "giving aid to
.

■

.

■

■

■ ■

Pope Alexander so that the pope might seize the Romagna."
(Ch. 3, 14)

A wise prince would "make himself head and

defender of lesser powers," (Ch. 3, 11) and Machiavelli

lists several such powers of the Romagna that came to meet

Louis as friends, after he acquired Lombardy.

What

Machiavelli does not say, however, is that it was part of
Louis' agreement with Alexander that he assist the Borgias
in their Romagna campaign in exchange for Borgia's assis
tance in his own enterprises in Italy.

That is, Louis did

not have the choice that Machiavelli faults him for not

making.

He needed the help of the Borgia to consider his

campaign in the first place.
Further, to better inform the present by making refer

ence to the ancients, Machiavelli cites the Roman example in
Greece; "And I want the province of Greece alone to suffice

as an example," (which should alert the reader to be wary,

as Machiavelli has employed the device of omission, exclud

ing all other examples), in which the Romans indulged the

lesser powers, "the Achaeans and the Aetolians," (Ch. 3, 12)
to achieve their objective in Greece and Macedonia, from

which example we are to draw a comparison between the legen
dary and formidable Achaeans and Aetolians, and the petty
lords of the Romagna.

As Leonard Feinberg observes, "Humor
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is always a distortion of the familiar, and the humorous
comparison is simply one form of distortion.

The remaining errors for which Louis XII is blamed,

"increasing the power of a power in Italy [the Church]," and
bringing in "a very powerful foreigner [Spain]," (Ch. 3, 15)
led ultimately to the defeat of France.

Louis was himself,

of course, a powerful foreigner who invited himself into

Italy.

As for bringing Spain, it was not Louis, but the

actions of Charles VIII and, even more directly. Pope
Alexander, who bore the responsibility.

When Charles en

tered Naples in 1494, "Alfonso fled, and Charles entered

without firing a shot."

When he attempted to leave, howev

er, he encountered the forces of an alliance put together by
Pope Alexander, and was defeated at Fornovo, in 1495.

"The

son of Alfonso, Ferrante II, returned [to Naples] but with

troops furnished by his Spanish relative King Ferdinand...
and thereafter the Spanish monarchy no more let go from
southern Italy."®'
Machiavelli devoted Chapter Three to the five errors

committed by Louis XII, but in his conclusion, he remarks,
"Yet if he had lived, these errors could not have hurt him

if he had not made a sixth; depriving Venice of their
state," (Ch. 3, 15) which effectively negates the importance

of the original errors, including the error of increasing
the power of the Church, which ultimately ruined Louis.

And

if Louis "had lived," he would haVe encountered the Medici
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pope, who did not "favor" France,™ and who found the Church
greater than when Louis first arrived in Italy.
In Chapter Three, then, Machiavelli gives us our first

glimpse of modern Italy.

He sets the tone with respect to

the "quality of the times." (III. 8, 428-9)

There is no

mention of nor concern with the common good or the common
benefit, a central principle in the Discourses.

Nor does

Machiavelli make any reference to letting the people "live
by their laws" (Ch. 5, 20) and retain their institutions.

Louis is portrayed as a tyrant whose intent was to exact
complete control and authority over his new subjects—in
effect to enslave them.

By associating Louis, who repre

sents a country with good civic order,™ with tyrannical
practices, Machiavelli creates a transition in the minds of

his readers toward acceptance of such practices.

One of the

rhetorical devices employed by Swift in his Modest Proposal
was "the progression of diminution," of "man to animal to

food," which means "the impression of normalness (and the
reluctant acceptance) is gradually achieved."™
By means of the errors that Louis committed,

Machiavelli reveals how a tyrant must view his subjects, as
an enemy against whom he must guard.
can guard them himself.

By living there, he

Or he could use military force.

The better remedy, however, is to plant one or two colonies,

which would never be sufficient to contain a people accus
tomed to "liberty," whose "refuge in rebellion" and "its own
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ancient orders... are never forgotten." (Ch. 5, 21)
Machiavelli does succeed in ridiculing France/ however, for

its pretensions to empire, by suggesting that France colo
nize in Italy, in imitation of the Roman Empire.
Machiavelli also reveals the growing power of the

Church in secular affairs in Italy.

And, by mentioning the

Borgias in the context of the Romagna, he suggests the
corrupt state of the Church in his time, a standard against

which his satire unfolds, inherited by the Medici pope in
whom the Medici power resides.
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Chapter VII.

Slavery and Freedom

By its title, "Why the Kingdom of Darius which
Alexander Seized did not Rebel from his Successors after

Alexander's Death," Chapter Four gives the appearance of a

digression, having no apparent connection to the preceding
chapter.

As L. Arthur Burd remarks, "the following chapter

[four] is one of those which have received the least atten
tion from the critics and commentators.

It is not difficult

to see why this should be so, for it is indeed hardly more

than a digression."

Burd suggests that Machiavelli may have

anticipated objections to his conclusion in Chapter Three;

"If the difficulties of establishing and maintaining a
government absolutely new are so great, why did the succes

sors of Alexander find no other difficulty in maintaining
his ^new conquests' except that which arose from their own
ambition?"^

I think the answer to that question depends on whether
or not the conquered people were accustomed to living in

servitude or in freedom.

In Chapter Four, Machiavelli

distinguishes between two different kinds of states in which

servitude is the norm, yet governed in "two diverse modes:
either by one prince, and all the others servants who as

ministers help govern the kingdom by his favor and appoint
ment," in which case the prince will find them difficult to
conquer because they are "united," but easy to hold, once

the "blood "line of the prince is "eliminated."
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The other

mode is represented by France, "by a prince and by barons

who hold that rank not by favor of the lord but by antiquity

of blood line" which, while easier to conquer as "you can
easily enter there, having won over to yourself some baron
of the kingdom," it will be harder to hold, due to difficul

ties arising from "those who have helped you and from those
you have oppressed." (Ch. 4, 16-19)

In neither case, howev

er, is the prince attempting to subject a populace accus
tomed to freedom.

As the kingdom of Darius was like that of the Turk,
Alexander had no difficulty in maintaining it, once it was

conquered, and his successors (had Alexander provided for
this eventuality) would have maintained it as well, if

united, for as Machiavelli states in the Discourses, "cities
accustomed to subjection are usually not so particular about

changing masters:

on the contrary, they are often glad to

do so." (III. 12, 441)

The tone of Chapter Four is significantly different
than that of Chapter Three.

I detected none of the satiri

cal malice and contempt that animated the pages of the

previous chapter.

As a digression, however, it serves a

function within the satire.

Digression is an element of

classical rhetoric, employed by Swift in his Modest Propos
al, in which the "projector" digressed into subject matter
that contained a "historical parallel" to the subject matter
of the essay," followed by the proof, which contained rea
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sons why the proposal should be accepted.^

There are simi

larities in Chapters Four and Five of the Prince with the

classical form followed by Swift.

In Swift's digression,

the historical parallel is provided by relating the custom
of the Formosan Court in eating the flesh of young girls

whose bodies have just been cut down by the public hang

man."^

Machiavelli's historical parallel is demonstrated in

the progression from freedom to servitude exemplified by the
"frequent rebellions in Spain, France, and Greece against
the Romans" that, for "as long as their memory lasted,"
caused the Romans to be "uncertain of their possessions, but

when their memory was eliminated with the power and long

duration of the empire, the Romans became secure possessors
of them." (Ch. 4, 19)

The historical examples of servitude

in Chapter Four, and particularly the gradual movement from
freedom to servitude over time, corresponds with the rise of

the Medici.

Thus, the threat of slavery was as great from

within Italy as from without.

As Francesco Guicciardini

said of Lorenzo the Magnificent, "He had such great authori
ty that one may say that the city yas not free in his time,

even though it was rich in all those glories and good for
tune which a city may enjoy when free in name but in fact

ruled as a tyrant by one of its citizens."'*
In one of his earliest letters, to Ricciardo Bechi,
Machiavelli gave an account of one of Savonarola's sermons

and observed, "He said next—having digressed, as his custom
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is, further to weaken his adversaries, and also to make a

bridge to his next sermon—that our discords might cause a

tyrant to rise up who would destroy our homes and lay waste

to our fields."^

Iri so far as a digression can be employed

to "weaken" one's adversaries, then, Machiavelli's attention

to the subject of servitude, like Swift's reference to

eating human flesh in Formosa, disarms the reader by lessen
ing the shock of what one is asked to believe as the satire

unfolds.

We are desensitized in a gradual process of ac

cepting the unacceptable.

'

Despite its brevity. Chapter Five constitutes an impor
tant segment of Machiavelli's satire.

The key to its sig

nificance resides in his statement, "And whoever becomes

'

patron of a city used to being free and does not destroy it,
should expect to be destroyed by it," (Ch. 5, 201) because

it is clear from his Discourses that he does not suggest to
every new prince that a free city must be destroyed to hold
or maintain it.

As Leo Strauss reminds us, "In the Dis

courses, he says that precisely a prince, as distinguished

from a republic, provided he is not a barbarian, would spare
and protect conquered cities and would leave intact, as much

as possible, their autonomy."®

Further, it is Machiavelli's

opinion that as people are "frequently influenced more by
appearances than reality," a new government introduced in a

free city should "retain as much as possible of what is
old... by one who proposes to set up a political regime
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whether by way of a republic or by way of a monarchy." (I.
25, 175-6) Yet Machiavelli is quite emphatic in Chapter Five

that if a prince wants to be certain of possessing a free
city, he must "ruin" or "destroy" it.

The explanation is

that the new prince is not setting up a "political regime"
for a republic or monarchy, but, rather, a despotism;

"But

he who proposes to set up a despotism or what writers call a

tyranny, must renovate everything," (I. 25, 175-6) that is,

to make everything new, the old must be destroyed, including
the destruction of cities.

Thus, a new prince should

... appoint new governors with new ti
tles and new authority... make the rich
poor and the poor rich... build new
cities and destroy those already
built... move the inhabitants from one

place to another far distant from it...
such methods are exceedingly cruel, and

are repugnant to any community, not only
to a Christian one, but to any composed
of men. It behooves, therefore, every
man to shun them, and to prefer to live
as a private citizen than as a king with
such ruination of men to his score.

None the less, for the sort of man who

is unwilling to take up this first
course of well doing, it is expedient,
should he wish to hold what he has, to
enter on the path of wrong doing. Actu
ally, however, most men prefer to steer

a middle course, which is very harmful.
(I. 26, 176-7)

Without exception, Machiavelli will advise, in the
Prince, that the new prince follow the "path of wrong doing"
as distinguished from the "course of well doing," and by so
advising it can be inferred that his new prince is, by his
own description, a tyrant.
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Further, Machiavelli used the word "patron" rather than

prince, which is inconsistent with his usual habit; "And
whoever becomes patron of a city and does not destroy it,
should expect to be destroyed by it."

The word "patron"

harbors multiple nuances of interpretation.

As benefactor,

it implies one who gives aid, perhaps even comfort, to
another, in which case Machiavelli has used the word with

h\amor and sarcasm in reference to the prince.

It also

suggests the beneficent liberality practiced by the Medici
in the City of Florence, of the kind that redounds to the

benefit of the people from which the benefactor gains influ
ence and position to his own advantage.

In the context of

force and warfare. Pope Alexander VI was patron extraordin

are of Cesare Borgia's campaign, nor can we forget the aid

given by France, in that regard.

Perhaps Machiavelli in

tended that "patron" be interpreted in all of these ways
(and perhaps more) by those who understood his intent.

At

the very least, I think that he meant to imply the patronage

of the Medici in Florence, as such forms of patronage ulti
mately lead to corruption and ruin in a republic (and repub

lic is his reference in the concluding sentence to Chapter
Five), by means of fraud.

Thus, he alludes to the ruin of

the city's liberty by that family in a subtle manner, in a
chapter devoted to the destruction of liberty.

The title of Chapter Five, "How Cities or Principali

ties Which Lived Under Their Own Laws before They Were
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Occupied Should Be Administered" suggests two things:

that

the cities were occupied, not destroyed, and second, they
were given some form of new government.

One cannot adminis

ter a city that has been destroyed, however, which is
Machiavelli's primary recommendation, and therefore the

chapter title is comically misleading.

The notion that the prince might "Let them live by
their laws, taking from them and creating within them an

oligarchical state which keeps them friendly to you,"
(Ch. 5, 20) is the most reflective of the chapter title, but

it is dismissed by Machiavelli with a few historical examr
ples demonstrating that it doesn't work.

The Spartans lost

Athens and Thebes by such methods, and the Romans, after

establishing an oligarchy in Greece, were compelled to
destroy it, as they destroyed the rebellious Capua, Carthage
and Namantia.

Having disposed of the-subject, he does not

return to it in his conclusions.

When Cosimo de' Medici returned from his exile, "and
some citizens said to him... that the city was ruined and
that it was an act against God to drive out of it so many

important men, he answered that a city ruined was better

than one lost."' Machiavelli might have responded that the
Medici should beware of their own ruin; "When [a] government
has been brought into being by the common consent of a whole

people which has made it great, there is no reason why, when
the said people as a whole meets their downfall, they should
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harm anyone except its head.

This was the case with Rome's

government and with the expulsion of the Tarquins.

It was

also the case with the government of the Medici in Florence,
which, when it fell in 1494, harmed nobody but the Medici
themselves," (III. 7, 425-6) and the people returned to a
republican government.
I would conclude that in Chapter Five, Machiavelli

emphasized the need to ruin and destroy free cities, for the
purpose of justifying the tyrannical precepts he recommends

in the Prince} for in those restless bastions of liberty,
the people are "extraordinarily revengeful towards those who

have destroyed their liberty." (II. 2, 276)

He also makes

it clear that the idea of freedom can never be erased from

their memory; thus, his conclusion that "the most secure

path is to eliminate them or live in them" is only partly
true for in neither case will the prince extinguish their
memory of freedom.

Unless the prince exterminates or dis

perses the entire population, he must always fear the peo
ple, and thus the draconian measures Machiavelli advocates

in the Prince become a necessity.

Within the realm of distorted reality created by the
satirist, the poet's true voice can sometimes be heard.

In

A Modest Proposal, one can detect it in Swift's negation of
sound solutions to the problems of Ireland:

"Therefore, let

no man talk to me of other Expedients; Of taxing our Absen

tees at five Shillings a Pound... of being a little cautious
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not to Sell our Country and Conscience for nothing...
Machiavelli's voice can be heard as well, even as he urges

the prince to ravage free cities, for as he reminds us, a
city "always has as a refuge in rebellion the name of liber
ty and its own ancient orders which are never forgotten
either through length of time or because of benefits re
ceived... in republics there is greater life, greater ha
tred, more desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient

liberty does not and cannot let them rest," (Ch. 5, 21)
reflecting, above all, the Republic of Rome he admired.
As Machiayelli would write long after his composition
of the Prince,

I am now beginning to write again, and I
relieve myself by blaming the princes,
who have all done everything to bring us
here.

Farewell.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Historian, comic writer, and

tragic writer'
I By his own self-description—historian, comic writer,
and tragic writer (he ignored his former statesmanship from

which experience his major works emerged), his literary
gifts are readily apparent, nor did he lack a motive for a
critical appraisal of his times.

Of Florence, Ridolfi

remarks, "As freedom ebbed away, there went also the old way
of life in the city which we have described, surviving only
in the regrets of those who had enjoyed its last moments,
and if Machiavelli was concerned "that peoples of old were
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more fond of liberty than they are today," (II. 2, 277) the
danger was compounded by the rising ambition of those who

were eager to take it away.

As a cutting edge for his own

vengeance, satire was perfectly suited to Machiavelli, and

in Gilbert Right's "tribute to the power of satire,"" one
r

can sense the tormented spirit of the satirist in relentless

pursuit of his prey, and we are left to discern his meaning
or not, as though it were enough for him that he gnawed the
1

bone for his own satisfaction.

Hail, Satire! Hail, clear-eyed, sharptongued, hot tempered, outwardly disil
lusioned and secretly idealistic Muse!
Mother of Comedy, Sister of Tragedy,
defender and critic of Philosophy, hail!
You are a difficult companion, a mis
tress sometimes elusive and tantalizing,
sometimes harsh and repellent; but in
your mercurial presence no one is ever
bored. Stupidity, Self-satisfaction,
Corruption, the Belief in Inevitable
Progress—these and other intellectual
monsters, produced spontaneously from

the waste energy of the human mind, you
have destroyed again and again. Still
they are reborn, and still you arise to
destroy them. Hail to Satire, the tenth
Muse... who is not so devoted to build

ing immortal works as to cursing the
endemic ills of human beings; and who
nevertheless often creates one of her

own peculiar masterpieces, a portrait
which has a beating heart within and
which, when we look into its eyes, seems
to be a reflection, distprted with pain,
of our own soul."
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Chapter VIII.

Virtue and One's Own Arms

In Chapter Six, Machiavelli unveils the intended target
of his satire with regard to type, the private individual
who has risen to power, becoming a new prince in a new
principality, carved from within his own native land.

Although Italy became prey to such established powers as
France, Spain, and Germany, which was a grave concern of

Machiavelli's, the intrusion of foreign powers was precipi
tated by another problem within Italy itself, the phenomenon
of Ludovico Sforza, Cesare Borgia and others of their ilk.

Prior to the invasion of King Charles VIII of France,
in 1494, the balance of power in Italy was maintained by
five major states:

Venice, Milan, Florence, the Kingdom of

Naples (ruled by a branch of the Aragonese), and the Papal

States.

The imperialist tendencies of these states, howev

er, led to calling in foreigners which upset the balance of

power, causing Italy to become prey to the greed and ambi
tion of larger powers.

As Machiavelli observes in Chapter

Eleven of the Prince, the five states that dominated Italy

"had to have two principal concerns:

one, that a foreigner

not enter into Italy with arms; the other, that none of them

enlarge his state." (Ch. 11, 46)

Ludovico Sforza violated

the first principal by inviting Charles VIII into Italy.
The Borgia were guilty on both counts, having joined forces

with the French to facilitate their acquisitions in Italy,
hoping "not only to carve out a huge Italian estate for
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their family but [ironically] also to unify the entire
country and thus save it from the depredations of the French

king and the German (i.e. Holy Roman) emperor,"^ although it
is unclear who or what would have saved the Italians from

the depredations of the Borgia themselves.

At the time

Machiavelli wrote the Prince, the Medici were poised to
continue a policy of conquest within Italy.

Thus, the

problems in Italy emanated both from within and without, and
the first cause, the ambition of the new princes of Italy,
became the target of Machiavelli's satire, the object of his
contempt and loathing.

Machiavelli first satirizes the origin of the new

prince, one who rises from ^privatie individual.'

Iri Chapter

Six; he refers to the man who becomes "prince from private
individual" for the first time, which "presupposes either
virtue or fortune," (Ch. 6, 22) but not legitimate authori

ty, as when it is conferred by a process of selection, or

inherited through the bloodline of the prince.

In Chapter

Seven, he considers "those who become princes from private
individual solely by fortune... ." (Ch. 7, 25)

Again, in

Chapter Eigiit, he states, "one becomes prince from private
individual" also by two modes other than "fortune or vir

tue," namely by "crime" or "with the support of fellow

citizens," (Ch. 8, 34) and, finally, in Chapter Nine, he
turns to the theme of private individual most closely relat

ed to the rise of the Medici in Florence, "when a private
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citizen becomes prince of his fatherland,"; in what he calls
a "civil principality." (Ch. 8, 38).
Thus, when Machiavelli speaks of a new prince, he is
referring to a particular model, a breed of man who, because

of personal ambition, is not content to live in equality
with his peers, under judicial and constitutional restraint.

Rather, he threatens the liberty, peace and security of all.
Nor could he have found a "fresher example" than Cesare

Borgia, (Ch. 7, 33) or the Medici, to whom he directed his

advice in the Prince.

In developing his satire, however,

Machiavelli was faced with the dilemma of making such a

prince appear acceptable, even desirable and worthy of
imitation.

By appealing to ancient examples no less incred

ible than Moses, Romulus, Theseus and Cyrus, he provides a
transition from the destruction of freedom, in Chapter Five,
to the source of that destruction, the modern princes,

exemplified in Chapter Seven onward, who, in the company of

the four virtuous exemplars, do not appear threatening as

private individuals newly rising.

His standard, as always,

resides in the ancients, and from that standard one can

discern what is lacking in the contemporary models of
princely power and aspirations.
The example of Moses reflects the lack of virtue in the

modern princes of Italy and of the Church, as well, which
had descended into new depths of corruption with the advent
of Pope Alexander VI.

In the Discourses, Machiavelli offers
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a perspective on Moses that goes to the heart of the matter,

with regard to the achievement of Moses that won his praise
and admiration, as a builder of a free city.

"The virtue of

the builder is discernable in the fortune of what was built,
for the city is more or less remarkable according as he is
more or less virtuous who is responsible for the start.

This virtue shows itself in two ways:

first in the choice

of site, and secondly in the drawing up of laws," (I. 1,
102) which, in the case of Moses/ were "based on a Covenant

relationship with God."^

Although Machiavelli advises the

new prince to imitate moses in Chapter Six, he recommended

that he destroy free cities in the previous chapter, to
preserve his state.

A truly virtuous prince would not find

the destruction of a free city a desirable end, and if he

had the opportunity, he would turn his thoughts from tyranny
and found a city or state for the greater good.

He would

build, rather than destroy.
In his first reference to Moses, Machiavelli writes,
"And although one should not reason about Moses, as he was a
mere executor of things ordered for him by God, nonetheless

he should be admired if only for that grace that made him

deserving of speaking with God." (Ch. 6, 22)

The word

"mere" severely qualifies the achievement of Moses.

The

exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt was an accomplishment of

the highest order, wrought with extreme hardship and danger.
And while Moses was deserving of admiration for his grace—
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and as a faithful servant of God--the word "only" excludes
the virtue of Moses as a courageous leader.

In fact,

Machiavelli seems to reserve his highest praise for Moses'
faith rather than his achievements, a notion that is decid

edly out of place in a work that recommends the new prince
need only pretend to have faith.

Machiavelli then reverses himself, however, by exalting
Moses almost to the exclusion of God, with regard to oppor

tunity.

In considering the "actions and orders" of Cyrus,

Romulus, and Theseus, Machiavelli remarks, "they will appear

no different from those of Moses, who had so great a teach
er... It was necessary then for Moses to find the people of

Israel in Egypt, enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, so
that they would be disposed to follow him in order to get

out of their servitude... Such opportunities, therefore,
made these men successful, and their excellent virtue en

abled the opportunity to be recognized; hence their father

lands were ennobled by it and became very prosperous." (Ch.
6, 22-3)

Moses did not return to Egypt of his own accord,

however.

God told him to return.

Moses did not recognize
I

an opportunity; God created the opportunity for him, and he
reluctantly obeyed.

Thus, the points that Machiavelli makes regarding Moses

are thinly veiled efforts to disguise what he really intend
ed with his example.

Unlike the tyrannical prince

Machiavelli advises in Chapter Five, who had of necessity to
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enslave the people to preserve his state, Moses led the
oppressed Hebrews to freedom.

Moses was not a prince seek

ing his own principality, nor did he covet personal gain and
glory.

"Moses was the vehicle and interpreter of [the]

Covenant stipulations, including the Ten Commandments," who
"exerted a lasting influence on... religious life [and]
moral concerns."^

Machiavelli's inclusion of Moses as an

exemplar in the Prince is absurd, particularly when consid
ered in the company of Cesare Borgia and the Medici, but as
a standard for comparison, Machiavelli could have chosen
none better, for not only did Moses lead the Hebrews to

freedom, but God chastised him for being too harsh on the

people.''
Perhaps Machiavelli was also prompted to include Moses
in his satire as a reminder of the occasion of Cesare

Borgia's appointment as "Captain General and gonfalonier of
the Church" for "the salvation of the people," in 1500.
Following a blessing from the pope, a "long list of great

biblical leaders in whose steps Cesare was about to follow"

was given. : Alexander credited Cesare with "not only nobili

ty but power and virtue."^

As statesman of Florence at that

time, Machiavelli might reasonably have been expected to be
informed of this event as it was an important one, investing
Cesare with the power and authority to pursue his ambitions
in the Romagna, which threatened Tuscany, as well.

Satirists also resort to myth, a source of giantism, to
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establish certain standards.

myth in his Satire.^

Juvenal used anecdotes from

Myth provides examples of moral behav

ior which, handed down over centuries, often conflict with
contemporary moral values, particularly in a society that

has become corrupt.' In comparing the victim to mythologi
cal giants as Machiavelli does in Chapter Twenty-six, and

holding them up as models worthy of imitation in Chapter Six
(and who could hope to emulate the heroic actions of The

seus?), grand absurdities are created that make the victim
appear ridiculous.
Of Theseus, Machiavelli remarks that he "could not have
demonstrated his virtue if he had not found the Athenians

dispersed," but he does not explain the praiseworthy actions
of Theseus, or what he finds particularly praiseworthy,
which is more to the point.

In fact, Theseus personifies

all of the attributes of good governance and virtue lacking
in the new prince:
That age produced a sort of men, in
force of hand, and swiftness of foot,

and strength of body, excelling the
ordinary rate and wholly incapable of
fatigue; making use, however, of these
gifts of nature to no good or profitable
purpose for mankind, but rejoicing and
priding themselves in insolence and
taking the benefit of their superior
strength in the exercise of inhumanity
and cruelty, and in seizing, forcing,
and committing all manner of outrages
upon everything that fell into their
hands; all respect for others, all jus
tice, they thought, all equity and hu
manity, though naturally lauded by the
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common people, either out of want of
courage to commit injuries or fear to
receive them, yet no way concerned those
who were strong enough to win for them
selves.®

Theseus, however, "set forward with a design to do

injury to nobody, but to repel and revenge himself on all

those that should offer any,"' so that in his actions, he
rose above the villains of his time, and achieved greatness.
He brought the dispersed people of Attica together as "one
people of one city" to promote the "common interest... He

then dissolved all the distinct statehouses, council halls,
and magisteries, and built one common state-house and coun

cil hall on the site of the present upper town, and gave the
name of Athens to the whole state."

Most importantly,

however, and I would submit that Machiavelli included The

seus as an exemplar principally for this reason, "Then, as
he had promised, he laid down his regal power and proceeded
to order a commonwealth, entering upon this great work not

without the advice from the Gods."; Theseus "promised a
commonwealth without monarchy, a democracy, or people's
government, in which he should only be continued as their

commander in war and the protector of their laws, all things
else being equally distributed amOng them."^®
How much in common, then, does Theseus have with the

new prince, who would demand that all power and authority be
invested in himself?

The comparison is stunning, and all

the more so as Machiavelli urges the new prince to imitate
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the virtue of Theseus, whose actions contradict the advice
he actually gives throughout the Prince.

The example of Theseus giving up his power is reminis

cent of Machiavelli's Remodeling^^ in which he offered his
recommendations to the Medici for returning the government
of Florence to the people after the death of the Medici

elders. Pope Leo X and Cardinal Giulio,'^

yet securing their

power during their lifetime." In Mark Hulluing's summary of
the Remodeling, he writes, "Doomed to fight perpetually
against the natural order of things, a Medici prince can
only be a hated tyrant, subject to a ^thousand dangers' and
condemned to infamy; whereas ((an adaptation of Discourses
I. X, 10)), a Medicean ruler who reconstitutes Savonarola's

Great Council, giving everyone a stake in a republican
status quo, and then becomes in fact what the Medici have

traditionally claimed to be, merely the leading citizens of

a republican government, will enjoy the ^everlasting fame'
that has always been the reward of ^those men who have with

laws and with institutions remodeled republics and king
doms.

Machiavelli's advice in the Remodeling was ignored

by the Medici.

It seems clear, however, if one considers

the sentiments expressed by him in that work, that his

admiration for Theseus extended beyond his uniting of the
dispersed to the means by which he organized the government
of Athens, and his criticism of the Medici is implicit in
the example of that Greek hero.

.
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Unlike Moses, Theseus, and Cyrus, Romulus is not men

tioned in Chapter Twenty-six of the Prince.

As the mythical

founder of Rome, Romulus should have been the most signifi

cant symbol of virtue in Machiavelli's final chapter, in
which he calls on the Italians to unite under the Medici and

expel the barbarians—but he is not mentioned there despite

Machiavelli's closing lines from Petrarch alluding to an
cient Italian virtue.

(Ch. 26, 105)

The omission of Romulus from the last chapter is sig
nificant, suggesting that perhaps Machiavelli thought the
ancient virtue of Italians was, indeed, dead—or so dimin
ished as to warrant such a criticism.

He also states in

Chapter Twenty-six, "And in Italy matter is not lacking for
introducing every form:

here there is great virtue in the

limbs, if it were not lacking in the heads," in which con
text he finds Italians superior in "duels," but poor with
regard to "armies" and leadership;

"Everything follows from

weakness in the head... ." (Ch. 25, 104)

He goes on to

exalt the Medici as the long-awaited saviors of Italy, but
the point remains that he demonstrates no examples of Ital
ian virtue in the final chapter, omitting even Romulus, who

was certainly as important and virtuous an example (as
founder) in the minds of the Italians as a Greek hero or a
Persian warrior.

Further, Machiavelli writes, "It was fitting that
Romulus not be received in Alba, that he should have been
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exposed at birth, if he was to become king of Rome and
founder of that fatherland." (Ch. 6, 23) The issue of

Romulus' obscure "birth" is riot germane to the question of

opportunity, however, except with regard to his origins in
heroic myth.

The birth of Moses was also obscure, found in

a floating basket in the riyer and raised as a prince in
Egypt by the Pharaoh's daughter.

Cyrus was given to a

shepherd to raise because the king, Astyages, feared him; "a
Cyrus legend" evolved that "follows a pattern of folk be

liefs about the almost superhuman qualities of the founder

of a dynasty.

Machiavelli, however, only makes an issue

of the birth of Romulus, the quintessential example of
Italian virtue.

With the Medici in mind, perhaps he was

pointing a playful finger at the obscure births in the
Medici family, which qualified them (as it qualified
Romulus)—together with their opportunity touted so loudly
in Chapter Twenty-six—to perform the heroic salvation of

Italy he claimed to expect of them.

One may recall that

Cardinal Giulio de' Medici was the illegitimate son of

Giuliano (brother of Lorenzo the Magnificent), whose legiti

macy was later arranged by Pope Leo." Further, there were
the two younger Medici bastards, "Ippolito, the son of

Giuliano [to whom the Prince was first dedicated], and
Allesandro, who was thought to be the cardinal's own child,

although at that time, he passed as the son of Lorenzo, Duke

of Urbino."^' If Machiavelli intended that a subtle compari
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son be made between the illegitimate births in the Medici

family and the "literary pattern of heroic life" in which
"the hero often has a miraculous begetting and an obscure

birth,

it only becomes clear when considered in conjunc

tion with Chapter Twenty-six in which the Medici are raised
so high, their mission is compared to that of Moses,
Theseus, and Cyrus—rendering epic stature to a family that
could hope to achieve little more than the "odor of it."
(Ch. 6, 22)

As for Cesare Borgia, his parentage is obscure as well.
Before he became Pope Alexander VI, Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia
took as his mistress Vannozza Cattanie, who gave birth to
Cesare in 1475.

As she was married at the time, "the child

was thought to be legitimate, but Rodrigo Borgia lost no

time in acknowledging himself as the father."''
Machiavelli praises Romulus in the Discourses for
having made "many good laws quite compatible with freedom"
(I. 2, 110) and for his "intention" to "govern... for the

common good," and "not in his own interests." (I. 9, 131-2)
Machiavelli notes that he "instituted a senate with which he

consulted, and with whose views his decisions were in ac

cord."

Further, Romulus only kept authority to "command the

army in time of war and the convoking of the senate."

Thus,

the "original institutions" of Rome conformed more to "a

political and self-governing state than with absolutism or
tyranny." (I. 9, 133)
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Those qualities that Machiavelli, found admirable in
Moses, Theseus, and Romulus are blatantly deficient in

Cesare Borgia and the Medici.

Any comparison would be

absurd, and yet we are invited to make that comparison when

he urges the new prince to imitate their excellent example.
The humor that he weaves through this chapter on virtue

reflects the wit and genius of Machiavelli, his literary
gifts and his passion to be heard united in perfect accord
which, as in all satire, "should, like a polished razor keen
wound with a touch that's scarcely felt or seen."^°
The inclusion of Cyrus among Machiavelli's virtuous

giants reflects his notion of those attributes a good prince
should have.

Like the others, he was "stern, sagacious, and

incorruptible,"^^ and, as Machiavelli points out in the Dis
course, "Xenophon, for instance, is at considerable pains to
show what great honors, what great victories, and how much

good repute Cyrus gained by his humanity, and his affabili

ty, and how entirely free he was from pride, cruelty, licen
tiousness and other vices by which the lives of men are

marred." (III. 20, 462)

Machiavelli also notes that Cyrus

"attained" greatness by means of fraud [rather] than force,
(II. 13, 310-11) which parallels the Medici mode for acqui

sition of power in Florence, but unlike the Medici, Cyrus
was a great warrior, capable of founding a great kingdom and
in his conduct worthy of Machiavelli's admiration.

He was

held in "high esteem... not Only by his own people, the
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Persians, but by the Greeks and others... tolerant toward

the Babylonians and others [his conquests]... supporting
local customs... thus it was by diplomacy as well as force

of arms that he established the largest empire known until
his time... a great conqueror and administrator..; the

epitome of the great qualities expected of a ruler in antiq
uity, and he assumed heroic features as a conqueror who was
tolerant and magnanimous as well as brave and daring.
Cyrus freed the Jews held captive in Babylonia, allow

ing them to return to their homeland—and perhaps

Machiavelli chose Cyrus as an exemplar in part for that
reason, to suggest a comparison with a modern prince, the
Catholic King of Spain, Ferdinand.

In Chapter Twenty-one of

the Prince, Machiavelli says of Ferdinand, "If you consider
his actions, you will find them all very great and some of
them extraordinary... in order to undertake greater enter

prises, always making use of religion, he turned to an act

pf pious cruelty, expelling the Marranos from his kingdom
and despoiling them; nor could there be an example more
wretched and rarer than this." (Ch. 21, 88)

Thus, while

seeming to praise Ferdinand for his actions, offered as an

illustration of how "nothing makeis a prince so much esteemed
as to carry on great enterprises and to give rare examples

of himself," (Ch. 21, 87)

Machiavelli includes, among

Ferdinand's other qualities, his "pious Cruelty" in expel
ling both the Jews and the Muslims which, if contrasted with
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the example of Cyrus, indicates the extent to which the

virtue of modern princes fails the test of antiquity.
In satire, subtle inferences help to clarify the intent
of the satirist, but the success of such subtlety relies on
alert readers to make important connections.

That is, the

passage on Ferdinand and the Inquisition is remarkable not

only in the context of a chapter devoted to princely esteem,
but also in regard to cruelty, when it is understood against
the actions of Cyrus on behalf of the Jews in Babylonia, in
which esteem is demonstrated through right actions, his

"humanity," and the absence of vice. (III. 13, 310-11)
Machiavelli's understanding of virtue seems clear
enough from his examples in Chapter Six, if one examines the
lives of the individuals he portrays as most deserving of
imitation for their virtue and their practices.
themes emerge.

Certain

The importance of establishing good laws-

not mentioned in the Prince because the new prince is, after

all, maintained by force rather than law—provided stability
and continuity to the cities and states begun by these great
builders and founders of antiquity.

None of his exemplars

personified tyrannical practices, for above all, the notion

of public welfare is demonstrated in their actions, which is
one of the most important principles of governing put forth

by Machiavelli in his works, with the exception of the

Prince, in which the public interest is sacrificed entirely
to the arrogant and despotic rule of one individual.
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On

this point alone one could undertake a lengthy proof against
the validity and integrity of the Prince as an exposition of
Machiavelli's political beliefs.

As a device in satire, colossal models serve the pur
pose of "offering violent changes in perspective so that the

reader [intended victim] can see himself for what he really
is from strange new angles of vision... Rabelais with his

giants and their tremendous comical appetites, for example,
and Swift with his Brobdingnagians and their loathsome giant
rats and lice.

Here again, however, Lucian in his True

History provided a model.^

Machiavelli's giants are enor

mous in stature, but each of them symbolized the actions and

qualities that he found praiseworthy in the dim past and
deficient or absent in the present, including Cyrus, who has
his place in the "minds of the Persian people similar to
that of Romulus and Remus in Rome, or Moses for the Israel

ites."^

Machiavelli's giants are meant to be compared with

the modern dwarfs who occupied center stage in Italy.

The

quality that separated the ancients from the moderns was

virtue, formidable in Moses, Theseus, Romulus and Cyrus, and
notably absent in the Borgias, Petrucci, Medici and Sforzas.
The standard of virtue is an important element in

Machiavelli's satire—-the key to understanding his intent,

for in the remaining pages of the Prince (and in Chapters

Three and Five, as well), he undermines virtue in every
conceivable way.

The ancient giants he presents, in Chapter
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six, suggest "high burlesque," which "compares by placing
our standard above the victim, thus making his shortcomings

stand out sharply."^®

A comparison with the Medici (and

other modern princes) is meant to be inferred, as in his

remark, "a prudent man should always enter upon the paths
beaten by great mean, and imitate those who have been most

excellent.

"and a new prince in a new principality "en

counters more or less difficulty in maintaining them accord

ing to whether the One who acquires them is more or less
virtuous." (Ch. 6, 22)

In Chapter Twenty-six, Machiavelli

will make direct comparisons to the Medici specifically,
when he turns our attention once again to Moses, Theseus,

and Cyrus; "This is not very difficult if you summon up the
actions and lives of those named above.

And although these

men are rare and marvelous, nonetheless they were men, and
each of them had less opportunity than the present; for

their undertaking was not more just than this one, nor

easier, nor was God more friendly to them than to you." (Ch.
26, 102-3)

Setting aside for the moment the farcical ele

ments contained in his statement, it is clear that

Machiavelli intended a comparison between the circumstances

surrounding the ancient models with those pertaining to the
Medici in the present, in which virtue is required to over
come all obstacles. (Ch. 26, 105)

Throughout most of the Prince, however, particularly
between Chapters Six and twenty-six, Machiavelli conforms
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more to low burlesque, "the process of diminishing and
degrading the object... it creates a standard below its
victim and makes the reader measure him against that stan
dard... [it] compares its subject with what is base and

sordid... [and] treats an elevated subject in a trivial

manner."^ Thus, comic tension is created between what ought
to be, as offered by Machiavelli in the virtuous achieve

ments of his grandiose models in Chapter Six, and the re
ality—what is—that fills the pages of the Prince with its

captivating horrors.

If, in our present age, scholars have

deigned to recognize the comic operative of the *is' and

^ought' in his satire, they nonetheless acknowledge the
shocking quality of the Prince, which suggests that

Machiavelli's precepts continue to be evaluated against a
higher moral standard of what political life ought to be.
As, Isaiah Berlin remarks, "What is there, then, about his

words, about his tone, which has caused such tremors among

his readers?,"^* a view expressed by Bertrand Russell, who
labeled the Prince "a handbook for gangsters," views- si;:;.. ':.d

by Leo Strauss and others as well.^'
While "satirists have always taken vice and corruption
as their targets, Machiavelli did that and much more; he

made vittue, traditionally the hanging judge of satire, his

special target,"^® first by establishing the traditional idea
of virtue as the standard, in Chapter Six, followed by a
slow descent throughout the Prince into its opposite, vice,
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which he skillfully transforms into a new concept of virtue.
There are no modern examples of virtue in Chapter Six.
Savonarola is cited, but for his failure rather than his

virtue.

This omission, together with the fact that no

living person is mentioned at all, suggest that virtue is an

attribute beyond the reach of moderns grasping for power,
which Machiavelli comically refers to in his analogy of the
prudent archer:

For since men almost always walk on
paths beaten by others and proceed in
their actions by imitation, unable ei
ther to stay on the paths of others
altogether or to attain the virtue of

those whom you imitate, a prudent man
should always enter upon the paths beat
en by great men, and imitate those who
have been most excellent, so that if his

own virtue does not reach that far, it
is at least in the odor of it.

He

should do as prudent archers do when the
place they plan to hit appears too dis

tant, and knowing how far the strength
of their bow carries, they set their aim
much higher than the place intended, not
to reach such height with their arrow,

s

but to be able with the aid of so high
an aim to achieve their design. (Ch. 6,
22)

A literal translation of the word "strength" is "vir

tue," which better represents Machiavelli's meaning when he
states, "and knowing how far the [virtue] of their bow

carries,"^* far the arrow represents the intent of the
prince, and as he is not virtuous, he can hope for no more
than to be "in the odor of it."

He can, nonetheless, imi

tate the "greatest examples" (offered by Machiavelli) by
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pretending to be virtuous, and thus "achieve" his "design,"

in which case the "odor" is all that is required, for ap
pearances.

The prince should take "great care," as he

advises in Chapter Eighteen, to "appear all mercy, all

faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion," but be
prepared, at the same time, not to "observe" them at will.

(Ch. 18, 70)

Machiavelli thus ridicules the new prince, in

Chapter Six, by intimating that he does not measure up to
the high standards personified in his models, but he also
makes clear that such a prince can succeed in achieving his

aims through ignoble means.

And by ridiculing him,

Machiavelli criticizes the new prince just as he criticized
Cosimo de' Medici who was always in the odor of virtue, as
such methods "bring men flying [like that arrow] to the
principate,

and cause citizens to fear that "he would

become their prince,

and destroy their liberty.

The intent of Machiavelli's new prince is to acquire a
principality for himself, a state in which "his citizens
always and in every quality of time, have need of the state

and of himself," (Ch. 9, 42) a tyrant who rules according to
his own interests, and what a prince "does in his own inter
ests usually harms the city and what is done in the inter

ests of the city harms him.

Consequently, as soon as tyran

ny replaces self-government, the least of the evils which

this tyranny brings about are that it ceases to make prog
ress and to grow in power and wealth... and Should fate
f

,

,

■

■

,

'
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decree the rise of an efficient tyrant, so energetic and so
proficient in warfare that he enlarges his dominions, no

advantage will accrue to the commonwealth, but only to him
self... ," (II. 2, 276) for the glory of acquisition belongs

to him, and the "citizens would gain not subjects but fellow
slaves."^
As Allan Gilbert remarks in his introduction to

the Prince, "His figure dominates the little work," but,

ironically, he finds "the figure of the prince perfect in

goodness, in active energy, in prudence, ruling for the
common good of all the people of Italy" despite the fact

that Gilbert includes, in his appraisal of Italy's "sorrow,"
a "desire" to be "liberated" from the "native tyrant."^®
is Machiavelli's new prince if not a "native tyrant?"

Who
Nor

should we be fooled by his assignation of the innocuous term

new prince to such a man.

The same device of diminution was

utilized by Swift in A Modest Proposal, "the substitution of
the lesser word, and the imputation of lesser motive," which

creates an "illusion,"^® one that is quite convincing if we
accept Machiavelli's arguments for absolute power in the

interest of liberating Italy, manifest in the ^new prince.'
In truth, however, the 'new prince' is a tyrant—seeking his
own advantage.

Italy will not be liberated, but enslaved.

The art of satire is not to state your objective directly,
however.

"The true satirist, no matter how violent his

feelings, usually tries to get at his target indirectly.
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otherwise, we have only diatribe.

The great irony of the Prince, as previously stated, is
that Machiavelli turned to his oppressors for salvation from
oppression, and the more entrenched the Medici became in

their personal power and influence, the less likelihood
there was that the republic would be revived.

The Discours

es affirm that Machiavelli never lost sight of the value of
democratic principles for the common benefit, in a republic

devoted to liberty and justice, and his models of virtue
reflect, in various ways, his preoccupation with governments
founded on principles conducive to the evolution of freedom.

The Prince contradicts those principles in every aspect, but
most especially with regard to common interest; the new
prince, unrestrained by laws, does what he likes, and "a

prince who does what he likes is a lunatic."
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(I. 58, 256)

Chapter IX.

Fortune and the Arms of Others: Cesare Borgia

In Chapters Seven through Nine, Machiavelli discourses

on those principalities acquired by means other than virtue,
by fortune and the arms of others, by crimes, or with the

support of fellow citizens.

These chapters reflect the

means by which the modern princes acquired their positions
o^ power, and are meant to be understood as inferior to the

standard of virtue presented in Chapter Six—manifestlyi
absent in the modern examples.

In Chapter Seven, Machiavelli gives his example of a
modern prince "with a great virtue of his own," Francesco

Sforza, who "acquired with a thousand pains," but "main
tained with little trouble," whom he contrasts with Cesare

Borgia, who "acquired his state through the fortune of his
father and lost it through the same... ." (Ch. 7, 25-6)

Sforza, it would seem, should have been included in Chapter
Six, but he was omitted because his example does not reflect
the virtue of antiquity.
of a modern prince.

Rather, he personifies the virtue

That is, virtue re-defined by

Machiavelli, to suit the present era.
Francesco Sforza was a condotterie, "hired to protect"

the Ambrosian Republic of Milan, in 1447.

He betrayed the

republic and "made himself Duke of Milan" in 1450, ruling as

a despot.^

In a set speech from the History,^ Machiavelli

gives his assessment of Sforza's attributes in the words of

a Milanese ambassador, who accuses Sforza of "treachery,"
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"wickedness," "cruelty, ambition, and arrogance," stating
further, "O unhappy those cities forced to defend their

liberty against the ambition of him who wishes to oppress
them!"^

Unlike Moses, then, who led the enslaved to free

dom, Sforza led the people into servitude, through the
ignoble means of betrayal and deceit.

In his desire to

"[carve] out a principality for himself in Italy's north and
center,

he exhibited the greed and ambition common to the

new princes of Italy.

Theseus gave the authority to govern

to the people; Sforza took authority unto himself, ruling as
a tyrant.

Further, the good princely qualities exhibited by

Cyrus are not evident in Sforza, who was corrupt, vile, and
treacherous.

Nor did Sforza lay proper foundations, as did

Cyrus and Romulus.

In the discourses, Machiavelli blames

Sforza for building a fortress (castle) in Milan;
And if Count Francesco Sforza, having
become Duke of Milan, was reputed a wise
man, and yet built a fortress in Milan,
I maintain that in this he was not wise,
and the result has proved that this
fortress did harm to his heirs instead

of affording them security. For with a
fortress they thought they were safe and
could oppress their citizens and sub

jects, so lost no opportunity of doing
them violence; with the result that they
came to be detested beyond all measure,

and lost their state to the first enemy
who attacked them."

Thus, Francesco Sforza was not virtuous or wise when

compared to the examples of antiquity.

When compared ^to

Cesare Borgia, however, he appears virtuous indeed, for he
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acquired a state to pass down to his heirs (facilitated by
his marriage to Bianca Maria, daughter of Filippo Maria
Visconti, former Duke of Milan), and he prevailed in over

coming obstacles to his personal ambition largely by his own
devices, from private individual, without the wealth of the

Church at his disposal—truly a great modern exemplar.

Both

Borgia and Sforza threatened Tuscany, and neither succeeded,
but if one were to assess who was the greater villain,
Sforza must be considered superior for having succeeded,

while in all important respects, Cesare Borgia was "a noto
rious, spectacular failure."^

Machiavelli praises Cesare lavishly in Chapter Seven,
however, in a provocative discourse on a man most of

Machiavelli's contemporaries "hated, feared, and despised."®
The Florentines nurtured "a long standing hatred" of him,'
including the aristocrats who "shared the people's revul

sion,"* which, as Garrett Mattingly observes of their num
ber, "Giuliano de' Medici" would have been the "last man to

be attracted by the notion of imitating the Borgia,"' for
reasons of ambition and ability.

Precisely because Borgia

was "universally despised,"^" "universally feared,"" and a
dismal failure, Machiavelli could not have chosen a better

representative of his type to satirize the new prince, in a
supreme mockery of all he stood for.

Machiavelli mentions Cesare Borgia's "high intention"
(Ch. 7, 32) which should be understood in the context of
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Machiavelli's analogy of the prudent archer, in Chapter Six.
Machiavelli also uses the word "empire" in reference to
Cesare; "to acquire so much empire before the pope died that
he could resist a first attack on his own," and that he

should be "imitated by all those who have risen to empire
through fortune and the arms of others." (Ch. 7, 31-2)
Empire is a comical reference to his actual achievement.

Machiavelli states that he "planned to become lord over
Tuscany," and "he would have jumped on Pisa" had he not had

to "pay regard to France (which he did not have to do any

longer, since the French had already been stripped of the
kingdom by the Spanish, so that each of them was forced of

necessity to buy his friendship)," and, further, "Lucca and
Siena would have quickly yielded." (Ch. 7, 31)

In reality,
(

Cesare had only succeeded in acquiring the "cities of Ro

magna and the Marches,"'^ an accomplishment rendered even
more insignificant by Machiavelli's understatement, "he
already possessed Perugia and Piombino." (Ch. 7, 31)

And

had Cesare acquired all that Machiavelli says he intended to
acquire, one would not dignify it as empire but as a state.
The word empire relates, again, to Julius Caesar-

Machiavelli's way of ridiculing the pretentious arrogance of
the other, lesser Cesare.

Just as he did in Mandragola,

Machiavelli "exaggerated for comic effect."^'
Borgia's banner prophesying "all or nothing" fluttered

majestically over a principality founded on the capricious
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whims of fortune, and his "failure to achieve his ambition

to seize total power reflected badly on the efficacy of his
underhanded methods."^'' Indeed, his foundations were exceed
ingly poor.

In the opinion of Renzo Sereno, "Niccolo's

judgment of Caesar is so grossly flattering as to be nonsen

sical... Caesar's attempts at kingdom-building in Romagna
fell very short of the most pessimistic expectations.

His

realm collapsed almost at once with the death of Alexander
VI.

As soon as the Spaniards were ousted from the Court of

Rome, Caesar's political power vanished.

Garrett

Mattingly makes the point that, "without papal support his
principate was built on quicksand," and when he "slinked"

out of Italy, utterly defeated, he was "followed by the
scornful laughter of Italy.

For nothing is more absurd than

the great straw-stuffed giants of carnival, and when such a

giant has for a season frightened all Italy, the laughter is
that much the louder."^®

Cesare failed because he was dependent on the fortune

and aid of his father, who provided him with the means to

acquire.

To finance his "government and his wars,"

Alexander "sold offices, took over the estates of dead

cardinals, and exploited the jubilee of 1500 to the full.

Dispensations and divorces were given as profitable parts of
political bargains... Cesare Borgia used jubilee funds to

finance his campaigns for recovery of the Papal States.

To

further celebrate the jubilee, Alexander... created twelve
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new cardinals, who paid a total of 120,000 ducats for their
appointment... he named nine additional cardinals at a
t

commensurate price... he created ex nihilo eighty hew offic
es in the Curia, and these places... were sold at 760 ducats

each."' Satirists and pamphleteers took notice.

A "sting

ing pasquenade" was "attached to the statue of Pasquino
(1503)," critical of Alexander; "The keys, the alters,
Alexander sells, and Christ; with right, since he has paid
for them."'®

With "the abominable Borgia, Alexander VI, the Church
had grown so profoundly corrupt that it was threatened with

estrangement from its mission."'' The infamous Alexander,
"addicted to all lusts of the flesh," could be said, "like
many other men of the culminating Renaissance, [to have]

lost both his religion and his morals by his' too exclusive
pursuit of purely selfish advantage,"'® including "the ag
grandizement of his children.""

He "plotted" to "elevate

his son [Juan] to the throne of Naples,"" but Juan was mur
dered.

Alexander "became almost certain that his son Cesare

was his brother's murderer,"" although his guilt was never
proven.

Juan's death, however, was distinctly advantageous

to Cesare, for it "would force the pope to make Cesare a

layman once again.

He could then obtain a princely posi

tion... [his] destiny decreed that he should physically
eliminate the Duke of Gandia [Juan]: no one had more inter
est in this elimination than he.""
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Cesare was made gonfalonier of the Church and captain
general, to recapture the papal lands of Romagna for the
Church but, in reality, Alexander's ambition was to carve

out a principality for Cesare in central Italy.

To this

end, the Borgia used religion to achieve their design.
Under the power of papal authority, Cesare seized one city
after another with "bulls excommunicating rebellious sub

jects and interdicting their cities."^

Machiavelli intro

duced the notion of using religion with regard to King
Ferdinand who despoiled his subjects on the grounds of
suspected heresy, (Ch. 21, 88) which increased his wealth,

and helped provide for his eventual supremacy in Italy, by
defeating the French.

Pope Alexander used religion in

striking his bargain with King Louis XIII, dissolving his
marriage in exchange for military aid.

Machiavelli makes a

point of this indirectly in Chapter Seven when he states

that the pope did "not oppose" the Venetian efforts to bring
the French into Italy.

Rather, he facilitated it "by the

dissolution of the former marriage of King Louis.

So the

king came into Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the
consent of Alexander, and he was no sooner in Milan than the

pope got men from him for a campaign in Romagna, which was

granted to him because of the reputation of the king." (Ch.
7, 27-8)

Just as he did in Chapter Three, (Ch. 3, 15)

Machiavelli diminished the importance of the agreement

between Louis XII and Alexander, granting only "consent" by
174

Alexander, and attributing the aid of French forces to the

"reputation of the king" rather than acknowledging the quid
pro quo arrangement for what it was, made long in advance,

reflecting the corrupt abuse of papal authority exhibited by
Alexander.

Alexander thus used religion in a variety of ways to
'v

'

^

promote secular advantage for himself and his family.

■

He

■

was perhaps the most corrupt pope in the history of the

Church, and he, together with his son, Cesare, are deserving
of the satirical scorn Machiavelli heaps upon them in the
Prince as models extraordinaire of corruption.

Nor does

Machiavelli reserve his contempt solely for explication in

the,Prince.

He refers to Cesare's demise as "deserved by

rebels against Christ" in the First Decennale,'^ a remark
that appropriately charges him with those abuses against God
and man for which he later praises him in the Prince.
Machiavelli also displays his contempt for Alexander in the
Decennale; ?'the soul of splendid Alexander, that it might
have rest, departed to the blessed spirits; his sacred

footsteps were followed by his three dear and intimate

handmaids; Luxury, Simony, Cruelty."^' There was "incredible

rejoicing," writes Francesco Giucciardini in his History of
Italy, vjhen the "Romans viewed Alexander's body in St.
Peters... the dead serpent who, with his immoderate ambi

tion, his cruelty and avarice, had infected the whole
world.
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Machiavelli's satire is evident, then, in his praise of
Cesare, a new prince who was dependent on the fortune of

another (particularly that of a vile and corrupt pope who
symbolized ecclesiastical rule), and one who lacked the

requisite virtue to overcome the demise of his benefactor,
even to the extent that Machiavelli excuses Cesare for his

lack of virtue; "And if his orders did not bring profit to
him, it was not his fault, because this arose from an ex

traordinary and extreme malignity of fortune," (Ch. 7, 27)
the death of his father and his own illness.

But there was

nothing extraordinary or extreme about the death of the
f

■

'

■

pope, "who died at the age of seventy-two after a papacy of
eleven years (not such a short life and not such a short

reign).

In the History, Machiavelli cites the "short"

life of popes generally as one reason "why a secular prince
cannot wholly rely one a pontiff and cannot securely share

his fortunes with him.

In reference to Pope Nicholas III

(1277-1280), Machiavelli remarks:

he was the first of the popes who openly
revealed his personal ambition... as
before this time no mention had ever

been made of any pontiff's nephews or
relatives, so in the future they will
fill history and at last we shall come
to the sons; and there is nothing left
for the pontiff's to try except that, as
up to our times they have planned to
leave their sons as princes, in the
future they may Strive to leave them the
popedom as hereditary. It is indeed
true that up to now the princedoms they

have established have had short lives.
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because most of the time, the pontiffs,
since they lived but a short while,
either did not finish setting our the
plants, or if they did set them out,
left them with so few and so weak roots

that, since the strength sustaining them
was gone, at the first wind they with
ered away.

Thus, Machiavelli could not have considered the death

of Pope Alexander an extraordinary event in terms of expec
tations.

In the Prince, he describes a state similar to

that begun by the Borgia with similar language, but also
suggests how it might be preserved; "states that come to be

suddenly, like all other things in nature that are born and

grow quickly, cannot have roots and branches, so that the

first adverse weather destroys them—unless, indeed, as was
said, those who have suddenly become princes have so much

virtue that they know immediately how to prepare to keep
what fortune has placed in their laps," (Ch. 7, 26) virtue

that Machiavelli could not possibly attribute to Cesare, who
failed to make such preparations.
Nor should Cesare's illness be considered an "extreme

malignity of fortune," for he was not too ill to give orders
to "the faithful Michelotto" to seize "200,000 ducats worth

of silver and jewels and two chests containing 100,000 gold
coins" from the papal coffers, when he received "news of his
father's death.

And although he suffered a "bout with

malaria," he was "not too ill to stall the election and then

maneuver the choice of the old and ailing Pius III, thus
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delaying an unavoidable doom."^^

Machiavelli's many refer

ences to Cesare's illness are tantamount to overstatement,
which suggests the real significance he attaches to it:
Alexander "left the duke with only the state of Romagna

consolidated... and sick to death;" (Ch. 7, 31) "so sound

were the foundations that he had laid in so little time,
that if he had not had these armies on his back or if he had

been healthy, he would have been equal to every difficulty;"
(Ch. 7, 32)

"But if at the death of Alexander the duke had

been healthy, everything would have been easy for him.

And

he told me, on the day that Julius II was created, that he
had thought about what might happen when his father was

dying, and he had found a remedy for everything, except that
he never thought that at his death he himself would also be

on the point of dying." (Ch. 7, 32)

As Garrett Mattingly

explains, however, "he did not even record then that Cesare

ever said anything of the sort; and though it would not be
unlike some of the duke's whimperings, he could not have

said it on the day of Julius II's election, when he was
boasting to everyone that the new pope would obey him.
Cesare's illness was but a feeble excuse, exaggerated
by Machiavelli to ridicule Cesare's ineptness.

Machiavelli

could hardly have admired a prince who, although ill, was
well enough to raid the wealth of the Church and influence

the papal election, but whose foundations were so poor, he
could not arrange to defend and maintain his acquisitions in
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adversity.

And perhaps Machiavelli had something else in mind as
well, when he referred to Alexander's death and Cesare's

illness as "an extraordinary and extreme malignity of for
tune," the suggestion of a rumor that they were poisoned at

a banquet together with other guests, a "legend" related by
Giucciardini and most later historians.

How ironic and

appropriate to his satire, if Machiavelli attributed

Cesare's failure to an illness that was, in fact, the result
of foul play, particularly since poisoning was a method of

extermination so favored by their own family that Ivan
Cloulas mentions the "notorious potion of the Borgias" when

discussing this event.

Even more interesting, the "legend"

asserts that "in agreement with the pope, Cesare had sent
Cardinal da Cornetto some poisoned wine that was to be
served only to the host but which, through carelessness, was

poured out to everyone present," including the Borgia—^
extremely bad fortune indeed.

"According to another ver

sion, Adriano da Cornetto himself poisoned the pope."
Although "the different phases of Alexander's illness and

the hideous appearance of his corpse pointed to poisoning,"
their deaths are generally attributed to malaria.^®
In his praise of Cesare, Machiavelli lauds his actions

in eliminating the Colonna and Orsini, great noble families
of Rome, as grounds for having laid "very good foundations

for his power," (Ch. 7, 29) and following the death of
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Alexander, "although the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came

to Rome, none followed them against him." (Ch. 7, 32)

In

truth, the Colonna and Orsini who survived rallied forces

against him almost immediately; "the news of Alexander's
death [spread] havoc among the Roman populace... but it was

mainly in the Romagna that violent opposition arose, incited
by the Orsinis and the Colonnas.

From all sides, the Orsini

were rushing back to reoccupy their lands.

Salvio Savelli

retook his Roman palace, opened up the jails, and released

the Borgia prisoners.

Prospero Colonna meanwhile was making

a forced march north from Naples," and when he arrived in

Rome, "he took possession of the palace from which he had so

long been banished.

That night the Capitol was lit up by

Colonna supporters while pro-Colonna areas of the city
resounded with exuberant shouts.

Meanwhile, the Orsini's

were zeroing in on the pro-Orsini quarter... from there they
roughed up Borgia supporters and set fire to 100 Spaniards'
homes.

Thus, when Machiavelli writes of Cesare, "and the

first thing he did was to weaken the Orsini and Colonna

parties in Rome.

For he gained to himself all their adher

ents, who were gentlemen, by making them his gentlemen, and

by giving them large allowances; and he honored them, ac
cording to their merits, with commands and with government
posts, so that in a few months the partisans' affections in
their minds were eliminated, and all affection turned toward

the dvike," (Ch. 7, 28) he falsely attributes good founda
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tions to Cesare that did not, in fact, exist.

So adamant

were the Orsini in their hatred of the venal Cesare, they
resolved "to capture the duke in person or pursue him ^to

the death,'" as participants in a "secret" pact with Spain.

Machiavelli makes the point that Cesare "thought espe
cially that he had acquired the friendship of Romagna, and

that he had gained all those peoples to himself since they
had begun to taste well-being," (Ch. 7, 29) and notes that

,

although Cesare was "half-alive," yet "Romagna waited for
him for more than a month."

Romagna waited.

(Ch. 7, 32) But not all of

There and elsewhere, the petty tyrants

ousted by the Borgia rushed into the vacuum to reclaim their,
lands, together with others well loved by the people (such
as Guidobaldo da Montefeltro), as well as the Venetians
pressed for territory as well.

During the conclave that i

elected the new pope, Pius III (whose reign only lasted
twenty-two days), the Venetians had: already come to,the aid
iOf "Guidobaldo of Urbino with troops, and allowed him to
take over the fortress of San Leo... the next move was to
i

oust Pedro Ramirez from Urbino.

'

The Florentines... helped

GiampaolO Baglioni clear Cesare's partisans out of Magione
and Giacomo Appiano to return to his fief of Piombino.

Baglioni was advancing on Caimerino, accompanied by the last

surviving member of the Varano family.

The Vitellis, now

once more ensconced in Citta di Castello, were celebrating
their homecoming by triumphantly carrying a golden calf
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through the streets to erase the memory of the red Borgia

bull.

On the Adriatic coast, Bartolomeo Alviano had set

Pandolfo Malatesta up once again in Rimini, and Giovanni

Sforza in Pesaro.

Luckily for Cesare, his capital of

Cesena, with its solid fortifications, could hold fast,
protected by Dionigi di Naldo's tough force of 1,000 veter

ans."^®

It was in Cesena that Pedro Ramirez hanged Pedro de

Oviedo as a traitor, which ultimately led to Cesare's ar

rest.

Oviedo had accompanied a representative of Julius II,

to "take possession of the fortresses."

The murder so

enraged Julius that he imprisoned Cesare in Rome, and "[con
fiscated] all the duke's possessions, proclaiming that he

was going to use them to compensate those people who had a
grievance against him... this spelled Cesare's financial
ruin."'^"

One of those compensated was Guidobaldo da Montefeltro,
Duke of Urbino, dispossessed by the Borgia in 1502.

His

court inspired "the setting for Castiglione's The Court

ier,"'*^ and during the reigns of Guidobaldo and his father,
Federico, Urbino "was admired throughout Italy for its

humanist learning and cultivated ways.

a tyrant but loved by his subjects.

Guidobaldo was not

Betrayed by Cesare, he

was forced to flee from Urbino leaving behind his works of
art and his extensive library, which Cesare confiscated for

his personal use.''' Shortly before his imprisonment, Cesare
visited Guidabaldo in his Vatican chamber, "who had been
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newly restored to his former estates by the loyalty of his

subjects, and to his former rank of gonfaloniere of the
church by the new pope [a position previously held by Cesare
under Pope Alexander].

There, Cesare kneels on the floor,

sobbing in pure terror, begging the old friend whom he had

betrayed and robbed, with incredible meanness, not just of

his duchy, but of his books and his antique medals, not to
kill him, please not to kill him, to leave him at least his

life, until Guidobaldo, beyond any feeling about this curi
ous monster, says he does not wish to kill him; he only
wishes him to go away

This pitiful portrayal of Cesare Borgia leaves little
to be admired by Machiavelli.

Above all, Machiavelli would

likely have found Cesare culpable for never managing to

forge together his own conquering army.
/

Even in his desper
■

.

■

ation at the end, having had five years to acquire his own
arms, Cesare struggled to "raise soldiers" for his return to

the Romagna, according to Machiavelli's own official reports

contained in the Legations*^.

As Machiavelli explains in

Chapter Seven, Cesare "armed to suit himself," (Ch. 7, 20)

an uncomplimentary statement, and he "depended on the for
tune and force of someone else." (Ch. 7, 31)

Garrett

Mattingly notes that while Machiavelli praises Cesare's arms

in Chapter Thirteen of the Prince, in the Legations, he
"never once refers to the military capacity of the Duke or

praises the courage or discipline of his army,""*® nor does he
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praise him for exceptional arms in the Discourses or in The

Art of War.^'' And although Machiavelli states that Cesare
"was never so much esteemed as when everyone saw that he was

the total owner of his arms" in Chapter Thirteen, (Ch. 13,
55) he was never the "total owner," and those he assembled

from his own territory constituted but a small part of his
army, nor was he ever financially able to support any of his
forces without continual support from the Church.'**

In Octo

ber, 1502, just ten months before the death of Alexander, by
Machiavelli's own estimates, Cesare's arms consisted of
"2,500 footsolders, plus 800 men enlisted in the Val da
Lamona and 1,000 mercenaries that Michelotto was to recruit

-in all, 4,300 infantry.

He had 1,000 mercenaries raised,

Gascons in Lombardy as well as Swiss.

Supporting these

offensive forces would be a reserve army of 5,000 Romagnols.
As for the cavalry, it was based on Cesare's company of 100
lances and three 50-lance companies under the command of

three Spanish captains... By the end of the month, Cesare's

army totaled 5,350 footsolders, including 600 Gascons and
Germans.

It would later gain 3,000 Swiss.

The men-at-arms

numbered 340... With the addition of the five French comp
anies—some 2,000 men in all—promised by Louis... that made

840 units of heavy cavalry (3,300 men) already raised,"'*'

which demonstrates the vast array of mercenary, auxiliary,
and Romagnal arms assembled by Cesare.

He was aided by

Swiss mercenaries^® when he eliminated the Orsini and Vitelli
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in Sinigaglia, in December, 1502.

Thus, when Machiavelli

states, in Chapter Thirteen, that he "eliminated" the merce
nary arms of "Orsini and Vitelli," and "turned to his own

arms," (Ch. 13, 55) the context of "own arms" always includ
ed mercenaries.

Only the Romagnal forces could be said to

constitute Cesare's own arms, if he hoped to defeat the

forces that would collaborate against him following the
death of the pope, including the Church and the foreign
invaders, France and Spain.

Cesare never gathered suffi

cient forces to prepare for that eventuality.

Far from it.

And even to support his own troops, which he never "owned"
because of it, he was dependent on the Church.

Cesare Borgia was so wretched an example, predictably
doomed to failure by Machiavelli's own estimation of like
circumstances, (Ch. 7, 26) that he could never have sincere

ly intended that Cesare's example be imitated.

Combined

with Cesare's failure to provide sufficient arms of his own
and his financial dependence on the Church (from revenues

furnished by simony and other ignoble means), one must ,also
consider the treachery of the pope and his son, to fully

comprehend the impact they had on the Italy of Machiavelli's
time, both terrifying and repugnant to those in their wake:

The pope was playing his role to perfec
tion.

He invited Cardinal Orsini to the

New Year's celebrations [1503]~lavish
banquets in the company of beautiful
women and fancy dress parades, at one of

which a row of thirty transvestites
sauntered past wearing false noses *in
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the shape of a priapus,' that is, male
genitals. Thus entertained,
Giambattista [Orsini cardinal] felt
reassured about his fate and thought it
would be a good move to congratulate the

pope on the capture of Sinigaglia. As
he was on his way to the Vatican to wait
for Alexander... he was promptly arrest

ed and taken prisoner to the Castle
Sant' Angelo. Incarcerated with him
were Rinoldo Orsini, the archbishop of
Florence, Bernardino Alviano... and
Giacomo Santa Croce, a friend of the
Orsinis, who was soon let out on bail.
The cardinals' estates were seized and

his eighty-year-old mother hounded out
of her house and thrown into th^

street... no one would risk taking her
^ in... all these moves threw Rome into a
panic; the bishop of Chiusi actually
died of fright.

On hearing of the cardinals' arrest,
Cesare had his relatives, Paolo Orsini
and the duke of Gravina, strangled on
the spot... That done, Cesare pushed
deep into Sienese territory, laying
waste the little towns of Pienza, Chiu
si, and San Quirico... [he] then set
down the long road to Rome, passing
Acquapendente, Montefiascone, and Viter
bo, which he pillaged. He had no re-'
spect for Church property and preferred
to give his old troopers pleasure rather

I

than provoke mutiny in their ranks.
After the death of Alexander, Cesare laid part of the

blame for his actions on the "perverted character" of his
father,

so perverted was he, himSelf,: in estimating his own

responsibility for events.

As Machiavelli writes in his

dispatch of November 20, 1503, "All the favors that the Pope
[Julius], Rouen, and those here have done Valentino have

been in order that he may go away, the sooner the better...
everybody here laughs about his affair?... We shall see
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where the wind will carry him... .

Machiavelli could not

have imagined that his own satire would, ironically, carry
Cesare Borgia to heights undreamed of at the moment he wrote

these critical and disparaging words of contempt.
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Chapter X.

Acquiring through Crimes: Ancient and Modern

Of those who follow a "criminal and nefarious path,"

(Ch.. 8, 34) in their assent to principality, the subject of
Chapter Eight, no example would have been more appropriate
than Cesare Borgia, but he is never blamed for his crimes,
as Machiavelli blames Agathocles and Liverotto da Fermo.

In

Chapter Seven, he treated Cesare's actions as praiseworthy,
but before the ink was dry, he reiterated his crimes in the
name of others, in the following chapter.

The extent to

which he actually blames Cesare thus becomes clear.

As Leo

Strauss observes, "Machiavelli does not even suggest that
Cesare Borgia, the model, was animated by patriotism or
concerned with the common good.

It is true that he con

trasts Cesare with the criminal Agathocles by not calling
Cesare a criminal.

But if one looks at the actions of the

two men, the contrast vanishes:

in describing Agathocles as

a criminal, he provisionally adopts the traditional judgment
on that man, whereas there does not yet exist a traditional

judgment on Cesare,"^ thus permitting Machiavelli his decep
tion.

Machiavelli begins Chapter Eight by making the point
that there is no distinction between ancient and modern

examples with regard to criminal paths, thereby leaving

aside his usual preference for the practices of antiquity;
"And to speak of the first mode [not altogether fortune or
virtue, but crimes], it will be demonstrated with two exam
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pies, one ancient, the other modern, without entering other

wise into the merits of this issue, because I judge it

sufficient, for whoever would find it necessary, to imitate
them." (Ch. 8, 34)

He does, however, devote this chapter to

the merits of this issue, and is by no means value neutral
in his conclusions.

One of the devices employed by Machiavelli that invites

closer scrutiny of his remarks concerning Agathocles and
also of Cesare is the fact that in both cases, Machiavelli

attributes virtue to their actions, but then subtracts it in

his final assessment of the modes by which they succeeded in
acquiring power.

Of Cesare's virtue, he states that, "he

made use of every deed and did all those things that should

be done by a prudent and virtuous man to put his roots in

the states that the arms and fortune of others had given

him," (Ch. 7, 27) and "there was such ferocity and such

virtue in the duke, "that he would have been "equal to every
difficulty had he not been threatened by foreign armies," or
"if he had been healthy." (Ch. 7, 31-2) "Nevertheless,"
Cesare "acquired his state through the fortune of his father

and lost it through the same," (Ch. 7, 26-7) because he

lacked the virtue to keep, in adversity, what fortune had
given to him.
And of Agathocles, Machiavelli notes that his "crimes

were accompanied with such virtue of spirit and body that
when he turned to the military, he rose through its ranks to
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become praetor of Syracuse," (Ch. 8, 34) and "whoever might

consider the actions and virtue of this man will see nothing
or little that can be attributed to fortune," (Ch. 8, 35)
which implies (since this chapter follows the chapter on
Cesare, fortune, and the arms of others) that Cesare is

inferior to Agathocles.

At least of Agathocles, Machiavelli

is willing to grant ability.

Because of his crimes, howev

er, Agathocles is robbed of his virtue, but in listing his
crimes, Machiavelli directs our attention back to Cesare,
whose crimes are similar to those of Agathocles, as well as
those of Liverotto da Fermo.

|

Machiavelli notes, for example, that "one cannot call

it virtue" to "kill one's citizens," (Ch. 8, 35) "citizens"

being those one kills in order to seize absolute authority.
Agathocles killed thousands, including the senate and those

of the ruling party, the "richest of the people." (Ch. 8,
34).

Cesare "killed as many [of the lords he had despoiled]

as he could reach." (Ch. 7, 31)

Agathocles betrayed his

"friends," (Ch. 8, 35) as did Cesare when he betrayed
Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, taking "the duchy of Urbino."
(Ch. 7, 28)

Agathocles is accused of being without "faith,"

(Ch. 8, 35) and of Cesare, Machiavelli refers to his deceit

in Sinigaglia.

Further, of Agathocles, Machiavelli charges

that "one cannot call it virtue" to be "without religion"
(Ch. 8, 35) and of Cesare and his father, Alexander VI,

Machiavelli states that the pope "did not see the path to
190

being able to make [Cesare] lord of any state that was not a
state of the Church," and so he "decided to take that of the

Church," (Ch. 7, 27) which reflects the abuse of his faith

in making use of religion on behalf of his son.

Machiavelli also refers to the "savage cruelty and

inhumanity" of Agathocles, (Ch. 8, 35) while, in Chapter
Seven, as I stated above, he makes the point that Cesare had

killed Remirro to appease the people, revealing his own
cruel and inhumane nature (if we accept the version of

affairs offered by Machiavelli in the Prince). (Ch. 7, 30)
Many other examples could be given of the crimes, violence,
and ambition of Cesare Borgia and his father, but I have

cited those from Chapter Seven that parallel the references

Machiavelli makes to Agathocles in the following chapter to
illustrate that for those actions and qualities that
Agathocles is blamed, Cesare is praised.

Further, having

indicated that he found Agathocles admirable, for having
raised himself up without the aid of fortune or the arms of

others (which imputes blame to Cesare for having depended on
both), Machiavelli "nonetheless" attributes neither "for

tune" or "virtue" to Agathocles, relegating him to a posi

tion inferior even to that of Cesare in his esteem, who at
least had fortune on his side.

And although Agathocles is

not "celebrated among the most excellent men," (Ch. 8, 35)
because of his actions, Cesare, whom he defined by similar
actions, is lauded as a model of such excellence that
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Machiavelli "[does] not know what better teaching I could

give to a new prince" than his example. (Ch. 7, 27)
The example of Liverotto da Fermo offers the modern

counterpart to Agathocles, in kind if not in scope.

Cesare

would have provided a much grander example, having threat

ened a large portion of Italy with his treachery.

Through

the actions of Liverotto, however, Machiavelli offers an

illustration of Cesare's own villainy, for whether the fox

is large or small, deceit for personal gain stems from the

same qualities of greed, ambition, and immoral (or amoral)
behavior, all the more intriguing when one fox outwits
another, as Cesare outwitted Liverotto.

As the adopted son of his maternal uncle, Giovanni

Fogliani, Liverotto, who became proficient as a mercenary,
returned to Fermo for a visit, "to acknowledge his patrimo
ny." (Ch. 8, 36)

He arranged for a "banquet," after which

he had his uncle and "other citizens" murdered, "besieged"
the "magistery,H and made himself "prince." (Ch. 8, 37)
Liverotto's perfidy was outmatched by Cesare, however, who

had him "strangled" at Sinigaglia, together with other
mercenary captains who had plotted against the Borgia.
(Ch. 8, 37)

Cesare's part in villainy, however, is left

uncriticized by Machiavelli, and one has the sense that
Cesare simply meted out punishment that Liverotto deserved.

Both Cesare and Liverotto, however, enticed their victims by

devious and cunning means, and with savage cruelty extermi
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nated them to further their own selfish interests.

Thus,

they are alike in kind as well.

One of the points made by Machiavelli in calling up the
example of Agathocles from antiquity, is that ability unac

companied by virtue is insufficient to judge excellence in a

prince, and in the examples of Cesare Borgia (in Chapter
Seven) and Liverotto da Fermo, he shows how far from excel

lence the modern princes had deviated, particularly when

contrasted with Moses, Theseus, Romulus, and Cyrus who, as
"excellent" (Ch. 6, 22) exemplars, exhibited ability and

virtue combined in their enterprises.

Despite his profuse

praise for Cesare Borgia, Machiavelli does not refer to him

as excellent in the Prince.

In fact, in blaming Agathocles,

Machiavelli shows that he has not deported from his prefer
ence for and admiration of the virtue displayed in antiquity
by Moses and the others, for whom his praise is sincere.

In

the illustration of Liverotto, Machiavelli transfers blame
to the modern princes.

Nor does he attribute virtue to the

Borgia or the Medici, who represent force and fraud respec
tively, the lion and the fox.

Machiavelli thus uses the

examples of Agathocles and Liverotto as a mirror, in which

is reflected the modern princes generally—and the Borgia in
particular.

With the appearance of his reasoning on cruelty in
Chapter Eight, there should be little doubt that we are

being manipulated by a clever Machiavelli who indeed "has
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his sleeves full,"^ not only of things "he knows [that]
other men do not," but of grand illusions created with

trickery and deceit—equal to that displayed by the worst
villains he portrays in the Prince.
From the example of Agathocles who, "after infinite

betrayals and cruelties, could live for a long time secure

in his fatherland," Machiavelli argues that Agathocles'
success resulted from "cruelties badly used or well used.

Those can be called well used (if it is permissible to speak

well of evil) that are done at a stroke, out of necessity to
secure oneself and then are not persisted in but are turned

to as much utility for the subjects as one can.

Those

cruelties are badly used which, though few in the beginning,
rather grow with time than are eliminated," for "injuries
must be done all together so that, being tasted less, they
offend less." (Ch. 8, 37-8)

As part of his satire, Machiavelli's comment, "if it is
permissible to speak well of evil" suggests his humaneness

in partially rejecting the use of cruelty, a device used by
Jonathan Swift as well.^

And, like Swift, Machiavelli's

comment has the tone of an aside.

Swift used parenthesis to

"slip in cutting asides reflecting the judgment of the
projector,"'^ and it seems clear from this remark that

Machiavelli does find cruelty as evil (having so labeled
it), despite his recommendations to use it.

Quentin Skinner makes the point that "Aristotle had
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laid it down in his Politics that rulers generally come to
be hated as a result of confiscating the property of their

subjects or violating the honour of their womenfolk. (1311
\

a-b)

To this the Roman moralists had added that cruelty is

another leading cause of hatred.

As Seneca had put it in De

dementia, cruelty always increases the number of a king's
enemies and eventually makes him hated and loathed (1,8,7;
1,25,3)

It is striking that Machiavelli completely ignores

this latter argument.

But it is even more striking that, in

offering his own opinion about how to avoid hatred, he
simply reiterates what Aristotle had already said,"^ in
Chapter Nineteen, that the prince should "abstain" from the

"women of his subjects," and their property." (Oh. 19, 72)
Machiavelli thus ignores the "Roman Moralists" who "added

that cruelty is another leading cause of hatred."®

Rather,

he encourages the new prince to practice cruelty in the
context of "well" or "badly" used, and the effect is to

suggest the true nature of the prince.

Machiavelli may also have intended that the phrase, "if
it is permissible to speak well of evil" be understood as a

criticism of the Church, which failed to halt the corruption
of its own prelates.

Of the Franciscan and Dominican fri

ars, Machiavelli notes, in the Discourses, "they also lived
so frugally and had such prestige with the populace as
confessors and preachers that they convinced them it is an

evil thing to speak evilly of evil doing, and a good thing
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to live under obedience to such prelates, and that, if they
did wrong, it must be left to God to chastise them.

And,

this being so, the latter behave as badly as they can,
because they are not afraid of punishments which they do not

see and in which they do not believe.

It is, then, this

revival which has maintained and continues to maintain this

religion," (III. 1, 389) a strong commentary on the Church
offered by Machiavelli, and one that I think has relevance

to the Prince, as well, for if "it is an evil thing to talk

evilly of evil doing," as he says above, then might it not
be a good thing, and thus "permissible," to speak "well of
evil"?

Machiavelli hints at this absurd notion when he asks

"if it is permissible to speak well of evil," in the Prince.

And he dutifully follows the advice of the friars by omit
ting moral considerations from his recommendations (with the

exception of the phrase in question), nor does he speak

evilly of cruelty (which he implicitly labeled as evil).
Rather, he speaks "well" of it in the sense that it can be
"well used."

Machiavelli thus mocks the friars for that

teaching which left (and continued to leave) the Church
mired in corruption.

In Machiavelli's time, the Dominicans "were entrusted

with [the] execution of the Spanish Inquisition,"^ autho
rized by Sixtus IV in 1478.

In 1492, the Spanish Jews and

Muslims were given four months to convert to the Rqman

Catholic faith or leave Spain, forfeiting wealth and proper
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ty, as described above.

The savage cruelty that accompanied

the Inquisition was done in the name of God, the same God
that would (the friars taught) chastise those who were

guilty of evil doing among the Church prelates, which sug
gests an irony that is compounded by Machiavelli's observa
tion that the prelates neither feared or believed in such

^

punishments.

If the priests had so little fear of God's punishment,
what had the princes of Italy to fear?

Pasquale Villari

attests to this moral vacuum when he remarks that, in

Machiavelli's time, "individual members of the community
[were] deprived of all guidance save that of their own

instincts,"* and the instinct for self-preservation in the
new princes of Italy permitted no conscionable objection to
cruelty or crimes, to achieve their ends.

A general principle of Machiavelli's that finds expres
sion in all of his major works is that new benefits do not
make men forget old injuries.

In Chapter Eight, however, he

suggests the opposite; "in taking hold of a state, he who

seizes it should examine all the offenses necessary for him
to commit, and do them all in a stroke, so as not to have to
renew them everyday and by not renewing them, to secure men

and gain them to himself with benefits... for injuries must
be done all together, so that, being tasted less, they
offend less; and benefits should be done little by little so
that they may be tasted better."
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(Ch. 8, 38)

To illustrate the extent to which Machiavelli has

distorted his principles in the above passage, I refer to
the Discourses, in which he cautions, "when a man is de

prived of something which possesses intrinsic value, he
never forgets it, and you are reminded of it every time you
in any way need it; and since such need is of daily occur
rence, you are reminded of it every day," (III. 23, 472) and
he warns "all potentates" that "old injuries are never
canceled by new benefits, least of all when the benefits are

of less importance than the injuries previously inflicted,"
(III.4, 394-5) which must be the case when injuries are done
all at once, and the benefits a little at a time.

Further, he states in the History that "an old love or
hate cannot by new benefits or new injuries easily be can

celed,"' and "men are naturally guicker in their revenge for
an injury than in their gratitude for a benefit; they feel

that gratitude causes them loss, but revenge brings them

profit and pleasure."'®
Even in the Prince, Machiavelli observes that men don't

forget their "ancient orders" and "liberty," "either through
length of time or benefits received," (Ch. 5, 20-1) and in
Chapter Seven, he warns, "And whoever believes that among
great personages new benefits will make old injuries be
forgotten deceives himself." (Ch. 7, 33)

Yet, he urges the

new prince to ignore his advice, in the following chapter,

not only urging that benefits be granted following injuries,
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"to secure men and gain them to himself," (Ch. 8, 38) but
advising the manner in which they should be bestowed as
well.

Therefore, having admitted that cruelty is both injuri
ous and evil, Machiavelli yet encourages the new prince to
be cruel by offering the artful caveat that it be "well

used," that is, done all at once, which in a civil society
accustomed to liberty, would likely provoke great hatred and

desire for revenge.

Machiavelli's counsel in Chapter Eight

is deceptive, then, for should the cruelty of the prince
give rise to a rebellion, even if he has sufficient force to

defeat it, he must still hold "a knife in his hand" (Ch. 8,
38) as a precaution against conspiracy, an option that
remains to the populace; "In the midst of universal hatred

no security is ever to be found, because you do not know
from where the evil is going to come; and he who fears all

men cannot secure himself against anybody, and if you do try
to do so, you augment your dangers, because those who are

left are more fiery in their hate and more prepared for

vengeance."" Machiavelli's failure to warn the new prince
that cruelty is a cause for hatred coupled with his advice

to grant benefits to secure himself, following injury and
offense, is not advice for the wise, but counsel for fools.

As logical as it may appear, it does not represent the
wisdom of the ancients, nor is it consistent with

Machiavelli's thought as represented in his other works.
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In the Discourses, Machiavelli offers a sentiment

similar to that given in Chapter Eight, but one can readily
see that the similarity is only superficial one:
It does considerable harm to a state to

arouse every day fresh discontent in the

minds of your citizens by inflicting
fresh injuries on this or that person,
as happened in Rome after the fall of
the Decemviri. For all ten of them, and
other citizens besides, were at various
times accused and condemned, so that the
whole nobility was in a state of extreme
terror, since they thought there would
be no end to such condemnations until

the whole of the nobility was destroyed.
This would have caused great incon
veniences in the city if Marcus Duilius,
a tribune, had not made provision
against it by issuing an edict which
made it unlawful for anyone to cite or
accuse any Roman citizen for the space
of a year; whereby the whole nobility
was reassured.

This shows how harmful

it is to a republic or to a prince to
keep the minds of their subjects in
suspense and fear by continually in
flicting punishment and giving offense.
Than this there is unquestionably no
practice more pernicious. For when men
begin to suspect that evil may befall
them, they take any means to protect
themselves and grow more bold and less

restrained in attempting a revolution.
It is necessary, therefore, either never
to injure anyone, or to inflict the
injuries at one go, and then to reassure
men and give them ground to expect peace
and security. (I. 45, 221-2)

A distinction should be made between the above passage
and Machiavelli's remarks in Chapter Eight, in regard to
context.

In the Discourses, his discussion centers on the

appointment of the Decemviri for the purpose of establishing
new laws in the Roman republic "whereby the freedom of that
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state might be stabilized." (I. 40, 210-11)

What actually

occurred, however, was the rise of one Appius Claudius, and
the threat of tyranny.

The Ten were eventually brought down

by the plebs, who desired vengeance.

The plebs wanted all

of them handed over, whom they "proposed to burn alive." (I.

44, 219)

While the plebs did not succeed in administering

that cruelty, they did succeed in continuing with fresh
accusations and condemnations which, as Machiavelli points
out, does harm to a republic or a prince when renewed every
day.

In the Prince, Machiavelli's, remarks are offered in

support of seizing power and securing the safety of a tyrant

who is, after all, above the law once he is established, and
outside the law at the moment he seizes power, those actions
that caused Machiavelli to accuse Agathocles of crimes.

Further, the injuries inflicted by the new prince are la^
beled simply as cruelty rather than a continuum of accusa

tions and condemnations finding redress within established
laws, observed by all.

Therefore, he urges in the Prince

that injuries be done all at once followed by benefits,

while in the Discourses, he recommends "[giving the people]
ground to expect peace and security" by lawful means, in the
example of the edict issued by Marcus Duilius.

The edict

should not be confused with a benefit which is offered a
■

V-

little at a time such as wealth, honors, and position.
Rather; it constituted a mode of lawful restraint issued for
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one year, in which no accused could be brought before the
people; a remittal of injury and offense altogether.

While

security for the tyrant is paramount in the Prince, security
for the people forms the thrust of his opinion in the Pis-

courses, whether in a republic or in a state governed by a
good prince.

In the Prince, Machiavelli seems to parody his discus

sion of the Decemviri in the Discourses which, because the

Discourses were begun before the Prince and the quote is
from Book One, may already have been written, or formulated

in his notes.

He shows only contempt for the means used by

Agathocles and Liverotto da Fermo, and the whole point of
Chapter Eight is an attempt on his part to demonstrate that

there is no virtue in such a path, nor is there any glory,
and his contempt extends to Cesare Borgia for the reasons I

have given above.

Cruelty well or badly used is not quali

fied as virtuous, but simply as a means to safeguard the
prince, and Machiavelli does not explain how cruelty "well
used" (having been committed in some grand fashion, all at
once) will protect the prince from hatred, which scholars

might have expected him to address.

Further, his mention of

the fact that the plebs wanted the Ten burned alive, in the

Discourses, suggests the punishments of the Spanish Inquisi
tion and the cruelty of that spectacle, if only because he
drew the Dominican friars into his discourse, in the Prince,

by alluding to their remonstrance that "it is evil to speak
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evilly of evil doing," casting a pall over the Church as
well.

As Pasquale Villari observed, the "statecraft" of

Machiavelli's time was "full of cruelty and devoid of scru

ples,"'^ and the Church was not exempt from those practices.
Machiavelli's sardonic humor is apparent throughout
Chapter Eight, devoted to (of all things) cruelty and inhu

manity, demonstrating his ability to illuminate the comic

stage with the dark obsessions of his fellow man, no simple
feat, even for Machiavelli.

One has only to read the Prince

as Machiavelli intended that it be read to discover the wit

and humor that lies just below the surface—those less than

conspicuous gems that qualify him as a most entertaining
satirist, and I offer the following example:

Of Liverotto

da Fermo (who embodies all that was vile and contemptible in
the modern dwarfs), Machiavelli remarks, "And to overthrow

him would have been as difficult as to overthrow Agathocles
if he had not permitted himself to be deceived by Cesare
Borgia when at Sinigaglia, as was said above, he took the

Orsini and the Vitelli." (Ch. 8, 37)
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Chapter XI.

Civil Principality: The Medici

Machiavelli introduces Chapter Nine on civil principal

ities (an apt description of Florence under the Medici)
under the heading of Chapter Eight, devoted to crimes; "But,
because one becomes prince from private individual also by
two modes which cannot be altogether attributed either to

fortune or virtue, I do not think they should be left out,
although one of them can be reasoned about more amply where
republics are treated.

These are when one ascends to a

principality by some criminal and nefarious path or when a

private citizen becomes prince of his fatherland by the
support of his fellow citizens." (Ch. 8, 34)

Harvey C.

Mansfield, Jr. notes that Machiavelli "does not say which of
the two modes is reasoned about more amply ^where republics

are treated,'"^ a point well taken, because the statement is
thus confusing, blurring the distinction between the two

modes of acquisition, and intended to be so.

Although

Machiavelli never mentions the Medici in Chapter Nine, it is
a chapter devoted to the means by which a new prince rises

"with the support of his fellow citizens," precisely as the
Medici did, and if doing so does not quite meet the defini
tion of crime (having always preferred to subvert the con

stitution to their benefit rather than seize power with
violence and force), their actions were no less malfeasant—

as fraudulent, corrupting, and dangerous to the liberty of
Florence.

Thus, the Medici were criminal in their intent,
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in the broader context of crimes against the republic,
particularly to one who valued the principles of republican
government, as did Machiavelli.

In Chapter Nine,

Machiavelli restates the introduction he gave in the previ
ous chapter; "But, coming to the other policy, when a pri

vate citizen becomes prince of his fatherland, not through
crime or other intolerable violence but with the support of
his fellow citizens (which one could call a civil principal
ity; neither all virtue nor all fortune is necessary to
attain it, but rather a fortunate astuteness)—I say that
one ascends to this principality either with the support of

the people or with the support of the great," (Ch. 9, 38-9)
a passage that appears to clarify the distinction between

rising by means of a criminal path or with the support of
fellow citizens but which, through repetition and by associ
ation, again suggests a link between the two modes, contami

nating the latter with the former in negative connotation.
Further evidence that Machiavelli is less than candid

in his remarks is his reference to "fortunate astuteness," a
derogatory tribute to those who lack virtue, but have on

their side that part of fortune which provides the opportu
nity to pursue a nefarious path of fraud in the willful
destruction of liberty.

In Chapter Eighteen, Machiavelli

remarks, "How laudable it is for a prince to keep his faith,

and to live with honesty and not by astuteness, everyone
understands.

Nonetheless one sees by experience in our time
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that the princes who have done great things are those who
have taken little account of faith and have known how to get
around men's brains with their astuteness; and in the end
they have overcome those who have founded themselves on

loyalty." (Ch. 18, 68-9)

"Fortunate astuteness" is the

ability to acquire with shrewdness and trickery, having the
appearance of honorable practice but, in fact, resorting to
dishonorable means, as when he urges the new prince to

"astutely" foster enmities to achieve personal recognition,^
without also acknowledging that all such enterprises, while
useful in elevating the reputation of the prince that he

desires for himself, are ultimately won with hardship for
the people.

This example offers but one instance of many in

which Machiavelli sets aside his interest in the common good
of the people in favor of the self-interest of the prince,
in the Prince.

In referring to Severus as a "very astute fox," (Ch.

19, 79) Machiavelli again uses astute in a generally deroga
tory manner, for he alludes to the "criminal" nature of his

actions,^ describing him as a "wicked man" (I. 10, 137) in
the Discourses, and "cruel and rapacious" in the Prince.

(Ch. 19, 77-8)

Having founded the Severan Dynasty (193-235

A.D.) during the Roman Empire, his example provides an

excellent model for a new prince who also lusts for empire.

His qualities and actions which find expression throughout
the Prince are demonstrated in Machiavelli's assessment of
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the Roman Empire before and after the period of the five
good emperors (96-180 A.D.);

Let a prince put before himself the
period from Nerva to Marcus, and let him
compare it with the preceding period and
with that which came after, and then -let
him decide in which he would rather have

been born, and during which he would
have chosen to be emperor. What he will
find when good princes were ruling, is a
prince securely reigning among subjects
no less secure, a world replete with
peace and justice. He will see the
Senate's authority respected, the magis
trates honored, rich citizens enjoying
their wealth, nobility and virtue held

in highest esteem, and everything work
ing smoothly and going well. He will
notice, on the other hand, the absence
of any rancor, any licentiousness, cor
ruption or ambition, and that in this
golden age everyone is free to hold and
to defend his own opinion. He will
behold, in short, the world triumphant,
its prince glorious and respected by
all, the people fond of him and secure
under his rule.

If he then looks attentively at the
times of the other emperors, he will
find them distraught with wars, torn by
seditions, brutal alike in peace and in
war, princes frequently killed by assas
sins, civil wars and foreign wars con
stantly occurring, Italy in travail and
ever prey to fresh misfortunes, its
cities demolished and pillaged. He will
see Rome burnt, its capitol demolished
by its own citizens, ancient temples
lying desolate, religious rites grown
corrupt, adultery rampant throughout the

city.

He will find the sea covered with

exiles and the rocks stained with blood,
in Rome he will see countless atrocities

perpetrated; rank, riches, the honors
men have won, and, above all, virtue,
evoked upon as a capital crime. He will
find calumniators rewarded, servants
suborned to turn against their masters.
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freed men to turn against their patrons,
and those who lack enemies attacked by
their friends. He will thus happily
learn how much Rome, Italy, and the
world owed to Caesar. (I. 10, 137-8)
An "astute fox" such as Severus does not represent the

good government described by Machiavelli in his reference to
the government of "good princes," who clearly had the common

good in mind.

His contempt for princes who disregard the

common good could not be more plainly stated than in the

above passage, and yet the Prince represents nothing if not
!

the sacrifice of common good for the personal benefit of the
ruler, for his own security.

Security from what?

Revolt,

conspiracy, and rebellion from within, attack from foreign
ers, often invited by exiles and other malcontents, from

without.

Therefore, although Machiavelli attributes "good

luck" (fortune) and "virtue" to Severus in the Discourses

(I. 10, 137) he does not consider Severus a good prince.
"Fortunate astuteness" is intended to mock those who

possess those qualities that will enable them to succeed by
nefarious means, ability that, as Machiavelli explained in
the context of Agathocles, cannot be called virtue.

And

while the Medici did not seize Florence with force and

violence (for the most part), as did Agathocles in Syracuse,
and Cesare Borgia in Romagna, their means were no less

wicked because they resorted to fraud and deceit, over a
period of several decades.

Machiavelli's statement, "the people desire neither to
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be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the great

desire to command and oppress the people," (Ch. 9, 39) is a
principle of such importance that he repeats it three times
in this rather short chapter.

He notes that "the end of the

people is more decent than that of the great, since the
great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppres

sed," (Ch. 9, 39) and two paragraphs later, he again re

marks, "one who becomes prince through the support of the
people should keep them friendly to him, which should be

easy for him because they ask of him only that they not be
oppressed." (Ch. 9, 40)

The new prince is, of course, one of the great, who has
elevated himself to a position of power either with the

support of the great, who "see they cannot resist the peo
ple, [and] begin to give reputation to one of themselves,"
or with the support of the people, who, "when they see they
cannot resist the great, give reputation to one, and make
him prince so as to be defended with his authority." (Ch. 9,
39)

If the prince is a "good prince," as Machiavelli de

scribes a ruler who respects the laws, the "authority of the
Senate," and "justice," the prince and the people will find

security in the common good.

(I. 10, 137-38)

If the prince

desires to impose tyranny, however, to "ascend from a civil
order to an absolute one," (Ch. 9, 42) his need to oppress

will be of the greatest magnitude because of the necessity

to protect himself against both the great (the few) and the
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people (the many).

Because the people desire not to be

oppressed, they would not willfully give power to a tyrant.
Therefore, a private individual who desires to establish
himself as prince in a civil state must either use force of

arms (as did Agathocles and Julius Caesar who rose to power

through the ranks of the military, or follow the example of
Cesare Borgia, who used the wealth and arms of others), or
resort to fraud and deception.

Machiavelli notes, in the

Discourses, that a tyrant "will wait until, with the support
of the populace, he has got rid of the nobility, and will

not begin to oppress the people until he has got rid of it,
by which time the populace will have come to realize that it

is a slave and will have no way of escape."

The mistake

made by Appius in establishing his tyranny was that he
"deserted the populace and courted the nobles,"for "though

nobles desire to tyrannize, that part of the nobility which

finds itself left out in a tyrannical regime, is always the
tyrant's enemy.

Nor can he win them all over, for so great
(

is the ambition and the avarice with which they are imbued,
that no tyrant can have enough riches and enough honors to
satisfy all." (1.40, 214-15)

Therefore, although Machiavelli emphasizes the point
that the people do not want to be oppressed, he devotes

Chapter Nine to instructing the new prince that he should
found on the people (as opposed to the great) which will
give him the best chance for success.
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And because the

Prince teaches the art of tyranny, the end result for the
people will indeed by "slavery."

In this sense, Machiavelli

issues a warning in the Prince, for in satire, "warning
■

/

examples" are given "in order to help others," and "If we
[the satirists] show our fellow-men the painful and absurd
consequences of certain types of conduct... others will be
cured," a view that is traced to Socrates and the "Greek

philosophical schools" that followed, "emphasizing the power
of reason.

If you understand, they said, you will do right.

Indeed you must do right, if you understand.

Only strive to

see the truth," a view shared by Horace and other satir
ists.''

If in a free city the people want to avoid tyranny,
then, they should understand the danger in giving reputation
to one of the great, who will use every covert means avail

able to gain them to himself.

He warns against the ambition

of those striving for power when he remarks, "these princ
ipalities customarily run into peril when they are about to

ascend from a civil order to an absolute one," (Ch. 9, 41-2)
yet, he does not specify the means by which the people are
won over to the new prince.

In fact, he only remarks that

"the prince can gain the people to himself in many modes,
for which one cannot give certain rules because the modes

vary according to circumstances, and so they will be left
out." (Ch. 9, 40-1)

By leaving out any discussion of "cer

tain rules" that govern the modes, he employs the rhetorical
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device of omission, dismissing the subject on the authority
of his own statement.

He need not defend it or offer proof

for his claim that there are such "rules," nor does he

define the different "modes" that give rise to different

"rules."

Had he elaborated on this topic, however, he could

not have avoided throwing the spotlight on the Medici who

exemplified various modes of gaining popular support, and I
do not think it unreasonable to question why he did not
seize the opportunity to praise the Medici in that regard,

if the Prince is a work of sincerity and integrity as many
scholars think it to be.

The answer, of course, is that he

objected to the fraudulent methods of the Medici, and did
not support the notion of a private citizen rising with the
support of his fellow citizens.

In the History, Machiavelli emphasizes the example of
Cosimo, who "gave his attention to doing good to everybody

and, with his liberality, to making many citizens his parti

sans.

Hence his example brought about further censure of

those who ruled; yet he thought in this way either to live

in Florence as powerful and secure as anybody or, if through
the ambition of his adversaries he came up against something
beyond the laws, to be in both arms and support their super
ior,

which contributed to factionalism and strife within

the city.

"Civil strife always increased his influence in

Florence, and external wars his power and reputation."®

The

greater the reputation of a private individual, the greater
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the danger to the liberty of the city, particularly if the
populace is corrupt and thus more susceptible to the influ
ence of benefits, honors, privilege, rank—all the modes

utilized in acquiring favor and preference.
In the Discourses, Machiavelli makes the point that
Cosimo "began to arouse alarm for the security of its gov

ernment; with the result that his fellow citizens thought it
dangerous to touch him, and still more dangerous to let him

alone," due to "favours gained by his own prudence and

through the ignorance of the citizens." (I. 33, 191-2)

By

his methods, men achieve their designs, as he notes in the
History, and the dilemma is that "it will be necessary to
urge as the reasons for driving him out that he is compas

sionate, helpful, liberal, and loved by everybody.

Tell me

now, what law is it that forbids or that blames and condemns

in men, pity, liberality, love?"'
The weight of Machiavelli's views in the History and
the Discourses profoundly discredits the advice Machiavelli
gives to the new prince, and this is especially obvious with

regard to Chapter Nine, devoted to the subject of free
cities and how one might transform them into a principality
by becoming "prince" of their "fatherland," (Ch. 9, 38) an
absurd advocacy on Machiavelli's part, for not only did he
have contempt for such men, but also for principality it
self, one of the "six types of government," that he classed

as "pernicious." (I. 2, 106)
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Referring to those cities which from the beginning have
"been governed in accordance with their wishes" as opposed
to those "subject to another power," (I. 2, 104-5)
Machiavelli sviinmarizes, in the Discourses, the "variations"
of government that arise in such cities.

He first notes

that "those who have written about states say that there are

to be found in them one of three forms of government, called

by them Principality, Aristocracy and Democracy," while
"others—and with better judgment many think—say that there

are six types of government," of which principality, aris
tocracy, and democracy are "good," but because they "easily
become corrupt," cannot be classed as good: (I. 2, 106)
For Principality easily becomes Tyranny.
From Aristocracy the transition to Oli
garchy is an easy one. Democracy is
without difficulty converted into Anar
chy. So that if anyone who is organiz
ing a commonwealth sets up one of the
three first forms of government, he sets
up what will last for awhile, since
there are no means whereby to prevent
its passing into its contrary, on ac
count of the likeness which in such a

case virtue has to vice. (I. 2, 106)

When men first chose a prince, having already estab

lished justice, they chose "one who excelled in prudence and
justice," but when the prince passed his title to his heirs

and was no longer elected, "his heirs soon began to degen
erate as compared with their ancestors, and, forsaking
virtuous deeds, considered that princes have naught else to
do but to surpass other men in extravagance, lasciviousness,
and every other form of licentiousness.
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With the result

that the prince came to be hated, and since he was hated,
I
:

I

came to be afraid, and from fear soon passed to offensive

action, which quickly brought about a tyranny." (I. 2, 107)
Machiavelli emphasizes that the new prince has need to
"secure himself," (Ch. 9, 39) and the sum of his advice

throughout the Prince is designed to preserve and protect
his power.

Unlike the "first prince" he defined in the

Discourses, who "excelled in prudence and justice," the new

prince more resembles his "heirs" who corrupted the original
notion of "Principality,^' and brought it to "tyranny."
Virtue not only bears a "likeness" to vice, but has the
appearance of becoming vice—and vice, virtue.

As he re

marks in Chapter Fifteen, "if one considers everything well,
one will find something appears to be virtue, which if
pursued would be one's ruin, and something else appears to

be vice, which if pursued results in one's security and well
being," (Ch. 15, 62) which reflects in part his argument for
tyranny and the transvaluation of virtue and vice into their

opposites, from necessity.

Everyone is bad; therefore the

new prince must learn to be bad as well, as though the
i

ambitious and greedy required lessons in that art.
One need only consider how far such a corrupt world
would lead the people from liberty and justice to question

Machiavelli's sincerity in offering the advice he gives in
the Prince, unless, as he notes in the Discourses, "it is
present evils that are terrifying, but for the future there
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is hope, since men are convinced that the evil ways of a bad
prince may make for freedom in the end," (I. 58, 257)

In

this statement, he suggests the passing of tyranny to aris
tocracy, the form of government that follows principality
and its contrary.

Tyranny is overthrown when the "dishon

ourable life" of the prince becomes intolerable.

The people

rise up against the prince with "arms," led by "powerful
leaders" from the ranks of the great," men conspicuous for

their liberality, magnamity, wealth, and ability."

When the

prince has been "liquidated," the great form "themselves

into a government" without a "sole head," the "very term"
having become "odious" to them.

The new government "ruled

in accordance with the laws which they had made, subordinat
ed their own convenience to the common advantage, and, both

in private matters and public affairs, governed and pre
served order with the utmost diligence." (I. 2, 107-8)

Aristocracy passes into oligarchy when, once again,
the government passes to the "descendants," a government "in

which civic rights are entirely disregarded."

The people,

not wanting to return to princely rule and to rid themselves
of government by the few, turn against the oligarchs, "liq

uidate" them, and organize a "democratic form of govern
ment."

In time, however, the first generation having

"passed away," democracy passes into anarchy, "in which no
respect was shown either for the individual or for the

official, and which was such that, as everyone did what he
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liked, all parts of outrages were constantly committed," so
that, to rid themselves of anarchy, "principality was once
again restored." (I. 2, 108-9)

The cycle would likely continue "for ever," were it not
for the fact that in periods of transition, in which the

"commonwealth" lacks "both counsel and strength," it becomes
prey to "neighboring and better organized" states. (I. 2,
109)

Thus, Machiavelli maintains "that all the forms of

government mentioned above are far from satisfactory, the
three good ones because their life is so short, the three

bad ones because of their inherent malignity.

Hence, pru

dent legislators, aware of their defects, refrained from
adopting as such any one of these forms, and chose instead

one that shared in them all, since they thought such a
government would be stronger and more stable, for if in one

and the same state there was principality, aristocracy and
democracy each would keep watch over the other." (I. 2, 109)

Machiavelli would likely have agreed with Aristotle that in
such variations of government, "none of them" served "the

common good of all."*
Of course Machiavelli does not include his discourse on

the cycles of government in the Prince, although it would
have been appropriate to his work, if only to warn the new

prince of the dangers inherent in tyranny.

But he alludes

to it, for the benefit of those familiar with his views;

"From these two diverse appetites [the great want to op
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press, and the people want not to be oppressed], one of

three effects occurs in cities; principality or liberty or
license." (Ch. 9, 39)

He does not label the "effects" in

logical order, however, for principality (brought about by
anarchy) is not followed by liberty (manifest, although
short-lived, in aristocracy and democracy).

Rather, princi

pality is followed by license, the effect of corruption,

which causes the principality to pass into tyranny.

Had he

ordered them principality or license or liberty he would

have gone more directly to the point--that a new principali
ty founded by the new prince was doomed from the start.
I

In recommending that the new prince acquire and found a
principality, then, Machiavelli casts himself in the role of

an "[im]prudent legislator," (I. 2, 109) by his own defini
tion, a wonderful irony that those familiar with his view
would surely have discovered in the Prince.

Machiavelli began his discourse in Chapter Nine by
addressing his advice to a private citizen; "But, coming to
the pther policy, when a private citizen becomes prince of
his fatherland," followed by his observation that "one

ascends to this principality either with the support of the

people or with the support of the great." (Ch. 9, 38-9)
Before closing the chapter, however, having advised the
prince to found on the people as the best course (or at
least keep them "friendly"), he remarks, "And let no one

resist my opinion on this [we must take it on his authority
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alone] with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the

people founds on mud.

For that is true when a private

citizen lays his foundation on them and allows himself to

think the people will liberate him if he is opposed (in this
case one can often be deceived, like the Gracchi in Rome and

Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence)," although, a "prince,"
who has also founded on the people, "will never find himself

deceived by them," provided he has the qualities enumerated

by Machiavelli.' If it is true that a private citizen who
lays his foundations on the people founds on mud, what is

the distinction between that private citizen and the private
citizen who becomes the so called "prince of his father
land," who also founded on the people?

In what he calls a

"civil principality," they are one and the same.

A princi

pality is a sovereign state ruled by a reigning prince.
There is no reigning prince in a "civil" principality, in
which the "magistries, who, especially in adverse times, can

take away his state [it is not his state if supreme power is
not vested in the prince] with great ease either by turning
against him or by not obeying him," in a state in which the
people take "commands from the magistrates," rather than the

prince. (Ch. 9, 42)

What Machiavelli is describing und^r

the heading of civil principality is a free city or state in

which a private individual rises to power with the support
of the people, and maintains his position with prudent

actions, "and with his spirits and orders keeps the general
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ity of the people inspired," (Ch. 9, 41) until he turns his
thoughts to tyranny.

If he is to "ascend from civil order

to an absolute one," (Ch. 9, 42) he must eliminate opposi

tion to his power in civil government,|and seize power for
himself alone, in which case liberty is lost, and "civil
principality" easily becomes principality.
In the context of "civil principality," then,

Machiavelli warns against the phenomenon of a private citi
zen who is prince in everything but name, as were the
Medici.

Cosimo lacked "nothing of being prince but the

title,

one who "had been brought so high that, unless

something were done about it, he would become their prince
[of Florence].""

Over the decades from Cosimo's rise to

power in 1434, the Medici gained great reputation in
Florence, and their influence in government rose proportion
ately.

In this sense, the city was not a principality, nor

was the government completely controlled by the people, for
the Medici influence determined who was chosen to serve in

government, based on fidelity to the Medici faction and

interests.

The Medici rose with the support of the people,

as Machiavelli advises the new prince to do as well.

At the

same time, however, he reminds both the Medici and the

people that such attempts to acquire excessive authority

have failed in the past, with his example of Giorgio Scali,
whom he associates (in context) with the "trite" proverb
that "whoever founds on the people founds on mud," a proverb
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that is anything but trite with regard to cities accustomed
to freedom, should anyone desire to found a tyranny there.

Giorgio Scali began his rise in reputation as a defend
er of the people, and was beheaded when he betrayed them,

for, having gained a position of power, he turned to tyran

ny,12

message seems clear enough.

As Machiavelli re

marks in the History, relative to the attempt made by the
Duke of Athens to become prince of Florence, the Florentines
"cannot keep their liberty and yet cannot endure servi

tude,"^^ the very dileitima reflected in the notion of a "civil
principality."

To avoid the fate of Messer Scali, then, a private

citizen who would become sole authority in a free city such
as Florence, must rid himself of the obstacle of government

intervention and its authority, as the magistries have the
power to ruin him, and if this difficulty is partially rec

tified in the control and influence exerted in civil govern
ment by the private citizen himself (as it was in the case

of the Medici), it is by no means solved.

Thus, Machiavelli

introduces his argument for the need to establish absolute

authority in the last paragraph, in preparation for that

time in which "the state has need of the citizens," ensuring
that "always and in every quality of time [they] have need

of the state and of himself; and then they will always be

faithful to him." (Ch. 9, 42)

There is no assurance, of

course, that they will "always be faithful to him."
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In

fact, the more odious he becomes in his tyranny--as he must,

if the people are to have need of him "always and in every
quality of time"—the more hatred he will encvimber, which
ultimately will lead to his ruin.

Machiavelli only states that the prince "must think of
a way" (Ch. 9, 42) to make the people have need of him.

does not say how this is to be accomplished.

He

Nor does he

explain how the prince rids himself of "civil order" to make

way for his "absolute" rule.

He could, of course, liquidate

his opposition with the expedience and means demonstrated by
Cesare Borgia.

Were it not for the advice offered by

Machiavelli in Chapter Seventeen, 1;he new prince might have
cause to hesitate in following the example of Cesare for, in
doing so, he risks the blame heaped upon Agathocles for "his

savage cruelty and inhumanity," which prevents his "[cele
bration] among the most excellent men." (Ch. 8, 35)

In

Chapter Seventeen, however, Machiavelli counsels that a

prince "should not care about the infamy of cruelty,"
(Ch. 17, 65) because modern princes are not celebrated by

the standard of virtue and excellence represented in antiq

uity.

Rather, if a new prince were inclined to seek lessons

from the past, he would find the best instruction in the

examples of men like Julius Caesar and Agathocles, who
demonstrated how far personal ambition and great enterprises
can raise a private individual from a low station to one of
supreme power.
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As the world is a corrupt world, pf necessity the new
prince must act accordingly, if he is to succeed, particu
larly when others, like himself, crave power, principality,
and empire.

Such a man will stop at nothing to satiate his

ambition, and if Machiavelli seems to nourish his vile na

ture with every persuasion to the contrary of his own be

liefs, in the Prince, it is to render his nature transparent
and thus subject to the scrutiny of all.

With the exception

of Chapter Six, Machiavelli does not plead with his readers
to consider the good examples of the past.

Rather, he holds

up for our scorn the degradations of the present, which is
but another path to the same end; by "inspiring a horror of

evil," one can "convey love of virtue.

In the Discourses,

he does not hesitate to criticize the present.

Of the

"highly virtuous actions performed" in the past, "so shunned
by everybody in each little thing they do," he notes "that
of bygone days there remains no trace, it cannot but fill.me

at once with astonishment and grief.

In Chapter Nine, then, Machiavelli exposes the danger
of the rise of a private citizen in a civil state, in which

the people should,beware of jeopardizing their liberty and
i

freedom by supporting such a man, for in time, to ensure his

authority and power, he will give up the good qualities that
earned their confidence, and think only of his own interest

and personal benefit.

Surely the Medici would have recog

nized themselves in this portrait of a rising tyrant.
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Chapter XII.

Weak Princes and Ecclesiastical Principality

Because Chapter Ten addresses the subject of the mili

tary forces of the new prince, it would seem more appropri
ate to join it to Chapters Twelve through Fourteen, which
also treat military affairs.

Further, Machiavelli might

reasonably have followed Chapter Nine on civil principali

ties, with the subject of Chapter Eleven, ecclesiastical
principalities, thus concluding his commentary on the kinds
of principalities that are acquired by a new prince, before
turning to a new topic.

He seems to have turned the two

chapters around, so to speak, and the net effect is to give

the appearance of digression in Chapter Ten, separating the
rule of priests from that of secular princes (one could

almost charge Machiavelli with a pause of reverence), but of
course they were inextricably joined, the popes and their
relatives, in common pursuit of worldly gain.

Machiavelli offers his thoughts as to "whether a prince

has enough of a state that he can rule by himself when he
needs to, or whether he is always under the necessity of

being defended by others." (Ch. 10, 42)

He "[judges] those

capable of ruling by themselves who can, by abundance of

either men or money, put together an adequate army and fight
a battle against whoever comes to attack them." (Ch. 10, 43)
This is not prudent counsel, however, and if the new prince
follows his advice, "either men or money," and relies on
wealth rather than arms of his own, he risks inherent weak
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ness.

As in the case of Cesare Borgia, when the source of

wealth dries up, you are finished.

point in the Discoursesz

Machiavelli makes this

the importance of money is rela

tive to whether or not the prince or "country" is "well
equipped with arms."

The "King of France and the Italians

today" should keep the enemy at a distance, "for since

[their] virtue lies in money, not in men, as soon as any
thing gets in the way of your obtaining it, you may be
undone." (II. 12, 308)

The notion that wealth alone will

enable a prince to rule by himself leads the new prince down

the path followed by Cesare Borgia, for a prince who is
dependent on someone else for either arms or wealth cannot

quite be said to rule by himself because he lacks the requi
site independence.

Machiavelli made that point in Chapter

Nine with regard to authority. (Ch. 9, 42)
Further, if a prince has money but not men, he must

hire mercenaries or auxiliary forces.

In Chapter Thirteen,

Machiavelli refers to them both as "useless," (Ch. 13, 54)
advising that a "wise prince, therefore,has always avoided
these arms and turned to his own," (Ch. 13, 55) for there is

danger of ruin in the use of such arms, and "without its own

arms no principality is secure."^

As he observes in the

Discourses, "money is not the sinews of war, as it is com
monly thought to be," for although money "adds to your

strength," it does "not provide you with it," because with

out "faithful troops... no amount of money will suffice
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you... nor can any opinion be more false than that which

asserts that money is the sinews of war." (II. 10, 300)
Therefore, the prince who must rely on his "abundance

of money" rather than "arms" is "always under the necessity
of being defended by others," and thus could be said not to
have "enough of a state that he can rule by himself" despite
the fact that Machiavelli suggests the contrary.

Without

going directly to the point, Machiavelli suggests that not

only do weak princes not have arms of their own, but they
fail to understand the need for such arms, thinking their
wealth alone will sustain them.

He encourages them in this

fallacy, when he stresses "either men or money," despite the

fact that he completely contradicts this notion in Chapter
Thirteen.

Because Chapter Ten follows his commentary on

civil principalities, in which the Medici were his intended

target, perhaps his purpose was to expose their ignorance in
the matter of arms.

As I have stated, at the time he wrote

the Prince, the Medici had already disbanded his militia. In

their self-interest, the Medici sacrificed the security of
the Florentines for their own political principles.
The remainder of Chapter Ten is devoted to the subject
of siege, in which the prince must take refuge "behind walls
and to guard them" (Ch. 10, 43) which is a somewhat humorous

way of stating it, for obviously the prince will have to
guard the walls if he is hiding behind them.

This prince

"always has necessity of others," (Ch. 10, 43) specifically
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the people, but also the possibility of aid from the out
side, which Machiavelli does not address.

In his recommendations for preparation, Machiavelli

advises that the prince "fortify and supply their own
towns," arid he specifically urges the prince "to take no

account of the countryside." (Ch. 10, 43)
Machiavelli's counsel is suspect.

Again,

In Chapter Fourteen he

makes the point that a prince learn "to know one's own
country," to "better understand its defense," (Ch. 14, 59)
and in The Art of War, he states, "cities and castles can be

strong either by nature or by artificial fortification,"^ in
which case the countryside would itself determine the par
ticular requirements needed to provide maximum security for
defense.

Secondly, Machiavelli recommends that "for at least a

mile around the walls, no one [be] allowed to carry on

farming or to put up walls, but the land must be all plain,
without a bush or a bank or trees or houses to obstruct the

view and give shelter to an enemy who pitches his camp."'
Having so ordered the countryside, the prince would have
less need to deal with the circumstances portrayed in the

Prince, in which the "enemy" finds it expedient to "burn and

ruin the countryside on his arrival," causing the people who

"have their possessions outside and see them burning," to
lose their "patience" and "forget the prince" through con
cerns for their own loss. (Ch. 10, 44)
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Third, the countryside can provide "extraordinary
means" by which "friends" can "aid you."

Machiavelli cites

the example of the town of Casalino, besieged by Hannibal.
As there was a river running through it, the Romans "threw

into it a great quantity of nuts, which, carried by the
stream without any possibility of being stopped, fed the
Casalinensians for some time.""*

Finally, the besieged should guard against deception on
the part of the enemy positibned outside the walls.

In The

Art of War, he cautions that the besieged "should not rely
on anything they see the enemy do continually, but should
invariably believe that such habitual actions hide some

deception and that the habit to their injury can change,"
for "one must guard against the" deception and tricks of the
enemy.

Failure to pay close attention to the movements

of the enemy beyond the walls could have dire consequences

for the prince, and Machiavelli's failure to warn him of it
betrays the insincerity of this discourse in the Prince.

There is the dilemma, of course, of how a tyrannical

prince inspires the people to defend him in a siege, as

opposed to defending their own interests.

As he explains in

the History, when defending "themselves," the "glory" goes
to the people, but when defending a "tyrant," the "glory of
defense" goes to "another."

And in the matter of defending

their liberty, the people can be inspired to noble and

courageous actions.

In a set speech given by one of the
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"old and wise" of Lucca to the lower classes, for the pur
pose of inspiring resistance to the Florentines in order to

preserve their liberty, Machiavelli makes the following
points; "You should not be disturbed on seeing your fields

laid waste, your farmhouses burned, your town captured,"
because if the city is saved, "they will of necessity be
saved; if we lose her, they will be saved without any profit
to us; because if we continue free, our enemy only with
difficulty can hold them; if we lose our freedom, in vain we
hold them."

Thus, as "one man," the people "promised to die

rather than surrender or rather than consider any agreement

that in any way would taint their liberty."®
If a prince is "respected" by the people because he has
protected their interests and "acted in accordance with the
laws," (I. 10, 136-7) such a prince should find the people
inspired to defend him.

Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, Duke of

Urbino, was so revered by the people that when Urbino was
threatened by Cesare Borgia and other condottierie, he
called the people together to inform them of the danger, and

they replied "that they intended to die with him."^

As

Machiavelli remarks in the Discourses, "a prince should seek
to gain the obedience and affection of his soldiers and his

subjects; their obedience by his fidelity to the constitu
tion and by the reputation he has for virtue; their affec

tion by his affability, kindliness, compassion, and other
qualities for which Valerius was conspicuous,"
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(III. 22,' 470) but a tyrant has the conspicuous problem of
fidelity.

In the Prince, Machiavelli only suggests that, in
addition to a "strong city," the prince not "make himself
hated." (Ch. 10, 44)

Unlike the example of Lucca above,

when the people see their possessions ruined, there is no

noble cause to inspire them, nor can the new prince appeal
to the respect the people have for him, as in the case of

the Duke of Urbino.

Machiavelli thus urges the prince to

inspire "fear of the enemy's cruelty," (Ch. 10, 44) thereby
advising the prince to encourage fear in the people, at a

time when there is need to calm their fears lest they aban
don him.

Had the prince made adequate preparations for this

adversity in advance, he would not be left with such petty
devices as reliance on fear, which offer little or no secur
ity for the prince.

As Machiavelli remarks in the Discours

es, the prince should not "put off conferring benefits on
people until danger is at hand," for "the people as a whole

will not consider that they owe this benefit to you [siege,
hunger, war], but rather to your enemies." (I. 32, 188)

Machiavelli does not offer this advice in Chapter Ten,
however.

He only remarks that the people will "unite with

their prince all the more," having lost their homes and
belongings, for which the prince "appears" to have "an

obligation toward them," followed by "And the nature of men

is to be obligated as much by benefits they give as by
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benefits they receive." (Ch. 10, 44)

When Machiavelli says

the prince "appears" to have an "obligation," it does not

mean the prince will, in fact, entertain an "obligation."

As Machiavelli advised in Chapter Nine, the new prince "must

think of a way by which his citizens always and in every
quality of time, have need of the state and of himself,"
(not the other way around), "and then they will always be

faithful to him," (Ch. 9, 42) a notion that would be seri
ously compromised if the new prince allowed himself to

acknowledge and act on obligations to his subjects for any
reason.

The people, however, are obligated to continue fighting
if they are to defend themselves (as well as the prince),
because they constitute his defense.

Therefore, the prince

is, in fact, dependent on his subjects, who might readily
abandon him, particularly if they do not feel obligated from

affection, and their only inspiration is fear.

As the

prince has more need of the people than they of him, he has
no assurances, then, that they will remain faithful to him.
Machiavelli also advises the prince to "secure himself

skillfully against those who appear to him too bold."

(Ch. 10, 44)

If he intends "bold" to indicate opposition to

himself, Machiavelli is, in fact, suggesting that the prince
must defend against the enemy from within as well, his own
subjects.
Further, he urges the prince "to give hope to the

231

subjects the evil won't last long.," (Ch. 10, 44)

This

should not be difficult for a new prince if he believes

Machiavelli's counsel that "worldly things are so variable
that it is next to impossible for one to stand with one's
armies idle in a siege for a year." (Ch. 10, 44)

In the

Discourses, however, Machiavelli observes that the Romans

"realized that if the army was routed, they acquire a king
dom in a day; whereas, if they besieged an obstinate city,
it might take years to get it," (II. 32, 381) and in a
letter to Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, he expresses the same
opinion, acknowledging the modern examples of "Rhodes and

Hungary" as well.®
Perhaps Machiavelli meant to imply that the prince need

not expect the siege to last long, owing to his weak prepar
ations for defense, for one could not describe the circum
stances of siege in Chapter Ten as a reflection of an "ob
stinate city."

He makes no mention of military forces,

leaving the city's protection in the hands of his subjects—

or so it would appear.

Machiavelli makes the pbint in the

Discourses that the people "cannot remain faithful to yoii
unless you are able to protect them." (II. 10, 300)

The

prince> then, has little hope to "keep the spirits of his

citizens firm in the siege," (Ch. 10, 44) who, by the way,
are not his "citizens," but his subjects.
hximor closes a

Machiavelli's wry

chapter that is, in fact, a discourse on

weak princes who do not have "enough of a state" to rule by
■
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themselves, although he encourages them in the belief that
they do.

His counsel that "men or money" suffice as the

sinews of war is antithetical to his beliefs, and reflects
\

the means by which he satirizes Cesare Borgia and other
Italian princes who were dependent on others, because they
lacked virtue of their own.

In Chapter Eleven, Machiavelli introduces the notion of

ecclesiastical principalities, distinguishing the pope as

yet another manifestation of the rise to princely status
from private individual.

As princes of the Church, most of

the popes in Machiavelli's time were prime movers in the
secular affairs of Italy.

Machiavelli notes, in the History, that Sixtus IV
(1471-84) "was the first to show what a pope could do, and
how many things earlier called sins could be hidden under
papal authority."

He "gave the city of Forli" to his son,

Girolamo, and "this ambitious way of acting made the pope
more esteemed by the princes of Italy."

Girolamo married

the daughter of the Duke of Milan and he received, as her

dowry, the "City of Imola."®
Innocent VIII (1484-92) fathered "sixteen children"^®
and "lived surrounded by [them]," as did his successor,
Alexander VI.

Innocent wanted to "provide" his son,

Francesco, "with states and with friends through which he

could maintain himself."

A marriage was arranged between

his son and the daughter of Lorenzo the Magnificent,'^ fol
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lowing lavish solicitation on the part of Lorenzo for the

pope's affection, which resulted in the "[acceptance]
throughout Europe that the policies of the Curia were in
future to be directed by Florence, that, as in the time of
Cosimo, a Medici was once again to be virtual arbiter of
Italian policy," despite the fact that "Lorenzo's reputation

as a master of diplomacy was largely undeserved."'^
A great deal has already been said about the Borgia
pope, Alexander VI (1492-1503), singled out by Machiavelli
as the pope "of all the pontiffs there have ever been," who
(

"showed how far a pope could prevail with money and forces."
(Ch. 11, 46)

The corruption of Alexander reflected the

corruption of Rome itself, a "sink of inequity" in which a
legion of prostitutes "[worked] in brothels licensed by the

papal authorities and many of them suffering from syphilis,
^a kind of illness very common among priests.'"

Often "pro

fessional criminals" escaped punishment with "bribes.

There

were alleged to be an average of fourteen murders a day [in
a population of roughly 50,000]," and the "stench from the
rows of rotting corpses of executed men" made it unpleasant

to "cross the bridge" beneath the Castle Sant' Angelo;
Rodrigo Borgia "secured his own succession as Alexander VI

by disbursing the most lavish gifts to all his rivals and
potential supporters.

Five asses laden with gold were

believed to have entered the courtyard of one Cardinal,

Ascanio Sforza, whose own riches and influences might have

234

defeated

But the corrupt means that purchased the

papacy for Alexander paled in comparison with the venality
that sustained him during his tenure as prince of the Church
of Rome.

"Obsessed" with his children,

he gave away "the

riches of the Church" to them, for, "like many other men of
the culminating Renaissance, he had lost both his religion

and his morals by the too exclusive pursuit of purely self

ish advantage."^®

Machiavelli describes him as a "wicked

pope, his head full of his own designs, [who] preyed on

Milan and Florence; the times served him well."^'
Nor was Julius II (1503-1513) "devoid of the family
spirit of his uncle, Sixtus IV.

He persuaded the childless

Guidobaldo da Montefeltro to adopt his nephew, Francesco
della Rovere.

His chief concern, however, was the defense

of the Papal State,

and to that end, he strove "to prevent

the French from dominating Italy.

To rid Italy of the

French, however, he formed an "inconsistent alliance with
Spain, and thus helped to rivet upon Italy the chains of its

first permanent subjection to foreign domination,"^" prompt
ing Francesco Guicciardini to accuse him as "the fatal
instrument of the ills of Italy.

With Spanish arms,

Julius aided the return of the Medici to Florence, in 1512,
which terminated the republican government in which
Machiavelli had served, an enterprise that must have caused

feelings of deep resentment in Machiavelli.

All the more

so, perhaps, because Julius soon realized the implications
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of his actions, but too late; he became "[angry] with Cardi
nal de' Medici whom he had sent to get rid of Soderini, not
to make himself tyrant," and "declared [his] intention of

changing the government of Florence again,

course, never transpired.

which, of

Even if Julius had lived longer,

it is doubtful that he could have unseated the Medici,
reunited with their supporters and reclaiming the position
of power they took such pains to increase over so many
decades.

The death of Julius and the election of Cardinal

Giovanni as the new pope, in 1513, the same year that
Machiavelli wrote the Prince, extended the power of the
Medici in new and disconcerting ways for if, before, the
Medici endeavored to become princes of Florence, the wealth
and forces of the Church opened new vistas to their ambi

tion, which Machiavelli knew Leo X intended to pursue.^
Superficially at least, the parallels between the Borgia and
the Medici are quite striking, and once again, a Medici was
in position to influence the affairs of Italy.
Therefore, one should not be surprised to find that
(

Machiavelli introduces the subject of ecclesiastical princi
palities with the same detached objectivity as that reflect
ed in his introduction to secular principalities, relative

to their acquisition "by virtue or by fortune," and how they
are maintained, in this case "without the one or the other."

(Ch. 11, 45)

Quentin Skinner refers to the "self-conscidus
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ly cool and abstract style" with which he "presents this

classification," and he remarks, "when he ends by discussing
the papacy [in Chapter Eleven], he insists on treating that
august institution--in a manner that must certainly have

startled his original readers—as nothing more than one of
the various principalities contending for power in Italy,

which is precisely the point that Machiavelli intended to
make with the style of his presentation.

By referring to

the acquisitions of popes made on behalf of their sons and
relatives as "ecclesiastical principalities," Machiavelli

goes directly to the problem—that such acquisitions amount

ed to nothing more than the carving out of princedoms from
nepotic ambitions, and such enterprises both disrupted the

peace in Italy and threatened to upset the balance of power.
Further, the Church had become so corrupt it failed to
admonish those who made extravagant use of religion, from

reaching for empire to the sale of indulgences and profi

teering from the sale of "Church benefices,"^® as did
Alexander VI.

To fund the mercenary condottieri of Cesare's

"Romagna army," Alexander "used the donations left by the

Jubilee Year pilgrims, dipped into the levies raised for the
Crusade on the incomes of clerics and Jews... [and] created

new cardinals" who paid handsomely "for the privilege."^
Machiavelli's contempt for the princes of the Church is

revealed in the manner in which he feigns innocence with the
false appearance of reverence with regard to ecclesiastical
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principalities; "But as they subsist by superior causes to

which the human mind does not reach, I'will omit speaking of
them; for since they are exhalted and maintained by God, it
would be the office of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to
discourse on them." (Ch. 11, 45)

Foolhardy indeed.

The

satirical malice he displays in this statement "bathes

[their] crimes in acid,"^ as satire is meant to do, for the
pontiffs made a mockery of God and the church, and
Machiavelli mocks them in turn for their lack of faith.

While Machiavelli says he "will omit speaking" of ecclesias
tical principalities, he devotes the remainder of his dis
course in Chapter Eleven to that subject.

In fact, whenever

he mentions Cesare Borgia in the Prince, he is discussing
ecclesiastical principalities, and implicit in his dedica
tion of the Prince to the Medici is the notion that the

Medici seize power in Italy, in imitation of the Borgia

nepotism.

Machiavelli's Prince not only beckons the Medici

to greatness, then, but the Church as well.
with the phrase "nonetheless," Machiavelli launches

into his discourse on ecclesiastical principalities, despite
the fact that he judges a man "presumptuous and foolhardy"
to do so; "Nonetheless, if someone were to inquire of me how

it came about that the Chutch haS: come to such greatness in
temporal affairs despite the fact, that, biefore Alexander,

the Italian powers, and not only those that are called
powers but every baron and lord, even the least, held her in
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^

I

low esteem in temporal affairs—and now a king of France
trembles at her and she has been able to remove him from

Italy and, to ruin the Venetians-—though this is known, it
does not seem to me superfluous to recall a good part of it

to memory."^*

Although he speaks matter-of-factly regarding

the power and increasing reputation of the Church, we should
be on guard, for in the Discourses, Machiavelli faults the

"Church of Rome" for "approaching either ruin or scourge."
The bad example set by the "Court of Rome" has caused Italy

to lose "all devotion and all religion," and "has kept and
keeps Italy divided," preventing her from uniting under "one
prince" or "one republic."

He observes that "in our own

day, it stripped Venice of its power with the help of
France, and, later on, drove out the French with the help of

the Swiss."

(I. 12, 144-5)

In Machiavelli^s view, then,

the Church was not an agent for unity, but disunion, and his

call to the Medici to unite Italy a fraudulent and cynical
barb.

Ivan Cloulas makes the point that from the time of
Sixtus IV, the papal states increasingly "came to resemble a

principality like all the others that squabbled for their

material interests alone.

The only difference between it

and the petty Italian tyrannies was in the way power was

passed on—by election, not inheritance,"^® and, as
Machiavelli observes, "if up to our times they have planned
to leave their sons as princes, in the future they may
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strive to leave them the popedom as hereditary."^®
Machiavelli thus had little praise for the pontiffs of
a Church that had grown so corrupt, he viewed it as disrup
tive and dangerous to the peace of Italy, and the first

point he makes regarding the increasing "greatness in tempo
ral affairs" of the Church, in Chapter Eleven, (Ch. 11, 45)
concerns the balance of power maintained in Italy prior to
the arrival of King Charles VIII of France in 1494.
(Ch. 11, 45-6)

Historically, from the time of the "Roman

ruins, nothing has afterwards been built to redeem her from
those ruins so that under the government of a strong ruler
she could proceed gloriously; nonetheless some of the new

cities and new states born among the Roman ruins showed such

great ability "that, though one of them did not master the
others, they nevertheless were so united and so well orga
nized that they freed Italy and defended her from the bar

barians," including Florence.

The decline in "vigor,"

however, that followed Cgsimo's rise to power, in 1434,
"opened" a new road to the "barbarians" in what Machiavelli

describes as a "corrupt world," in the History,

leading

ultimately to a severe disruption of the balance of power

previously maintained by "the pope, the Venetians, the king
of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Florentines," (Ch. 11,
45-6) as described by Machiavelli in the Prince.

The ambi

tion of the popes played a significant role in disrupting
that balance, which he emphasizes in the remaining discourse
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of Chapter Eleven.

The problem, as Machiavelli pointed out

in the History, is that no ruler emerged from the "Roman

ruins" who could govern in such a manner as to inspire Italy
to "proceed gloriously."

No Romulus reappeared to found a

new civic state—one that Machiavelli would have approved
of—governed to promote the public interest with good laws

and justice, defended with well-organized military forces,
"enlisted,"

from the ranks of the people who "were of age

to bear arms;" the virtue of one's own arms.'^
The tenuous balance of power maintained by the five

major powers in Italy, imperfect as it was, at least pre
vented any one member from rising up to tyrannize the oth
ers.

As Machiavelli remarks in the Prince, "these powers

had to have two principle concerns;

one, that a foreigner

not enter into Italy with arms; the other, that none of them
enlarge his state," (Ch. 11, 46) both of which were violated
by the popes, although it was the duke of Milan who initiat
ed the process of decline by inviting King Charles into

Italy, which "completely shattered the delicately balanced

peninsular relations"^^ of the past, from which Italy never
recovered.

Of the major powers in Italy, Machiavelli states that

"the pope and the Venetians" were the greatest, "and to hold

back the Venetians the union of all the others was needed,

as in the defense of Ferrara; and to hold down the pope they
made use of the barons in Rome," the "Orsini and Colonna"
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factions. (Ch. 11, 45-46)

Having already made the point in

Chapter Eleven that the Church "[ruined] the Venetians,"
(Ch. 11, 45)

Machiavelli then turns to the greatness of

Alexander VI who, "with Duke Valentino as his instrument [a

generally degrading reference to Cesare], did all the things
I discussed above in the actions of the duke." (Ch. 11, 46)
That is, Cesare murdered or otherwise destroyed both the
Colonna and the Orsini, as discussed in Chapter Seven, thus

freeing the pope from the former restraints to his power

provided by their factions.

Therefore, the opportunity for

the Church to seize power in Italy had never been greater
than in the present, or, to be more accurate, the opportuni
ty for a pope to establish his family in power had never
been greater, were it not for the inconvenience of the

"brevity of their lives," (Ch. 11, 46) which was the cause
of Cesare's ruin, for the "princedoms" established by pon

tiffs "lived but a short while.""*

Thus, when Machiavelli

urges the Medici to seize Italy in Chapter TWenty-six, as
"he does not know what time has been more apt for it,"
(Ch. 26, 102) he is, in fact, issuing a call to arms that he
knew had little hope of lasting success, but which would

ultimately "[redound] to the greatness of the Church," with
the death of the pope.

And, as I mentioned above,

Machiavelli had little regard for priestly rule that had
ruined both the Church and state.

Therefore, when Machiavelli concludes Chapter Eleven by
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stating, "His Holiness Pope Leo, then, has found this pon
tificate most powerful; one may hope that if others made it

great with arms, h4, with his goodness and infinite other
virtues [^infinite' greatly exaggerates his point], can make

it very great and venerable," (Ch. 11, 47) he expresses a
desire that the Church continue increasing in greatness, an

end that Machiavelli opposed not only as an Italian, but as

a Florentine republican devoted to democratic principles.
There was no reason to think that the Medici would govern
Italy in a manner other than that Which they had demonstrat
ed in Florence.

And of Leo's nepotic ambition, although

doomed to failure for the reasons given above, his enter

prises Would, nonetheless, hasten the demise of Italy,
already in travail.

Machiavelli began to establish the ground in this
Chapter for his farcical treatment, in Chapter Twenty-six,

of the greatness of the Church inextricably joined with the
greatness of the Medici, in a biblical calling comparable to

the Exodus in the Old Testament-^-a provocative lampoon on
the first family of Florence.

And in the proud rascal's fall, he nev

ertheless did not forget Mohametf.^®
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Chapter XIII.

No Art But the Art of War

In Chapters Twelve through Fourteen, Machiavelli advis

es the new prince on military affairs.

He faults reliance

on Italian mercenaries and foreign auxiliary forces, which
is in accord with his principles or theory of the art of

war.

He first dedicated the Prince to Giuliano de' Medici,

however, who had no interest or ability in military matters
and thus, although his recommendations are sincere for the
most part, they are also humorous and ironic in their ef

fect.

Giuliano was "the last man to be attracted by the

notion of imitating the Borgia," and "wanted no more than to

occupy the same social position in Florence that his magnif
icent father had held, and not even that if it was too much

trouble."^

The notion that Giuliano should practice no art

"but the art of war," (Ch. 14, 58) then, as Machiavelli

advises the new prince, smacks of ridicule and contempt, not

only for Giuliano but for Pope Leo, as well, who made
Giuliano "Gonfaloniers" of the Church, the same position as
that held by Cesare under Pope Alexander.

Before Machiavelli offers his argument against the use
of mercenary arms, in Chapter Twelve, he satirizes the

absence Of good laws and justice in tyrannical regimes; "the

principle foundation that all states have, new ones as well
as old or mixed, are good laws and good arms.

And because

there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and
where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall
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leave out reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms." (Ch.
12, 48)

This omission is a critical one, used by

Machiavelli to minimize the importance of law despite the
fact that "justice is the foundation of Machiavellian theo

ry."^

Commentators such as Ernest Cassirer have observed

that Machiavelli "discarded" th^e "idea" of "Plato and his
followers [who] saw the state as founded on law,

but that

is not the case, although Machiavelli would have us believe

that it is in the Prince.

Rather, he thought that laws were

the critical element of good foundations, such as those
"laws" given by "Romulus, Numa, and others," that kept Rome
"so rich in virtue," (I; 1, 104) providing for good order
from which proceeded well ordered arms.

The notion, then,

that there "cannot be good laws where there are not good

arms" is simply not true.

In his Preamble to A Provision

For Infantry, Machiavelli states;
\

Whereas it has been observed by the
Magnificent and Exhalted Signers that
all republics which in times past have
preserved and increased themselves have
always had as their chief basis two
things, to wit, justice and arms, in
order to restrain and to govern their
subjects, and in order to defend them
selves from their enemies; and whereas
they have observed that your republic is
well founded on good and holy laws, and
organized for the administration of
justice, and that she lacks only to be
well provided with arms; and since
through long experience, indeed with
great expense and danger, she has
learned how little hope it is possible
to place in foreign and hired arms, be
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cause when they are numerous and of high
repute they are either unendurable or
suspected, and if they are few and with

out reputation, they are of no use,
these signers judge it well that she
should be armed with her own weapons and
with her own men/

Therefore, good laws do not mean that a city or state
will have good arms.

In fact, Florence relied on arms that

were not good (mercenary and auxiliary) for "nearly two

centuries,"^ during which time the preservation of the
republic was always at risk.
Nor is it accurate to suppose that "where there are
good arms there must be good laws."

It is true that in the

Discourses, Machiavelli remarks, "Although I have said

elsewhere that the security of all states is based on good
military discipline, and that where it does not exist, there

can neither be good laws nor anything else that is good, to
repeat this does not seem superfluous... one sees that the
soldiery cannot be good unless they are in training, and

that it is impossible to train them unless they are your own
subjects." (III. 31, 491)

The point he is making in this

passage, aside from the importance of organizing and train

ing one's own forces, is that nothing is good in the sense

that it will endure and remain secure without good military

discipline, because "where military organization is good

there must needs be good order,"® and "no government is
stable without providing itself with a protector," comprised
of citizens of the state or one's own subjects.

246

To suppose/ however, that "where there are good arms

there must be good laws [Italics mine]" Is untrue, particu
larly if we consider Machiavelli's understanding of good
laws, which centered upon the issue of the common good, laws
favorable to the preservation of liberty rather than those

formulated to secure and increase the power of a tyrant.

It

is doubtful that Machiavelli would have described the law of
t

Agathocles as good, despite the fact that his arms were very
good.

Julius Caesar made himself dictator after raising

himself up-through the ranks of the military as well.

Of

Caesar, Machiavelli observes, "it was neither the name nor

the rank of the dictator that made Rome servile, but the

loss of authority of which the citizens were deprived by the
length of his rule.

If in Rome there had been no such rank,

the dictator would have found some other; for it is easy for
force to acquire a title, but not for a title to acquire

force," (I. 34, 194) Agathocles and Julius Caesar, then, did

not generate laws for the public good as a consequence of

good arms but, rather, increased their own authority and
security, which was prejudicial to the security of the
larger community.
Further, Machiavelli does not merely dismiss the sub
ject of law in this chapter, but states that he will "leave

out reasoning on laws." (Ch. 12, 48)

As he says in Chapter

Eighteen, "Laws" are proper to "man," and "force" is proper
to "beasts." (Ch. 18, 69)

As a product of reason, laws
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should serve "the common good," in Machiavelli's view, as

exemplified in the actions of "Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and
other founders of kingdoms and republics" who used their
authority for that purpose. (I. i, 133)

Force, on the other

hand, is proper to beasts and, in Chapter Eighteen,
Machiavelli advises the new prince to cultivate that side of
his nature. (Ch. 18, 69)

in tyrannical regimes.

The force of arms becomes the law

The notion that "I shall leave out

^

reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms" (Ch. 12, 48) is,
then, perhaps one of the most distinctive markers of his
satire in the Prince.

In the Discourses, Machiavelli makes the point that
after Rome "became an Empire," the emperor deserved "praise"
if he "acted like good princes, in accordance with the
laws," in which case he would have "no need of soldiers to

form a praetorian guard, nor a multitude of legions to
protect" him, for his "defense" resides in his "habits, the
goodwill of the people, and the affection of the senate."

(I. 10, 136)

This would seem good advice for a new prince

were it not for the fact that Machiavelli is not educating a
good prince, in the Prince, but a tyrant.
Because of his vile crimes, Cesare Borgia is described

by Garrett Mattingly as having been seen "sometimes swagger
ing through the streets with the powerful armed guards he
felt he needed to protect him from the vengeance of the

Orsini,"' an arrogant Cesare, even in his demise.
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Lorenzo

the Magnificent was provided with an armed guard to "defend

him from domestic plots" following .the Pazzi conspiracy,®
furnished by Florentine citizens to protect him from other

citizens in the city.

Before he became pope. Cardinal

Giovanni de' Medici returned to Florence, in 1512, "with
1,500 troops and entered his former palace in the full
panoply of his rank with the air of a man who had returned

to his native city in order to rule it."' As Machiavelli
observes, the "constitution was destroyed," and force was

required to return to the (Medici faction) former modes of
governing.

Corrupt factions "make laws and statutes not for

the public benefit but for their own."^"
In the Discourses, Machiavelli cautions that a prince
should not rule "tyrannically" and "violate the laws," for
"princes should learn... that they begin to lose their state
the moment they begin to break the laws and to disregard the
ancient traditions and customs under which men have long
lived." (III. 5, 395-6)

Yet, Machiavelli remarks, in Chap

ter Twenty-six, that "nothing brings so much honor to a man

rising newly as the new laws and the new orders found by

him." (Ch. 26, 103-4)

At every opportunity, then, in the

Prince, Machiavelli mocks the new prince for his reliance on
force rather than the rule of law, the beast that overtakes
reason.

Of mercenary arms, Machiavelli notes that they are both
"useless and dangerous," (Ch. 12, 48) and "have led Italy

249

into slavery and disgrace." (Ch. 12, 53)

Most importantly,

"one sees that only princes and armed republics make very
great progress; nothing but harm ever comes from mercenary
arms.

And a republic armed with its own arms is brought to

obey one of its citizens with more difficulty than is a
republic armed with foreign arms," (Ch. 12, 50) such as

those of "Alberigo da Conio from Romagna" who first "gave

reputation to this kind of military," followed by, "among
others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their times were the
arbiters of Italy.

After them came all the others who have

controlled these arms until our times," (Ch. 12, 52-3) which
includes Cesare Borgia who was, himself, a condottieri.

Thus, "Italy has been overrun by Charles, taken as booty by

Louis, violated by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss," as
a result of the Italian mercenaries who fought disgraceful
ly, with "military orders" described by Machiavelli as
"discovered by them... so as to escape trouble and dangers."
(Ch. 12, 53)

In Chapter Thirteen, Machiavelli continues his argument
against "useless arms," (Ch. 13, 54) those of auxiliary and
mixed forces.

Auxiliary arms "are those of a power that is

called to come with its arms to help and defend you," (Ch.
13, 54) as in the example of Pope Julius II, who created
alliances with France, Germany, and Spain.

"Mixed" arms are

"part mercenary and part [one's] own." (Ch. 13, 56)

Machiavelli gives the example of France, who hired the
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Swiss, but a more pertinent example would have been Cesare
Borgia who relied on a few of his own forces, the French,
and the Italian mercenaries.

Nor does Machiavelli mention

that Louis not only hired the Swiss, but relied on Cesare,
as well.

With mercenary arms, Machiavelli notes that "laziness

is more dangerous," while with auxiliary arms, "virtue is,"

for with auxiliary forces, "ruin is accomplished; they are
all united, all resolved to obey someone else." (Ch. 13, 55)
Machiavelli is consistent in this opinion in his works,

which contributes to an air of authenticity in his satire.
And in his conclusion to Chapter Thirteen, he reiterates a

familiar theme, applicable to republics and principalities
alike; "without its own arms no principality is secure; in

deed, it is wholly obliged to fortune [as was Cesare Borgia]
since it does not have virtue to defend itself in adversi

ty." (Ch. 13, 57)

Nevertheless, there are elements of dis

tortion in both Chapters Twelve and Thirteen.
In Chapter Twelve, Machiavelli cites Philip of Macedon,

who "was made captain of their troops by the Thebians; and
after his victory he took their liberty from them." (Ch. 12,

50)

As Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. observes, however, "Philip

(who does not appear to have been a mercenary captain) be

came king of Macedon in 359 and occupied Thebes in 338."^^
The example of Philip, then, is not appropriate to the con

text of mercenary arms, and renders the text untrustworthy.
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In the example of Pope Julius II, in Chapter Thirteen,
Machiavelli states that he turned to foreign (auxiliary)
arms but was saved by his "good fortune" and the Swiss; "for

when his auxiliaries [Spain] were defeated at Ravenna [in
1512], the Swiss rose up and, beyond all expectations, his
own and others, drove out the victors; and he came out a

prisoner neither of his enemies [France], who had fled, nor
of his auxiliaries, since he had won with arms other than

theirs." (Ch. 13, 54)

Julius was saved by mercenary arms,

the Swiss, whom Machiavelli lauds as "masters of modern

warfare." (I. 16, 321)

Machiavelli creates confusion over

the issue of mercenary arms by giving praise to the Swiss

mercenaries while faulting mercenary arms generally.

Had he

made the point that the Swiss exhibited extraordinary abili
ty in Chapter Twelve, he would have contradicted his criti
cism of mercenary arms, which, despite his reference to the
"Carthaginians" and "Philip of Macedon," (Ch. 12, 50) was
aimed solely at his fellow Italians.

Of the Swiss, he

states that they "are very well armed and very free,"

(Ch. 12, 50) thereby neglecting to define them as mercenar
ies, as in his reference to Julius II, in this chapter, who

was saved by the "Swiss" when his "auxiliaries were defeated
at Ravenna."

While Machiavelli makes the point that Julius II did

not come out a "prisoner" of France or Spain, as a result of
his campaign, the Florentines did become prisoner of the
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Medici once again, a notion that Machiavelli would avoid in

a work dedicated to the Medici, but one that is appropriate
to his republican sentiment.

He refers to Florence in the

following sentence, but in a different context, (Ch. 13, 54)
prompting the realization that what Julius avoided was, as a
result of his actions, visited on his native city.

Subtle

nuances of interpretation rely on an intimate knowledge of
the satirist's thoughts and beliefs, and therein resides the
■

V

elusive quality of indirect satire, far better understood in
intimate circles of the author, among those who are not
fooled by the slick surface of sincerity but who are, rath
er, regaled by his wit and chicanery.

As a Condottieri, Cesare Borgia's arms were in the hire

not only,of the Church (which funded his enterprises), but
also of others, such as "Bentivoglio" of Balogna, who "en

gaged the pope's son as a condottieri in his service, prom

ising to reward him with 100 cavalry squadrons of three men
each—a sizeable revenue for Cesare."

Further, "the Floren

tine government signed a treaty with him, offering him a
condotta—that is, taking him for three years as a condotti

eri at a salary of 30,000 ducats a year, with Cesare supply
ing 300 cavalry squadrons," although the Florentines "had

signed the agreement without the slightest intention of
sticking to it.

In Chapter Twelve, Machiavelli makes a

"pun on the contract (condotta) by which a condottieri is

hired,"" in reference to the faults of mercenaries.
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As

Cesare was a condottieri, then, with arms for hire, a great
irony is apparent, for when Machiavelli praises the arms of

Cesare, he is, in fact, praising the arms of a mercenary in
Italy.

In praise of having arms of one's own, in Chapter Thir
teen, Machiavelli gives the example of David and Goliath
from the Old Testament, in an illustration that is loaded

with symbolism appropriate to satire, and one that has

(justifiably) bewildered scholars down to the present;
Machiavelli puts a knife in David's hand:
I want further to recall to memory a

figure of the Old Testament apt for this
purpose. When David offered to Saul to
go and fight Goliath, the Philistine
challenger, Saul, to give him spirit,
armed him with his own arms—which

David, as soon as he had them on, re
fused, saying that with them he could
hot give a good account of himself, and
so he would rather meet the enemy with
his sling and his knife. (Ch. 13, 56)

Machiavelli's "account of this episode differs signifi
cantly," as Harvey C. Mansfield observes, "from the biblical

original in I Samuel 17:38-40, 50-51."" Indeed, having re
fused the armour and sword offered by Saul, the bible gives
the following account of David's arms; "And he took his
staff in his hand, and chose him five smooth stones out of

the brook, and put them in a shepherd's bag which he had,
even in a scrip; and his sling was in his hand; and he drew
near the Philistine.

Saul offer him one.

Clearly David had no knife, nor did

"Since [the biblical account] says that
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David had no sword, coltello is hardly to be translated
sword, as often in sixteenth-century Italian.

David is>

however, often represented with Goliath's sword, which he

took after striking the giant down with a stone from his

sling," as Felix Gilbert explains.^®

L. Arthur Burd remarks,

"strictlyv speaking this is inaccurate:
of ^cotello' in I. Samuel xvii.

there is no mention

Possibly Machiavelli mis

read verse 51."" That is, if Machiavelli didn't get it
right, he must have read it wrong—not a very compelling

explanation.

Machiavelli was very familiar with the Bible,

having made several references to it in his works.
A more likely explanation is that Machiavelli intended

the "knife" to represent a satirical marker, a device to

"call attention" to a "disruptive detail" which is "funny
[or remarkable] when it is considered a sign of inferiori

ty,"" which is indeed the effect Machiavelli achieves, when
it is understood.

Because David is misrepresented, the

story of David and Goliath is robbed of its moral integrity
and meaning.

According to the account in the Bible, "David put his
hand in his bag, and took thence a stone, and slang it, and
smote the Philistine in his forehead, that the stone sunk

into his forehead; and he fell upon his face to the earth.

So David prevailed over the Philistine with a sling and
stone, and smote the Philistine, and slew him; but there was

no sword in the hand of David.
\
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Therefore, David ran, and

stood upon the Philistine and took his sword, and drew it
out of the sheath thereof, and slew him, and cut off his

head therewith."^®

Thus David used, in part, the arms of

another, his enemy, to slay Goliath.

In weighing the value

of one's own arms, there are shades of humor and irony in
his example.

The point that Machiavelli makes in the example of
David, however, represented with a knife, is that modern
princes combat their enemies more often than not with

treachery, rather than meet their foe on the battlefield,

the traditional proving ground of valor and ability (and
even in battle, the Italian mercenaries fought disgraceful
ly).

Cesare Borgia did not defeat the Orsini and Colonna in

the arena of battle, but with villainous deceit.

A "knife"

reflects the inglorious path of murder, conspiracy, intrigue
and revenge, while a sword symbolizes the art of war, glory,

and military virtue, a notion expressed in Aristophane's The
Clouds—a play that emphasized the departure from custom and

tradition (Philosophy) evident in the moderns (Sophistry),
and the teachings of Socrates:

Philosophy
Er... Peleus, for example.

Why, instances abound.
His virtue won him a

sword.
V

Sophistry
A sword,

you say? What a charming little profit for the
poor sucker! Look at our Hyperbolos: nothing
virtuous, about him, God knows, and yet, what with
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peddling lamps—plus a knack for swindling—he
piled up a huge profit. All cold cash.

No swords for him. No sir, hypbolos and
swords just don't mix.^^
If the sword is associated with chivalry and military
might, the knife, in contrast, reflects underhanded methods
that are often used to combat power and authority, as in
conspiracies against princes.

In the Discourses,

Machiavelli remarks that a prince "can never so despoil
anyone but that there will remain to him a knife with which
to wreak vengeance," (III. 6, 400) and in the Prince, he

cautions that the new prince "is always under necessity to
hold a knife in his hand" if he does not commit all offenses

"in a stroke," (Ch. 8, 38) in which case a prince would
likely have every necessity to beware of conspiracy.

In the

Pazzi conspiracy, Giuliano de' Medici, brother of Lorenzo

the Magnificent (who survived) was murdered with a knife,
and perhaps Machiavelli intended that the knife in David's
hand symbolize that event and other conspiracies against the
Medici, which I will discuss in connection with the particu
lar relevance of David to the Republic of Florence.

Symbolism is a useful device in the satirists arsenal

of ci:*eative artifice.

"Like the poet, the satirist uses

symbols frequently, but his reason for using them is not
quite the same as that of the poet.

The poet uses symbols

to represent things; the satirist sometimes ulses symbols to
misrepresent things.

He often makes use of symbols as a
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means of indirection and distortion."

Machiavelli used the

"knife" both to represent and misrepresent David, in the
eyes of his fellow Florentines.

In the biblical account of David and Goliath, David is

the moral exemplar of virtue inspired by his faith in God,

and it is his faith that is compromised by Machiavelli's
misrepresentation with the knife.

The point is not that

David downed the giant with his sling and a stone, but that

they were sufficient because he was empowered by God,

anointed as the new king of Israel.^' Therefore, when
Machiavelli states that David "could not give a good account

of himself [Italics mine] with Saul's arms," (Ch. 13, 56) he
makes it appear that the defeat of Goliath was David's
personal victory, thus robbing David of his faith, which
mirrors the lack of faith in modern princes.

Putting a

knife in David's hand removes the obstacle of faith
altogether.
■

1

On another level, as I said above, the knife may have

been intended to represent the defence of the Florentine
republic.

David "had long been a symbol of, Florentine

liberty" and "civic virtue,"^ represented in the marble
figure of David by Michelangelo, completed in 1504, and
"placed at the entrance of the Palazzo Vecchio, on the

Piazza della Signoria," in Florence.

Michelangelo's David

is described as having the quality of "some timeless moment

as a personification of vigilance and courage,"^ appropriate
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to the traditional republican ideals of the city.

Although

he did many works of sculpture for the Medici during his

lifetime, Michelangelo remained in Florence during the
period in Which the Florentines fought to restore the repub

lic, (1527-30) and the Medici were in exile, designing fort

ifications to aid in defense of the city.

His fidelity to

the Republic of Florence would seem to have outweighed any
sense of personal gratitude he may have felt toward the

Medici, as his benefactors of long standing^

A knife in David's hand, then, may have signified the
defense of Florentine liberty by a means as corrupt as the

Medici were themselves, whose lack of "civic virtue" and,
disregard for "1iberty" perverted the traditional symbolism
of David.

There was another figure of David that also stood

in the Palazzo Vecchio, that of Donatello's, which was
associated with the Medici.

From the time of Cosimo,

Donatello's David stood in the Medici courtyard.

In 1495,

however, following Piero de' Medici's exile from Florence,

it was moved to the Palazzo, and is described as having
"little to do with the ethos of Biblical heroes," reflecting
"not an ideal but an object of desire, strongly androgynous
in its combination of sinewy angularity with feminine soft

ness and fullness,

attired in "military boots," and a hat

similar to "a type of hat popular in the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries for hunting and traveling.

It was a

modernized David, and not the sort of image that would
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likely have appealed to Machiavelli as a representation of

David's virtue, or as symbolic of republican liberty and
civic virtue.

In the Discourses, Machiavelli observes that

idle republics become "effeminate or give rise to factions"
in time of peace, "and these two things, either in conjunc
tion or separately, will bring about its downfall."
(I. 6, 123)

The Medici faction contributed to the ruin of

the republic, and the Medici themselves typified the Renais
sance as patrons of the arts and men of letters, the refined

pursuits that times of peace provide.

As Machiavelli ob

serves in the History, "the discerning have noted that
letters come after arms, and that in countries and cities

generals are born earlier than philosophers... the virtue of

military courage cannot be more corrupted with a more honor

able laziness than that of letters, nor with a greater and
more dangerous deception can this laziness enter into well-

regulated cities.^" The Medici typified the honorable pur
suits that defined the Italian Renaissance, but by
Machiavelli's standards, their appreciation of the past was

but a superficial endeavor.

That is, it was one thing to be

familiar with the ancients and their ethics and values, but
quite another to think of imitating them in one's own ac
tions and character.
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Donatello's David, then, poised in the shade of his
Renaissance hat, typified in its own way the transition from

military virtue to the more delicate pursuits that dignified
the Medici and other great men of the Renaissance era.

That

is not to suggest that Machiavelli did not find such pur
suits honorable; "those are to be held to be infamous and
detestable who extirpate religion, subvert kingdoms and
republics, make war on virtue, on letters, and on any art
that brings advantage and honour to the human race, i.e. the
profane, the violent, the ignorant, the worthless, the idle,
the coward," (I. 10, 135) but "honour" for the "human race"

is not quite the same thing as seeking reputation as patrons
of the arts for personal reputation and political gain.

As

Garrett Mattingly remarks, the motives of "Italian prince
lings" led them to "[patronize] scholars" in order "to

foster an empty Ciceronian elegance designed solely to

secure the immortality of the patron by enshrining his name
in aureate verse and ornate prose,

and while these pur

suits, including the construction of great buildings, can be
said to have benefited the public, they also contributed to

the persona of wealth and power enjoyed by the Medici, whom
Machiavelli might have charged with having more concern for

their personal reputation than the safety and preservation

of the city of Florence and her liberty, particularly in
times that demanded full attention to military preparedness.

Donatello's David, then, may have suggested the subject of
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David for his satire, especially when viewed in contrast
with Michelangelo's David, each symbolic of different values

in different times, reflecting the corrosive influence of
the Medici themselves on the traditional ideals of Florence,
"civic virtue" and "liberty," more revered in the past than

in the corrupt present.
Machiavelli introduces Chapter Fourteen with the notion
that the new prince should think of nothing but war; "Thus,

a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought,
nor take anything else as his art but the art of war and its
orders and disciplines; for that is the only art which is of
cpncern to one who commands," (Ch. 14, 58) and "he should

never lift his thoughts from the exercise of war, and in
peace he should exercise it more than in war." (Ch. 14, 59)

I'm not certain that anyone could say, with confidence, what
he intended to convey in the latter sentence.

In the for

mer, however, he clearly meant to exclude from the reader's

consideration all other arts associated with princely rule
save that of the art of war.

John H. Geerken makes the

point that "Fabrizio Colonna, who is the principal interloc
utor in The Art of War (Book One), said that war is not his

only business and occupation; rather, his profession is

governing his subjects well and defending and protecting
them—ends requiring as means the simultaneous study of the

arts of peace and war,"^^ and in the Discourses, Machiavelli
argues that a "good prince" provides for the security of his
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subjects with "a world replete with peace and justice," (I.
10, 137) in which the common good is not sacrificed to the
ambition of the ruler.

Because the new prihce must think of

his own interests before all other considerations, however,
he must constantly be in "command" and conduct his affairs

accordingly.

If his rule is absolute, he will always be at

war with his enemies within, who desire to recover their

liberty, nor can he grant any measure of authority to his
subjects, without diminishing that of his own.

Machiavelli betrays his own principles when he states

that "it is of such virtue [the art of war] that not only

does it maintain those who have been born princes but many
times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that
rank," (Ch. 14, 58) a reference to men like Julius Caesar,
Sulla, and Marius:

When a citizen had been for long in
command of an army, he won the army over

and made it his partisan; so that it
came in time to forget of the Senate and
to recognize its commander alone as its
head.

It thus came about that Sulla and

Marius were able to find troops to sup
port them in actions contrary to the
public good, and it thus came about that

Caesar was able to reduce his country^ to
subjection. Had the Romans not pro
longed offices and military commands,
they would not have attained such great
power in so short a time, and, had they
been slower in making conquests, they
would also have been slower to arrive at

servitude. (III. 24, 474)

Machiavelli's "heroes" were men like "Agesilaus and
Timoleon, Brutus and Scipio" rather than "Pisistratus or
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Julius Caesar who extinguished republican regimes and de
stroyed their spirit by exploiting human weaknesses.

With

their armies, "Caesar" and "Agathocles... at one stroke sub

jugated their country by means of the forces they command
ed," while others, such as "Pisistratus" and "Pandolfo

Petrucci" achieved the same "aim" with smaller forces, over
time. (III. 6, 421)

Ruin comes about because, in corrupt

times, the people are "blinded" and "unaware of the yoke

which they thetiselves [have] placed on their necks."

Thus,

even "when Caesar was killed, and Gaius Caligula and Nero
were killed, and the whole of Caesar's stock was extermin

ated," Rome "was not only unable ever to maintain liberty,
but could not even make a start... This was due to the

corruption with which the Marion faction had impregnated the
populace." (I. 17, 158)

One is reminded of Pope Leo's mot

to, "Truly my yoke is easy," written beneath "his personal

device—an ox-yoke,"^ in Florence, reflective of the power
of the Medici faction, destructive to the liberty of Flor
ence as was the Marius faction in Rome.

Machiavelli's recommendation, then, that the new prince
take no art but the art of war, together with his tacit

approval of commanders who rise through the military to the
rank of prince indicate the degree to which he distorts his

advice in the Prince, to suit the necessity of the prince.
Machiavelli himself imitates the moderns by advocating the
ends and means of his adversaries, those who craved personal
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power and empire.

He puts into his own mouth the counsel of

a fool, in mockery of the times and the men who shaped
events.

And as Machiavelli exhorts the new prince to "do as

some excellent man has done in the past who found someone to

imitate who had been praised and glorified before him, whose
actions he always kept beside himself," he includes the ex

ample of "Caesar" who imitated "Alexander." (Ch. 14, 60)
Machiavelli did not consider Julius Caesar an "excellent

man," but his example reminds one of Cesare Borgia who in

turn imitated Julius Caesar—and always kept the actions of
his "illustrious namesake" beside himself in the "episodes
of Caesar's triumphs" that were "engraved" on his "parade
sword.

As Garrett Mattingly remarked, reading "The Prince

as satire... gives a new dimension and meaning to passages

unremarkable before,"^® even in the small details that other
wise pass unnoticed.

Machiavelli's mention of Xenophon's "Life of Cyrus," in
Chapter Fourteen, permitted him—should anyone wonder that a
prince take no art but the art of war—the pretense of^
1

sincerity, for Cyrus was a great warrior who created an

empire.

The modern princes, however, did not have the

requisite military virtue to imitate Cyrus in the art of

war.

Machiavelli displays his caustic humor in suggesting

such comparisons.

Most obvious, however, is Machiavelli's omission of
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Cesare Borgia, his model prince, in a chapter devoted to war
and its modes and orders—for Cesare was a man born to

arms,the quintessential prince who thought of nothing but
war, the prime exemplar whom, Machiavelli states, he would

imitate himself if he "were a new prince."''
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Chapter XIV.

Effectual Truth; The Vices of Princes

In Chapters Fifteen through Eighteen, Machiavelli

discourses on the character of the new prince, and how he
should conduct himself with regard to those qualities that
are deserving of praise or blame—whether to be liberal or

parsimonious, cruel or merciful, faithful or unfaithful, and
how to avoid hatred and contempt.

He remarks, "and because

I know that many have written of this, I fear that in writ

ing of it again, I may be held presumptuous, especially in
disputing this matter I depart from the orders of others.

But since my intent is to write something useful for whoever
understands it, it has appeared more fitting to go directly
to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination
of it," because "a man who wants to make a profession of

good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are

not good."

Therefore, "it is necessary to a prince, if he

wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be
good, and to use this or not use it, according to necessi
ty." (Ch. 15, 61)

There is nothing revolutionary (or even new) in the

notion that in affairs of state republics, monarchs and

princes alike have always been under the necessity to be

vigilant in their responsibility to the governed, to cor
rectly and prudently assess the actions of any power that
might threaten the peace, stability, and well being of their

state, and respond accordingly.
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Machiavelli's intent is not

merely to admonish the new pririce to exercise caution,

however, as any wise ruler should do.

Rather, he has set up

in the minds of his readers a necessity to pursue corrupt
means, thus "departing from the orders of others," the an

cients whose wisdom and virtue he resolutely defends in his
other works.

He just closed Chapter Fourteen with the

reminder that Cyrus should be imitated, (Ch. 14, 60) the
example of a prince who did not "come to ruin" despite his

virtuous qualities and actions.

Unlike the modern princes,

Cyrus is praised by Machiavelli for his virtue in Chapter
Four, and in the Discourses, Machiavelli offers his example
to illustrate the point that "humanity" often "makes a much
greater impression than an act of ferocity or violence."
(III. 20, 461-2)

If a "wise prince should observe" the "modes" that
Cyrus exemplifies, (Ch. 14, 60) as Machiavelli recommends in
Chapter Fourteen, Machiavelli appears to contradict himself

in the following chapter, when he advises the new prince to
"learn not to be good," and indeed it is a contradiction.
He observes that if the prince doesn't "learn not to be

good," he will "come to ruin among so many who are not

good," and this is the key to understanding his real intent.

In referring to the "many who are not good," he is making a

statement about the present era, the quality of the times,
an age in which "the vices" are "as clear as the sun,"* one
in which no one thinks of "imitating" the past, "as if the
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heaven, the sun, the elements and man had in their motion,
"X

their order, and their potency, become different from what

they used to be."^

If men would only turn their thoughts to

the ancient example of virtue, perhaps present abuses could

be corrected.

While he "consider[s] in what honour antiqui

ty is held" in the present, he observes that the past "is
rather admired than imitated; nay, is so shunned by every

body in each little thing they do, that of the virtue of by
gone days there remains no trace.

And he expresses a

desire to effect a change; "Since I want to get men out of
this wrong way of thinking, I have thought fit to write a
commentary on all those books of Titus Livius" which "will

comprise what I have arrived at by comparing ancient and

modern events and think necessary for a better understanding
of them, so that those who read what I have to say may the

more easily draw those practical lessons which one should

seek to obtain from the study of history,"'^ the example of
virtuous actions and character.

"A bad citizen cannot do much harm in a republic that
is not corrupt," (III. 8, 426) in which "political life is

still vigorous."

But "if anyone... wants to seize supreme

power in a republic and to impose on it a bad form of gov
ernment, it is essential that he should find there a materi
al which has in course of time become disordered, and that

this disorder shall have been introduced little by little
and in one generation after another.
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And this, as we have

remarked in a previous discourse, must of necessity come
about unless that republic be given fresh life by the exam
ple of good men or by fresh legislation be brought back to
what it was at the start." (III. 8, 429)
As Allan Gilbert remarks, Machiavelli wanted to "teach

the ignorant and give advice to the erring," and if at times
he seems cynical and pessimistic in his dim view of the
present, he yet expresses optimism in the belief that, with

proper education, the young will turn from the ways of the
present, and follow the path demonstrated in the examples

from antiquity.

Nor does he withhold this opinion from his

other major work, the History, in which he condemns the
present age, from the time Cosimo came to power in 1434:
The reader will see there that at last a

new road was opened to the barbarians,
and Italy put herself back into slavery
to them. So if the things done by our
princes, abroad and at home, cannot,
like those of the ancients, be read with
wonder because of their ability and
greatness, perhaps for their other qual
ities they will be viewed with no less
wonder; for one can see how such weak

and badly handled armies held in check
so many splendid peoples. And if in
describing the things that happened in
this corrupt world, I do not tell of the
bravery of soldiers or the efficiency of
generals or the love of citizens for
their country, I do show with what de
ceptions, with what tricks and schemes,
the princes, the soldiers, the heads of
the republics, in order to keep that
reputation which they did not deserve,

carried on their affairs. It is perhaps
as useful to observe these things as to
learn ancient history, because if the
latter kindles free spirits to imita
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tion, the former will kindle such spir
its to avoid and get rid of present
abuses.^

Thus, Machiavelli attempted to show,in the History and
the Discourses, that the cause for Italy's decline was the
growth of corruption, and in the Prince he voices the same

criticism.

(Gh. 15, 61)

It was an overarching concern for

the former statesman of the Republic of Florence, who under

stood that "only in corrupt times can liberty be
overthrown."®

In Felix Gilbert's "analysis of the evolution of the

Florentine Histories," he finds a "consistency between
[Machiavelli's History] and the Prince and Discourses

grounded in the process of corruption and decline."' In
fact, Machiavelli thought Italy more corrupt than "all other
lands," (I. 55, 244) the result of "weakness... misery...
the defenselessness of the faction ridden Italian principal

ities of his own day before the trampling armies of the
great, well-organized, national states of the North and

West,"* invited by popes and princes alike.
The phenomenon of corruption and its influence was

especially observable in Florence.

Prior to 1434, "equality

of opportunity was a basic principle of Florentine constitu

tionalism," enhanced by "the system of electing magistrates
by lot,"

This system was eroded by the Medici, "especially

Lorenzo," for they "used the oligarchical trend in Floren

tine politics to underpin their personal ascendancy," a
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process that was not reversed until 1494, with the "vesting
of sovereign power in a [Great Council] of over 3,000 citi

zens,"' a reform that remained in place until the return of
the Medici in 1512, at which time it was abolished.

Machiavelli observes that "where equality exists, it is
impossible to set up a principality, and, where it does not

exist, impossible to set up a republic," (I. 55, 243) and,
thus, as the Medici gained power, the phenomenon of the

rising private individual reflects the eroding influence of

inequality.

And if Florence "was still, in name, a repub

lic" at the time Lorenzo was a young man,^° his "iron hand
within the velvet glove was quietly extinguishing the liber
ty of Florence.

At ten-year intervals, in '70-'71, '80 and

'90, reforms had gradually restricted the governing power in

ever fewer hands, faithful to Lorenzo, which^ ensured the
security of his personal rule... The corruption of morals,
beginning with the corruption of political life, which arose

inevitably from the changing times and was imported from
other courts, was favored by Lorenzo as an instrument of

government," prompting Machiavelli to remark, "The one who

could rend his fellows most cleverly, was deemed the wisest
I

and most estimable."" As for the reforms of the Medici, his
contempt is revealed in the Discourses:
Those who governed the state of Florence
from 1434 to 1494 [the Medici] used to
say that it was necessary to reconsti
tute the government every five yhars;
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otherwise it was difficult to maintain

it; where by ^reconstituting the govern
ment' they meant instilling men with
that terror and that fear with which

they had instilled them when instituting
it—in that at this time they had chas
tised those who, looked at from the
established way of life, had misbehaved.
As, however, the remembrance of this

chastisement disappears, men are embold
ened to try something fresh and to talk
sedition. Hence, provision has of neces

sity to be made against this by restor
ing that government to what it was at
its origins. (III. 1, 388)

Machiavelli is clearly voicing a criticism of the
Medici as their example follows that of the Roman Republic,
which returned to "its start" with the "introduction of the

plebeian tribunes, of the censorships, and of all the other

laws which put a check on human ambition and arrogance,"
(III. 1, 387) a prescriptive antidote he might have liked to
impose in some form in Florence.

The rise of corruption, then, can be thwarted by
"laws," "institutions," and the example of "the simple
virtue of one man" whom "men seek to imitate," (III. 1, 388)
all of which were demonstrated in the ancient model of the

Republic of Rome.

At regular intervals, renovation is re

quired to return the government to its original principles—
to "show [the] people that not only is it essential to up

hold religion and justice, but also to hold in high esteem
good citizens" (III. 1^ 386) which, as an ideal, stands in

stark contrast to the notion of renovation in the example of

the Medici, who "reconstituted" the government at regular
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intervals by "instilling men" with "terror" and "fear" as
they "had instilled them when instituting it."
(III. 1, 388)

In the Discourses, Machiavelli advises how to found a
state for the purpose of establishing and preserving liber

ty—for the benefit of the people and the glory of the
country.

In the Prince, he reverses himself, instructing a

would-be prince how to acquire, establish, and maintain
himself as an absolute ruler, a tyrant who must take as his

first priority his own security and his own interest.

In

the Discourses, Machiavelli offers the models from antiquity
as exemplary and worthy of imitation.

In the Prince, he

makes a mockery of the advice he gives in the Discourses,
offering instead the modern examples of vice and corruption
as deserving of emulation and praise, even discounting
ancient wisdom and the traditional notion of how a good

prince should conduct himself and his affairs, as commonly
recorded in the numerous handbooks for princes, and under

stood in the traditional ideas of morality and virtue.

If

Machiavelli did not oppose tyranny, why did he bother to

write the Discourses, to instruct the many in how to defy

the currents of corruption and defeat the rise of tyranny?
In fact, Machiavelli opposed tyranny in both the Prince
and the Discourses, but by two different means.

In the

latter, he took the approach of one, as defined by Bernard

Crick, whose theory for republican government qualifies him
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for favorable comparison with Aristotle.

In the Prince,

he adapts his views to the genre satire, in which he criti
cizes tyranny by exploring the modes and orders of absolute

rule that are anathema to liberty and democratic principles.
And by relating it to modern examples, he shows how far

Italy had plunged into corruption.

It is clear in the pas

sage from ttie History cited above how he views the lessons
from the past and the present, and how they should be ap
plied.

While the Discourses reveal the value of "ancient

history" which inspires "free spirits to imitation," the

Prince reflects his observation of "things that happened in
[the] corrupt world," from "1434-94," that "should kindle

such spirits to avoid and get rid of present abuses.
The Prince then, constitutes the unmasking of that

corrupt world (lest we be fooled by appearances) in an ex
traordinary and unprecedented manner, by lauding the art of

tyranny itself, written in such detail as to resemble a pre
scriptive manual, accompanied by a sense of urgency that
almost makes it compulsory as a matrix of essential attri

butes the new prince must acquire.

He not only should have

these attributes, he must have them, to succeed, which mag
nifies to an even greater degree the reader's perception of
the distance between how things ought to be, and what is,

the reality.

Like Shakespeare's "principal Machiaval, lago

-who is probably the most famous of all such characters,"
the "very obviousness [of his villainy] to the audience
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presumes its invisibility to the characters,"^'' just as
Machiavelli intended that his readers recognize the new

prince as the villain and rogue that he was, oblivious to

his own greed, ambition, and the prospect of inevitable
ruin, a warning that Garrett Mattingly reminds us occurs

several times in the Prince, despite its "brevity."'^
This political reality is defined by Machiavelli as the
"effectual truth of the thing," rather than the "imagination

of it." (Ch. 15, 61)

As I am not aware of any other refer

ence to "effectual truth" in his works, and because he

places considerable emphases on it in the Prince, in any
case, it perhaps has a special significance that is perti
nent to this work alone.

"Effectual truth" can be defined

as a truth that is derived from observing effects, as in the

outcome of one's actions, or the end achieved—as opposed to

what is "imagined," what it is thought to be in appearances,
or the ideal.

An example would be Pope Alexander VI.

The

papal image is one of holy piety, humility and faith, al
though Alexander's true nature allowed^none of those quali

ties.

The founding of the papal office, augmented by cen

turies of custom and tradition, created an ideal which the

popes of Alexander's time nourished with appearances, but
the effects of their actions (more notably repugnant in
Alexander than in any of his predecessors) exposed the
reality.

By the end of his reign, little evidence remained

of those attributes formerly associated with the Vicar of
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Christ, the Bishop of Rome, and the head of the Church.
Romans did not mourn his death,

The

and as Voltaire would

later comment, "the holiness of his ministry made him more

guilty.""
The "effectual truth of the thing" may be deserving of

praise or blame, and it is not always justified.

To make

this point, Machiavelli gives the example of Romulus in the
Discourses:

... Many perchance will think it a bad
precedent that the founder of a civic
state, such as Romulus, should first
have killed his brother and then have

acquiesced in the death of Titus Tatius,~
the Sabine, whom he had chosen as his

colleague in the kingdom. They will
urge that, if such actions be justifi
able, ambitious citizens who are eager
to govern, will follow the example of
their prince and use violence against
those who are opposed to their authori
ty. A view that will hold good provided
we leave out of consideration the end

Which Romulus had in mind... Wherefore,
the prudent organizer of a state whose
intention it is to govern not in his own
interests but for the common good, and
not in the interest of his successors
but for the sake of the fatherland which

is common to all, should contrive to be
alone in his authority... It is a sound
maxim that reprehensible actions may be

justified, by their effects, and that
when the effect is good, as it was in
the case of Romulus, it always justifies
the action." (I. 9, 131-2)

Further, "it is the man who uses violence to spoil
things, not the man who uses it to mend them, that is blame
worthy." (I. 9, 132)

Therefore, in defense of liberty,

Machiavelli offers "counsel" that "merits the attention of.
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and ought to be observed by, every citizen who has to give

advice to his country," that, as in the example of Romulus,
the end justifies the means, and that course should be

adopted "which will save the life and preserve the freedom
of one's country," and no man will "blame him for taking
such action, however extraordinary, which may be of service

in the organizing of a kingdom or the constituting of a
republic." (I. 9, 132)

Although Machiavelli states, however, that "reprehens
ible actions" (the means) are justified when the "effect is

good" (the end), as he defines good (with regard to kingdoms
and republics), further elaborated in the example of
Romulus, he does not state that sole authority is justified

in establishing or preserving a tyrannical state in which
the effect is not good vis-a-vis the destruction of freedom,
liberty, or the common good—even in the Prince—although he

gives the appearance of justification in the notion of ne
cessity.

Machiavelli does not state that a ruler is justi

fied in seizing absolute power because he was opposed to it
in every form.

Government under a "good prince" (one who is

not a tyrant) should serve the public interest, esteem

"virtue" (not vice), promote "peace" and security (not war
and disorder), respect the "senate's authority" and honor

the "magistrates" (not destroy the institutions of govern
ment), allow the "rich citizens [to enjoy] their wealth"

(not rob them of it at every convenience), (I. 10, 137) and
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most importantly, "regulate his conduct by laws." (I. 58,

252)

Therefore, the means are not justified by the end

(tyranny), in the Prince, because the end itself is not

justified.

This point is central to his satire.

His argu

ments for absolute power, always from necessity, are thus

fraudulent and deceptive, having only the appearance of
justification.
Appearances play a major role in Machiavelli's satire,

and the art of appearances that he employs, in the Prince,

he also advises the new prince to cultivate.

The wonderful

irony, then, is that he does to the prince what he tells the
prince to do to others.

As he cautions, in Chapter Eight

een, "men are so simple and obedient to present necessities

that he who deceives will always find someone who will let
himself be deceived." (Ch. 8, 70)

In the notion of "the effectual truth of the thing,"

then, Machiavelli strips away the mask of appearances while,
at the same time, encouraging the new prince to perfect that
art.

By instructing the new prince to turn vice to his ad

vantage, and call it virtue, Machiavelli reveals the prince
for the nefarious I character that he is, and one is treated

to the comic spectacle of Machiavelli's persuasive rhetoric

imploring the new prince to pursue his own folly.
Machiavelli shows his contempt for tyranny in the
notion of blame as well.

In the Discourses, he states,

"Those who set up a tyranny are no less blameworthy than are
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the founders of a republic or a kingdom praiseworthy," (I.
10, 134) for "when they might have founded a republic or a

kingdom to their immortal honor, turn their thoughts to tyr
anny, and fail to see what fame, what glory, security, tranA

quility, conjoined with peace of mind they are missing by
adopting this course, and what infamy, scorn, abhorrence,

danger, and disquiet they are incurring." (I. 10, 135)

Machiavelli's remonstrance has the tone of "the teaching of

a moral reactionary,"'® even in the Discourses.

In the

Prince, he brings it to life in the Borgia model, although
his indictment is specifically aimed at the Medici who rep
resent the current threat of further calamity across the
peninsula.
Of all the princes of their kind, the Medici most suc
cessfully fostered the art of appearances.

With Leo as the

new pope, the impression of religiosity was brought to great
heights in that family.

Lorenzo the Magnificent had ulteri

or motives, however, when, young Giovanni was made cardinal
I

at the age of sixteen,'' "so that he could look after the

interests of the family and of Florence in Rome,"^" virtually
one and the same thing.

Nor could a more liberal family be

found in Italy, and with their liberality they gained renown

at home and abroad, with the additional benefit of gaining
loyal partisans, who forme^ a Medici faction to whom they
showed their gratitude with public offices and other bene

fices.^' If a little cruelty was called for in maintaining
;

,
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t '

their position, necessity demanded it in Italian politics.
Bernard Crick makes the point that "the strong indict^

ment of tyranny in this discourse [I. 10, pp. 134-8] makes
it clear how intensely Machiavelli hated tyranny, and hence
the last thing he had in mind in composing The Prince was to
help would-be princes to set up a tyranny.

He believes that

autocracy is called for in certain circumstances, and that

these circumstances were realized in the Italy of his day,
but never tyranny.
Machiavelli does not recommend autocratic rule under

any circumstances, however, or any form of power that is
absolute, with the notable exception of the Prince.

What he

does recommend, in the Discourses, is the appointment of a
dictator, circumscribed by law, based on the Roman model of
the republic.

The appointment of a dictator provided a

means by which a republic could respond to crisis, for re
publics are "slow in functioning," and "reconciliation of
diverse views takes time," (I. 34, 195)

In conferring

authority in one person^ efficacy is greatly, enhanced, but

by no means did he intend that the title of dictator be

understood as the granting of unlimited power;

It is clear that the dictatorship, so
long as it was bestowed in accordance

;

with public institutions, and not as
sumed by the dictator of his own author
ity, was always of benefit to the state.
For it is magistrates that are made and
authority that is given in irregular

ways that is prejudicial to a republic,
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not that which is given in the ordinary
way, as is clear from the fact that dur
ing a very long period in Rome's his
tory, no dictator ever did anything but
good to that republic.
The reasons for this are obvious.

First, if a citizen is to do harm and is

to obtain extraordinary authority, he
must have many attributes which in a
republic that is not corrupt it will be
impossible for him to acquire; for he
will need to be very rich and to have
numerous adherents and partisans, which
he cannot have so long as the laws are
observed; and, even if he had them, men

of this kind are so dreaded that people
would not freely vote for him.

Furthermore, a dictator was appointed
for a limited time, and for the purpose
of dealing solely with such matters as
had led to the appointment. He had the
authority to make what decisions he
thought fit in order to meet a definite
and urgent danger, and to do this with
out consultation; anyone he punished had
no right of appeal. But he could do
nothing to diminish the constitutional
position of the government, as would
have been the case if he could have

taken away the authority vested in the
senate or in the people, or have abol
ished the ancient institutions of the

city and made new ones.

Wherefore, in

view of the short duration of the dic

tatortorship/ of the limited authority
which the dictator possessed, and of the
fact that the Roman people were not^

corrupt, it was impossible for the dic

tator to overstep his terms of reference
and to do the state harm,^^

Machiavelli states that the dictator "acquired the more
fame the sooner he resigned," (I. 30, 186) exemplified in

Camillus, who never abused his power and authority, "having
thrice been dictator [and who] always administered that
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office to the benefit of the public, not in his own inter
ests." (III. 30, 485)

As mentioned above, it was not the

title of dictator but the length of office that lead to
tyranny. (I. 34, 193-4)

In Machiavelli's discourse on religion (I. 12,

pp. 143-46), in which he boldly criticizes the Roman Church
as a cause of Italy's decline because it contributed to
corruption by neglecting divine worship, and because the

Church "keeps Italy divided," (I. 12, 142-3) he does suggest
the need for some form of unity in Italy; "Now of a truth no

country has ever been united and happy unless the whole of
it has been under the jurisdiction of one republic or one
prince, as has happened to France and Spain." (I. 12, 145)

Although his preference was always for republics, he admired
the kingdom of France in which "the kings are pledged to ob

serve numerous laws," (I. 16, 156-7) "maintained by parlia
ments" which renovate the laws and institutions "whenever it

takes action against a prince of this realm or in its judge
ments condemns the king." (III. 1, 389-90)
Further, he states that the Church has had neither the

"power" nor the "virtue" to enable it "to usurp power in
Italy and become its leader," (I. 12, 145) despite its
efforts to the contrary, for, in Machiavelli's time, the
great usurpers streamed out of the Vatican, and the term

"leader," as a designation of power, reflects restraint (if
not hximor) on Machiavelli's part.
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The Church is the "cause

why Italy has never come under one head, but has been under

many princes and signori

bringing "disunion" and "weak

ness, thus becoming "prey" of anyone who attacks it, for
which our Italians have to thank the Church and nobody
else," yet another reference to the need for some form of

sole authority.

(I. 12, 144-5)

In none of the above instances however does Machiavelli

call for a tyrant, despot, or autocrat to fulfill that need,
nor would he.

Even when he refers to the Church and its

inability to "usurp power in Italy," the end he states is

leadership, not acquisition of the peninsula in the grip of
tyranny.

In fact, Machiavelli closes this discourse with

praise for the Swiss religious and military "institutions,"^
which he suggests would be ruined if the Vatican relocated
in their midst.

Despite Machiavelli's charges against the Church, how

ever, in the Prince he appeals to the Vatican to unite
Italy, for the power he hoped would accrue to Giuliano and
then Lorenzo did not reflect their potential, but that of

Pope Leo as head of the Church, and that potential did not
promise the end of peace and security, but disunity, chaos,

and power,—precisely as the Borgia had attempted, although
the short life of popes promised almost no hope for success.
Without the wealth and power of the Church to assist him, a
fledgling prince had little hope to triumph, as the major
powers in Italy would move against him, most especially—as
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Machiavelli remarks in the Discourses—the Church, which was

never "so weak that it could not, when afraid of losing its

dominion over things temporal, call upon one of the powers
to defend it against an Italian state that had become too
powerful." (I. 12, 156)

In the Prince, then, Machiavelli calls upon the Church
to promote the rise of a .power in Italy, which would not

benefit the Church, however, although greatness would re
dound to "the Church," (Ch. 11, 47) but the new prince as

beneficiary of papal nepotism—the acquisition of a Medici
principality.

And if the precepts in the Prince are fol

lowed by the new prince, the end Machiavelli calls for in
Chapter Twenty-six would result in "a bad form of govern

ment" (III. 8, 429) rather than liberty and freedom, as sug

gested in the notion of freeing Italy "from the barbarians."
(Ch. 26, 101)

Reality, and the imagination of it, is expressed in the

notion of what is and what should be, or ought ^to be, by
Machiavelli, as when he states, "it is so far from how one
lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is
done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his

preservation." (Ch. 15, 61)

The ^is' and the ^ought', so to

speak, form a basis for comedy in which the degree of humor
achieved resides in the amount of distortion the satirist

creates^ between the ideal and the reality, between what
should be, as given in custom, tradition, education, and
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sensibility, and what is presented as reality, which is the
property of the satirist in any case.

MaChiavelli used the

^is' and the ^ought' as a device in his comedies, what Doug
las Radcliff-Umstead refers to as the application of "the

same effective truth... about how people really do live, not

how they ought to live,"^® which succeeds as comedy because
how the characters behave proceeds against an understanding,
on the part of the audience, of how they should behave.

In

his farcical and comic play, Mandragola, Machiavelli satir

ized the "foibles and baseness of Italian Society,"^ mir
rored in such characters as "a doleful lover, a judge by no
means shrewd, a friar living wickedly, a parasite the dar
ling of malice [who] will be sport for you today.
As James B. Atkinson observed, Machiavelli "seized upon
comedy as a useful tool for hammering out his political mes

sage so that it reached a more immediate audience... like
Aristophanes, Machiavelli unsettles his audience with incon
gruity, distortion, and other techniques bordering on the

grotesque."^' In the Prince, Machiavelli's clever manipula
tion of the notion of what is and what ought to be forms the
lifeblood of his satire, given full reign in Chapters Fif

teen through Eighteen.

"Wit has its eyes glued on reality.

It distinguishes, it makes invidious comparisons... wit
strips away flattering disguises and checks the poor, naked

anatomy that remains,

fully exposed by Machiavelli in his

archetypal new prince, who is not new in the sense that
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Machiavelli invented him, but in the sense that he personi

fies the modern princes as opposed to those of antiquity.
Like Tacitus, Machiavelli uses "irony" to "contrast the
appearances of public life with the underlying realities of

power, and a deliberate cultivation of ambiguity."'^
Machiavelli recommends that the prince "needs to have a

spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and varia
tions of things command him, as I have said above, not de
part from good, when possible, but know how to enter into
evil, when forced by necessity," (Ch. 18, 70) in which case
evil is still evil and good is still good.

Yet, he also

states, "if one considers everything well, one will find
something appears to be virtue, which if pursued would be
one's ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if

pursued results in security and well being," (Ch. 15, 62)
and by his application of the word "appears," vice and
virtue become conditional entities, necessity becomes the
operative, and, as Mark Hulliung remarks, Machiavelli cre
ates "a transvaluation of values, in which what had been
called virtue—Christian and stoic virtue—is Henceforth

deemed corruption, and what has been considered vice—
Machiavellian politics—becomes virtue.

In Machiavelli's pairing of those qualities that "all
men," but "especially princes, since they are placed high
er," are deserving of "blame or praise," (Ch. 15, 61) one

finds that it is impossible to generate a listing of them

289

(taken from the text in the order in which they appear,

organized in two columns), in which the heading of blame or
praise can be assigned:
1.

liberal

—

mean

2.

giver

3.

cruel

rapacious
merciful

4.

breaker of faith

faithful

5.

effeminate

6.

pusillanimous
humane

spirited
proud

—

fierce

7.

lascivious

chaste

8.

honest

clever

,

9.
10.

hard
grave

agreeable
light

11.

religious

unbelieving
(Ch. 15, 61-2)

Machiavelli was a clear and logical thinker.

Yet, in

his haphazard ordering of the paired qualities in the text

(and one need not organize it into columns to recognize it),
it is impossible to discover what he considered "of the

above mentioned qualities" to be those "that are held good,"
(Ch. 15, 62) or deserving of blame.

As he remarks in the

Discourses, "So that this is just one of those things in

which evil is so qlosely associated with gobd, and so bound
up are they one with the other, that it may easily happen
' '

i

.

that he who thinks he will get one, gets the other."
(III. 37, 507)

Machiavelli's satire in the Prince attacks what passes
for virtue or, as Edgar Johnson says of satire in general,
"foolishness" that passes for "sense:
But satire everywhere attacks evil arro
gant and triumphant, pride victorious
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and riding for a fall. It attacks those
conventional respectabilities which are
really hidden absurdities or vices
blindly accepted by thoughtlessness,
habit, or social custom.

It attacks...

stuffed shirts, hypocrisies aping mer
it... counterfeit passing for true. The
merely foolish, satire may be content to
take down a peg or two; the dangerous
and vicious it would reduce to ruin...
the ugliness revealed in its true colors
has masqueraded as merit.
1

The vices that call for the scourge of
satire, observes Sylvan Forester in
Melincourt, ^are those which pervade the
whole frame of society, and which under
some specious pretense of private duty,
or the sanction of custom and precedent,
are almost permitted to assume the sem

blance of virtue, or at least to pass
unstigmatized in the crowd of congenial
transgressions.^
The elements of satire discussed above are appropriate

to the Prince in many respects.

Machiavelli not only gives

vice "the semblance of virtue," but attempts to justify it
in the "specious pretense of private duty," in his call to
the Medici to save Italy.

His intent, however, was not to

establish the Medici as tyrants in Italy, but to warn

against the threat of tyranny.

Just as Rome "sunk under

tyranny, having lost her virtue,

Machiavelli thought Italy

was doomed as well, owing to the currents of corruption.

Because the Prince was not recognized as satire, it is
not surprising that it created such a scandal.

"The horror

with which plain citizens heard of his counsels is suggested
by the fact that ^Old Nick', though already a familiar alias

for the devil, came to be associated with his name; that The
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Prince was called the Devil's Catechism or the Ten Command

ments Reversed,"^® and their horror was justified if they
were among the faithful who observed the teachings of the

Bible; "woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil;
that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that

put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter,"" a verse that
Machiavelli himself was probably familiar with.

Those

citizens might have been less horrified if they knew the
Prince was a satire, but his irreverence would likely have
been appalling to them nonetheless.

Much has been written about Machiavelli's concept of
virtue:

whether pagan or Christian, civic or military,

ancient or modern.

The difficulty arises primarily from his

writing in the Prince, in which he departs from his defense

of liberty in the Discourses and the History*

Everything is

made new or "afresh," patterned on his advice in the Dis

courses that "he who proposes to set up a despotism or what

writers call a ^tyranny', must renovate everything," (I. 25,

176) and "leave nothing of that province intact, and nothing
in it, neither rank, nor institution, nor form of govern

ment, nor wealth, except it be held by such as recognize
that it comes from you." (I. 26, 177)

Therefore, while in

republics the purpose of renovation is to restore the gov
ernment to its "original principles," (III. 1, 385-6) in

reference to tyranny, Machiavelli recommends renovation by
obliteration.
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virtue is reflected in the traditional values

Machiavelli associates with republican government in the
Discourses, while in the Prince, he reverses himself to

accommodate the necessities of tyrannical rule.

The only

conceivable bridge between the two works, that could be said

to harmonize with his democratic principles, is the notion
that in defense of liberty and for the preservation of a
free city or state, the end justifies the means, as I dis

chssed above.

In that context, the lessons he gives the new

prince should be observed by those that would defend their

freedom, the threat of tyranny personified in the new prince
himself.

Beyond that consideration, however, any attempt to

justify his transvaluation of vice and virtue in the Prince

is fundamentally flawed, because there is no justification
for the precepts of the Prince in his political theory, as
expressed in his other major works.

As he states in Chapter

Eighteen^ "in the actions of all men, and especially of
princes, where there is no court to appeal to, one looks to
the end," (Ch. 18, 71) and in the minds of modern and cor
rupt princes, it mattered little whether or not the end was

justified.

In persuading the new pringe to pursue the path of
vice, and thus to let go "of what should be done" for what
"is done" (Ch. 15, 61) Machiavelli seems to make the worse
argument appear the better, a technique that originated with

the sophists; a form of rhetoric (forensic) utilized in the
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art of persuasion.

As a humanist scholar of antiquity,

Machiavelli would have been familiar with the sophists and
their arguments from the "antithesis of Nature and Conven
tion as moral authorities:"

Among the most significant thinkers of
the fifth century B.C. were the travel
ing lecturers known as sophists. They
were primarily teachers of political
excellence whose aims were practical and
immediate and whose investigations led
in many cases to a philosophical rela
tivism. Of these, Protagorus is the
best example. To him absolute truth was
unknowable and perhaps nonexistent. Man
is the measure of all things... and
truth must be approximated in each indi
vidual time and place somewhat in the
manner that the just is determined in a
court of law. In this process, rhetoric

is useful and legitimate, for only when
two sides are persuasively presented can
the choice between them be clearly per
ceived and intelligently made. Similar
ly, in political life no universal prin
ciples can be accepted. Courses Of
action must be determined between alter

natives presented in persuasive fash
ion.^®

Protagarus was the "originator of the Doctrine of Two

Logics (or Antilogoi)," the "so called Just (or Major or

Better) Logic and the Unjust (or Minor or Weaker) Logic.""*"
The Just is represented in "Nomos, with honor as its re

ward... [nomos] represents the ideal for man,""** that which
is given in law, custom, and tradition.

The Unjust is

represented in "Physis... acts from motives of self-inter

est.""*^

"Physis, or nature" is thus antithetical to "nomos,

or law and custom."'*^
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In his comedy, The Clouds, Aristophanes creates a
"formal debate, between the Just and Unjust Discourses," in
which, as Lois Spatz explains, the "Unjust Discourse is

certain that he can manipulate the audience because they are
fools," while the "Just Discourse [relies] on the truth,
assuming the audience wise enough to discern it.

He, of

course, believes that absolute truth and justice exist,
established by the gods as standards by which man is judged
and gains honor... the Unjust Discourse denies the existence

of any such standard."'*^

Aristophanes thus used the "Doc

trine of the Two Logics" for comic effect.

As William

Arrowsmith remarks, Aristophane's "Logos is not logic but a
prelogical discourse of the whole human reason," and, there

fore, Mthe Just argxunent is helpless against his opponent.
His case cannot be expressed logically, and yet it remains

rational.

Further, "for Aristophanes the antilogoi are

transparent sophistry, humbug on a huge scale, and he ac

cordingly makes the debate between the two Logo! the climax

of his comedy."''^
Although Machiavelli was familiar with Aristophanes'

The Clouds, as I mentioned above, and wrote a play in imita

tion of it, "Le Mechere" {The Masks),'" one can only specu
late concerning the influence Aristophanes' comedy may have
had on Machiavelli, with regard to the Just and Unjust
arguments that seem apparent to me, in the Prince.

I have

referred to Aristophanes' comedy, however, to introduce the
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dynamics of making the worse argument appear the better, and
to make the point that using the antilogoi for comic effect
had a precedent in at least one work that is associated with
Machiavelli.

Machiavelli discusses liberality and its contrary,

mean, in Chapter Sixteen, the first of those qualities he
listed in the eleven pairs of contraries in the previous
chapter.

As he explains, "someone is considered liberal,

someone mean (using a Tuscan term because avaro [greedy] in

our language is still one who desires to have something by
violence, misero [[mean]] we call one who refrains too much
r

from using what is his." (Ch. 15, 61)
Liberality is a virtue that received considerable at

tention from the humanists.

"The subject of princely vir

tues" was important to them "as formulated in the medieval
mirror of princes," and "by confining themselves to the com

position of catalogues of virtues, the writers could pattern
themselves closely on ancient models and adopt schemes pro

vided by Aristotle in the Nicomachean ethics or by Cicero in
De Officiis... under this influence the humanist catalogue

of virtues took on a new aspect and came to differ from
those of the middle ages.

Purely worldly virtues took their

place beside the religious ones and even superseded them in
the degree of interest they aroused... those worldly virtues
were considered purely from the point of view of their ef
fect, their advantages or disadvantages being exactly
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weighed.

This is particularly true of liberalitus, which

was now regarded as a means of consolidating the position of
the ruler.

Machiavelli conforms to the humanist notion of liberal

ity as a useful "means of consolidating the power of a

ruler," in his discourse, but he distorts the issue by
recommending means that disregard the public welfare and
favors, instead, the greed and avarice of an ambitious
prince.

The intended "effect," to be sure, was not in

harmony with Renaissance expectations of ruling power, which
he must have known would lead to reasoned objections, par
ticularly as he departed from broad generalizations in his

discourse, and began to focus on specific virtues that in

vited the scrutiny of centuries of scholarship.

His de

fense, however (should he need one), lay in present neces

sity, grounded in the notion of effectual truth or political
reality that he offers in Chapter Fifteen.

Therefore, even

though it is clear from the Discourses that Machiavelli

praised ancient virtue and deplored modern vices,"*' he freed
himself, in a sense, to treat liberality (and the other vir
tues) in a manner that reflects his satirical malice.

In

the court of public opinion Machiavelli might be thought
perverse, but it would have been difficult for his adversar

ies, such as the Medici, to charge him with sedition, howev
er transparent his mask of innocence.

Aristotle "defined virtue as a habitual moderation,
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that is to say, the habitual avoidance of extreme modes of
conduct.

Extremes are always evil, while virtue is a mean

between extremes."^®

Aristotle's definition of virtue and

its associated vices provides the insight for understanding
the method Machiavelli used to develop his arguments in such
a way that vice is given the appearance of virtue.

In

Aristotle's listing of "twelve^ important virtues," liberali
ty, for example, appears as follows;
/

Vice

Virtue

of

of

Vice
of

Deficiency

Moderation

Xlliberality

Liberality

Excess

Prodigality®'

Machiavelli did not adhere to Aristotle's labeling of
the virtues and associated vices, when they were the same or
similar.

Rather, he gives his own interpretation.

Thus,

while Aristotle labels mean as an associate vice of the vir

tue magnificence,®^ Machiavelli pairs mean with the virtue
liberal, which may or may not have relevance to his satire.
The important point to consider, however, is Aristotle's

definition of virtue as "habitual moderation," the mean be

tween the vices of excess and deficiency, which reflects
three aspects of each quality.

In his eleven pairs of con

traries, Machiavelli only includes two aspects.

By exclud

ing one of the associated vices, for example, it becomes a
free agent, so to speak, which he thus incorporates into his

argument as part of his strategy.
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To illustrate the point,

Machiavelli excludes the vice of excess in his pairing of
liberal and mean:

Vice

Virtue

of

of

Deficiency

Mean

—

Vice
of

Moderation

—

Excess

Liberal

[Not Represented]

As Machiavelli develops his argument regarding liberal
ity, however, it becomes Clear that it is grounded solely in

the extremes of deficiency and excess.

He deceptively in

troduces the vice of excess into his argument, and it is

that vice (and not the virtue of moderation) that is used to
rationalize the necessity for adopting the vice of deficien
cy, meanness.

The virtue of moderation is thus excluded,

and the contraries are redefined, from moderation-deficiency
to excess-deficiency.

The thrust of Machiavelli's argument,

then, is predicated on relevance to political expedience and
necessity, or physis, the Unjust.

Nomos, represented in the

virtue of moderation, retains its original quality.

The

vice of deficiency triumphs over the vice of excess and, as
such, is given the appearance of virtue.

In fact,

Machiavelli has merely chosen the greater of two evils, that

which affords the greatest utility for the prince.

Machiavelli begins by stating the Just argumerit, followed by
the Unjust:
Beginning, then, with the first of the
above mentioned qualities, I say that it
would be good to be held liberal; none
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theless, liberality, when used so that
you may be held liberal, harms you. For
if it is used virtuously and as it
should be used, it may not be recogniz
ed, and you will not escape the infamy
of its contrary. (Ch. 16, 62)

When Machiavelli states that "it would be good to be
held liberal," he reflects the time-honored standard of

liberality passed on from antiquity in custom, tradition,
and education; the Just.

He never defends it, however, as a

viable option for the prince.
With the phrase, "nonetheless," he introduces the

Unjust argument, which redefines the contraries; "nonethe

less, liberality when used so that you may be held liberal,
harms you."

To suggest that liberality be used for the

purpose of being held liberal imputes ulterior motives to

one's actions.

In the following sentence, he identifies the

motive as recognition; "For if it is used virtuously and as
it should be used, it may not be recognized...," which is to

say, one will not acquire a reputation for liberality, if it

is used moderately.

If liberality is used extravagantly,

however, it will be recognized, not just among the few, but
the many; "And so, if one wants to maintain a ndme for

liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave out any
kind of lavish display...," (Ch. 16, 63) a statement that
clearly defines the vice of excess;

The original notion of

being held liberal, as stated by Machiavelli, "I say that it
would be good to be held liberal," has been corrupted by his
introduction of the word used.
300

As a consequence, the virtue

of moderation (deserving of praise) has been replaced by the
vice of excess (deserving of blame), and the transition is
clear even before he elaborates on "lavish display;"

"For

if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, it may
not be recognized, and you will not escape the infamy of its
contrary."

In the first place, it is a false claim to state

that if liberality is used virtuously (that is, in habitual
moderation, the defining quality of virtue), one will incur

the "infamy" of meanness, the "contrary."

Had he stated,

"For if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, you
will not escape the infamy of its contrary," one can see how
foolish the statement is, for in that case, one is virtuous

and, at the same time, mean.

By adding "it may not be

recognized," however, meanness (the contrary) becomes con
tingent upon recognition, and the argximent is altered to
reflect the extremes of the associated vices, excess and

deficiency.

The virtue of moderation is replaced by the

vice of excess.
Machiavelli assails excess when he states that it is

"liberality when used so that you may be held liberal" that
"harms you," in the desire for reputation.

attack in the notion of "lavish display."

He continues his

The prince will

"consume" all of his recourses "in such deeds."

It will be

"necessary" to "burden the people extraordinarily," to
resort to "taxes," and "do all those things that can be done

to get money."

As a result, the prince becomes "hated by
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his subjects," who will "esteem" him "little" as he becomes
"poor." (Ch. 16, 63)

The notion that excessive use of liberality will lead
to hatred of the prince allows Machiavelli to move toward

his advocacy of the vice of deficiency in his argument.
"Thus, since a prince cannot, without damage to himself, use

the virtue of liberality so that it is recognized, he should
not, if he is prudent, care about a name for meanness."

(Ch. 16, 63)

The virtue of liberality is again misrepre

sented as the vice of excess in this statement, with the
words use and recognize.

Machiavelli reasons that the

prince should be reluctant to use his own resources, and
"spend," rather, "from what belongs to someone else," in

which case, "he should not leave out any part of liberality
[excess]." (Ch. 16, 64)

That is, "Either the prince spends

from what is his own and his subjects, or from what belongs
to someone else." (Ch. 16, 64)

Machiavelli makes a distinc

tion between what belongs to the prince and his subjects,
and what belongs to someone else, but it should be under

stood that his intent was to make the point that the wealth
of the people belongs to the prince, which constitutes the
wealth of someone else as well.

He excludes the wealth of

the people as using someone elses, but his examples of
Julius II and King Ferdinand dispel that notion.
Pope Julius II, Machiavelli observes, "while he made

use of a name for liberality to attain the papacy, [he] did
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not think of maintaining it later, so as to be able to make

war," an example of a "mean" prince, who "will always be
held more and more liberal when it is seen that with his

parsimony his income is enough for him, that he can defend
himself from whoever makes war on him, and that he can

undertake campaigns without burdening the people." (Ch. 16,
63)

Julius' "income," however, was the wealth of the

Church, which he plundered to conduct his enterprises,
wealth that belonged to the institution of the Church,

comprised of the people over whom the pope presided as

prince; his subjects, so to speak.

Julius albo used the

wealth of someone else in another sense, the spoils of a
.

.

conqueror.

■

■

-
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■
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Julius "dispossessed Cesare... appropriating

[his] conquests for himself and the papacy,

a fact that

may also clarify the reference Machiavelli makes to Julius

in Chapter Eleven; "Julius found the path still open to a
mode of accumulating money, never used before Alexander,"
(Ch. 11, 47) a comic portrayal of Cesare's demise and the
vengeance of Julius.
King Ferdinand of Spain offers the best evidence for

satirical malice, however, among the examples given by
Machiavelli for meanness.

He comments that if Ferdinand

"had been liberal, he would not have been able to make war

or win so many campaigns." (Ch. 16, 64)

Although Spain was
1

generating wealth as the result of exploration in the new

world, in the context of using someone else's, Machiavelli's

303

intent was to demonstrate, by Ferdinand's' example, the
plunder of one's own subjects.

And while he goes on to

elaborate on his enterprises, "he has always done and or

dered great things, which have always kept the minds of his
subjects in suspense and admiration, and occupied with the

outcome," one can interpret his meaning as reflective of the
"Marranos" specifically rather than the general population,
in which case his statement reeks of sarcastic venom.

Machiavelli also includes the example of King Louis XII

of France, who was "publically ridiculed for his economy,"^
as Allan Gilbert observes in his notes to the Prince,

Machiavelli makes the point that "the present king of France

carried on many wars without imposing an ex.traordinary tax
on his subjects, because the extra expenses were adminis
tered with his long practiced parsimony." (h. 16, 63-4)
Perhaps the king's parsimony was facilitated by the fact

that Italy was "taken as booty by Louis," as stated by
Machiavelli in Chapter Twelve,

which shows the effects of

using someone elses from the perspective of the exploited.
Machiavelli's mention of Louis reminds one of his predeces

sor, King Charles VIII, an example that had particular
significance! for the Florentines.

In the Discourses,

Machiavelli states, "In regard to untrustworthiness, for in
stance, everybody knows how often money was given to King
Charles VIII, and how he promised to restore the fortresses

of Pisa and never did so; whejreby this king displayed alike
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his untrustworthiness and no small avarice." (III. 43, 518)
Machiavelli's recommendation that a prince use someone elses

gives tacit approval to the means used by King Charles (as
well as Louis), which would not have pleased the Floren
tines.

In defense of the vice of deficiency, then, Machiavelli
states, "Therefore, so as not to have to rob his subjects,

to be able to defend himself, not to become poor and con
temptible, nor to be forced to be rapacious, a prince should
esteem it little, to incur a name for meanness, because this

is one of those vices that will enable him to rule." (Ch.
16, 64)

It would be difficult to find a more rapacious

prince than King Ferdinand, however.

Nor could Julius have

conducted his enterprises, in regaining the papal states,
without using the wealth of his flock.

And although

Machiavelli only refers to one pope, Julius, the recommenda
tion that one should use the wealth of others extends to the

simony and nepotism of his predecessors, especially
Alexander VI, and excuses their immoral and venal practices.
Further, the issue of being "able to defend himself" is

not the issue.

Rather, in the examples of Pope Julius,

Louis XII, Kind Ferdinand and Julius Caesar, (Ch. 16, 64)
the issue is making war on others, the great campaigns and

enterprises that give reputation to the prince, and bring

disorder and chaos to the people.

Most certainly

Machiavelli had the Catholic king in mind when he mentions
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"a certain prince of present times, whom it is not well to

name, never preaches anything but. peace and faith, and is

very hostile to both."^®
Although Machiavelli argued against the use of liberal
ity for the purpose of acquiring reputation, because all of
one's resources are used in doing so, he concludes that
"when you are on the path" to becoming prince, "it is indeed

necessary to be held liberal" (Ch. 16, 64)

This is true, of

course, because it is the method by which an aspiring prince
earns the reputation that elevates him above the rank of his

fellow citizens, and by which he gains power through his
influence, and followers who become his partisans.
Machiavelli deplored such men and their methods as anathema

to his republican principles.

Their excessive liberality

hastened the process of corruption and decline in a republic

which in turn made the rise of a prince possible, and
threatened the destruction of freedom and liberty.

A case

in point is Lorenzo the Magnificent, and in his example one
discovers that even when one's wealth has been consumed, the
way is open to using that of the public coffers, that which
belongs to the people, nor do such means lead to hatred and

low esteem.

Quite the contrary.

In his History of Florence, Francesco Guicciardini
remarks that Lorenzo, who used his liberality to "gain him

the goodwill of the great," spent lavishly while his income

"diminished."

He "knew nothing about business and paid
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little attention to it, so that his affairs on many occa
sions fell into such disorder that he was on the point of
bankruptcy and had to fall back on his friend's money and on

public funds."

Further, in financing the war in 1478, "he

arranged that the soldiers be paid by the Bartolini bank in
which he had shares.

By his orders, they held back in their

payments about eight percent, which was to the detriment of

the commune since the condottieri keeps so many fewer men
and the commune had to pay for extra commissions.

At other

times, too, he used public funds to supply his own needs.""
When Lorenzo died, there was "great sorrow" among the peo
ple, "especially" the "lower classes" who were always kept
by him in abundance, with many pleasures, entertainments,
and feasts," although, as Guicciardini remarks, "those who

were repressed were glad when he died."^*
Christopher Hibbert also faults Lorenzo's character and

use of public funds; "Refusing as always to allow moral
scruples to inhibit political or personal ambition, he did
not hesitate to delay that ruin by dipping his hands into

funds that did not belong to him... [he] helped himself to
money from the public treasury.

After his death his heirs

were held responsible for the return of almost 75,000 flo

rins which had been withdrawn without the sanction of any
law and without authority, to the damage and prejudice of
the commune.""

Despite his abuse of privilege and power, however,
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Lorenzo was by no means universally despised for his ac
tions.

The many benefitted from his extravagance, and as he

controlled the government of Florence, the few who might

have raised objections had no recourse for their grievances.

In fact, the Medici were perhaps the most esteemed family in
Italy, and certainly so, in Florence.

;

Machiavelli does not raise the issue, however, of where
an aspiring prince might turn when his resources are deplet
ed, certainly an important issue for one who is on the

"path" and who must rely on his own wealth.

This omission

is significant because Machiavelli could not have addressed

it without drawing attention to the Medici, his intended
target.

But the implications are there if one reads the

discourse carefully, and if a powerful citizen could rob the
people in a republic with impunity, how much greater the

opportunity to rob his subjects, should he become a tyranni
cal prince, particularly when he views their wealth as his

own.

This is the comic truth, the political reality that

underlies his recommendation that the prince use someone
else's money although it is hidden by the connotation he
gives to using someone else's—as the spoils of acquisi

tions, in empire.

In the latter sense, one can compare

Cesare Borgia or Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici to the

examples given by Machiavelli, "of Cyrus, Caesar, and
Alexander," (Ch. 16, 64) who were very liberal with someone

else's—a comparison that invites profound ridicule of the
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modern princes and their aspirations.

With the introduction of the qualities "giver" and
"rapacious," Machiavelli advises the prince to indulge in
the vice of excess, but with the wealth of someone else,

which conforms, rather, to the vice of deficiency—-an ironic

twist in his argument that can be demonstrated by returning
to the earlier model (see Figure 1):
Figure 1:

Liberal and Mean
Vice

Vice

Vice

of.',,

of

of

Deficiency

Moderation

Excess

Mean

Liberal

[Not Repreisented]

t/se someone else's

[Excluded}

use own wealth

Represented In:
1. Recognition
2. Lavish Display

prince

giver

rapacious

useful

contradictary
conclusion

illustrated

defined

as

as

useful

harmful
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The model illustrates the shift in Machiavelli's argu

ment, as the vice of excess takes the place of the virtue of
moderation, and thus the contraries are redefined to reflect

the associated vices; virtue is no longer represented.
"Giver" and "rapacious," the second pair of contraries

listed in Chapter Fifteen (Ch. 15, 61), conform in subs
tance, as defined by Machiavelli in Chapter Sixteen, to the
vice of deficiency and thus, by definition, neither quality
represents a virtue. (Ch. 16, 64)

"Giver" represents ex

cess, but with the use of someone else's wealth.

Further, Machiavelli represents giver as one who also
takes, and rapacious as one who also gives.

That is, he

defines "giver" in the following manner; "And of what is not
yours or your subject's one can be a bigger giver, as were

Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is
someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it

to you; only spending your own is what hurts you."
And in reference to what qualifies as rapacious,
Machiavelli advises, "And for the prince who goes out with
his armies, who feeds on booty, pillage, and ransom and

manages on what belongs to someone else, this liberality is

necessary; otherwise he would not be followed by his sol

diers." (Ch. 16, 64)

On the surface, Machiavelli's argument

appears logical and compelling, but we should not be fooled

by appearances as Machiavelli intended that the new prince
be deceived in his little work.
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The notion that a prince will only be followed if his

soldiers are allowed to pillage and plunder is a significant
marker for satire, for Machiavelli thus describes a prince
who either lacks discipline and authority, or one who is so
poor he cannot afford to pay them by any other means.

It

should be noted that in the Discourses, Machiavelli praises
the Roman practice of paying their soldiers, which redounded

to the public benefit.

Because they were paid, the Consuls

were not as generous with them concerning booty.

"They

thought it a good plan that the public should benefit by it,
so that they would not have to tax the city to pay for their

enterprises.

In a very short time, this made the treasury

very rich." (II. 6, 293)

This seems good advice for a

prince, especially one whom Machiavelli has counseled to
take no art but the art of war—were it not for the fact

that it is not in the best interest of a tyrannical prince
to consider the pubic good.

Despite the fact that Machiavelli condoned rapacious
behavior as a necessary mode of liberality, as in the exam
ple of the military above, he condemns having "a name for
rapacity" in his conclusion.

"So there is more wisdom in

maintaining a name for meanness, which begets infamy without
hatred, than in being under the hecessity, because one wants

to have a name for liberality, to incur a name for rapacity,
which begets infamy with hatred." (Ch. 16, 65)

In

either

case, Machiavelli only represents the associated vices.
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Moderation, as a matter of policy and good governance, is
never considered in this discourse.

The Unjust argument was

destined to triumph from the beginning, for no matter which

vice Machiavelli preferred, utility for the prince, physis,
was his sole consideration, grounded in his argument which

deliberated the advantages or disadvantages of either vice.
Vice has not become virtue, however, nor has virtue become
vice.

Machiavelli has merely condoned vice, the vice of

deficiency deemed more efficable for an established prince,
and the vice of excess favorable and necessary when on the
path to becoming prince.
Machiavelli did not intend to instruct the modern

prince with his advice concerning liberality, or the "effec
tual truth of the thing." (Ch. 15, 61)

Rather, in their

actions and character, the modern princes instructed him and

he, in turn, as a servant of the public good, took it upon

himself to share his knowledge with others in the hope that
in doing so, he might inspire a desire for reform.®"

The

Medici could not have been pleased to find their excessive
liberality exposed as a means to an end, and detrimental to

the greater good of Florence.

How fortunate then, for them,

that his message was drowned in a flood of damnation against

which he could never defend himself without admitting the
true nature of the Prince-—and that it was dedicated to the

oppressed rather than their oppressors—'a revelation that

would have held the promise of dire consequences for the
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former statesman of Florence.

Machiavelli used a similar methodology in his treatment
of the contraries cruelty and mercy, in Chapter Seventeen.

Cruelty represents the vice of deficiency, and mercy, the

virtue of moderation.

As in the previous example of liberal

and mean, the vice of excess is not represented.

He begins

J

by stating the Just argument:

Descending next to the other qualities
set forth before, I say that each prince
should desire to be held merciful and

not cruel. (Ch. 17, 65)

Machiavelli probably intended that his reference to

"descending" have a double meaning.

He is, of course, de

scending down the list of paired contraries given in Chapter

Fifteen.

At the same time, however, he is also descending

further into that evil that earned him the title of "Old

Nick,"®V an unrepentant evil that masqueraded as virtuous
conduct, clothed in verbal irony, including "absurd sugges
tions made with apparent sincerity," as "praise of harmful

things under the pretext that they are good."®
As in the previous chapter, the Just argximent is never
elaborated or defended.

In the examples of Manlius

Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus from the Discourses, howev

er, Machiavelli amplifies his views of mercy and harshness
with regard to princes and republics.

Manlius and Valerius

were both successful generals, but proceeded by different
means.

Manlius used "severity," while Valerius was consid
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erate and "homely."

Of Manlius, Machiavelli coricludes:

For a citizen who is living under the

laWs of a republic, I think it more
praiseworthy and less dangerous to adopt
the procedure of Manlius, since this way
of behaving was entirely in the public

interest, and was in no way affected by
private ambition, for it is impossible
to gain partisans if one is harsh in
one's dealings with everybody and wholly
devoted to the common good, because by
doing this one does not acquire particu
lar friends or—as I have just called
them—partisans. Wherefore, than such a
procedure none can be more advantageous

or more desirable in a republic, since
it neither fails to take account of the

interests of the public nor does it
suggest that personal power is in any
way being sought. (III. 22, 469)
Of Valerius, however, Machiavelli cautions that such

generals who gain the "goodwill of the troops" in a repub

lic, especially if he "should retain his command for long"

may, in itis effects, "be prejudicial to liberty" (as was the
case with Julius Gaesar).

Although for these reasons

Machiavelli finds the modes of Valerius inappropriate in a
republic, he finds them desirable in a prince:
But if one takes the case of a prince,
which is the case Xenophon is consider
ing, we should have to decide wholly
with Valerius and to discard Manlius.

For a prince should seek to gain the
obedience and affection of his soldiers

and of his subjects; their obedience by
his fidelity to the constitution and by
the reputation he has for virtue; their
affection by his affability, kindliness,
compassion, and the other qualities for
which Valerius was conspicuous; and
Cyrus also, so Xenophon tells us. For

that a prince should be well liked by
each of his subjects and should have a
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devoted army, is in conformity with
other features appertaining to his
princely status. (III. 22, 470)

Machiavelli concludes that the method used by Valerius,

if used by a private citizen, "prepares the way for tyran
ny," while the behavior of Manlius "in a prince," is "harm
ful," (although he does not elaborate). (III. 22, 470-1)

In considering the qualities of cruelty and mercy in
the Prince, however, Machiavelli offers advice that contra

dicts that given in the Discourses.

The modes of Manlius,

severe and "harsh," are favored in the new prince rather

than the "affection," "kindliness," and "compassion" dis

played by Valerius—which he praised as the qualities a

prince should have.

The untrustworthiness of his argument

in the Prince, then, can be inferred both on the basis of

that contradiction and the devices he employs in the argu
ment itself, the Unjust, in which, as in the previous chap
ter, he redefines the contraries.

Having stated that "each prince should desire to be
held merciful and not cruel," he continues;
Nonetheless, he should take care not to

use this mercy badly.

Cesare Borgia was

held to be cruel,v nonetheless his cruel

ty restored the Romagna, united it, and
reduced it to peace and to faith. If
one considers this well, one will see
that he was much more merciful than the

Florentine people, who so as to escape a
name for cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be

destroyed. A prince, therefore, so as
to keep his subjects united and faith
ful, should not care about the infamy of
cruelty, because with very few examples
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he will be more merciful than those who
for the sake of too much mercy allow
disorders to continue, from which come
killings or robberies, for these custom

arily harm a whole community, but the
executions that come from a prince harm
one particular individual. And of all
princes, it is impossible for a new
prince to escape a name for cruelty,
because new states are full of dangers.
(Ch. 17, 65-6)

In the notion that a prince should "not use this mercy
badly," badly is defined as "too much mercy," which repre
sents the vice of excess.

Cruelty, the vice of deficiency,

is thus deemed "more merciful."

The mean (the virtue of

moderation represented as mercy) is excluded from the debate
and, as in the previous chapter, the contraries have been

re-defined, from moderation-deficiency to excess-deficiency.
Ironically, "more" (excess) is also reflected in the less

(deficiency) side of the argument, demonstrated by
Machiavelli in the notion that a prince will "be held more

and more liberal" when he practices "parsimony," as well, in
the previous chapter.

(Ch. 16, 63)

There are, then, both

intriguing and comic aspects to his Unjust arguments.
Machiavelli targets Cesare Borgia, in Chapter SevenI

teen, to satirize Borgia's cruelty and the cruel nature of a

tyrannical prince.

As I mentioned above, Garrett Mattingly

challenged Machiavelli's assumption that Cesare's "cruelty
restored the Romagna" and "united it."

Machiavelli "never

mentions these statesmanlike achievements" in his reports
from Borgia's camp, "nor do any of the other reports from
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observers in the area, Spanish, French, Venetians, Sienese;
nor do any other contemporary sources.

All the indications

are quite the contrary... the duke did nothing to end fac

tional strife and anarchy in the Romagna; he merely superim
posed the brutal rule of his Spanish captains on top of

it."®^

Mattingly's conclusion is supported by the fact that

Cesare's so-called unified state rapidly disintegrated with
the death of Alexander VI.

Further, Machiavelli's assertion that Cesare "reduced

[the Romagna] to peace and faith" is a questionable state
ment.

One might say that order is reduced to chaos or that

good is reduced to evil, but it seems inappropriate in the
sixteenth century to refer to the population within the
papal states as having been "reduced" to "faith."

The

Romagna was, of course, regained for the Church, but as
Ferdinand Schevill says of Cesare's "brutal seizures and
bloody conquests... in the course of little more than three

years he succeeded in uprooting a score of petty tyrants

planted in papal territory and in assembling hiS; whirlwind

gains into a single political unit.

Technically, even after

his conquests had been consolidated, they constituted not
his personal realm but the state of the Church and owned the

pope as their ruler.

No one doubted, however, that [Cesare]

was firmly resolved to keep as his property what he had

seized, as it was universally assumed that the pope, his
father, was so completely under the son's domination that he
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was fully prepared to coimit the monstrous felony of alien

ating the patrimony of St. Peter in order to supply his
bastard with the territorial basis required for a self-

perpetuating dynasty."*^

By "reduced" to "faith," then,

Machiavelli seems to convey the oblique nature of his con
quests, relevant to the greater good of the Church, as a
"rebel of Christ."®'

Machiavelli refers to the "killings" that arise from

"too much mercy" in the example of the Florentines, noting
that "these customarily harm a whole community," while the

"executions that come from a prince harm one particular
person," suggesting that killing one particular person would
have no such impact.

The first "particular" person the

tyrant must eliminate, however, is the head of state.
Cesare was responsible for the murder of Astorre Manfredi of

Foenza,®® Guilio Cesare Varano of Camerino,®' and prince
Alfonso of Aragon, husband of Cesare's sister, Lucrezia,®*
among others.

Cesare was implicated in the death of his

brother, Juan,®® whom the pope was excessively fond of, and
wanted to "elevate... to the throne of Naples."™

His elimi

nation of the Orsini and Colonna parties, praised by
Machiavelli in Chapter Seven in reference to events in

Sinigaglia, resulted in many murders, including "the tragic

death of Cardinal Orsini."'V William Ebenstein remarks that,
in addition to the assassination of Cesare's brother and his

sister's husband, "the number of his other assassinations is
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legion, and his cruelty was matched only by his treachery
and debauchery."''^

Only the death of Remirro could be said

to reflect an execution that only harmed "one particular
person," and even benefitted the community.

Machiavelli does not go directly to the issue of hate,
as he did in Chapter Seven, when he stated that Remirro's

"past rigors had generated some hatred."

Rather, he directs

our attention to love and fear, fear representing a response
to cruelty that is less inciteful than hate, particularly
when considered in the context of whether it is better for a

prince to be loved or fealred, a question that reflected the
concerns of the ancients, the subject of long debate.

He

introduces the notion of fear with the phrase, "nonethe
less," which generally signals movement to, or within, the

Unjust argument, although his statement has the appearance
of returning to the Just, and moderation:
Nonetheless, he should be slow to believe and to move, nor should he create
fear for himself, and he should proceed
in a temperate mode with prudence and

'

humanity so that too much diffidence
does not render him intolerable.

(Ch. 17, 66)

The prince should practice his cruelty with "humanity"
(a contradiction in terms), being neither "too confident"

(overbearing) or too "diffident" (hesitant) in proceeding.
He should adopt a "temperate mode" (moderation), the mean
between two extremes.

Under cruelty (the vice of deficien

cy), then, Machiavelli has constructed the appearance of a
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virtue and its associated vices.

"Humanity" represents the

virtue of moderation, while "too much confidence" (excess),
and "diffidence" (deficiency) represent the associated

vices.

In the process, he has introduced the paired con

traries, "humane" and "proud," given in Chapter Fifteen,
(Oh. 15, 62) represented in "humanity" and "too much confi

dence," respectively.

Combined with "diffidence," the three

aspects thus appear to conform to Aristotle's model of
virtue and its associated vices—but one should not be

confused by this distortion, for all three aspects fall
under the heading of vice, and there is no virtue in vice.
(See Figure 2)

Nor was there anything humane in Cesare Borgia's ac
tions.

Rather, he was "universally feared,"'^ "hated" and

"despised," as "pitiless as a beast of the jungle... pre
pared to go through fire and wade through blood to reach his

goal.""*
Indeed, Cesare Borgia had "created" inordinate "fear

for himself," which Machiavelli never addresses.

Rather, he

moves from the specific example of Cesare's cruelty to the
more general issue of "whether it is better to be loved than

feared, or the reverse.

The answer is that one would want

to be both the one and the other; but because it is diffi
cult to put them together, it is much safer to be feared
than loved." (Ch. 17, 66)

Machiavelli thus diverts atten

tion away from Cesare (who is not mentioned again in this
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chapter), for Machiavelli's answer contradicts that given by
one ancient writer in particular, Cicero, who raised the
same question in his De Officiis.

Figure 2:

Cruelty and Mercy
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Excess
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Cicero maintained that "fear... is a poor safeguard."'^
"To banish fear and hold fast to love, Cicero had affirmed,
offers the best means to maintain our influence over other

people and our own safety at the same time.

Machiavelli

responds with a flat contradiction," in his statement that

"it is much safer to be feared than loved."

Further,

"Cicero had gone on to add that there is no power so great
that it can hope to last if it is upheld by fear (II. 7,
25).

Machiavelli replies that, because men are in general

so self-interested, they will break the bonds of love when

ever they find it useful, whereas fear of punishment will

always hold them effectively."'®

Innocent Gentillet, writing in the sixteenth century,
argues that Machiavelli's position is "entirely erroneous,
for there is nothing easier for a prince than to obtain them
both [love and fear], as sound reason will attest," exempli

fied in "the good emperors of old, such as Augustus, Trajan,
Hadrian, Antonius, and others, who were dreaded, loved, and

revered all at the same time."" Certainly Machiavelli's
advice that it is "safer to be feared than loved" does not
conform to his example of Valerius Corvinius in the Dis

courses, and if a prince should conduct himself in the

manner of Valerius, which has the greater weight of his

writings in support of it, the Prince has the appearance of
an aberration, by dsign.

His contradiction of Cicero was

meant to be obvious; he makes a mockery of ancient wisdom
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and in so doing, apes the moderns who have no more regard
for it than he himself displays.

"For Gicero, the honestum,

or the common good, and the utlle, or individual interest,
cannot conflict because man is a part of a larger social and

moral whole, which makes radical individualism unacceptable
as a basis for ethical action.

In such cases where the two

values appear to conflict, utility, to be sure, is the norm
invoked to resolve the conflict.

But it is utility on a

social level, utilitus rel publicae,"'® not that of the
prince.

Machiavelli's regard for physis, represented in

"safety" or the security of the prince, thus refutes

Gicero.

Only in the Prince, however, does Machiavelli

abandon the public welfare, which indeed must be the case

when the advantage for the prince is the sole consideration.

The notion that "love is held by a chain of obligation,
which, because men are wicked, is broken at every opportuni

ty for their own utility, but fear is held by a dread of
punishment that never forsakes you," (Gh. 17, 66-7) is

defined by Innocent Gentillet as "a truly tyrannical pre

cept,"'^ and one that is doomed to failure if Gicero is cor
rect, in his belief that no power can last if "upheld by

fear."^®
er.

Such a regime is predicated on mutual fear, howev

The people fear the prince because he is a tyrant who

has taken their liberty, and will "revolt" (Gh. 17, 66)
whenever they have the opportunity.

The tyrant fears the

people, because he cannot give them their liberty and retain
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his ovm power at the same time.

Therefore, he is under the

necessity to protect his own interests by every possible
means.

As Garrett Mattingly observes, Machiavelli seems to

issue a warning to the prince,*^ further elaborated in his
remonstrance that the prince "should nonetheless make him

self feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love,
he escapes hatred." (Ch. 17, 67)
A prince will avoid hatred if he "abstains from the

property of his citizens and his subjects [a sovereign
'

J

prince does not have citizens] and from their women, and if
he also needs to proceed against someone's life, he must do

it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause

for it.

But above all, he must abstain from the property of

others, because men forget the death of a father more quick

ly than the loss of a patrimony."*^

This would seem good

advice for any ruler, but Machiavelli also uses the occasion

to ridicule his model prince, Cesare Borgia, in his state
ment that "men forget the death of a father more quickly

than the loss of a patrimony."

While Pope Julius "was

confiscating all the duke's possessions," Cesare met with
Guidobaldo of Urbino at the Vatican, and uttered the follow
ing sentiments:
He made two extremely deep bows and laid
the blame on his youth, the bad advice
he had been given, the wicked deeds and

totally perverted character of the pope,
and all those who had encouraged him in
the venture.

He cursed his father's
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memory. He promised to give back every
thing he had taken at Urbino... this was
a strange sight for those who had known
the arrogant Cesare in his time of tri
umph. But... he was preparing for the
future, believing that fickle fate would
allow him to return to power, perhaps

with his former victim's help.

This

time he was mistaken; no one took him

seriously.®^
Nor should one forget the example of Liverotto da

Fermo, who turned on his adoptive father, Giovanni Fogliani,
and had him killed in order to claim his patrimony.
(Ch. 8, 35-7)

Such "epigrams [as] ^a man will forget the death of his
father sooner than the loss of his patrimony'... all seem to

come out of some sort of philosophical Grand Guignol and,

like the savage ironies of Swift's Modest Proposal, are
rendered the more spine chilling by the matter-of-fact tone

in which they are uttered."^
Cesare not only plundered the property of Guidobaldo of

Urbino and countless others, he also had a reputation for
violating women during his escapades as well.

Caterina

Sforza (of Forli and Imola) and her forces were attacked by
Cesare at her fortress, "La Rocca."

Caterina "was taken

prisoner" to "the town of Forli," where "Cesare installed

her in the same house as himself and treated her brutally,
even, if the story is to be believed, forcing her to sleep
with him... One of her partisans sent the pope a letter

impregnated with poison.

The plot was uncovered, the man
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arrested, and he declared himself ready to lose his life if,

in killing Alexander, he could save his native city and his

princess."^®

Cesare is described by Ivan Cloulas as an "un

scrupulous seducer... refusing to let anything stand in the

way of his enjoyment and pleasure."*®

Machiavelli could not

have chosen a more spectacular model for the Prince than

Cesare Borgia.

His exploits were well known, and thus his

example usually emphasizes the fallibility of Machiavelli's

counsel, as he intended, among those who understood the
facts.
/

Machiavelli returns to the question of cruelty and
mercy in his examples of Hannibal and Scipio.

He mentions

Hannibal's "inhuman cruelty," and his "infinite virtues,"

which together made him successful. (Oh. 17, 67)

Of Scipio,

Machiavelli reflects on his "excessive mercy" and his
"agreeable nature" which "would in time have sullied

Scipio's faioie and glory if he had continued with it in

empire; but while he lived under the government of the
Senate, this damaging quality of his was not only hidden,
but made for his glory." (Ch. 17, 68)

One could go in depth

into a discussion over these points, but in considering the
relevance of these examples for the Prince, I think it comes

down to one issue.

As Machiavelli states in the Discourses,

"those who desire to imitate [Valerius Corvinus and Manlius
Torquatus] may, however, fall into the vices I mentioned in

connection with Hannibal and Scipio, namely the evoking of
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contempt or of hatred, vices which you can avoid only if in
you there be more than ordinary virtue, but not otherwise."
(III. 22, 468)

Hannibal and Scipio had such virtue, but the

modern princes did not.

Therefore, Cesare is the more

blameworthy for his excessive cruelty, which earned for him
the hatred he deserved.

Scipio's "excessive mercy" represents the vice of

excesJ in the Unjust argument, and Hannibal's "inhuman
cruelty," the vice of deficiency.

The paired contraries,

"hard"! and "agreeable," (Ch. 15, 62) are reflected in
■

1

■

'

Hannibal and Scipio respectively; "agreeable" is mentioned
■

1

■

,

specifically, while "hard" must be inferred from "venerable
i

and terlrible," (Ch. 17, 67) with regard to Hannibal. Nei
■

1

,

.

ther "agreeable" or "hard," then, reflect the virtue of

moderation.

Machiavelli has excluded virtue from his argu-

I

ment, and, as in the previous chapter, the vice of deficien
!

cy (cruelty) is deemed more worthy than the vice of excess
(too much mercy), giving it the appearance of virtue.

In his concluding statement, Machiavelli remarks,
i ■"

"returning to being feared and loved, that since men love at
i

their convenience and fear at the convenience of the prince,
a wise prince should found himself on what is his, not on
1

what is someone elses; he should only contrive to avoid
i

hatred, a's was said." (Ch. 17, 68)

If the prince "should

only contrive to avoid hatred," it is reasonable to question

why Machiavelli failed to offer "the classical analysis of
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'

cruelty, from Seneca's De dementia," which "denounced cruel
ty as the characteristic vice of tyrants, and hence as the

evil most of all to be avoided by true princes."*' He might
also have turned to Cicero to clarify the point that "im
morality is expedient."

That is, "There are certain ac

tions, such as tyrannicide and some forms of civil disobe

dience, which are good and expedient even though they vio
late the moral law,"** but that would have been manifestly
inappropriate for consideration in the Prince, and the same
could be said for Seneca<s advice, for Machiavelli's new

prince was not a "true prince," but a tyrannical usurper
whom both Cicero and Seneca would have opposed.

Machiavelli turns to the subject of faith and keeping
one's word in Chapter Eighteen.

It would be difficult to

construct a model based on virtue and its associated vices
1

in this chapter because Machiavelli has confounded such

efforts by including three virtues in his opening arguments.
He begins by stating the Just:

How laudable it is for a prince to keep
his faith, and live with honesty and not
by astuteness, everyone understands.
(Ch. 18, 68),

"Honesty" and "faith" represent virtues, while astute

ness reflects the vice of deficiency in so far as cleverness

suggests manipulation of the truth and, thus, shades of

dishonesty.

In the Unjust argument, he introduces a third

virtue, "loyalty:"

^
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Nonetheless one sees by experience in
our times that the princes who have done
great things are those who have taken
little account of faith [breaker of
faith] and have known how to get around
men's brains with their astuteness; and
in the end they have overcome those who
have founded themselves on loyalty.
(Ch. 18, 69)

Loyalty represents neither excess or deficiency, but
Machiavelli gives it the appearance of the vice of excess.
That is, the paired contraries "breaker of faith" and

"faithful," given in Chapter Fifteen (Ch. 15, 62) represent
deficiency and moderation respectively—and, thus, loyalty
takes on the appearance of excess.

"Honest" and "clever,"

paired contraries that are given in Chapter Fifteen (Ch. 15,

62) represent moderation and deficiency respectively, as in

"how to get around men's brains" with "astuteness," repre
sented in the cleverness of the fox.

I have discussed

Machiavelli's notion of "fortunate astuteness" in connection

with Chapter Nine on civil principalities. (Ch. 9, 39)
Machiavelli refers to law, but dismisses its further

consideration on the grounds that it is insufficient:
Thus, you must know that there are two

kinds of combat: one with laws, the
other with force. The first is proper
to man, the second to beasts:

but be

cause the first is often not enough, one
must have recourse to the second.

Therefore, it is necessary for a prince
to know well how to use the beast in
man.

Machiavelli omits law from his discourse on the basis

that "it is often not enough," but he doesn't say in what
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cirGumstances law is not enough, or when force is necessary.
Where laws are observed, however, reason prevails, as law is
"proper to man," and "combat" is conducted in courts of law.
Where laws are overturned or not observed, force or fraud

may be the issue, reflecting the domain of beasts, in which

case "combat" is conducted in an arena outside the jurisdic
tion of established law and justice.

With regard to the new

prince, I refer to Chapter Nine, to give an example of what
Machiavelli may have had in mind in the notion that law is
"often not enough."

He counsels that a "wise prince" should

find a way to rid himself of the magistrates because he
won't "have time in the midst of danger to seize absolute

authority," (Ch. 9, 42) and thus the prince, must eitheir
destroy the government by force or resort to fraudulent

means by filling the magisteries and other government posts
with partisans he can rely on not to obstruct his designs.

In that sense, Machiavelli's remarks concerning man and
beast are intended as a criticism of force and fraud as a

means to an end, for he would never have approved of such

methods for the purpose of installing a tyrant.

He makes a

clear distinction in the Discourses between princes (and
even tyrants) who observe the laws, however, and those who

do not.

Even a "tyrant" can address the "demand for free

dom" (which he can never satisfy) by providing the people
with security in good laws.

One means is to "introduce such

institutions and laws as shall, in conjunction with the
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power of the prince, make for the security of the public as
a whole.

When a prince does this, and the people see that

on no occasion does he break such laws, in a short time they
will begin to live in security and contentment." (I. 16,
155-6)

Machiavelli issues no such counsel in the Prince,

however, that a prince should "on no occasion" break the

laws.

Law and justice are never defined as principle compo

nents of the new regime, which is not surprising if one

considers that, by his very nature, a tyrant of the sort
described in the Prince must obtain to force and fraud to

maintain his power—or be undone by revolt or conspiracy.
In advancing his argument that a prince should learn to
use the beast in man, Machiavelli refers to "ancient writ

ers" who told of princes "given to Chiron the centaur to be
raised, so that he would look after them with his disci

pline.

To have as teacher a half-beast, half-man means

nothing other than that a prince needs to know how to use

both natures; and one without the other is not lasting."
(Ch. 18, 69)

The example of Chiron, however, betrays

Machiavelli's own use of the beast, the clever fox.

Unlike

the other centaurs who were "violent" and "fierce crea

tures,"'" Chiron was a gifted teacher of medicine, "wise and
kindly"'* known everywhere for his goodness and wisdom... He
alone among the centaurs was immortal," but having been

injured in battle, "Zeus permitted [him] to die rather than

live forever in pain."'^

In yet another story, which gives
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the example of Chiron a particular relevance to the Prince,
he was "willing to die" for Prometheus, who "refused to
submit to cruelty and tyranny," and whose "name has stood
through all the centuries, from Greek days to our own, as

that of the great rebel against injustice and the authority
of power.

Chiron, then, who is half-beast, represents

that which is proper to man, while Machiavelli's prince
stands for what is proper to beasts, and thus the example of

Chiron constitutes a great irony that is loaded with symbol
ism, particularly with regard to Prometheus and what he
represented, as a foe of "tyranny" and "injustice."

"Necessity" dictates that the prince must "know well
how to use the beast."

"The lion does not defend itself

from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves.

So one needs to be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to

frighten the wolves." (Ch. 18, 69)

More to the point (if

one considers the modes used by the Medici and the Borgia),
one "needs to be a fox" to set "snares," and a "lion" to

devour the wolves, but at the same time, it is also "neces

sary to know well how to color this nature, to be a great

pretender and dissembler." (Ch. 18, 70)
Quentin Skinner makes the point that, in addition to
satirizing hypocrisy;

Machiavelli's other and even more point
ed satire is contained in his suggestion
that rulers must cultivate two natures—

a good one which they should follow when
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possible, and a bad one which they must
be prepared to follow when this is dic

tated by necessity. Cicero had already
observed in De Officiis that there are
two ways of gaining one's ends. One is
by argument, the other by force; the

first is proper to man, the second only
to beasts (I. 11, 34) Sharpening the
distinction, Cicero had added that
beastly methods, encompassing the use of
fraud as well as force, are completely
unworthy of men. Force reduces us to
the level of the lion, fraud to that of
the fox, and both must be avoided at all

costs (I. 13, 41).^
A tyrant, however, need not avoid beastly behavior,
because he is not encumbered with ethical and moral con
cerns.

Machiavelli "reduces" him to "the level of the lion"

and "the fox," by attributing those qualities to him.

Mark Hulliung argues that "Machiavelli's image of the
lion and the fox is, then, Cicero's stoicism stood on its

head," for "there is in Machiavelli no passage more quoted
than his insistence... that the prince must avail himself of
the force of the lion and the fraud of the fox.

Not a

single hximanist had excuse to miss the significance of
Machiavelli's words, which were taken from Cicero's De Offi
ciis—a work well known to all students of the classics—^and

turned upside down."

Further, Hulliung remarks that "from

Machiavelli's point of view, the decisive baptism of Cicero
was the one sponsored by Dante:

Of all malicious wrong that earns Heav
en's hate the end is injury; all such
ends are Won either by force or fraud.
Both perpetrate evil to others; but
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since man alone is capable of fraud, God
hates that worst; the fraudulent lie
lowest, then, and groan deepest.

In "overturning both Cicero and Dante," Hulliung ar
gues, Machiavelli overturned "Stoicism and Christianity in
one efficient and brilliant move.

And he did so using the

imagery (the lion and the fox) and the language (either
force or fraud) of On Duties and The Divine Comedy, two

works with which every educated person in Renaissance Italy
was conversant."®'

Only in the Prince, however, is there strong evidence
for Hulliung's argument.

In his other works, and particu

larly in the Discourses, Machiavelli makes compelling argu
ments for virtuous character and actions, most notably from
the example of the Roman republic, expressing the ancient

wisdom he is accused of overturning.

Perhaps Machiavelli

chose Cicero and Dante as sources precisely because "every
educated person in Renaissance Italy was conversant" in
them,, and thus his satire would not elude the erudite who

might be expected to perceive his departure from convention
al wisdom as a clear marker for his intent; to issue a

critique of evil.

If Machiavelli were the devil incarnate,

as his accusers believed, his fiendish motives were kept
well hidden during the course of his service to the repub
lic, and all that it represented.

And if he really desired

employment from the Medici, why would he ply his diabolical

counsel in what ampunts to a public epistle to his would-be
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benefactors, revealing the sum of his wisdom to anyone who
chanced to read the circulating manuscript?

It is absurd to

think that he would, especially if one considers that Machi

avellian diplomacy and art of state in the Prince, were
dependent on deceit and cultivated appearances for success,
which by their very nature demand a covert application.
In order to succeed as a "pretender and dissembler," it

is only "necessary" that one "appear" to be "merciful,

faithful, humane, honest, and religious and to be so, but to
remain with a spirit built so that, if you need not to be
those things, you are able to know how to change to the
contrary," and Machiavelli mentions Alexander VI as a good
example, "because he well knew this aspect of the world."
(Ch. 18, 70)

"To be" or "not to be" is a question the

prince must decide, predicated on necessity, and "This has
to be understood;

that a prince, and especially a new

prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are
held good, since he is often under a necessity, to maintain

his state, of acting against faith, against charity, against
humanity, against religion."

Therefore, he should "not

depart from good, when possible, but know how to enter into

evil, when forced by necessity." (Ch. 18, 70)
In his play, Mandragola, Machiavelli's characters

"become comic especially when they fall into the traps the
truly cunning persons set for them,"®^ and there is a like

quality to the Prince, if one can imagine a new prince
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taking Machiavelli at his word—trying to figure out how to
use cruelty mercifully, or how to be a generous miser, a
humane executioner, a religious non-believer, or an honest

dissembler.

The essential incongruity is reminiscent of the

comic tension created in Machiavelli's ill-fated "spirited
man riding a cowardly horse," (II. 18, 319) in which little
progress can expect to be made.

For added emphasis, Machiavelli repeats that "a prince
should thus take great care that nothing escape his mouth

that is not full of the above-mentioned five qualities and

that, to see him and hear him, he should appear all mercy,
all faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion.

And

there is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this
last quality." (Ch. 18, 70-1) This represents, it seems to
me, a distinct criticism of the Vatican and papal ambition
for they, above all others, were expected not to appear to
be, but to be the embodiment of the Church and its beliefs

and orders—the exemplars of Christian piety and ethics.

Their actions and example, however, hastened the onset of

the Protestant Reformation, and created chaos, misery and
fear among those Italian states that fell victim to the

emerging power of the Church.

Machiavelli's emphasis on

"religion," then, should be taken as a barb flung at the
feet of Leo X and Alexander VI, but with an important and

somewhat comic distinction.

While Leo's opportunity to

generate disorder was as great as that manifest in the
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Borgia, the Medici were compromised by their lack of abili
ty, so that whatever spectacle they might create across the

peninsula, although threatening to be sure, carried with it
a certain humorous aspect when compared to the more formida

ble Borgia, or even the impetuous .Julius II, for that mat
ter.

Machiavelli counsels the new prince to take note of

the astute fox, but the Medici hardly needed lessons in the

art of fraud and deceit.

If he had really intended to give

sincere advice to that family, MachiaVelli would have fo
cused instead on how the lion devours the wolves, the combi

nation of force and treachery that made the Borgia so power
ful.

The views of Cicero, then, take on a special signifi
cance in Machiavelli's time, for Machiavelli's frame of
reference included princes of the Church, as well as secular
rulers.

In fact, most particularly it included the popes,

and Machiavelli's essential refutation of Cicero reflected a
refutation of the "ethical doctrine" handed down from the

Stoics, blended with "popular Platonism" and "Aristotle"

that was evident in "the writings of the Christian Fath
ers."®'

Cicero maintained that "the virtue one seeks to

advertise must be virtue that one actually possesses.

The

essence of the problem, he says, is to be what we wish to be

thought to be.

Hypocrisy wins no glory; but equally impor

tant, it simply does not work.
crite will be found out.

Sooner or later, the hypo

In the long run, it requires less
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effort to possess virtue than to try to fake it."^™
To be sure, one cannot resort to deceit too often for,

among princes, if a contract, treaty, or verbal agreement is
broken, the injured party would be imprudent indeed to put
his trust in the perpetrator again.

"Cicero's De Officiis

observes Quentin Skinner, "had treated it as axiomatic that

the keeping of promises represents the foundation of justice
(I. 7, 23).

It had thus become proverbial to say that, even

when dealing with our enemies, we must always regard our

word as our bond,"^®^ although breaches of faith may be
reasonable in certain circumstances.

In the Prince, however, Machiavelli portrays breaches

of faith as commonplace, a game of cunning in which he who
is most clever outsmarts all of the others.

"Nor does a

prince ever lack legitimate causes to color his failure to
observe faith.

One could give infinite modern examples of

this, and show how many peace treaties and promises have
be^n rendered invalid and vain through the infidelity of
princes; and the one who has known best how to use the fox

has come out best." (Ch. 18, 69-70)

As he states, in a

letter to Francesco Vettori (April 29, 1513), "And of loyal

ty and of promises no one today makes any account."^'®

Pope

Alexander once said of Cesare, "no one ever kept his word

more faithfully than he; nor has he ever broken a prom

ise,"'*® but as Machiavelli remarks of the pope himself, he
"never did anything, nor ever thought of anything, but how
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to deceive men." (Ch. 18, 70)

In the end, however, Cesare

was compelled to rely on good faith in the hope of retaining
his acquisitions, and as Machiavelli wrote in his dispatches
from Rome, "The duke, who never kept faith with anyone, is
now obliged to rely on the faith of others.
Yet, in the Discourses, Machiavelli makes a point of
distinguishing exceptional circumstances in which a ruler

may break his word with good cause.

"Promises extracted by

force ought not to be kept," for "it is not shameful to fail

to keep a promise which you have been forced to make.

Forced promises affecting the public will, in fact, always
be broken when the force in question is removed, and this

without shame to those who break them." (III. 42, 515-6)
The Florentines, for example, signed a treaty with Cesare
Borgia, but only to "rid" themselves of his "formidable

army."*"®
And regarding fraud generally, Machiavelli states,
•

■

^

'

,

■ ■

■

■

"Although to use fraud in any action is detestable, yet in
the conduct of war it is praiseworthy and glorious.

And a

man who uses fraud to overcome his enemy is praised, just as

much as is he who overcomes his enemy by force... I do not
mean that a fraud which involves breaking your word or the

contracts you have made, is glorious; for, although on
occasion it may win for you a state or a kingdom, as has

been said in an earlier discourse, it will never bring you
glory." (III. 40, 513)

Bernard Crick comments that "this
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treatment of the legitimate and even ^glorious'' use of

>fraud' (something admitted to be ^dishonorable') both
narrows the grounds to war and to states of emergency, and,

compared to Prince 18, specifically excludes failure to keep
one's pledged word and the breaking of promises as legiti
mate types of fraud.

Perhaps, then, Machiavelli does not excuse the fraud

and deceit that he advises the prince to use, in the Prince,
despite appearances to the contrary, on the grounds that it
is dishonorable and> therefore, inglorious.

He does refer

to the Prince in the Discourses, in this regard, but in an
ambiguous manner; "Everywhere in history one comes across

examples, of this [forced promises] of one kind or another,
and everyone is aware that it happens also at the present
day.

And not only are forced promises not observed by

princes when the force in question is no longer operative;
but we also find that all other promises are broken when the

reasons which caused such promises to be made no longer hold
good.

Whether this is praiseworthy or not, and whether a

prince should or should not behave in this way, we have

discussed at length in our treatise on The Prince.

Here,

therefore, nothing will be said about it." (III. 42, 516)
Machiavelli does not state, in the Prince, that he deems
such behavior as "praiseworthy," but he does make a point of
exposing the fraudulent means used by princes; such state
ments as, "Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate causes to
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color his failure to observe faith" and the prince need not
observe faith, because "they are wicked and don't observe
faith with you" indicate the extent to which the observance

of faith had been corrupted.

(Ch. 18, 69)

Machiavelli

gives the reader a sense of the degree to which princes do
not observe good faith when he refers to "infinite modern

examples," of the "infidelity of princes," although they

"color this nature" by pretending fidelity.

(Ch. 18, 69-70)

Machiavelli does not state that such actions bring glory to
the prince.
Further, Machiavelli observes, "Where there is no court

to appeal to, one looks to the end.

So let a prince win and

maintain his state [by force or fraud]; the means will

always be judged honorable, and will be praised by everyone.
For the vulgar are taken in by the appearance and outcome of

a thing, and in the world there is no one but the vulgar;
the few have a place there." (Ch. 18, 71)

There is "no

court to appeal to" where "law," as he said in his opening
argument, is "not enough" (as when one wants to stop an
aggressor), whether power is seized by force, or by fraud
(when the laws are subverted to benefit one individual or

one faction over time).

The "means" will be judged "honor

able" by the "vulgar," the many who "judge more by their

eyes than by their hands, because seeing is given to every
one, touching to few." (Ch. 18, 76)

As he has emphasized

throughout this chapter, appearances are deceptive.
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But the

reader should not be deceived, for if one can touch the

prince, which he has given to all, the deception is foiled,
nor should we think that a prince who makes a practice of
fraud—and even endeavors to be the best at his craft, "the

one who has known best how to use the fox [will] come out

best"^—(Ch. 18, 70) is either honorable or glorious.

Rath

er, he is dishonorable and worthy of blame.
Pope Julius II made many promises prior to his election
as pope, including the "restitution of the whole state of

Romagna" to Cesare Borgia.

Machiavelli, "believing it to be

impossible that the pope could have forgotten his old hat
reds and his exile, concluded with a touch of irony:

^The

Duke allows himself to be carried away by his brave confi
dence, and believes that other people's words are more to be

relied upon than his own were.'"""

Machiavelli's model

prince would not have served as a good exemplar, then, for
his discourse onithe benefits of fraud and deceit, for
Cesare illustrates the point that even the most clever will
eventually become the prey of someone more wickedly splendid
than themselves.

When Machiavelli states that "in the world there is no

one but the vulgar; the few have a place there," Harvey C.

Mansfield, Jr. notes that "one manuscript says, "the few
have no place there... ," and the authorities are divided,
Casella, Russo, and Sasso accepting^no place,' Chabod and

Bertelli ^a place.'""'®

I think it is more appropriate to
j
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accept "no place there," which applies to Machiavelli him
self.

Those who understood the means used by princes to

achieve their ends had no voice to contest the will of the

many—who were taken in by the "false semblance of good" and
"renown," (I. 10, 135) and the "false appearance of advan

tage," (I. 53, 238) as he himself describes appearances in
the Discourses.

As Machiavelli said of Cosimo de' Medici,

"they are all methods that bring men flying to the princi
pate," although the people do not understand that they are,

nor do they listen to "such accusations.

In that sense,

then, those who did understand were alienated from the many.
Machiavelli did not retreat from the issue, however, and he
should be admired both for his courage in writing the 
Prince, and for his own brilliance as a pretender and a
dissembler which proves, even in our own centuty, that a
clever fox can trap the unwary in any corrupt age.
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Chapter XV.

The Courte of Princes:

How States are Lost:

Fortune

Machiavelli's satire is well developed by the conclu
sion of the first eighteen chapters.

He has defined both

the character of the new prince, and the means by which he

will satisfy his ambition.

Necessity dictates his actions,

grounded in the reality of a corrupt world.

He has also

defined political reality as "the effectual truth," (Ch. 15,
61) in which the effect or outcome of a thing determines its

value, and thus utility for the prince outweighs moral and

ethical concerns.

The public welfare is nowhere at issue,

nor is there any evidence of a visible government or civic
virtue which, together with his advocacy of vice, reflect
the essence of his satire.

Ashley Brown observes that, in Swift's A Modest Propos
al, "the reader must see the difference between the horrible

attitude he is being asked to endorse and some true moral
V

standard.

The tone of the essay is so ^reasonable,' and the

modern reader may consider overpopulation such a danger,
that he could get well into the satire before he realized

that he was in effect approving a mass-murder.

What Swift

wants to do is shock the public into awareness."'

The same

could be said for Machiavelli's Prince, especially with
regard to his contemporary readers.

The matter-of-fact tone

of the Prince, coupled with the desperate need to rid the

peninsula of foreign intruders and resolve the political
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conflicts within tended to obscure the fact that Machiavelli

was indeed calling for the rise of a tyrant—as a solution
to the threat of servitude.

His dedication of the work to

the Medici further clouded the issue so that, even among
those who were somewhat familiar with Machiavelli and his

political beliefs, one could, indeed, "get well into the

satire" before realizing what they were "being asked to
endorse" on behalf of the greater good of their country.

If

Machiavelli did succeed in shocking some of his readers into

"awareness," they were too few in number to have an impact
on the political reality in Florence.

A prince who goes "beyond morals, laws, and customs,"^
instilling fear with his "hypocrisy and ingratitude, mean
ness, cruelty, and treachery," and who revels in "diabolical

cunning" and "ruthless disregard for moral standards"^

cannot escape hatred and contempt for long.

In anticipation

of that objection, Machiavelli devotes two chapters to the

subject, but in doing so, he also adds emphasis to the
problem, treating it in his usual manner by giving assur
ances that the new prince can avoid the inevitable, if he
handles his affairs properly.

He begins by suggesting that the prince "should think
how to avoid those things that make him hateful and con

temptible," (Ch. 19, 71-2) which consists of virtually

everything that Machiavelli has advised the prince to do up
to this point in his discourse.
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"When he avoids them, he

will have done his part and will find no danger in his other
infamies."

He reminds the prince once again that "taking

away either property or honor from the generality of men"
will make him "hated above all." (Ch. 19, 12)

His vices,

then, including cruelty, will not generate the same degree
of hatred; those "other infamies" that will pose "no dan
ger."

Taking away "honor from the generality of men" repre
sents more than tampering with the women of one's subjects.

Dismissal from public office without just cause, persecu

tion, calumny, violence, unjust punishments, a display of
malevolence, executions, and ingratitude all constitute

private injury that may bring dishonor to an individual or

his family, especially when there is no opportunity to
obtain justice.

When Machiavelli states that the prince

"should insist that his judgments in the private concerns of

his subjects be irrevocable," (Ch. 19, 72) he is making the
point that the prince himself represents law and justice.
Machiavelli cautions that "what makes him contemptible

is to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous
[and] irresolute, from which a prince should guard himself
as from a shoal." (Ch. 19, 72)

These qualities, however,

although undesirable in a ruler, apply most earnestly to
military commanders.

In Chapter Twenty-three, Machiavelli

suggests that Emperor Maximilian I was irresolute and vari

able, and while he may have been held in contempt by Luca
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Rinaldi, a "bishop and ambassador of the emperor,"^ he
offers no evidence that the people found him contemptible.
Robert Ridolfi remarks that he was a "good," "generous and

noble prince."' A cowardly and irresolute prince would not
bode well for the state, but in a military leader, the
qualities mentioned above could mean certain disaster.

Machiavelli creates a false impression, then, by list
ing the most contemptible faults of military commanders as

those qualities that would generate the greatest contempt
for princes.

As a commander in the field, a prince would

indeed earn the disdain of his men if he exhibited those

qualities.

But in the business of governing, it is the

other vices of the prince that would engender the deepest
scorn and desire for revenge, whether it be his cruelty and

inhumanity, robbing his subjects of their property and
wealth, molesting their women, or threatening their lives.
(III. 6, 400)

Yet, when Machiavelli turns to the subject of conspira
cy, he does not caution the prince against personal inju
ries, except to say that he should avoid hatred.

Rather, he

frames conspiracy in the larger context; "For whoever con

spires always believes he will satisfy the people with the
death of the prince, but when he believes he will offend

them, he does not get up the spirit to adopt such a course,
because the difficulties on the side of the conspirators are

infinite." (Ch. 19, 73)

If this is true, that the conspira
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tor "always believes he will satisfy the people with the

death of a prince," private vengeance is omitted as probable
cause for conspiracy, which is not true.

As Machiavelli

observes in the Discourses, "The chief cause which led the
Pazzi to conspire against the Medici was the inheritance of

Giovanni Bonromie of which they had been deprived by the
Medici orders." (III. 6, 400)

There is "another cause, and this a very powerful one,
that makes men conspire against a prince," which Machiavelli

neglected to mention as a warning to the prince, "the desire

to liberate their fatherland [in which case the conspirator
would "satisfy the people" with his death] of which the
prince has seized possession.

It was this that caused

Brutus and Cassius to turn against Caesar... nor can any
tyrant prevail over this spirit, except by discarding his
tyranny.

And since one does not find tyrants doing this,

one finds few who have not come to a miserable end.

Hence

the verse of Juvenal:"

To Pluto's realm few kings unscathed
descend nor tyrants oft escape a sticky
end. (III. 6, 400-01)

Machiavelli warns, in Chapter Five, that in republics
accustomed to liberty prior to their acquisition by a

prince, there is "greater hatred," and "desire for revenge,"
(Ch. 5, 21) yet he fails to reiterate this important point
in the context of conspiracies.

Having been accused of

conspiracy by the Medici, however (of the liberation vari
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ety), it would have been unwise for Machiavelli to suggest
any obvious parallels with himself in connection with con

spiracy on behalf of liberating one's native city.

Never

theless, in his discourse on conspiracies, he speaks from
the point of view of the conspirator, reflecting on the

difficulties and warning that one can only "find company"
from "malcontents," and when you "disclose" a conspiracy to
a malcontent, "you give him the matter with which to become

content," because a content malcontent hopes "for every

advantage from it." (Ch. 19, 73)

This passage probably had

a deeper significance for Machiavelli and his acquaintances,
as it has the tone of a comic tribute of sorts.

Machiavelli mentions "Nabis the Spartan" in this chap
ter, who "with[stood] every thrust." (Ch. 19, 72)

As Harvey

C. Mansfield, Jr. notes, Machiavelli "does not disclose

here, as he does in the Discourses on Livy III. 6, that

Nabis was in fact killed by a conspiracy."®

Since it is

clear that Machiavelli knew the facts, his misrepresentation
suggests a deliberate distortion of the truth, which has the
effect of ridiculing his own advice, and renders the text
unreliable.^

In his discussion pertaining to "how not to make the
great desperate and how to satisfy the people and keep them
content" with regard to conspiracies and avoidance of hatred

and contempt, Machiavelli refers to the examples of the ten
emperors, "from Marcus the philosopher to Maximus."
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(Ch. 19, 75)

There are certain discrepancies in the text

that distort the truth in support of his arguments.

He
I

remarks, for example, that "Pertinax... created hatred for
himself, and to this hatred added disdain since he was

old... ,

which caused his ruin. (Ch. 19, 77)

In the Dis

courses, however, Machiavelli observes that "in Rome indeed

no attention had ever been paid to age; what it had always
looked for was virtue, whether in the young or in the old."
(I. 60, 260)

Of Alexander, he states, "He was of such goodness that
among the other praise attributed to him is this:

that in

the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to

death by him without a trial." (Ch. 19, 77)

In fact, mili

tary anarchy began during his reign, and "large sections of

the civilian and military populace lost faith in the govern
ment at Rome and lapsed into lawlessness."' By his remark,
Machiavelli gives the impression that there was good civil
order, but Alexander was incompetent in every aspect.
Severus personifies the qualities of the "lion" and the
"fox" (force and fraud) that Machiavelli advised the new

prince to acquire.

Severus was extremely corrupt, but a

good example of successful crime, and Machiavelli calls him
a "criminal" in the Discourses.^

He also notes that of the

"twenty-six emperors from Caesar to Maximinus, sixteen were

assassinated and only two died a natural death... if among
those who died ordinary deaths, there was a wicked man, like
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Severus, it must be put down to his great good luck and to

his ^virtue,' two things of which few men enjoy both." (I.
10, 136-7)

Machiavelli attributed fortune but not virtue to

Cesare Borgia, nor does he assign virtue to the Medici.

The

vices of the new prince disqualify him as virtuous, as well,
and, therefore, the new prince would do well to learn from

the "history of the emperors" to "distinguish between the
ways of renown and of infamy, the ways of security and
fear," as Machiavelli advises in the Discourses, (I. 10,
136) counsel he does not offer in the Prince.
Machiavelli attributes the success of Marcus to the

fact that he "succeeded to the empire by hereditary right
and did not have to acknowledge it as from either the sol

diers or the people," and to his "virtue." (Ch. 19, 77)

He

also makes the point that "Pertinax and Alexander, because
they were new princes, it was useless and harmful to wish to

imitate Marcus, who was in the principate by hereditary
right." (Ch. 19, 82)

Machiavelli contradicts this notion in

the Discourses, however.

"It will be seen, too, from a

perusal of their [Roman emperors] history on what principle
a good kingdom should rest; for all the emperors who ac

quired imperial power by inheritance were bad men, with the

exception of Titus; those who acquired it through adoption
were all good, like the five counting from Nerva to Marcus;

and when it fell to their heirs a period of decadence again
ensued." (I. 10, 137)
I

■

Alexander, like Marcus, was also

■
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adopted.

Caracalla's "excellent parts that made him marvelous in

the sight of the people and pleasing to the soldiers"
(Ch. 19, 79) reflects neither his actions nor his character,
which were abominable, or his physical attributes which
earned him the nickname, "Tarautus," after "an ugly, inso

lent, and bloodthirsty gladiator whom he was thought to

resemble."' Machiavelli offers modest praise of Caracalla,
but adds, "nonetheless, his ferocity and cruelty were so
great and unheard of... that he became most hateful to all

the world," (Ch. 19, 79) and of his assassination, he warns,
"Here it is to be noted that deaths such as these, which

follow from the decision of an obstinate spirit, cannot be
avoided by princes because anyone who does not care about
death can harm him." (Ch. 19, 79)

As he states in the

Discourses, however, Caracalla was suspicious of Macrinus,
and asked a friend in Rome to "inquire of the astrologer
whether anybody was aspiring to become emperor."

He was

informed that "Macrinus was the man who had this idea in

mind, but the letter fell into the hands of Macrinus before

it got to the emperor, and, in consequence, Macrinus saw

that it was necessary either to kill him before a further
letter came from Rome, or to be killed," and he "instructed
Martialis," a "devoted" centurion, to "assassinate the
emperor." (III. 6, 411-12)

There is a comic quality, then,

in Machiavelli's reference to Macrinus as an "obstinate
i

■

.
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spirit," and "one who does not care about death"

He cared

deeply for his own life, however, so much so that he ensured
the death of his predecessor to preserve it.

In the example of Maximinus, Machiavelli charges that
he was "hated and contemptible, in part because "he had

formerly herded sheep in Thrace (which was very well known
everywhere and caused great disdain for him in the sight of
everyone)." (Ch. 19, 80)

It is unlikely that Machiavelli

accepted this explanation.

Maximinus was never recognized

as emperor by the Senate in Rome, and the "disdain" in which
he was held by "everyone" undoubtedly had less to do with
his shepherd origins than with the fact that his office was

not sanctioned by the government, which put forth two sena

tors, Maximus and Balbinus, and thus his reign reflected
civil strife within the empire.
The example of the ten emperors illustrates, above all,

that cruel, arrogant, tyrannical rule leads more often than
not to the premature death of princes, yet Machiavelli has
advised the new prince to adopt similar means to achieve his

ends.

In his conclusion, he simply remarks that it "waS

useless and harmful" for the new princes, "Pertinax and

Alexander," to imitate Marcus who was "in the principate by

hereditary right," a misleading remark for the reasons given
A

above.

And he notes that "Caracalla, Commodus and

Maximinus" failed in their "pernicious" effort to imitate
"Severus," because they lacked his "virtue."
(
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Having no

"hereditary right," then, a "new prince in a new principali
ty cannot imitate the actions of Marcus," nor "is it neces

sary to follow" the actions "of Severus," (Ch. 19, 82)

although Machiavelli has argued that "a prince is compelled
of necessity to know well how to use the beast," the "fox"

and the "lion," (Ch. 18, 69) as did Severus, who provides
his example.

Machiavelli advises, then, that the prince

take "from Severus those parts that are necessary to found

his state," although the new prince lacks his "virtue" and
perhaps his "good luck," for there are "few men who enjoy
both." (I. 10, 136-7)

And he advises the new prince to take

from Marcus that which is "fitting and glorious to conserve

a state that is established and firm," despite his observa
tion that to do so is "useless and harmful" without heredi

tary right.
As Marcus evidenced extreme loyalty in making his

adoptive brother "co-emperor" by his "own insistence,"
observed the laws, a "field most congenial to him," dis
played "personal nobility and dedication," and pursued
intellectual interests, most notably the writing of the

"Meditations... basically the moral tenets of Stoicism,"^® he
was a prince worthy of imitation, but not for Machiavelli's

new prince whom he advises against loyalty, and does not
counsel to observe the laws or traditional ethics.

The

example of Marcus contradicts everything Machiavelli has

endeavored to teach the new prince, who has seized power and
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must: maintain it with extraordinary measures.

Most espe

cially, Machiavelli would not recommend that the new prince
adhere to the beliefs of "Marcus the Philosopher," (Ch. 19,
75) who contemplated the "moral tenets of Stoicism" in his

quiet hours which Machiavelli, in his own leisure, wholly
rejected in the Prince.

Machiavelli considers the subject of fortresses in
Chapter Twenty, both in military terms, and for their

efficacy as a defense against one's own subjects.

He also

discusses other matters related to the prince and the mili
tary, such as fostering animosities for the purpose of
gaining reputation:

Without doubt, princes become great when
they overcome difficulties made for them
and opposition made to them. So for

tune, especially when she wants to make
a new prince great—since he has a
greater necessity to acquire reputation
than a hereditary prince—makes enemies
arise for him and makes them undertake

enterprises against him, so that he has
cause to overcome them and to climb

higher on the ladder that his enemies

have brought him.

Therefore, many judge

that a wise prince, when he has the
opportunity for it, should astutely
nourish some enmity so that when he has
crushed it, his greatness emerges the

more from it.

(Ch. 20, 85)

The Pazzi conspiracy afforded Lorenzo the Magnificent
such an opportunity, and contributed to his greatness.

Pope Sixtus IV and King Ferdinand of Naples had sided
with the Pazzi family in their dispute with the Medici

which, as I said above, precipitated the conspiracy that the
355

Pazzi conducted against the Medici.

The Pope and Ferdinand

represented a "faction" in Italy that was opposed to the
"Venetians, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines," and the

"outbreak of war" threatened daily."

When the Pazzi con

spiracy failed to kill both Giuliano and Lorenzo, the pope

and Ferdinand threatened to attack Florence, claiming "they
did not wish anything from that city except that it should
rid itself of Lorenzo de' Medici, who alone of all the

Florentines, they held as an enemy."" Meanwhile, the pope
excommunicated the Florentines.

In the History, Machiavelli recreates, in a set speech,
the words uttered by Lorenzo to a gathering of city digni

taries,

Lorenzo grieved over the attack on his family, and

rejoiced that the city "defended" himself, and "avenged" his
brother.

He said God had not deserted his family, and

denied that they had "privately wronged." those who were
"hostile;" "They wrong rather you than us, rather this
Palace and the majesty of this government than our house...

you have always raised our house on high with such complete
agreement, for no other reason than it has striven to sur

pass everybody in courtesy, in liberality, in conferring

benefits."" Lorenzo concludes, "Would God it were true,"
that the king and the pope were only coming after himself
and his house.

If it were, "gladly would I put out your

fire with my ruin," and he offered "to end with my own blood

this war begun with that of my brother."
356

The citizens,

moved by his words, promised to defend him and provided
Lorenzo with a personal guard.

The pope and Ferdinand attacked Florentine territory in
1478, and war continued into 1479.

Because Florence was

"distressed" by both war and plague, Lorenzo was sent to
Naples to seek terms from King Ferdinand.

He was received

with "honor and with great expectation because, since so
important a war had been begun only to crush him, the great
ness of his enemies had made him appear very great.

Al

though they reached agreement, Ferdinand held him until

spring to see if disturbances might arise in Florence to his

advantage.

When they did not, Lorenzo returned to the city

"exceedingly great," and because the threat of continued war
resulted from the exclusion of the pope and the Venetians
from the peace agreement, the government was further consol
idated under Medici control.^®

Clearly Lorenzo was provided by his enemies with a
"ladder" to greatness, and the "enmity" that he "nourished"

(Ch. 20, 85) with the Pazzi family (because he feared their

power)—that ultimately involved the enemies of Florence
from without—worked in his favor to further advance his

position of power and erode the liberty of the Florentines.

In offering his recommendations to the new prince, then,
Machiavelli also revealed, at the same time, how the actions
of princes effect the public welfare, an ^effectual truth'
that is never directly stated in the Prince, but is meant to
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be understood.

Machiavelli brings his roguish wit to the issue when he

suggests, in reference to those who aided the prince from
within to seize the principality, "If it is not natural
affection toward them but only because those supporters were
not content with that state, he will be able to keep them

his friends with trouble and great difficulty, because it is
impossible for him to make them content.

And while review

ing well the cause of this, with examples drawn from ancient
and modern things, he will see that it is much easier to

gain as friends to himself men who were content with the
state beforehand, and therefore were his enemies, than those

who, because they were not content with it, became friends

and gave him support in seizing it." (Ch. 20, 86)

The

example of Florence (and Machiavelli's own experience)
contradicts this advice in so far as the Medici returned to

power, in 1512, with the support of their partisans within,
who enabled them to consolidate their power in a matter of

days.

While it may not have been possible for the Medici to

satisfy or make "content" all of those who supported their
return, they would have been imprudent to put their trust in

old adversaries, some of whom conspired against them within
months of their restoration.

On one level, Machiavelli

seems to suggest that a new prince cannot trust anyone.

But

there are two other interpretations of this passage, as
well, that show the duplicitous character of Machiavelli.
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In the passage cited above, Machiavelli uses the word

"content" four times, which emphasizes the importance of it,

with regard to his intent.^' As a former adversary of the
Medici, he is in fact a new malcontent under the new regime.
Therefore, I think he had a dual purpose in mind.

First, to

offer some sort of reasoned argument in support of his
masquerade as a former opponent who asks to be trusted, in

the capacity of adviser to the new government, a proposition
that finds no support in logic.

If the former malcontents

cannot be made content in the new government, how will the
prince hope to content the new malcontents, his former

enemies?

His other purpose, then, is to suggest with deli

cate subtlety the teaching he gave in the previous chapter,
that one contents a malcontent by disclosing a conspiracy to

him, (Ch. 20, 86) from which he would gain considerably more
advantage than present circumstances provided—a comic

reflection on a tragic reality.
Of fortresses, Machiavelli states, "the prince who has

more fear of the people than of foreigners ought to make
fortresses, but the one who has more fear of foreigners than

of the people, ought to omit them." (Ch. 20, 86-7)

He then

goes on to say, in the same paragraph, "the best fortress

there is, is not to be hated by the people, because although
you may have fortresses, if the people hold you in hatred
fortresses do not save you." (Ch. 20, 87)

As the two state

ments contradict one another, he creates confusion in the
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text.

In his examples and in his concluding statement, he

supports the notion that a fortress won't save the prince
from the hatred of his subjects; "so, having considered all
these things, I shall praise whoever makes fortresses and
whoever does not, and I shall blame anyone who, trusting in

fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people."
(Ch. 20, 87)

He reflects the confusion of his earlier

statements, then, when he states, "I shall praise whoever
makes fortresses and whoever does not."

From the Discours

es, it is clear that he did not praise those who made for
tresses.

"It must be borne in mind, then, that fortresses

are constructed as a defense either against enemies or

against subjects.

In the first case they are unnecessary,

and in the second case harmful." (II. 24, 353)

In his

lengthy discourse on the subject, he condemns reliance on
fortresses generally, (II. 24, 352-59) and thus his ambigu

ous approach in the Prince illustrates a desire on his part

to intentionally mislead the prince in a comical way—not to
give too much or too little, but just enough to give the
appearance that his advice is in accord with his beliefs—

and therefore represent himself as genuine and above
reproach.

Chapters Twenty-one through Twenty-five constitute a

curious amalgam of new ideas and old concepts revisited, so
to speak, to enhance the veneer of the new prince.

Machiavelli considers how the prince might gain esteem and
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reputation in Chapter Twenty-one, both at home and abroad.

The advice he gives would have certain appeal to an arro

gant, self-centered prince.

"Nothing makes a prince so much

esteemed as to carry on great enterprises and to give rare
examples of himself." (Oh. 21, 87)

With his counsel,

Machiavelli encourages the most frightening aspect of a
prince who undertakes such endeavors to enhance his reputa

tion, the depredations visited on the people in such circum
stances, particularly when it could have been avoided.
Lorenzo the Magnificent recommended that force be used

against Volterra in a dispute over the alum mines, in oppo

sition to those who thought it the wiser course to attempt
to seek terms peacefully.

In this "enterprise," force won

the day, and Machiavelli notes, in the History, that Lorenzo

"rose to a very high reputation" with its success, although
"for all of one day [Volterra] was robbed and plundered.

Neither women nor holy places were spared, and the

soldiers... despoiled them."

In a response that he assigns

to Messer Tommaso Soderini, Machiavelli expresses his disap

proval of the affair:

"To me she seems lost, because if you

had taken her on terms, you would have gained from her

profit and security, but since you will have to keep her by
force, in adverse times she will bring you weakness and
trouble, and in peaceful times loss and expense.

Hence, a
i

prince who undertakes such ventures often creates hazards

for himself that a prudent and wise prince would avoid.
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Machiavelli's advice to the new prince, then, has question
able worth regarding benefit either for the prince or for
the people that he governs.

With regard to "governing internally," Machiavelli

remarks that it "helps very much for a prince to give a rare
example of himself... similar to those that are told of

Messer Bernabo da Milano, when the opportunity arises of
someone who does something extraordinary in civil life,

either for good or for ill, and of picking a mode of reward
ing or punishing him of which much will be said." (Ch. 21,

89) Bernabo was the uncle of Giah Galeazzo Visconti [1378
1402], who "brought the entire Visconti inheritance into his

possession by imprisoning his uncle Bernabd and the letter's

sons through a ruse."^®

Bernabo was "killed" by Gian, who

"became sole prince of Milan.

Machiavelli uses the ex

ample of Gian's murder of his uncle, Bernabo, to demonstrate
how fraud enables a man of "low position" to rise to a

"great position," in the Discourses.

"Fraud," he observes,

"is always necessary" to those who, "from small beginnings
wish to rise to sublime heights, and the better they conceal

it, as the Romans did, the less blameworthy it is." (II. 13,
310-312)

Machiavelli did not praise fraud, however, as I

mentioned above, as a means of winning "a state or a king
dom," which "will never bring you glory."

Rather, he spoke

of the fraud "used in dealing with ah:enemy who has not kept
faith with you, i.e., of the fraud which is involved in the
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conduct of war." (III. 40, 513)

Therefore, if the example of Bernabo of Milan is con
sidered, the notion that "a prince should contrive to give
himself the fame of a great man and of an excellent talent

in every action of his" (Ch. 21, 89) implies infamy, not
glory—blame, rather than praise.

"Giovan Galeazzo... since

it was not enough for him to become Duke of all Lombardy"
(after the murder of his uncle), "he wished to conquer
Tuscany.

But when he thought he wds about to get control

and then be crowned King of Italy, he died."^^

Had he suc

ceeded, he "would have brought Florence into danger of
losing her freedom," but, as Machiavelli observes, "death

was always more friendly to the Florentines than any other
friend, and stronger to save them than any ability of their
own."22

When men are "deceived by... the false semblance of
renown," they "slip into the ranks of those who deserve

blame," establishing a tyrannical government rather than
founding a "republic or kingdom."

(I. 10, 135)

The new

prince, then, does not merit Machiavelli's esteem and

praise, but rather his scorn—and it is scorn that he heaps
upon him in his satire, "a sardonic description of the

political practices of his own day, and not a recommendation

of such practices,"22 despite all appearances to the con
trary.

'

"People with nothing to do often are the tool of him
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who is attempting to cause a revolution," observes

Machiavelli in the History, and the more "elaborate and
splendid" the celebration, the longer it will take the

people to prepare for it.^

Therefore, Machiavelli recom

mends that the prince "at suitable times of the year keep
the people occupied with festivals and spectacles."
(Ch. 21, 91)

When Lorenzo the Magnificent chose an Orsini for his

bride, Clarice, he was "contriving an alliance with a family
of far-reaching influence" who "could raise soldiers as well
as money," but the Florentines "did not entirely approve of
the match," as it was not the "custom" to "look outside

Tuscany for brides and bridegrooms."

One means "to recon

cile the Florentines to this unwelcomed event" was to ar

range a "splendid tournament," which was accomplished at
considerable cost and became the "subject" of "Luigi Pulce's

La Giostra di Lorenzo de' Medici,"^

Pope Leo was honored in

Florence with a "splendid reception," in 1515, at the cost

of "70,000 florins."^®
Savonarola warned, from the "Cathedral pulpit," that
"the Florentines had bartered their ancient liberties for

the spectacles provided them by a tyrant,"" in reference to
the Medici.

As Machiavelli remarks in the History, however,

"After these shows had been presented, the citizens returned

to their earlier thoughts, and each one followed his own

opinion with more zeal than ever."" One might conclude,
364

then, that festivals did provide a temporary distraction

from political concerns, and helped the prince gain the
goodwill of the people which, together with such things as
"prepar[ing] rewards... for anyone who thinks up any way of

expanding his city or his state," combined to keep the
public suitably occupied and entertained, and the prince in
command of the "majesty of his dignity," (Ch. 21, 91) a
prime example of Machiavelli's caustic humor.
When Machiavelli turns to the subject of the "secretar
ies" of princes, in Chapter Twenty-Two, and "flatterers," in

Chapter Twenty-Three, he satirizes the government of the new

prince.

There is no evidence of civil government in the

Prince, to administer the affairs of state.
speak, a head, but no body.

There is, so to

The reader can fill the void

with assumptions and guesswork, but Machiavelli does not
provide the information which, when contrasted with the em

phasis he places on institutions, law, and governing bodies
in the Discourses and in the History, indicates a form of

disregard for the regimes of tyrants.
government, in any case.

The government is his

Nor does Machiavelli make any

reference to trade and commerce with regard to governing
bodies.

He merely suggests that the new prince should "take

account" of "guilds" or "clans," and "meet with them some
times, and make himself an example of humanity and munifi

cence," (Ch. 21, 91) or, in other words, attempt to keep

them friendly.

Therefore, although Machiavelli devotes
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considerable attention to the problem of maintaining the

security of the prince, he spends virtually no time at all

on the intricacies of maintaining the state in every other

aspect, an omission that reflects his cynicism.
Nor is there any notion of civic virtue in the Prince.
As Marcia L. Colish observes:

The principle dimension that is present
in De Officiis and which Machiavelli

deliberately omits from the Prince is
the dimension of civic virtue... the
leaders whom Cicero addresses in the De

,

Officiis are an aristocracy, but in his
own mind they represent and inspire the
virtues the whole community can and
should manifest. Machiavelli, by con
trast, has difficulty envisioning such
an organic moral relationship between
the ruler and the ruled in a principal
ity. Or perhaps more precisely, he has
difficulty envisioning it in the case of
a Medici ruler for whom the Prince was

intended. His omission of the Topos of
civic virtue [in] the Prince therefore,
can be seen as an ironic comment on

princes in general and in particular.
It is certainly an omission which con
temporary readers, steeped as they were
in Cicero's De Officiis, were bound to
notice.^'

It is certainly true that Machiavelli had "difficulty

envisioning" an "organic moral relationship between the
ruler and the ruled" under the Medici, and modern princes
generally, which is the point of his satire.

But he offers

the example of "good princes" throughout the Discourses, in

which such things as "peace and justice... nobility and
virtue" are praised as worthy of imitation (I. 10, 137-8) by

modern princes.

Machiavelli did share the views of Cicero,
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but he realized that his contemporaries, although "steeped"
in Cicero's De Officiis, had lost sight of those ancient

principles.

If he had written a handbook for princes like

all the others, it would never have had the impact that the
Prince has generated.

By shocking his readers into aware

ness, however, he hoped to inspire a desire for reform, and
in the Discourses, he discussed the means to achieve that
end.

In discussing the matter of choosing ministers,
Machiavelli defines the second kind of brain, one "that dis
cerns what others understand," (Oh. 22, 92) which imputes

limited intelligence, and he states that the prince will

"always be reputed wise because he has known how to recog
nize [a minister] as capable... ," "although he does not

have the inventiveness by himself," (Ch. 22, 92) in which
the word "recognize" is equivalent to "discern," and carries
the same assignation of second brain capacity.

As I dis

cussed above, in connection with the dedication, Machiavelli
attributed the second rank brain to the Medici as well as

Pandolfo Petrucci.

Machiavelli makes a credible point in his warning that
a minister who is "thinking more of himself than of you, and
in all actions looking for something useful to himself," is
not trustworthy. (Ch. 22, 93)

In corrupt times, however,

the new prince would be imprudent if he did not assume that

those around him Were as corrupt as himself.
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Therefore, to

"keep" his ministers "good" by heaping "honors" and "wealth"

(Ch. 22, 93) on them is dangerous advice, as "conspirators
have all been men of standing or intimates of the prince,
and, of these, those who have been moved to conspire by too

many benefits are as numerous as those moved to conspire by
too many injuries, as was the case with Perennis versus

Commodus, Plautianus versus Deverus, and Sejanus versus

Tiberius.

For to all these men their emperors had granted

such wealth and so many honors and titles that there seemed

to be nothing wanting to complete their power, save the
imperial title." (III. 6, 403)
A corrupt court also creates a general climate of

corruption among the populace.

As Machiavelli remarks in

the Discourses, "the faults of Peoples are due to Princes,"

(III. 9, 483) as the ruler provides an example to the gov
erned, a notion that echoes Cicero's view that a "moral

relationship" should exist "between the ruler and the
ruled.

Machiavelli's statement, "he who has someone's state in

his hands should never think of himself, but always of the

prince," (Ch. 22, 93) reminds the reader that in tyrannical

regimes, the common good is never the first priority, but
rather the welfare of the prince himself.

Nor does

Machiavelli neglect to call attention to the inherent arro
gance of the prince within his own court.

He comments that

a minister "should never remember anything that does not
368

pertain to the prince," (Ch. 22, 93) a comic reference, in

my estimation, to his self-centered interests, including the
notion that ai devoted minister should not in fact have

anything on his mind but the prince and his prosperity.
Certainly many interpretations of this remark are possible,
which is true of so many of his humorous asides that, as
they may reflect double entendre of a highly personal na

ture, we may never appreciate the full extent of his meaning
or his wit.

Machiavelli's chapter on flattery mirrors a "standard

topic in the literature of advice-books for princes, the

topic of flatterers and how to avoid them."^^

The underlying

reality, of course, is that the Prince itself constitutes

the epitome of flattery, in its appeal to the Medici as the
designated saviors of Italy—what Garrett Mattingly refers
to "at best like empty rhetoric, at worst like calculating
but stupid flattery.

Indeed, flattery permeates the

little work, for the vanity of an arrogant prince makes him
a vulnerable target for the shrewd Machiavelli.

In addressing the problem of avoiding flatterers in the

court, and in what modes advice should be obtained,

Machiavelli notes that men "deceive themselves," (Ch. 23,
93) and he remarks that anyone is "deceived" who thinks that

a prince "who establishes an opinion of himself as prudent
is so considered not because of his nature, but because of
the good counsel he has around him," (Ch. 23, 95) although
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in the previous chapter, Machiavelli stridently emphasized

that the prince is judged by the men he has around him, "and
when they are capable and faithful, he can always be reputed
wise... ." (Ch. 22, 92)
Flattery is deceitful because it is insincere and lacks
conviction.

Machiavelli does not caution the prince to

distinguish between truth and deceit, however.

Rather, he

advises that the prince not accept the "truth" from every
one; "For there is no other way to guard oneself from flat
tery unless men understand that they do not offend you in

telling you the truth; but when everyone can tell you the
truth, they lack reverence for you.

Therefore, a prudent

prince must hold to a third mode, choosing wise men in the

state; and only to these should he give freedom to speak the
truth to him, and of those things only that he asks about

and nothing else." (Gh. 23, 93-4)

If the prince assumes

that everyone is telling him the truth (but he need only

accept it from "wise men"), he is oblivious to the danger of
flatterers.

And in failing to distinguish between truth and

opinion, he is in danger of losing his state.

In Chapter Twenty-four, Machiavelli considers why the
"princes" in Italy have lost their states in modern times.
He observes that there are two reasons for this problem: a
"defect in arms,'' and the fact that either the "people" were
"hostile" or, if "friendly," the "lords" failed to "secure

themselves against the great." (Ch. 24, 96)
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The point Machiavelli is really trying to make in

Chapter Twenty-four, is that the princes of Italy lost their
states because they were incompetent with regard to arms.
He states, "For men are much more taken by present things

than by past ones, and when they find good in the present,

they enjoy it and do not seek elsewhere." (Ch. 24, 96).

If

they "appear ancient," (Ch. 24, 96) it is not in the image
of Cyrus, or the mythical founder of Rome, Romulus.

Machiavelli's reverence for the ancients is generally
acknowledged among scholars of his works.

More often than

not, they will make reference to his letter to Francesco

Vettori, December 10, 1513, in which Machiavelli expresses,

with delicate elegance, his profound respect for antiquity,
and the virtue and wisdom which adorned that distant age.

Writing from his farm in Sant' Andrea during the period of
his exile, he refers to the mundane tasks of his day, and
the time he spends at the "inn" with local inhabitants, the

"vulgarity" of his pursuits, playing "cricca" and "trick
track," and the "thousand disputes and countless insults

with offensive words... fighting over a penny... we are
heard shouting as far as San Cascino."

And with these

"trifles," I keep my brain from growing mouldy, and satisfy
the malice of this fate of mine, being glad to have her
drive me along this road, to see if she will be ashamed of
it."



But "on the coming of evening," Machiavelli leaves the

vulgar and mundane behind, the debris of his meaningless
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existence, and revels in the glories of the past, from which
he draws his courage and resolve
I return to my house and enter my study;
and at the door I take off the days
clothing, covered with mud and dust, and
put on garments regal and courtly; and
reclothed appropriately, I enter the an
cient, courts of ancient men, where,

received by them with affection, I feed
on that food which alone is mine and

which I was born for, where I am not
ashamed to speak with them and to ask
them the reason for their actions; and
they in their kindness answer me; and
for hours of time I do not feel boredom.

I forget every trouble, I do not dread
poverty, I am not frightened by death;

entirely, I give myself over to them.^
He continues with a reference to the Prince, giving the
impression that everything he learned in his long hours of
study, he condensed into that little work.

More than that,

not only what he learned, but what he found worthy of in

structing others to imitate:
And because Dante says it does not pro
duce knowledge when we hear but do not
remember, I have noted everything in
their conversation which has profited
me, and have composed a little work On
Princedoms, where I go as deeply as I

can into consideration on this subjSet,
debating what a princedom is, of what

kinds they are, how they are gained, how
they are kept, why they are lost. And
if ever you can find any of my fantasies
pleasing, this one should not displease

ypu; and by a prince, and especially a
new prince, it ought to be welcomed.
Hence I am dedicating it to His Magnifi
cence Giuliano. Filippo Cassavecchia
has seen it; he can give you some ac
count in part of the thing in itself and
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the discussions I have had with him,
though I am still enlarging and revising
it.

Machiavelli, of course, learned two paths from his

study of antiquity, that of virtue and wisdom, reflected in
the Discourses, as evidenced by his own statements regarding

his purpose in writing that work,'® and the path of tyranny
and corruption, that he criticized in the Prince.

That is

not to suggest that he does not discuss bad government in
the Discourses.

The example of Julius Caesar's corrupt rise

to power is not neglected, (I. 10, 134-8), nor does he fail
to mention many others, including Nabis, Phalaris, and
Dionysius, (I. 10, 135) and the ambitious designs of such
men as Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus, (III. 8,
426-29) who were crushed in their efforts because the people
valued their liberty and were as yet uncorrupted.

But the

Discourses is a work dedicated to reviving ancient virtue,
and the examples he finds worthy of imitation, such as
Lucius Quintius (Cincinnatus), (III. 24, 473-4) the two

Catos, (III. 1, 389) and Brutus and Cassius (III. 6, 400)
reflect the character and actions that he admired.

He

praised those in anti^ity who had regard for the welfare of
others, rather than a high regard for their personal advan
I

tage.

As Allan Gilbert observed, Machiavelli believed that

government should serve the greater good of the community.''
Machiavelli champions modern princes in new principali
ties, in Chapter Twenty-Four, in a discourse devoted to the
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question of why princes in Italy have lost their states.

He

doesn't simply praise new princes with glory, but "double
glory," for "having made the beginning of a new principali
ty, of having adorned it and consolidated it with good laws,

good arms, good friends, and good examples." (Ch. 24, 96)
In fact, the new principalities were "adorned" with none of
the above.

"Good laws" can be understood in the context of

the good arms=good laws equation I discussed in connection

with Chapter Twelve.
arms.

Nor were the arms of new princes good

The "defect in arms" (Ch. 24, 96) that Machiavelli

refers to does not necessarily indicate a lack of arms,
which many of the princes (including the popes) obtained in
abundance by calling in foreigners, and hiring Italian
mercenaries.

Rather, he means the lack of virtuous arms—

those arms that are owned by the prince himself, and on

which he alone depends, and this applies to republics as
well.

"Good friends" (Ch. 24, 96) were nowhere to be found
when Cesare Borgia needed them most, after the death of
Alexander VI, with the exception of a few Spanish captains.
He had alienated all those with power and influence who

might have come to his aid.

And the notion that new princes

should be praised for their "good example" is Machiavelli's
way of ridiculing his own advice, to practice hypocrisy and
deception.
He creates the impression that only hereditary princes
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were deprived of their states when he remarks, "double
shame" to those "who, having been born a prince," have "lost

it through [their] lack of prudence." (Ch. 24, 96)
he meant every word of this accusation.

No doubt

In The Art of War,

he remarks, "It did not enter the minds of these poor
wretches that they were preparing themseilves to be the prey

of whoever attacked them,"^* precisely because they were
unprepared.

But new states were lost, as well, and for the

same reason.

And in his example of Naples and Milan,

(Ch. 24, 96) Machiavelli illustrates this point with a
vengeance, for a defect in arms combined with the ambition

of a new prince for power (and not one who became prince by
hereditary right) resulted in decades of war and chaos in
Italy, precipitated by the actions of Ludovico Sforza.

Ludpvicb was "de facto ruler of Milan... a guardian of
the titular duke [Gian Galeazzo, 1476-1494], his nephew and

a minor.

Gian was married to Isabella of Aragon, daughter

of Duke Alfonso of Calabria, and granddaughter of King
Ferrante of Naples.

When Gian turned twenty, Isabella

called on her "southern relatives" to end Ludovico's "long
regency, which Ludovico resisted, having "long ago decided
never to yield his place."

King Ferrante declared war, and

Lodovico called on King Charles VIII of France to "undertake

the long threatened campaign to vindicate his right to the

Neopolitan Crown."

In the summer of 1494, the King of

France "emerged upon Italian soil."''" The invasion by France
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1;

began "forty years of war,"'*' and, for that reason,
Machiavelli accuses Ludovico of causing Italy's "ruin," in

the History

Ludovico was also the cause of his own ruin.

After the mysterious death of Gian Galeazzo, in 1494,

Ludovico became Duke of Milan, described as a "tyrant,"'*'
"utterly unscrupulous," and "pricked with ambition,"'*^ a new
prince thoioughly in accord with the quality of the times.
Following the death of Charles VIII, in 1498, Louis XII

became King of France and, in 1499, Louis invaded Italy,
with the intent to lay claim to both Milan and Naples.

As

Machiavelli relates, in Chapter Three, Ludovico lost Milan.
He was taken prisoner to France, where he died in 1510.

"No

Italian with as much as a touch of patriotism can have

viewed the catastrophe of the Moor with any other feeling
that a traitor had received his reward.

Thus, both new

and old states were lost in Italy, despite impressions to

the contrary created by Machiavelli.

Had he also emphasized

new princes who were deprived of their states, Cesare
Borgia, his model prince, would have figured prominently
aihong them, as Machiavelli maintained that he could "find no
fresher example than the actions of that man." (Ch. 7, 33)

His absence in this discourse is conspicuous, and intended
to be so, to contradict the notion that hew princes were

secure in their new principalities, and deserving of "double
glory" (Ch. 24, 96) for their acquisitions, particularly
with regard to arms.
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with the exception of those like the Duke of Urbino,

whose subjects tried to come to his aid, most of the princes
of Italy were undefended, which is precisely the point that
Machiavelli is trying to make,

the notion of a "hostile

people," or failing to secure oneself "against the great,"

(Ch. 24, 96) while not without importance, J.s in this in
stance a ruse on his part, a means of ridiculing princes for

not organizing and training their subjects into a military

strong enough to defend the state.

Therefore, a defect in

arms was the cause for the princes losing their states, as
"those defenses alone are good, are certain, and are last
ing, that depend on you yourself and on your virtue." (Ch.
24, 97)

In his conclusion to the Art of War, Machiavelli con

siders the plight of Italy with regard to military prepared
ness:

He
is
he
at

then who despises these ideas, if he
a prince, despises his princedom; if
is a citizen, his city. And I repine
Nature, who either should have made

me such that I could not see this or

should have given me the possibility for
putting it into effect, since I am an
old man, I do not imagine today that I

can have opportunity for it.

Therefore,

I have been liberal of it with you who,
being young and gifted, can at the right
time, if the things I have said please
you, aid and advise your princes to
their advantage. By Italy's condition I

do not wish you to be dismayed or terri
fied, because this land seems born to
raise up dead things, as she has in
poetry, in painting, and in sculpture.
But so far as I am concerned, since I am
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advanced in years, I have no hope. Yet
assuredly if Fortune had in the past
granted me a state large enough to per
mit such an attempt, I believe that in a
short time I could have shown the world
how much ancient customs are worth.

Without doubt I would have made my state
greater with glory or lost it without
shame
I

Machiavelli addresses the question of how fortune can

be opposed in Chapter Twenty-five.

He makes the point that

"many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are
so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot correct

them with their prudence, indeed they have no remedy at

all." (Ch. 25, 98)

And "because of the great variability of

things which have been seen and are seen everyday, beyond

every human conjecture," (Ch. 25, 98) people are more in
clined to that opinion than ever.

He notes that he has,

himself, "been in some part inclined to that opinion,"

(Ch. 25, 98) a sentiment that is echoed in the Discourses as
well;

Hence men who in this life normally
either suffer great adversity or enjoy
great prosperity, deserve neither praise

^ nor blame; for one usually finds that
they have been driven either to ruin or
to greatness by the prospect of some
great advantage which the heavens have

held out, whereby they have been given
the chance, or have been deprived of the
chance of being able to act virtuously.
Fortune arranges this quite nicely.
For, when it wants a man to take the
lead in doing great things, it chooses a
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man of high spirits and great virtue who
will seize the occasion it offers him.

And in like manner, when it wants a man
to bring about a great disaster, it

gives precedence to men who will help to
promote it; and, if anyone gets in the
way, it either kills him off or deprives
him of all power of doing good,
(II. 29, 371)

Machiavelli remarks that "men may second their fortune,

but cannot oppose it," yet they should never give up, "be
cause there is always hope... ." (II. 29, 372)

Although he

states that fortune cannot be opposed, and even deprives men

of the chance to act virtuously, he allows that in some cir
cximstances, virtue can oppose fortune.

In reference to

Camillus, in the Discourses, Machiavelli remarks, "One sees
here how great men remain the same whatever befalls.

If

fortune change, sometimes raising them, sometimes casting

them down, they do not change, but remain ever resolute, so
resolute in mind and conduct throughout life that it is easy
to see that fortune holds no sway over them.

Not so do weak

men behave; for by good fortune they are buoyed up and in
toxicated, and ascribe such success as they meet with, to a
virtue they never possessed, so that they become insupport

able and odious to all who have anything to do with them,"
and when their fortune changes, they become "base and ab
ject." (III. 31, 488)

Further, he states, "For where men

have but little virtue, fortune makes a great display of its
power; and since fortune changes, republics and governments

frequently change; and will go on changing till someone

379

comes along so imbued with the love of antiquity that he

regulates things in such fashion that fortune does not every
time the sun turns round get a chance of showing what it can
do.". (II. 30, 375-6)

The notion that virtue can oppose;fortune is also
stated by Machiavelli in Chapter Twenty five; "It happens
similarly with fortune, which shows her power where virtue
has not been put in order to resist her and therefore turns

her impetus where she knows that dams and dikes have not
been made to contain her.

And if you consider Italy, which

is the seat of these variations, and that which has given
them motion, you will see a country without dams and without
any dike.

If it had been diked with suitable virtue, like

Germany, Spain, and France, either this flood would not have
caused the great variations that it has, or it would not

have come here." (Ch. 25, 98-9)

The idea that the flood

would not have come to Italy is in reference to foreign
invaders, against whom Italy had no virtuous arms (defined

as one's own, comprised of citizen or subject armies) for
defense.

His reference to Italy as the "seat of these

variations, and that which has given them motion," however,
is a criticism ofltaly within—the lack of virtue that led
to disorders and, ultimately, to attack from foreign powers.
Across the corrupt landscape of Italy, as Machiavelli por
trayed it in the Prince and in the Discourses, there was no

virtue to oppose fortune—not in the sense of arms, in the
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rule of princes, in the institutions of government or in the
Church, nor was there virtue in the people themselves.
There is a tone of lament in this discourse, a sense of loss

or foreboding, or perhaps helplessness on Machiavelli's
part, to affect the changes he desired for Italy and espe
cially Florence.

Despite the fact that he could have enter

tained little hope for change, however, he remained a re
lentless critic of the present.

The first indication that he is offering a distorted
perspective on his views regarding fortune is contained in
the statement, "I judge that it might be true that fortune
is arbiter of half of our actions, but that she leaves the

other half, or close to it, for us to govern." (Ch. 25, 98)
The idea that our actions are governed by fifty percent

fortune and fifty percent free will—or close to it—is pure
fiction, and he makes no effort to defend it.

By adding "or

close to it," Machiavelli suggests that free will might not

quite represent fifty percent, in which case our will is
even more seriously compromised or disadvantaged.

And if it

isn't fifty percent, what component fills the void that
remains?

Machiavelli, it would seem, has intended that the

new prince ponder these foolish notions.

Free will, of course, means that a prince can choose

the path of virtue or vice, good or evil.

Machiavelli makes

the point in the Discourses that he who acts in accordance

with the times will be the most prosperous.
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A "republic,"

he maintains, "enjoys good fortune for a longer time than a

principality, since it is better able to adapt itself to
diverse circumstances owing to the diversity found among its
citizens than a prince can do." (III. 9, 431) ' It is diffi

cult to change our ways because "it is impossible to go

against what nature inclines Us to," and when "a certain
line of conduct" works well, it is "impossible to persuade

men that they can get on well by acting otherwise.

It thus

comes about that a man's fortune changes, for she changes

his circumstances but he doesn't change his ways." (III. 9,

431-2)

As he does in the Prince, he gives the example of

Julius II, whose impetuous actions accorded with the times,
and allowed for his success.

As fortune varies, then, a prince will prosper or not,

according to his ability to adjust to the "quality of the
times." (Ch. 25, 99)

Machiavelli clearly defines the quali

ty of the times as corrupt when he states, "For one sees
that in the things that lead men to the end that each has
before him, that is, glories and riches, they proceed var

iously:

one with caution, the other with impetuosity; one

by violence, the other with art [force and fraud]; one with

patience, the other with its contrary—and with these dif
ferent modes each can attain it." (Ch. 25, 99)

Of glory,

Cicero "sternly warned in the De Officiis against assuming
that true glory can ever be gained by vain displays or

hypocritical talk.

All such pretenses fall to the ground as
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quickly as fragile flowers, for nothing counterfeit possess

es any lasting quality."'^' It is clear, given the precepts
in the Prince, that the new prince does not seek glory from
virtuous conduct that is genuine, or frqm virtuous actions

that redound to the public good.

Rather, he seeks glory in

reputation acquired in great enterprises, spectacles of
magnificence, and a display of those qualities that have the
appearance of virtue and noble conduct.

Vanity motivates

the new prince, and not a sense of honor.
vainglorious, seeking selfish ends.

He is then,

An honorable ruler,

such as Cyrus, gained "repute" from his virtue, and because
he did not exhibit those vices associated, by Machiavelli,
with bad governing, (Ch. 20, 462) while the new prince
relies on cruelty and the other vices to sustain him in his
power, without honor or true glory.

With regard to "riches," (Ch. 25, 99) Machiavelli
observes that "honour... was paid to poverty in Rome," and
the "citizens thought it sufficient to win honours in a war,

and to leave all the profits to the public," a "poverty that
lasted to the days of Paulus Aemilius, which were the last

happy days the republic enjoyed, days wherein a citizen
would by his triumph bring riches to Rome, yet himself
remain a poor man." (III. 25, 476)

This mode helped to

preserve the "freedom" of the state. (III. 25, 475)

And

while Machiavelli believed that a citizen, in his own times,

should be free to enjoy his wealth, (II. 2, 280) he strenu
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ously objected to those who used their wealth to advance

their private interests which corrupted the city, as evi

denced in the actions of Cosimo de^ Medici,^* and to princes,
as well, who "were poor, yet desired to live like rich men,"

and corrupted their subjects in the process.'*'
When the times conform to a mode of proceeding, then,
one will prosper, as did Pope Julius II, who "found the
times and affairs in harmony with his mode of proceeding,"

and "he always achieved a prosperous end."

Had the "times"

changed, however, requiring him to "proceed with caution,
his ruin would have followed." (Ch. 25, 101)

As the times

were corrupt, Machiavelli educated his new prince to proceed
accordingly, developing the character and modes of conduct
and actions that would enable him to achieve the end he

desired.

But these were not the ends that Machiavelli

thought noble or desirable for Italy.

His new prince was a

sham—a reflection of the dark and ugly side of fortune that

held sway over the country, and "deprived him [Machiavelli]
of all power of doing good." (II. 29, 371)

As he demon

strated in his play, Clizla, however, fortune is influenced

more by "wit and fraud," than by "force,

and Machiavelli's

wit and fraud constitute the elements of his satire in the

Prince that make it the remarkable literary work that it is.

Perhaps nowhere in the Prince are these elements better
demonstrated than in his concluding remarks, in Chapter

Twenty five, in which he urges the new prince to adversely
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affect his good fortune by attempting to influence it with
force, the least formidable means at his disposal.

With all

the brutality of a licentious prince, then, Machiavelli
beckons him to tempt his own fate:

I judge this indeed, that it is better
to be impetuous than cautious, because
fortune is a woman; and it is necessary,
if one wants to hold her down, to beat
her and strike her down. And one sees

that she lets herself be won more by the
impetuous than by those who proceed

coldly.

And so always, like a woman,

she is friend of the young, because they
are less cautious, more ferocious, and
command her with more audacity.
(Ch. 25, 101)

As in all of his conduct, necessity pardons the new

prince for his violence, even against fortune—the architect
of his path to riches, infamy, and power.
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Chapter XVI.

The Exhortation

In the first Twenty five chapters of the Prince,
Machiavelli crafted his satire with subtle shades of meaning
that often depended on a word or a phrase to convey his real

intent, a lively undercurrent beneath a mask of sincerity
offering every appearance of merit and justification.

The

new prince represented an authentic phenomenon in Italy, but
Machiavelli's advocacy of such a man was pure artifice.

In

this final chapter, he brings the various elements together
in a grand finale of rhetorical flourish—adorned with
biblical language and symbolism—that transforms his satire.
The chilling and sinister matter-of-fact tone of the previ

ous pages gives way to the realm of farce, in the ludicrous
and absurd notion that the Medici are poised to fulfill a
calling from God to lead their fellow Italians to a Promised
Land, a feat given no less significance, by Machiavelli,
than the suggestion of the Exodus, led by Moses.

The Prom

ised Land before the Italians, however, was not their liber

ty and freedom in this incredible exhortation, but, rather,
the promise of servitude and injustice under new masters.

In his opening paragraph, Machiavelli sets the stage

for his blasphemous and ingratiating appeal to the Medici:
Thus, having considered everything dis
cussed above, and thinking to myself
whether in Italy at present the times
have been tending to the honor of a new
prince, and whether there is matter to
give opportunity to someone prudent and
virtuous to introduce a new form that
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would bring honor to him and good to the
community of men there, it appears to me
that so many things are tending to the
benefit of a new prince that I do not
know what time has ever been more apt
for it. (Ch. 26, 101-2)

The notion that the "matter" will provide "opportunity
to someone," specifically a tyrant, defines the times as
corrupt.

In the Discourses, Machiavelli observes that where

there is good "material," the corrupt are thwarted in their

ambition, but when the "material" is "corrupt," it is possi
ble to "impress" a form of government that accords with

their "ambition." (III. 8, 428)

As Machiavelli thought

Italy more corrupt than other states, (I. 55, 244) the
"matter" he refers to was clearly corrupt, and he concludes

that the present times do tend to the "honor of a new
prince," and, in fact, he doesn't know "what time has ever
been more apt for it." (Ch. 25, 101-2)
Tyranny is the form of government that Machiavelli
alludes to in reference to "form," which one can intimate

from the precepts given in the Prince, and he makes a point
of stating that he has "considered everything discussed

above" in reference to his previous chapters. (Ch. 26, 101)
v.

Because the times are corrupt, then, the opportunity exists
for the rise of a tyrant, whose vices have been made to
appear honorable and virtuous as would be consistent with

times of that order, and the notion of prudence has given
way to "impetuosity." (Ch* 25, 101)
Above all, Machiavelli directs his sarcasm to the root
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of the problem of tyranny—a tyrant's disregard for the

public welfare.

He suggests that the new "form" will not

only bring honor to the new prince, but "good to the com
munity of men" as well.

In the jDlscourses, however,

Machiavelli observes that "Experience shows that cities have
never increased in dominion or wealth, unless they have been

independent," while "the opposite happens when there is a
prince" for when "tyranny replaces self-government," pro

gress "declines," and he notes that if anyone wants to "con
firm" his views on the matter, "let him read Xenophon's

treatise On Tyrannicide." (II. 2, 276)
In order to establish the need for the rise of a new

prince, Machiavelli appeals to the conditions in Italy, in
which the people are "more enslaved than the Hebrews, more
servile than the Persians, more dispersed than the

Athenians, without a head, without order, beaten, despoiled,

torn, pillaged, and having entered ruin of every sort."

(Ch. 26, 102)

Although conditions were deplorable in Italy,

especially from the perspective of a republican who not only
lamented the state of war in Italy, but the defeat of the

republican government in Florence, as well, what Machiavelli
is really describing is the fate that awaits Italy under the
rule of a tyrant prince, in which case "enslaved," "ser

vile," and "dispersed" all take on new meaning.

And if

conditions seemed "deplorable" at the moment, the prospect

of the princes of Florence becoming the princes Of Italy
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made those conditions pale in comparison, with regard to

liberty and freedom.

He refers to "Moses," "Cyrus," and

"Theseus" (Ch. 26, 102) to recall the ancient models of

virtue that he offered in Chapter Six, but he omits
"Romulus," (Ch. 6, 21-4) as I mentioned above, who would
indeed be maligned in an exhortation to oppress the peopie

of Italy, despite the fact that Machiavelli notes at "pres

ent," Italy required the "virtue" of an "Italian spirit,"
(Ch. 26, 102) one who displayed the right intentions of
Romulus, a founder who exemplified authentic virtue, by
Machiavelli's standards.

The first biblical language employed by Machiavelli is
in reference to Cesare Borgia and Alexander VI, in a passage

that clearly reflects his irreverence for the Vatican in
Rome; "And although up to how a glimmer has shown in someone
who could judge that he had been ordered by God for

[Italy's]

redemption, yet later it was seen that in the

highest course of his actions, he was repulsed by fortune."
(Ch. 26, 102)

In so far as God and fortune are often used

interchangeably by Machiavelli,' one might interpret his
remark as an indication that Cesare was "repulsed" by God,

for to suggest that he was ordered by God^—-tc fulfill his
own ambition and greed—is an absurd notion.

When Cesare

died, his sister, Lucrezia, "ordered Strozzi to compose... a
funeral chant," in which "II Valentino is depicted as a hero

sent by Providence to unite Italy and restore her to the
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glory of ancient Rome,"^ a' notion that would surely have
astounded Machiavelli, if he knew of it, and suggests the
nature of his satire, if indeed he was familiar with it.

In

any case, the idea that Cesare was "ordered by God"
(Ch. 26, 102) seems intended as a mockery of Alexander VI,
from whom Gesare took his orders, and in whom there was

hardly a spark of divine grace.
In Chapter Six, Machiavelli states that Moses was the
"mere executor of things that had been ordered for him by

God." (Ch. 6, 22)

He reiterates that theme with regard to

the Borgia, then, and repeats it in his appeal to the
Medici; "Nor may one see at present anyone in whom she can

hope more than in your illustrious house, with its fortune
and virtue, supported by God and by the Church of which it
is now prince, can put itself at the head of this redemp
tion." (Ch. 26, 102-^3)

Having called the Medici to "head"

the "redemption," Machiayelli moves in the direction of
farce, for while his previous remarks were outlandish, one

might still judge that, taken at face value, he is sincere
(if a bit poetic).

It becomes clear, however, that what

Machiavelli asks the reader to accept, with regard to the
Medici and their mission, is simply preposterous:
This is not very difficult if you summon
up the actions and lives of those named
above.

And although these men are rare

and marvelous, nonetheless they were
men, and each of them had less opportu

nity than the present; for their under
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taking was not more just than this one,
nor easier, nor was God more friendly to
them than to you. Here there is great
justice; "for war is just to whom it is
necessary, and arms are pious when there
is no hope but in arms." Here there is
very great readiness, and where there is
great readiness, there cannot be great
difficulty, provided that your house
keeps its aim on the orders of those

>

whom I have put forth. (Ch. 26, 103)

Machiavelli refers to Cyrus, Moses, and Theseus in his
mention of the "actions and lives of those named above."

His comment that despite their "rare" and "marvelous" stand

ing, "nonetheless they were men" is not quite true, strictly
speaking.

Theseus was a mythical hero, and thus not subject

to the limitations of man.

Had he included Romulus in this

chapter, who also had mythical origins, every Italian who
read the Prince would have been stupefied to find Romulus
reduced to the stature of the Medici, with no greater an

opportunity nor, one might assume, ability.

The inclusion

of Theseus, a hero in Greek mythology, seems less obvious

for, like Cyrus and Moses, he did not have historic ties
with the founding of Rome.
Nor does Moses quite fit the mold of an ordinary man,

having spoken to God, and whose "opportunity" was thrust
■^

;

■

■

■

upon him as a servant of God to fulfill God's will, and not

his own ambition.

Only Cyrus, whose success is not associ

ated with spiritual or mythical origins, can be said to have
relied wholly on his own virtue, and thus answers the de

scription of men implied in Machiavelli's statement.
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By

suggesting that Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus were (only) men,

however, their heroic stature is effectively diminished, and
by adding that "each of them had less opportunity than the

present," Machiavelli reduced the scope of their achieve

ments to fit the circumstances in Italy.

The Medici vision

of empire and family power thus invites an unfavorable
comparison to the motives of the great founders, who created
governments of lasting and profound significance.
Robert Ridolfi remarks that Machiavelli intended to

dedicate the Prince "to one who seemed to possess all the

qualities of the awaited ^new prince' except one: ^virtue.'
For that reason, in his book he quickly passes over heredi

tary principalities and deals briefly with those acquired
with virtue, to expiate instead on those acquired by good
fortune.

This had been the case with II Valentino and Pope

Alexander, and it was repeating itself with Giuliano and

Pope Leo,"^ and, one might add, with Lorenzo as well.

By

fortune, however, which also applies to the Borgia,
Machiavelli meant that side of fortune which raises up men

to promote "disaster," when that is fortune's desire.
(II. 29, 371)

The notion that "war is just to whom it is necessary,"

and "arms are pious when there is no hope but in arms"
(Ch. 26, 103) refers to armies who are at war, (III. 12,

440-43) and does not echo Machiavelli's beliefs, if necessi
ty pertains to his "exhortation" to the Medici "to seize
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Italy." (Ch. 26, 101)

In fact, Machiavelli refers to the

issue of just arms and necessity, in the History, in the
context of liberty, specifically addressed in opposition to
the Medici.

In a set speech delivered by Rinaldo degli

Albizzi, Albizzi endeavors to get "aid against COsimo's

government," from Duke Filippo, in which Machiavelli makes
the following assertions:"*
By all her people that city dese:rves to
be loved which loves all her people

equally, not that city which, neglecting
all the others, bows down before a very
few of them. No man should condemn in

all conditions weapons that citizens

turn against their native place.

He

should not do so because cities, though
they are mixed bodies, bear likeness to
simple bodies. Just as in simple bodies
diseases often appear which cannot be
healed without fire and steel, so in

cities many times there are such dis
orders that a merciful and good citizen,
when steel is the necessary remedy,
would sin much more in leaving them
untreated than in treating them. In the
body of a republic what illness can be
more serious than servitude?

What medi

cine is more necessary than that which
relieves it from disease? Only those
wars are just that are necessary; and
arms are holy when there is no hope
apart from them. I do not know what
necessity can be greater than purs, or
what holiness can surpass that which

takes any man's native city from slav
ery. It is therefore most certain that
our cause is holy and just—-something
that ought to be considered both by us

and by you,^
In the Prince, however, Machiavelli sanctioned the

predatory ambition of the Medici by offering the semblance
of necessity and just cause to their aspirations.
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It was a

function of his satire to put "holy" and "just" arms at the
disposal of the unjust and the unholy, and thus make a
mockery of necessity and the ends desired by princes.

In

the words of Plato:

The people have always some champion
whom they set over them and nurse into
greatness... . This and no other is the
root from which a tyrant springs; when

he first appears he is a protector.®
There was indeed great "readiness" in Italy, but for
the rise of tyranny rather than "redemption" of her ancient
glory.

In reference to the "corrupt world" from "1434 to

1494," Machiavelli notes that "upon the Roman ruins nothing
has afterwards been built to redeem her from those ruins so

that under the government of a strong ruler, she could

proceed gloriously," for the world he describes was tainted

with "deceptions," and with those "tricks and schemes the
princes, the soldiers, the heads of the republics, in order

to keep that reputation which they did not deserve, carried
on their affairs."' The redemption Machiavelli calls for in
the Prince, however^ is underlined by deceit, hypocrisy, and

cieverness—those qualities that created the corrupt world
in the first place.

Italy would not be redeemed by the new

prince, then, but brought to ruin and servitude.
The miracles that God performed for Moses and the

Israelites, Machiavelli claims. He is providing for Italy

and her redeemer, although he makes the point that they are
"without example," (Ch. 26, 103) to be sure:
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Besides this, here may be seen extraor

dinary things without example, brought
about by God:

the sea has opened; a

cloud has escorted you along the way;
the stone has poured forth water; here

manna has rained; everything has con
curred in your greatness. The remainder
you must do yourself,God does not want
to do everything, so as not to take free

will from us and that part of the glory
that falls to us. (Ch. 26, 103)
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. notes that the miracles are

not "given in the same order as in the Bible," and that they
occur "just before the revelation at Mount Sinai,"* when God
revealed His Covenant with the people of Israel—His laws
for their governance, including the Ten Commandments.

Machiavelli leads his readers to the threshold, so to speak,
but not through the portal.

The lesson that can be drawn

from the example of Moses, relative to the new prince and

his aspirations in Italy, is that law and justice provide
the foundation of great cities and states, and his models of

virtue all played a significant role in establishing laws,
and institutions to uphold them.

And of the Ten Command

ments, who among the modern princes could be said to have

observed them, or the laws given by governments in the

cities they coveted/ most especially the popes, who had lost
all reverence for God's laws and the laws of man.

The notion that "God does not want to do everything, so
as not to take free will from us and that part of the glory
that falls to us," (Ch. 26, 103) is a profound distortion,
on Machiavelli's part, of Old Testament teachings.
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There is

no part of God's glory that falls to us.

In Isaiah 48:11,

the words of God are expressed thus; "For mine own sake,

even for mine own sake, will I do it: for how should my name

be polluted?

And I will not give my glory unto another."'

Further, in Jeremiah 13:16; "Giye glory to the Lord Your
God, before he causes darkness, and before your feet stumble

upon the dark mountains, and, while ye look for light, he
turns it into the shadow of death, and make it gross dark

ness."^"

Machiavelli advised the new prince to use religion,

for such qualities as religion are "useful," if one appears
to have them, (Ch. 18, 70-1) and he, in turn, has used reli

gion to deceive the prince, making that which is done from
unjust motives appear just and holy.
Machiavelli notes that the Italians have failed in

their "revolutions" and in their "maneuvers of war," because

"it always appears that military virtue has died out in her.
This arises from the fact that her ancient orders were not

good, and that there has not been anyone who has known how

to find new ones; and nothing brings so much honor to a man
rising newly as the new laws and new orders found by him."

(Ch. 26, 103-4)

In this passage, Machiavelli clearly denies

his regard for ancient military and civic virtue, that which
he applauds throughout the Discourses and in his other major
works, including The Art of War.

The ancient orders of

Italy begun with Romulus reached their apogee in the great
ness of Rome, that hallowed ground lauded and revered by
/
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Machiavelli, together with the "highly virtuous actions
performed by ancient kingdoms and republics, by their kings,
their generals, their citizens, their legislators, and by
others who have gone to the trouble of serving their coun

try," which is "so shunned" in the present, "that of the
virtue of bygone days there remains no trace... .

The

"new laws and new orders found" by the new prince are not

informed by ancient wisdom and virtue, then, but discovered

in present necessity, as defined by the needs and desires of
the new prince, that which is not lacking for introducing
every form (Ch. 26, 104) of bad government and incompetent
•

military preparedness.

)

The "honor" that such a prince can

expect from his actions will not issue from Machiavelli,
however, but from those who praise infamy and its attendant
vices.

From the example of the "battle of Ravenna,"

Machiavelli makes the point that, in the disposition of

foreign arms, there are "defect[s]" in the "Swiss and Span
ish infantry," (Ch. 26, 103-4) and he calls for a "third
order" that "might not only oppose them but also be confi
dent in overcoming them." (Ch. 26, 104)

He does not address

the issue of cavalry, however, although in the battle of
Ravenna the French cavalry won the day, and thus his example
leaves a favorable impression of the effectiveness of caval

ry generally.

In fact, Machiavelli thought the infantry

"more highly esteemed" than cavalry, for "infantry, when
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well drawn up, can easily break cavalry, but with difficulty
are routed by them," and "among the sins committed by Ital

ian princes who have itiade Italy the slave of the foreigner,
there is none more grave than that of having held this arm

[infantry] of small account and of haying devoted all their
attention to mounted troops." (II. 18, 328-30)

If this is

so, it would seem valuable information to share with a new
pririce who is cailed to free Italy from the barbarians.

Rather than make the point that infantry is superior to
cavalry, however, which is fundamental to his military
theory, he finds a "defect" in both the Spanish and Swiss

infantry.

The lesson the new prince most needed to learn is

left untaught, and the status quo is fundamentally main
tained—which leaves little to recommend MaChiavelli's

military expectations of the new prinCe.

Machiavelli inculcates the "terrifying" aspect of the

"Swiss and Spanish infantry" when he observes, "the Swiss

have to be afraid of infantry if they meet in combat any
that are obstinate like themselves," (Gh. 26> 104) of which

they had little to fear from the Italian mercenaries.

He

observes, however, that if the Italians would learn the

defects of the Swiss and Spanish infantry (the Spaniards are
overcome by French cavalry, and the Swiss are afraid of

combat with Spanish infantry), they could, by establishing a
"third order," learn to "resist" cavalry and overcome their
fear "of foot soldiers."

(Ch. 26, 104-5)
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These broad

generalizations/ if they have any merit, offer little in the
way of useful advice and seem designed to confuse rather
than clarify the issue.

Thus, even when giving military

advice, Machiavelli does not quite take the matter serious

ly, as though he recognized the futility of his efforts.
Rather, he seizes the occasion to make light of his knowl
edge and experience.
The example of the battle of Ravenna also draws atten

tion to Pope Julius II, and another important aspect of the
conduct of war on the part of the Italian princes, that of

bringing foreign armies into Italy to achieve their ends.

Julius II "talked of delivering Italy from servitude and out
of the hands of the French.

Opposed by the Venetians in

his struggle to regain the Romagna, Julius formed the
"League of Cambrai" with "Louis XII, Ferdinand of Aragon,
and Maximilian I for the reduction of Venice."

When the

French defeated the Venetians, Julius became alarmed, fear

ing "the French would become the chief beneficiaries of the
league," prompting Julius to "come to terms" with Venice,
and turn against the French, who in turn moved to have

Julius "deposed" as "pope."

Julius formed the '•Holy League"

with Venice and Spain, "to protect the Church and oust the
French from Italy."

The French won the battle of Ravenna,

in 1512, but lost their commander, "Gaston de Foix."

Julius

brought "Emperor Maximilian" into the fray, and the French

were driven from Italy."
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The actions of Julius II illustrate the point that the

modern princes gave little thought to the long-term conse

quences of bringing foreign powers into Italy, to achieve
their ends.

Alexander VI and Julius II both relied on aid

from the "barbarians," and one might expect the Medici to

follow the example of Leo X's predecessors.

Not only did

the Medici lack arms of their own but at the time

Machiavelli wrote the Prince, they had dismantled the Flor
entine militia he had struggled to create, thus demonstrat

ing an utter disregard for the principle of owning one's own
arms.

Leo intended to "drive the foreigners from Italian

soil," and "form central Italy" into a "unified" state, as
discussed above.

Without sufficient arms of their own,

however, the Medici could hardly expect to either acquire in
Italy without foreign assistance, or to free Italy from the
threat of foreign powers.

Machiavelli's call to the Medici,

then (or any Italian prince), to free Italy from the barbar
ians, was intended to mock the general incompetence of the

princes in forming their own military—and their reliance on
the foreign arms he exhorts them to throw out of the coun
try.

The Medici, after all, had not hesitated to recover

their former position of power in Florence with the aid of
the Spaniards.

Machiavelli didn't support their efforts

then, and with the exception of the Prince, there is no
evidence of his support in his other major writings.

In his concluding paragraph, Machiavelli's passionate
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appeal to the Medici is almost unrestrained:
Thus, one should not let this opportuni
ty pass, for Italy, after so much time,
to see her redeemer.

I cannot express

with what love he would be received in

all those provinces that have suffered
from these floods from outside; with
what thirst for revenge, with what ob
stinate faith, with what piety, with
what tears,

What doors would be closed

to him? What peoples would deny him
obedience? What envy would oppose him?
What Italian would deny him homage?

^

This barbarian domination stinks to
everyone. (Ch. 26, 105)

Would the powers in Italy, so jealous of their states
and their power, willingly succumb to the Medici?

As Leo

Strauss observes, "The last chapter presents a problem not

because it is a call to liberate Italy but because it is

silent about the difficulties in the way... the chapter
creates the impression that the only thing required for the

liberation of Italy is the Italian's strong loathing of
foreign domination, and their ancient valor:

the liberator

of Italy can expect spontaneous cooperation from all his

compatriots and he can expect that they all will fly to arms
against the foreigners once he ^takes the banner,

and he

notes that "before the liberator can liberate Italy, he
would have to take not merely a banner, as is said in the
text of the chapter, but Italy herself, as is said in the

heading.

It is a rare if not unique case in Machiavelli's

books that the heading of a chapter should be more informa

tive than its body,

the "Exhortation to Seize Italy and to
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Free Her from the Barbarians." (Ch. 26, 101)

In response to the question, "what envy would oppose

him," one need look no farther than Venice, and of "what

peoples would deny him obedience," virtually every Italian
who valued their liberty would be numbered among them.

Machiayelli himself would be the first to "deny him homage,"
as his satire attests.

As Leo Strauss observes, the Medici

must conquer Italy to make it their own:
To liberate Italy from the barbarians
means to unify Italy, and to unify Italy
means to conquer Italy... the liberator
of Italy cannot depend on the spontane
ous following of all inhabitants of
Italy. He has to pursue a policy of
iron and poison, of murder and treach
ery. He must not shrink from the ex
terminmination of Italian princely fam
illies and the destruction of Italian

^

republican cities whenever actions of
this kind are conducive to his end.

The

liberation of Italy means a complete
revolution... Italians have to learn

that the patriotic end hallows every
means, however much condemned by the

most exalted traditions both philosophic
and religious... Cesare Borgia did not
become master of the Romagna except by

"cruelty well used," Philip of Macedon
did not become within a short time

"prince of Greece" except by use of

means which were inimical not only to
every humane manner of life but to every
Christian manner of life as well."
In the First Decennale, a work that reflects "ten years

of Florentine history, 1494-1504," Machiavelli observes that

the "kingdoms and the powers are not united and cannot be,'"*
due to conflicts among the powers in Italy, and the involve

ment of foreigners in the affairs of Italy.
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And in a letter

written to Francesco Vettori, in 1513, the year Machiavelli
wrote the Prince, it is clear that he had not changed his

opinion; "As to the union of the Italians, you make me
laugh, first, because there never will be union here to do
anything good.

Even though the leaders should unite, they

are not sufficient, because there are no armies here worth a

farthing, except the Spanish, who, because the^y are too few,
are not enough.

Second, because the tails are not united

with the heads.

The people of this generation will compete

in submitting to the Swiss before they will move a step to

use any opportunity that arises,"^®
Allan Gilbert observes of Machiavelli, "once for a

moment he became a dreamer, in the last chapter of the
Prince imagining a united Italy.

Nowhere else does he

suggest such union as likely or feasible," nor was a union

"warranted by immediate conditions"^®

But Machiavelli was

not an idle dreamer, as his comments above demonstrate.

He

understood perfectly the limitations of present conditions
in Italy.

Eric Whelpton makes the point that, as late as 1525,

"the small states in Italy were helpless because their

jealousies and rivalries prevented them from uniting,

nor

were "the political, economic, and military means necessary
to achieve Machiavelli's patriotic ends... then available in
Italy.

Sergio Bertelli remarks that, "Machiavelli did not so
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much admire or scrutinize Borgia as oppose him, the Secre

tary being conditioned by the century-old Florentine politi
cal and diplomatic tradition of opposing any movement toward
unification at the expense of the city's libertas'—a posi
tion largely borne out by Machiavelli's observations of the

Duke recorded in the Legations.

Most assuredly, if the

Medici succeeded in transforming Italy into a Medici princi
pality, liberty would be lost.

In a more perfect world, Machiavelli might have imag
ined a federation of sorts, comprised of the five major
powers, with the authority to grant dictatorial power to one
individual in times of crises—one who could marshall re

sources and reach decisions quickly, without endless arbi
tration.

In such a world, the citizen and subject armies

would be well armed and trained, united in Common defense of
their country,

in 1513, however, there was ho hope of any

such unification, no appreciable arms for defense, no virtu
ous leaders or military commanders, nor were the people

disposed to preserve their liberty.

If Machiavelli sati

rized the comic stage of Italy in a "blaze of revulsion,
he did so with good cause, his sense of foreboding clearly
manifest in his call to the Medici princes to seize the
country—who symbolized the avarice, incompetence and hypoc
risy of the powerful who continued to lead Italy to her
ruin.

Machiavelli closes his exhortation to the Medici with
V
■
■
.
. . .
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lines from Petrarch's Italia Mia:

Virtue will take up arms against fury,
and make the battle short,
because the ancient valour in Italian hearts

is not yet dead. (Gh. 26, 105)

Perhaps it is no coincidence that Machiavelli also
wrote another exhortation, An Exhortation to Penitence,

which also closed with a quote from Petrarch, expressing a
sentiment with profound relevance to the Prince:
And repent and understand clearly
that as much as pleases the world is a short
dream.

The date of this oration is "undetermined,"^ but it was
likely written after "1495," the year that Machiavelli
became a member of the "Company of Piety," one of the "reli

gious companies" that were "common in Florence."^' Whether
it was written before or after the Prince, however, it

appertains to that work in the sense that in the Exhortation
to Penitence, Machiavelli speaks of God's forgiveness of

those who repent of their "sin," "eVil," and their display

of "ingratitude to God," in changing from "angel to devil,
from master to servant, from man to beast.

Conversely, in

the Prince, Machiaveili inculcates sin and evil, satirizing

the beastly and wicked nature of princes.

Machiavelli's pious sentiments are evident in this
oration, in which he states that the Christian faith is
based on charity:
He cannot be full of charity who is not
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full of religion, because charity is
patient, is kindly, is not envious, is
not perverse, does not show pride, is
not ambitious, does not seek her own

profit, does not get angry, meditates on
the wicked man, does not delight in him,
does not take pleasure in vanity, suf
fers everything, believes everything,
hopes everything. Oh divine virtue!
Oh, happy are those that possess you!

These qualities, however, are precisely those that are

lacking in the new prince.

They represent, rather, the

qualities of religious faith that Machiavelli advises the

prince he need only appear to have, creating an impression
of his religiosity.

Robert Ridolfi refers to the "sad and

pious pages" of the Exhortation to Penitence as "the climax

of the author's Christian thought," through time "adjudged
by some otherwise most clear-sighted scholars... as a frivo

lous joke!"^°

Ridolfi upholds Machiavelli's "^essential

Christianity,' the intimate religious foundation of his

conscience which breathes from all his works,

and "finds

that Machiavelli was anti-clerical, but not an atheist...

who wrote [in addition to the Exhortation to Penitence} an

octave for a miracle play (recently found), and [lamented]
that ^no other hope remains to me but God.'

While Harvey

C. Mansfield, Jr. notes that "none of Machiavelli's jokes"
are "frivolous," he maintains that "if Machiavelli had

considered penitence according to Christian virtue a serious
possibility, he would have discussed it in the Prince and

the Discourses, where he put everything he knew.
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If the

Prince is satire, however, the reason for not including it

seems obvious, for in that work he champions everything that
is at variance with the notion of penitence.

A call to

repent in that unrepentant work would have spoiled the
subtlety of his grand artifice—by suggesting that the new
prince was, in fact, what Machiavelli portrayed him to be, a
beastly monster in need of God's forgiveness, and not a man

favored by God in a calling equated with that given to
Moses.

As for the Discourses, perhaps Machiavelli was not

inclined to give his political theory the resonance of

Savonarola's beliefs, who was "determined to hold high the
cross as a symbol of unification, and to root out evil by

penitence."^'*
Of charity, then, Machiavelli observes that he who

"lacks it... does not teach the ignorant... does not advise

him who errs... does not help the good... does not punish

the evil."^^

By this definition, Machiavelli was indeed

charitable, for in his works he always sought to teach the
lessons that he had learned from his long consideration of

ancient and modern events that shaped the destiny of Flor
ence and the greater peninsula.

And he was charitable to

his fellow Italians, who gave him little cause for optimism,
for he persisted in his belief that, when fortune holds sway
over affairs, one should not "despair," because "there is
always hope," (II. 29, 372) perversely expressed in his
satire.
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Machiavelli states, "with what thirst for revenge" the
people await their "redeemer," the Medici, under whose
"emblem this fatherland may be ennobled and under its aus

pices the saying of Petrarch's may come true," that the

"ancient valour in Italian hearts is not yet dead." (Ch. 26,
105)

But Petrarch did not issue a call for revenge in

Italia. Mia.

"It was his indignation" at the outrages within

Italy, the "warring'* prihcipalities "devastated" by mercen

aries, that "made it again what it had been before, the
spoil of barbarian hordes," which inspired him to write

Italia Mia, "from his desire to see peace re-established"^®
within Italy itself;
If thus by our own hands we have defiled

Our native soil, whose arm shall set us free?

Now, prisoned in one cage
Wild beasts and gentle flocks together dwell.
Until the good must suffer from the base.

^For love of God,' I cry

^Some time take thought of your humanity
And spare your people all their tears and grief!

From you they seek relief
Next after God.

If in your eyes they see

Some mark of sympathy.

Against this mad disgrace
They will arise, the combat will be short
For the stern valour of our ancient race

Is not yet dead in the Italian heart.

From strife and slaughter cease.
From hatching grievous ills, and consecrate
Your lives to a better fate.
To deeds of generous worth.
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To gracious acts that cheer and bless mankind;

Thus will you gather joy and peace on earth
And heaven's pathway opened wide will find,^'
Petrarch conveys his sense of despair over the condi

tions in Italy in this "noble ode,"^® that is echoed in
Machiavelli's Prince, as well.

"Petrarch's work," however,

"rings with the cry for peace,

the hope of peace to unify

Italy within to enable his countrymen to battle the invading
hordes.

Machiavelli's battlecry differs significantly,

then, from Petrarch, for Machiavelli does not call for unity
through peace, but a unification predicated on battles for
supremacy fought within--an invitation to continued chaos

and a further weakening of Italy that made it prey to for
eign intruders in the first place.

'

It seems incredible that anyone should have believed

such foolishness to have emanated from the politically

astute Machiavelli.

After nearly five centuries, no evi

dence has surfaced to indicate the Medici reaction to the

work, nor is there likely to be.

As Garrett Mattingly

observes, "we have never found the copy which should have

had the best chance of preservation—I mean that copy,

beautifully lettered on vellum and richly bound, presented

with its dedication to the Medici prince.

Not only is it

absent from the Laurentian Library now, there is no trace
that it was ever there.

existed.

There is no evidence that it ever

Probably Machiavelli figured that the joke was not

worth the extra expense."'*"
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But Machiavelli's other work on government, addressed

to the Medici, was nevet intended as a joke.

In The J?einod

eling, Machiavelli put forth his ideas for saving the liber

ty of Florence in earnest, yet with all the diplomacy that
the circumstances demanded.

Following the death of Lorenzo

de' Medici (1519), Cardinal Giulio de' Medici became ruler

in Florence, until his election to the papacy in 1523.

As

no legitimate male heirs remained in the Medici line.
Cardinal Giulio, at the request of Pope Leo,

solicited the

opinions of the Florentines regarding the future government
of the city.

Pope Leo died in 1521, and the Cardinal was

elevated to the papacy in 1523, taking the name Pope Clement
Vll.

As 1 mentioned above, in his final considerations,

Clement probably "never seriously entertained any other
thought than to preserve the Florentine dominion for his

family," and thus he "disclosed the existence of two young
Medici bastards," Ippolito and Alessandro.''^

Machiavelli's discourse was rejected by the Medici but
it is clear, from this work, that he did not favor a Medici

tyranny.

Following the death of Lorenzo, who provided a

military arm, so to speak, for seizing Italy (as had Cesare
Borgia to Alexander VI), one might argue that Machiavelli's
hopes for a conquered, united Italy (as expressed in the

Prince, in Chapter Twenty-six) were destroyed, and thus he

turned his thoughts away from the prospects of unifying the
country, although Giovanni delle Bande Nere (the Medici of a
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secondary line)"*' showed the promise for fulfilling the mili
tary opportunity compromised by the death of Lorenzo.

But

Machiavelli did not pursue the ambitious enterprise he
called for in the Prince, in the Remodeling, nor is there
any mention of unifying Italy in this discourse.

Rather, he

pleaded for the return to republican rule and the preserva
tion of liberty—in a work that reflected his true beliefs.

He does not adorn the work with extravagant embellishments
taken from scripture, or call on the Medici to redeem the

ancient glory of Rome by becoming tyrannical lords over
greater Italy, in pursuit of empire.

The glory of Rome was

the ancient republic, and Machiavelli appeals to the Medici

to forsake their own personal glory for the greater good of
Florence.

He could have desired no less for the greater

good of Italy as a whole.

With considerable tact, then, Machiavelli invites the

Medici, in The Remodeling, to satisfy their personal power
while they live, but on the death of the pope and the cardi
nal, to return the government to the people.

In preparation

for that eventuality, Machiavelli goes into considerable

detail on how the government should be constructed, includ

ing reconstituting Savonarola's Great Council, yet "uphold
ing" the "security" of the Medici "friends," and the "power"
of the Medici pope."*^

Machiavelli ignored the issue of

governing bodies in the Prince.

But in this discourse, his

regard for democratic principles is made plain, and I do not
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think anything in Machiavelli's writings, including the
Discourses, so negates the absurd precepts that he offers in

the Prince as this little work in which, with prudent fore
sight, Machiavelli implores the Medici to give up their

power and choose that path which will bring the greater
glory to their house:
I believe the greatest honor possible
for men to have is that willingly given
them by their native cities; I believe
the greatest good to be done and the

most pleasing to God is that which one
does to one's native city. Besides
this, no man is so much exalted by any
act of his as are those men who have
with laws and with institutions remod

eled republics and kingdoms; these are,
after those who have been gods, the

first to be praised. And because they
have been few who have had opportunity
to do it, and very few those who have
understood how to do it, small is the
number who have done it.

And so much

has this glory been esteemed by men
peeking for nothing other than glory
that when unable to form a republic in
reality, they have done it in writing,
as Aristotle, Plato, and many others,
who have wished to show the world that

if they have not founded a free govern
ment, as did Solon and Lycurgus, they
have failed not through their ignorance

but through their impotence for putting

it into practice.'*^
These are not the words of a man predisposed to politi

cal solutions grounded in force, fraud, and unlimited power
vested in one individual.

Even in the most dire circum

stances, Machiavelli does not advocate tyrannt.

He never

intended that the Medici increase either their dominion or

their authority, as he would have us believe in the Prince,
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Rather, his intent was to ridicule their ambition and that

of modern princes generally, who had become the scourge of

Italy.

He mocks their ignorance, their failure to compre

hend the consequences of their ambition, which held the

promise of continued chaos, war, and their own inevitable
ruin.

As did Aristotle and Plato before him, Machiavelli
endeavored to found, at least with words, a "free govern
ment," a republic that redeemed the virtue of his ancestors
in the Republic Of Rome, in the Discourses,

The Prince

casts a long shadow over that noble effort.

Taken at his

word in the Prince, and considering his other works, as
well, moral and immoral practices, good and evil, virtue and
vice, liberty and servitude, and justice and injustice all
vie for their place within the theoretical limitations of a
republican regime founded on democratic principles—in which

survival depends on rooting out the corrupting influence of
vice, immorality, evil, and injustice, which ultimately lead

to ruin.

Nor can society raise up a tyrant to meet present

necessities, and hope to recover lost freedom and liberties

when the crisis is past, when necessity becomes the property
of the prince.

Machiavelli would never advocate the principles and ac

tions of the new prince he satirized so brilliantly in the
Prince.

In defense against such a character, however,

Machiavelli would deploy every weapon in his arsenal to
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combat the threat of tyranny and oppression.

"One's country

should be defended whether it entail ignominy or glory," for
"it is good to defend it in any way whatsoever." (III. 41,
514)

Freedom is what Machiavelli fought to preserve in his

writings, (III. 41, 515) and if the Prince is understood as

satire, there are no exceptions to that principle in his
works; the enigma that surrounds Machiavelli thus evapo
rates.

Political life, in his view, was grounded in morali

ty and ethics, an essential component if tyranny, or the
corruption that leads to the rise of tyrannical government,
was to be avoided.

The more decadent and avaricious the

public becomes, the greater the danger that ultimately
liberty will be lost.

If there is a timeless quality to

Machiavelli's thought, it resides in this perspective from
his works, so long neglected by scholars of history and
political science.

In a collection of essays edited by Bhikhu Parekh and

R.N. Berki, the question of whether or not "politics has a
moral basis" is addressed.

Parekh and Berki suggest that

"we are today living through an acute moral crisis and in

particular through an agonizing state of interregnum in the
morality of politics" calling for "a thorough re-examination

of the problems of political morality, for a renewed and
persistent questioning of the relevant but hitherto neglect
ed principles of moral and political philosophy."

"Dogma

tism" and "subjectivism," they argue, have failed, and there
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is a "need... not for indignant denunciations and unilateral

ideological credos, but for patient—even plodding and
pedestrian—academic attempts designed slowly to disentangle
the knots, and to generate a new spirit of inquiry.

Big

questions don't always require big answers...

Machiavelli should not be excluded from this dialogue, for
his concern was also for the common good, what Parekh and~
Berki define as "the public interest of the whole communi

ty,"'*' that can only be realized when moral and ethical
considerations are joined to political principles.
How unfortunate, then, that Machiavelli's genius re

coiled on his intentions in the Prince.

We have been duped

by his cleverness, although he could not have expected to
escape discovery—perhaps the greatest danger a satirist
risks in weaving his deceptions—especially by those who
would be expected to weigh the Prince against his Discourses

and other works that followed.

Regrettably, however, his

satire was not understood and the message was lost.

The

"counterfeit" passed for "true,"'*® and the critic behind the
mask became an advocate, a most perverse irony visited on

Machiavelli himself.

To label such practices (which he

would surely disavow) ^Machiavellian,' then, is to play a
cruel joke on the sage prankster, although no doubt he would
allow that he deserved it.

After all, as he confided to his

friend Francesco Guicciardini:
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For a long time I have not said what I
believed, nor do I ever believe what I
say, and if indeed sometimes I do happen
to tell the truth, I hide it among so

many lies that it is hard to find it.^'
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APPENDIX A;

A DISCOURSE ON REMODELING

THE GOVERNMENT OF FLORENCE

[Written on t,he request of Pope Leo X, Giovanni de' Medici]

THE REASON WHY FLORENCE THROUGHOUT HER HISTORY HAS

frequently varied her methods of government is that she has
never been either a republic or a princedom having the
qualities each requires, because we cannot call that repub
lic well-established in which things are done according to
the will of one man yet are decided with the approval of

many;^ nor can we believe a republic fitted to last, in
which there is no content for those elements that must be

contented if republics are not to fall. And that this is
the truth, we can learn from the governments Florence has
had from 1393 until now.

Beginning with the alteration made at that date by
Messer Maso degli Albizzi, we see that then the lawmakers
intended to give her the form of a republic governed by
aristocrats, but their form had so many defects that it did
not last longer than forty years; and it would have been
less permanent if the Visconti wars had not ensued, which
kept it united. Its defects were, among others, that it
prepared the list of those eligible to office far ahead of
time; because of this, fraud was easy, and the choice could
be not good; for, since men change easily and turn from good
to bad and, on the other hand, places were given to citizens
much ahead of time, it could easily happen that the choice

was good and the drawing bad.^

Besides this, nothing was

established to cause fear in great men, so that they would
not set up factions, which are the ruin of a government.

The Signeria,^ moreover, had slight prestige and too much
power, being able to dispose without appeal of the life and
property of the citizens, and being able to call the popu
lace to a parliament. Hence it came to be not the defender

A description of the government of Cosimo and
Lorenzo de' Medici, in which the real authority had to get
the consent of the nominal authority.

A citizen might be fit for an office when his name
was put in the pouch containing the names of those eligible,
but might be unfit when, much later, on the drawing out of
his name, he assumed office.
The head of the Florentine government, consisting of
the Gonfalonier and (usually) eight Priors.
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of the state but a means for causing its ruin, whenever an
influential citizen could either control or befuddle it. On

the other hand, as has been said, it had little prestige,
because, since often it included men of low station, young
men, and had a short term, and did not carry on important
business, it could not have prestige.
That constitution also suffered from a failing hot of
slight importance: that men in private station took part in
deliberations oh public busihess. This kept up the prestige
of the meh ih private statiohs ahd took it away from those
ih official ones, and it had the effect of taking away power
and prestige from the magistrates—a thing opposed to every
sort of well-ordered government. To these failings of that
constitution was added another, which amounted to as much as
all the rest: the people did not have their share. These
conditions, altogether, caused countless injustices, ahd if,
as I have said, external wars had not kept that government
solid, it would have fallen sooner than it did.
Next, after this, Cosimo's governmeht was established,
tending more toward the princedom than toward the republic.
If yet it lasted longer than the other, the cause lay in two
things: one, that it was established with the people's aid;
the other, that it was controlled by the prudence of two
such men as Cosimo and Lorenzo his grandson. Nevertheless,

such weakness resulted from its having to decide through a

large n\amber what Cosimo planned to carry out,^ that many
times he risked the failure of a plan. From this came the
frequent parliaments and the frequent exiles that took place
during his control, and than at last, at the critical time
of King Charles's expedition, the Medici government fell.
After that, the city decided to resume the form of a
republic, but did not apply herself to adopting it in a form
that would be lasting, because the ordinances then made did
not satisfy all the parties among the citizens; and on the
other hand, the government could not inflict punishment.
And it was so defective and remote from a true republic that
a Gonfalonier for life, if he was intelligent and wicked,

easily could make himself prince; if he was good and weak,^
could easily be driven out, with the ruin of the whole
government. Since it would be a long matter to set forth
all the reasons, I will tell just one: the Gonfalonier did
not have those around him who could protect him, if he were

His plans became law only through republican chan^
nels.

virtually a reference to Piero Soderini, such a
Gonfalonier for life, driven out in 1512.
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good; nor anyone who, if he were bad, could restrain him or
set him right.
The reason why all these governments have been defec
tive is that the alterations in them have been made not for

the fulfillment of the common good, but for the strengthen
ing and Security of the party.® Such security has not yet
been attained, because there has always been in the city a
party that was discontented, which has been a very powerful
tool for anybody who wished to make a change.

The only government now left to consider is that from
1512 to the present, and what its weaknesses and strong
qualities have been, but because it is a recent affair and
everybody knows it, I shall not speak of it. To be sure,
the Dxoke's death has brought things to a point where new

types of government must be considered.' So I believe that,
to show my loyalty to Your Holiness, I cannot err in saying
what occurs to me. First I shall give the opinions of many
others as I have heard them stated, next adding my own
opinions; if I err. Your Holiness must excuse me as more
loving than wise.
I say, then, that some judge no government can be
established firmer than that existing in the times of Cosimo

and of Lorenzo.

Some others wish one more inclusive.®

They

s^y, indeed—those who would like a government like
Cosimo's—that things easily go back to what is natural.
For this reason, since naturally Florentine citizens honor
your house, enjoy those favors that come from it, and love
what it loves, and since they have followed this habit for
sixty years, nothing else can happen but that when they see
the same ways,® the same frame of mind will return to them.
Moreover they believe few could continue in an opposing
frame of mind~and those few would do so through a habit of
opposition, easily got rid of. To these reasons they add
necessity, showing that Florence cannot continue without a
director; and since she has to have one, it is much better
that he be of the house the people are accustomed to bow
down to than that either, not having a director, they should

6.

The party making them.

Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino, was in charge of
Florence until his death in 1519.

®-

Taking in a larger number of citizens.

®-

The ways they had been accustomed to under Medici

rule.
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live in confusion or, having one, should get him elsewhere—
which would bring less prestige and less satisfaction to
everybody.

Against this opinion we answer that a government of
that sort is risky if for no other reason than that it is
weak. If the government of Cosimo had in those times so
many weaknesses as are abduced above, in these times such a
government would redouble them, because the city, the citi
zens, the times are different from what they were then, so
that by no possibility can anyone devise a government in
Florence that can last and be like that one.

In the first

place, Cosimo's government had the approval of the people
generally, and the present one has their disapproval. The
citizens of Cosimo's time had never experienced in Florence
a government that gave greater power to the people; the
present citizens have experienced one that they think more
just and that pleases them better. In Italy at that time
there was neither army nor power that the Florentines, even
though standing alone, could not with their armies resist;
but now, since Spain and France are here, the Florentines
must ally themselves with one of the two; yet if the ally
they select loses, at once they are left as the booty of the
victor—-a thing that in Cosimo's day would not have hap
pened. Formerly, the citizens were accustomed to paying

many taxes; now, through either inability or change in
custom, they are out of the habit; and to try to get them
back into it is a matter hateful and dangerous. The Medici
who were governing then, since they had been educated and
brought up among the citizens, conducted themselves with
such friendliness that they gained favor. Now, they have
grown so great that, since they have gone beyond all the
habits of citizens, there cannot be such intimacy and conse
quently such favor. Hence, considering this unlikeness in
times and in men, there cannot be a greater deception than
to believe that upon such differently shaped matter one can
stamp the same form. And if in that day, as I said above,
every ten years the Medici were in danger of losing control,
now they would actually lose it. Nor should anyone believe
that men easily return to a way of life that is old and
habitual, because in truth they do so when the old way of
living is more pleasing than the new one, but when it pleas
es less, they do not return to the old way unless forced to,
and they live in it only as long as that force lasts.
Besides this, though it is true that Florence cannot

P. 103, "the frequent parliaments
3. 1; HISTORY OF FLORENCE 6. 7; 7. 1 end.
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Cf. DISCOURSES

exist without a director, and that if she should have to
decide, between one unofficial director and another, she
would like better a director from the house of Medici than

one from any other house, nevertheless, if it is a decision

between an official and an unofficial director," the offi
cial director would always be more pleasing-—no matter where
taken from^—than the unofficial director.

Some hold the opinion that you cannot lose control of
the government without an attack from outside, and believe
you will always have time enough to make a friendly arrange
ment with any invader. In this they deceive themselves
seriously, because,, usually, alliance is not made with the
strongest power but with the power which just then has the

best opportunity for injuring you or which your spirit and
your fancy most dispose you to love. Your ally may chance
to be defeated (and if defeated he is left in the power of
the victor) and his conqueror may not decide on a treaty
with you, either because you are too late in asking for it
or because he has grown to hate you as a result of your

connection with his enemies. For example, Lodovico the Duke
of Milan would, if he could, have made a treaty with King
Louis XII of France. King Frederick would have made a

treaty with the same ruler if he could have secured one."
Both of these princes lost their states through not being
able to make treaties; at such times a thousand accidents
spring up to hold you back. Hence, everything considered,
we cannot call a government modeled on Cosimo's either safe
or firm, since it has so many causes for lack of firmness.
Therefore, it should not be acceptable to Your Holiness and
your friends.
As to those who prefer a government more inclusive than
Cosimo's, I say that unless it is inclusive in such a way
that it will become a well-ordered republic, its inclusive
ness is likely to make it fall more rapidly. And if they
will explicitly tell how they would like it organized, I
shall give an explicit answer, but since they continue in
generalities, I am not able to answer other than generally.
I believe the following answer alone is enough; so to con
fute the government of Cosimo, I say this; No firm govern
ment can be devised if it is not either a true princedom or
a true republic, because all the constitutions between these

"•

An official director would be one constitutionally

chosen, as opposed to Cosimo de' Medici as a prince without
legal recognition.

"• King Frederick of the Kingdom of Southern Italy.
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two are defective. The reason is entirely evident, because
the princedom has just one path to dissolution, that is, to
descend toward the republic. And similarly the republic has
just one path toward being dissolved, that is, to rise
toward the princedom. Governments of a middle sort have two
ways; they can rise toward the princedom and descend toward

the republic.

From this comes their lack of firmness.

It

is therefore not possible. Your Holiness, if you wish to
give Florence a firm government for your own glory and the
security of your friends, to set up there other than a true
princedom or a republic having its distinctive parts. Any
other form would be useless and short-lived.

Now as to the princedom, I shall not discuss it in
detail, both because of the difficulty of establishing one
here and because there are no facilities for doing it.
Moreover Your Holiness needs to understand that in all

cities where the citizens are accustomed to equality, a
princedom cannot be set up except with the utmost difficul
ty, and in those cities where the citizens are accustomed to
inequality, a republic cannot be set up except with the
utmost difficulty. In order to form a republic in Milan,
where inequality among the citizens is great, necessarily
all the nobility must be destroyed and brought to an equali
ty with the others, because among them are men so above all
rules that the laws are not enough to hold them down, but
there must be a living voice and a kingly power to hold them
down. On the contrary, in order to have a princedom in
Florence, where equality is great, the establishment of
inequality would be necessary; noble lords of walled towns
and boroughs would have to be set up, who in support of the
prince would with their arms and their followers stifle the
city and the whole province. A prince alone, lacking a
nobility, cannot support the weight of a princedom; for that
reason it is necessary that between him and the generality
of the people there should be a middle group that will help
him support it. This can be seen in all the states with a
prince, and especially in the kingdom of France, where the
gentlemen rule the people, the princes the gentlemen, and
the king the princes.
But because to form a princedom where a republic would
go well is a difficult thing and, through being difficult,
inhximane and unworthy of whoever hopes to be considered
merciful and good, I shall pass over any further treatment
of the princedom and speak of the republic, both because
Florence is a subject very suitable for taking this form and
because I know that Your Holiness is much inclined toward

one; and I bplieve that you defer establishing it because
you hope to find an arrangement by which your power in

(

Florence may continue great and your friends may live in
security. Since I believe I have discovered one, I hope
Your Highness will give attention to my discovery,so that if
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there is anything good in it, you can make use of it and
also learn from it how great is my wish to serve you. And
you will see that in this republic of mine your power is not
only preserved but is increased, your friends continue to be
honored and safe, and the whole body of citizens has evident
reasons for being satisfied. With the utmost respect, I beg
Your Holiness not to condemn and not to praise this dis

course of mine without first reading it through.

And like

wise I beg you not to be disturbed by some changes in the
magistrates, because when things are not well organized, the
less there is left of the old, the less there is left of the
bad.

Those who organize a republic ought to provide for the
three different sorts of men who exist in all cities, name
ly, the most important, those in the middle, and the lowest.
And though in Florence the citizens possess the equality
mentioned above, nonetheless some of her citizens have ambi

tious spirits and thihk they deserve to outrank the others;
these must be satisfied in organizing a republic; the last
government, indeed, fell for no other cause than that such a
group was not satisfied. To men of this sort it is not
possible to give satisfaction unless dignity is given to the
highest offices in the republic—which dignity is to be
maintained in their persons.
By no possibility can this dignity be given to the
highest offices in the government of Florence if the Signo
ria and the members of the College remain in the same condi
tion as in the past. On account of the way in which these

groups are chosen-—since important and influential men now
sit in them only rarely—either this governmental dignity
must be lowered and be put in unsuitable places (which is
contrary to all political order), or must be abandoned to

private individuals." Therefore this method is necessarily
to be corrected, and in its correction the loftiest ambition
in the city is to be satisfied. This is the way to correct
it. Abolish the Signeria, the Eight of Practica, and the

Twelve Good Men;''* and in exchange for them, in order to give
dignity to the government, ordain sixty-five citizens of
forty-five years and more, fifty-three for the major guilds
and twelve for the minor guilds, who should remain for life
in the government, in the following manner: Choose from the
said nxomber a Gonfalonier of Justice for two or three years.

"■

To allow the government to be controlled by politi

cal bosses, not in office, as in COsimo's time.

The Eight of Pratica dealt with foreign and mili
tary affairs; the Twelve Good Men with finance and trade.
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if it should not seem proper to;set him up for life; the
sixty-four citizens who are left are to be divided into two
groups, thirty-two for each. One group is to govern along
with the Gonfalonier for one year, the other group the next
year; and so in succession they are to exchange, keeping the
arrangement indicated below. All together are to be called
the Signeria.
The Thirty-two are to be divided into four groups,
eight to a group; and each group is to reside with the
Gonfalonier three months in the Palace, and to assume the
magistracy with the ceremonies that are customary, and to
carry on all the business that the Signoria alone carries on
today. And after that, i with its other companions of the
thirty-two, it should have all the authority and carry on
all the business that today the Signoria, the Eight of
Practica, and the members of the College carry on; these are
abolished above. So this, as I have said, would be the
Chief head and chief arm of the government. This arrange
ment, if it is carefully considered, will be recognized as
giving dignity and influence to the head of the government,
for, evidently, weighty men, who have prestige, will always
occupy the highest places. It will not be necessary to
consult private individuals—which I said above is perni
cious in a republic—because the thirty-two who are not that
year in the magistracy can serve for advice and consulta
tion. It will also be possible for your Holiness to put in
this first selection, as I shall explain below, all your
friends and trusted followers.

But let us come to the

second rank in the government.
I believe it is necessary, since there are three sorts
of men, as I said above, that there be also three ranks in a
republic, and not more. Therefore I believe it good to get
rid of the jumble of councils that have existed for some
time in your city. These have been formed not because they
were necessary to good government but to feed through them

the vanity of more of the citizens, and to feed it with a
thing that in truth is of no consequence for the well-being
of the city, because all of these councils can by means of
parties be demoralized.
If I am trying, then, to design a republic with three
components, it seems to me necessary to abolish the Seventy,
the Hundred, and the Council of the People and of the Com
munity; and in exchange for all these to set up a Council of
Two Hundred, composed of men at least forty years old, forty
of them chosen from the minor guilds and a hundred and sixty

from the major guilds; not one of them would be permitteia to
belong to the Sixty-five. They should hold office for life
and be called the Council of the Selected. This Council,

along with the Sixty-five named, should do all the things
and have all the power that today is held by the above
mentioned councils abolished to make way for it. And this
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would be the second rank in the government; all of its
members would be chosen by Your Holiness. In order to make
these changes and to support and regulate the above-men
tioned groups and those that will be described below, and
for greater security to Your Holiness' authority and
friends, Your Holiness and the Most Honorable Cardinal of
the Medici must have, by means of the Balla, as much au
thority during the lives of both as is held by the entire
people of Florence. The magistracy of the Eight of Defence
and Balia is to be appointed by the authority of Your Holi
ness, from time to time. Also, for greater security of the
government and of Your Holiness' friends, thei levy of infan
try is to be divided into two brigades, to which Your Holi
ness, on your own authority, should provide annually two

commissioners, one commissioner for each brigade.
We see that by the things mentioned above we satisfy
two sorts of men, and give firmness to your authority in the
city and to that of your friends, since you have the mili
tary and criminal justice in your hand, the laws in your
bosom, and all the heads of the government as your support
ers,

It is now left to satisfy the third and final class of
men, which is the whole general body of citizens, who will
never be satisfied (and he who believes differently is not
wise) if their power is not restored or if they do not have
a promise that it will be restored. And because to restore

it all at one time would not be for the security of ypur
friends, nor for the upholding of the power of Your Holi
ness, it is necessary in part to restore it and in part to

promise to restpre it in such a way that they will be alto
gether certain of having it again. And therefore I judge
that you are under the necessity pf reopening the Hall of
the Council of one Thousand, or at le^st of the Six Hundred
Citizens, who would allot, just as they formerly did, all
the offices and magistracies except the aforenamed Sixtyfive, the Two Hundred, and the Eight of Balia; all of these
during the life of Your Holiness and of the Cardinal you
would appoint. Moreover, in order that your friends may be
certain, when there is a choice in the Council, that they
have been put in the pouches. Your Holiness is to select
eight couplers, who, remaining in secrecy, can declare

Balia means, in general, power. Specifically, here
and usually in Machiavelli, it is a committee with arbitrary
power to remodel the Florentine government.

425

elected whom they wish, and can deny election to anybody.^®
And in order that the citizens generally may believe that
the names^ of those elected were taken from the pouches," the
Council must be permitted to send in security two citizens
chosen by it to witness the pouching.
Without satisfying the generality of the citizens, to
set up a stable government is always impossible. Never will
the generality of the Florentine citizens be satisfied if

the Hall is not reopened.^*

Therefore, if one is to set up a

republic in Florence, this Hall must be reopened and this
allotment made to the generality of the citizens. Your
Holiness should realize that whoever plans to take the
government from you will plan before everything else on
reopening it; therefore it is a good scheme to open it with
conditions and methods that are secure, and to take away
from anybody who may be your enemy opportunity for reopening
it to your indignation and with the destruction and ruin of
your fiends. If once the government were so arranged, it
would not be necessary, if Your Holiness and the Most Rever

end Monsignor" were going to live forever, to provide for
anything else, but you must cease to be, and you wish to
leave behind a perfect republic made strong with all needed
parts, which everybody will see and realize needs to be just
as it is. Therefore, in order that the generality of the
people (both because of what is given to them and of what is
promised to them) may be contented, it is necessary, in
addition, to arrange as follows: The sixteen Gonfaloniers

of the Companies of the People are to be chosen in the way
and for the time for which they have: been chosen up to now;
they may be appointed on the authority of Your Holiness or
chosen by the Council, as you please; you would merely make
a second term less usual, so that the office will be dis-

Texts read: "will not be able to deny election,"
but considering that the function of the couplers was to see
that the right men held office, I assume that the negative
should be omitted.

"• The word for he elected, gain the office, is singu
lar but its meaning seems plural.
The Hall of the Grand Council, now called the Hall

of the Five Hundred, in the Palace of the Signory (Palazzo
Vecchio). The Grand Council was part of Savonarola^s gov
ernment formed in 1495.

Cardinal Giuliano de' Medici, later Pope
Clement VII.
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tributed more widely through the city; and it should be
specified that none of them could be taken from the Sixtyfive. When they have been selected, four Provosts should be
among them by lot, to hold office a month hence at the end
of their term all will have been Provosts. Among these
four, one should be chosen, to reside a week in the Palace
with the nine Signers in residence, so that at the end of
the month all four of them will have been in residence.

The

said Signers resident in the Palace are not to do anything
in a Provost's absence; he would not have to give his vote,
but merely be a witness of their proceedings. He could

indeed veto their decision in a case,^" and appeal it to all
the Thirty-two in a body.

So in the same way the Thirty-two

could not decide anything without the presence of two of the
said Provosts; yet the two would not have there other au
thority than to delay a decision considered among the Thir
ty-two and appeal it to the Council of the Selected. Nei
ther could the Council of the Two Hundred decide anything,
if there were not present at least six of the sixteen with

two Provosts; yet the latter could not do anything other
than take a case away from the Council and appeal it to the
Grand Council, when three of them were in agreement to do
it. It would not be possible to assemble the Great Council
without twelve of the said Gonfaloniers, among them at least
three Provosts; there they would be allowed to give a vote
like the other citizens.

/

The establishment of such colleges is necessary after
the lifetime of Your Holiness and of the Most Reverend

Monsignor for two reasons.

One is that if the Signoria or

one of the councils^^ does not decide a matter as the result
of discord, or does things opposed to the common good
through wickedness, somebody may be at hand to take from

them that power and appeal their decision to another body,
because it is hot good that one kind of magistrate or coun
cil should be able to retard public business without some
one's being there who can arrange for action. It is also
not good that office-holders should not have somebody to
observe them and make them abstain from actions that are hot

good, the other reason is that on taking from the generali
ty of the citizens (by removing the present Signoria) the
possibility of becoming a Signor, it is necessary to restore
to them an office resembling that taken away, and this

What follows makes this evident as the meaning,
though the text does not warrant it.

This meaning is required by what follows but is not
derived from either of the usual readings.
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provostship is greater, more useful to the republic, and
more honorable than the earlier office. For the present, it
would be well to choose these Gonfaloniers, in order to get
the city into proper procedures, but not to allow them to
exercise their powers without the permission of Your Holi
ness; and you might make use of them to get a review of the
actions of those groups with respect to your authority and
your government.

Besides this, in order to give perfection to the repub
lic after the lifetime of Your Holiness and of the Most

Reverend Monsignor, in order that it may not want any part,
it is necessary to arrange for a Court of Appeal from the
Eight of Defence and Balia, made up of thirty citizens, to
be taken from the pouches of the Two Hundred and of the
Sixty together. This Court of Appeal would be able to
summon the accuser and the accused within a certain time.

This appeal, during your lifetime, you would not allow to be
used without your permission. This appeal is essential in a
republic because a few citizens do not have the courage to
punish important men, and therefore it is necessary that for
such a result many citizens should join, that their judgment
may be secret, and since it is secret, each man may excuse
himself. Such an appeal will also be useful during your
lifetime in causing the Eight to expedite cases and do
justice, because, for fear lest you permit the appeal, they
will judge more justly. To keep everything from being
appealed, appeal can be forbidden in cases of fraud that do
not involve at least fifty ducats, and in cases of violence
in which there has been neither breaking of bones nor shed
ding of blood, unless the damage rises to the sum of fifty
ducats.

i believe, considering all this organization as a
republic, and without your authority, that it lacks nothing
necessary to a free government according to what is above
debated and presented at length. But if it is considered
while Your Holiness and the Most Reverence Monsignor are
still living, it is a monarchy, because you have authority
over the armed forces, you have authority over the criminal
judges, you keep the laws in your bosom. I do not know
anything more to be wished for in a city. Also there is
nothing that your friends, such as are good men and intend
to live on their own property, need to fear, since Your
Holiness has so much power and they sit in the highest seats
of the government. We do not see also how the generality of

the citizens can be other than satisfied, seeing that part
of the allotments have already been made and the others seem

as though little by little they would fall into their hands.
Because Your Holiness could now and then let the Council

choose one of the Sixty-five who is lacking, and also one of
the Two Hundred; and some of them you yourself would choose

according to the times.

And I am certain that in a short
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time, by means of the power of Your Holiness, who will steer
everything, this present government will change in such a
Way into the other one, and the other into this, that they
will become one and the same, and all one body, with peace
for the city and everlasting fame for Your Holiness, because
always your power can take care of such defects as arise.
I believe the greatest honor possible for men to have
is that willingly given them by their native cities; I
believe the greatest good to be done and the most pleasing
to God is that which one does to one's native city. Besides
this, no man is so much exalted by any act of his as are
those men who have with laws and institutions remodeled

republics and kingdoms; these are, after those who have been
gods, the first to be praised. And because they have been
few who have had opportunity to do it, and very few those
who have understood how to do it, small is the number who
have done it. And so much has this glory been esteemed by
men seeking for nothing other than glory that when unable to
form a republic in reality, they have done it in writing, as
Aristotle, Plato, and many others, who have wished to show
the world that if they have not founded a free government,
as did Solon and Lycurgus, they have failed not through
their ignorance but through their impotence for putting it
into practice.
No greater gift, then, does Heaven give to a man, nor
can Heaven show him a more glorious road than this. So of
all the many blessings God has given to your house and to
Your Holiness in person, this is the greatest; that of
giving you power and material for making yourself immortal,
and for surpassing by far in this way your father's and your
grandfather's glory.
Consider, then. Your Holiness, first
of all, that by holding the city of Florence under these
present conditions you risk, on the coming of accidents, a
thousand dangers; and before they come. Your Holiness has to
endure a thousand vexations unbearable by any man. (Of
these vexations you will be assured by the Most Reverend
Lord Cardinal, since he has been for these past months in
Florence.) They come partly from many citizens who in
asking are arrogant and unbearable; partly from many who-—
since they believe that at present they do not live in
security—do nothing else than declare that order should be
brought into the government; one says it should be extended
and one that it should be retracted, and nobody comes to
particulars about the way for retracting br extending,
because they are all confused. Though they suspect they are
not secure in their present way of life, they do not know

22.

Including Pope Leo's great-grandfather, Cositao.
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how they would like to adjust it; any man who might know
how, they do not trust. Thus with their confusion they are
enough to upset the most orderly brain.

If you wish, then, to escape these vexations, there are
but two ways: either be more sparing with audiences and do
not give the people courage to ask, even in an ordinary way,
or to speak when they are not asked, as did the Duke of

illustrious memory; or organize the government in such a way
that it will administer itself and that Your Holiness will

need only to keep half an eye turned on it.

Of these meth

ods, this last frees you from dangers and from vexations;
the first frees you from vexations only.
But to return to the dangers you run if affairs remain
as they are, I wish to make a prediction. I say that if an
emergency comes when the city is not at all reorganized, one
of two things will be done, or both of them at once; either
in riot and haste a head will be set up who with arms and
violence will defend the government; or one party will run
to open the Hall of the Council and plunder the other party.
And whichever of these two things comes about (which God
forbid), Your Holiness can image how many deaths, how many
exiles, how many acts of extortion will result, enough to
make the cruelest man—much more Your Holiness, who is most

merciful—die of sorrow. There is no other way for escaping
these ills than to give the city institutions that can by
themselves stand firm. And they will always stand firm when
everybody has a hand in them, and when everybody knows what
he needs to do and in whom he can trust, and no class of
citizen, either through fear for itself or through ambition,
will need to desire revolution. Gilbert (1965)
V.l

pp. 101-115.
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rather than three times in the third paragraph. Machiavelli
(1891) 169-174.

J.H. Whitfield, "Savonarola and the Purpose of ^The
Prince,'" Modern Language Review XLIV (1949) 45-6.
86.

Whitfield 45-6.

87.

Whitfield 45.

88.

Whitfield 48.

89.

Gilbert V.3, 1057.

The History.

90.

Mattingly (1960) 106: Machiavelli did not praise
the ability of the people to govern in the Prince, as he did
in the Discourses, for the obvious reason that, as the
oppressed, they had no authority or opportunity to govern
under the new prince. He did have great confidence in the
ability of the people to govern, however, which one would

expect of a republican devoted to democratic principles;
"Government by the populace is better than government by
princes. Nor do I care whether to this opinion of mine all
that our historian has said in the aforesaid passage [Livy]
or what others have said, be objected; because if account be
taken of all the disorders due to populaces and of all those
due to princes, and of all the glories won by populaces and
all those won by princes, it will be found that alike in
goodness and in glory the populace is far superior. (I. 58,
256).

'1-

Machiavelli (1985) 4,n.5.
Machiavelli (1985) 4 n.5.
Johnson 79.

Machiavelli (1961) 218.
Guicciardini, November, 1525.
V.

Letter to Francesco

Comic Writer

Petrarch, Petrarch: Sonnets and Songs, Anna Maria
Armi, trans. (New York, 1946) 157. From "Cesare, poiche"
I traditor d' Egitto: CXI. (p. 156).
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Machiavelli (1961) 106.

From a letter to Francesco

Vettori, April 16, 1513.
Mattingly (1960) 106.
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. "Stauss's Machiavelli."
Political Theory 3:4 (November, 1975) 381.
5.

Mansfield 381.

6.

Gilbert V.3,

1063.

The History.

7.

Gilbert V.3,

1407.

The History.

g.

Machiavelli (1961) 192.

9.

Machiavelli (1961) 192, n.2.

10.

Machiavelli (1961) 198.

11.

Machiavelli (1961) 199.

12.

Machiavelli (1961) 199-200.

13.

Machiavelli (1961)

14.

Machiavelli (1961) 206, n,1.

15.

Sices 9.

16.

Mansfield, Jr. 381

206.

•

17.

Mansfield, Jr. 380
From (I. 13
Walker counts this error (as one of "thirty-odd mistakes"
made by Machiavelli in the discourses. Leslie J. walker,
S.J., The Discourses of Machiavelli Yll:2 (London and
Boston, 1975) 311.
Ridolfi 60.
Jensen IX.

20-

Fliesher 267.

Leonard Feinberg, Introduction to Satire (Ames,
Iowa, 1967) 267.

22.

Pollard 70.

From "Epistle to a Lady" by Jonathan

Swift.
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VI.

Kinds of Principalities

Cloulas 333; L. Arthur Burd notes that "de prince
patibus" was the original title, and cites a letter from
Buonaccorsi as proof of his claim. Machiavelli (1891) 175.

Machiavelli (1891) 175.
^

Cloulas 333.

*■

Machiavelli (1961) 142.

Machiavelli (1983) 516; The Discourses were begun
in 1513, and the earliest possible date for completion of
that work is 1517. Gilbert VI, 186-87. From Allan
Gilbert's introduction to the Discourses.

Machiavelli (1891) 175.
7.

Mattingly (1960) 103.
Ridolfi 178.

9.

John H. Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies Since 1969."
Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (April-June, 1976) 357.

1®-

Machiavelli (1961) 151.

From a letter to Francesco

Vettori, February 4, 1514.
11.

Machiavelli (1985) 5, n.l.

12.

Machiavelli (1983) 267.

Preface to Book Two.

13.

Schumann 158.

14.

Felix Gilbert (B), "The Humanist Concept of the

Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli." The Journal of Modern

History XI (1939) 477-78.
Mattingly (1960) 102-03.
Strauss 15.

Strauss maintains that the movement

toward the "anti-traditional character of The Prince becomes

explicit after the middle of the book," which peaks "in the
center." (p. 14)

Gilbert (B) 453.
Gilbert (B) 460.
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19.

Gilbert (B)

20.

Schevill 502

461.

•

21.

Hulliung 242

•

22.

Hulliung 25.

23.

Gilbert V.3,

1346.

The History.

24.

Gilbert V.3,

1344.

The History.

25.

Gilbert V.3,

1383.

The History.

26.

Gilbert V.3, 1220. The History. These remarks
were framed in a set speech attributed to Niccold Uzanno, an
opponent of Cosimo. As I mentioned above, Donnato Giannotti
stated that Machiavelli remarked, what he "was not willing

to say as coming from myself, I shall have his [Cosimo]
opponents say." (p. 1028). The History.
27.

28.

29.

McKay 111.
Strauss 22.
Strauss 22.

30.

Ridolfi 119.

31.

Ridolfi 149.

32.

Ridolfi 119.

33.

Najamey

147.

34.

Najamey

146.

35.

Najamey

146-47.

36.

Najamey

147.

37.

This letter marks the end of Machiavelli's corre

spondence with Vettori, which did not resume until the
1520's, by all accounts that I have seen.
Allan Gilbert, trans. "Familiar Letters" from
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (Durham, North
Carolina, 1965) V2, 960, 886. John M. Najamey notes that
only four autographed letters of Machiavelli have been

discovered, pertaining to the years 1513-1515.
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Najamey 10

11, n.l5. The letter in question is not among them. Fur
ther, Najamey asserts that "most of the known letters, and
many of Vettori's letters to Machiavelli were preserved by
Giuliano de' Ricci, Maehiavelli's grandson, who copied the

origihals [Vettori's] together with Machiavelli's letters
and texts," collected in a single volume known as the "Apo
grafo Ricci," presently found in the Biblioteca Nazionale in
Florence. In Najamey's opinion, Ricci could only have ,
copied Machiavelli's letters to Vettori if Machiavelli
himself kept copies of them. "At one point in the corre
spondence, Vettori remarks that he was not in the habit of
keeping copies of letters he wrote to Machiavelli, whereas
there are indications that Machiavelli did copy and keep at
least some of his own to Vettori." (pp. 10-12); As I men
tioned above, Ricci failed to copy Machiavelli's play. The
Masks, based on Aristophane's The Clouds, because he found
the subject matter objectionable.
As John H. geerken observes, "After long lapses of

time, he occasionally recopied manuscripts... mixing in his
notebooks old passages with new ones, thus making it impos
sible to assign work to a given period of composition.
Usually with literary or official writings, he polished and
retouched his work; but on one occasion, while in exile, he
entirely rewrote... one of his old chancery reports...
clearly the state of the texts presages problems first in

chronology, then in interpretation and conceptualization."
Geerken 356-67.

Ramage 6. Horace's Epistles "are in essence the
philosophic extension of the Satires... it is clear from
references that Horace makes in the Epistles that this was
intentional... this repetition appears as the peed for moral

improvement.

But there is a difference.

In the Epistles it

serves as the reason for and the justification of the posi
tive philosophical recommendations that Horace wishes to
present."

Machiavelli (1961) 185.

'♦2-

Machiavelli (1961) 185.
Machiavelli (1961) 186.

Cloulas 233.

From Machiavelli's dispatches.

Mattingly (1960) 104.
46.

Cloulas 218.
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47.

48.

Cloulas 233.

Cloulas 234.

49.

Machiavelli (1985) 12, n.3.

50.

Feinberg 179.

51.

Gilbert V.3, 1408.

52.

Schevill 458.

53.

Gilbert V.3, 1448.

The History.

The History.

54.

"Alexander VI never did anything, nor ever thought
of anything, but how to deceive and he always found a sub
ject to whom he could do it." (Ch. 18, 70).
Cloulas 153.
Cloulas 152.

5'-

Cloulas 154.

5*-

Cloulas 155.
Cloulas 161.

Pollard 67-8.

Gilbert V.3, 1124.

The History.

Schumann 147.

Hibbert 189.

Hibbert 190.

Gilbert V.3, 1080.
Pollard 68.

Mattingly (1960 104.
Feinberg 131.
Schximann 147-48.
Schumann 152.
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Machiavelli's statement, "Yet if [Louis] had lived"
suggests that the Prince was not complete in December, 1513,
the date usually given for its completion. Louis died in
1515.

'2.

Machiavelli praises the laws and institutions of

France in the Discourses

(III. 1, 389-90).

Charles Allen Beaumont, Swift
(Athens, Georgia, 1961) 24-5.
■

■

. ,

VII.

■

Classical Rhetoric

■

r"

Slaverv and Freedom

Machiavelli (1891) 200.
Beaumont 17-18.
Beaumont 16.

Francesco Guicciardini, History of Italy: History
of Florence. Cecil Grayson, ed. (New York, 1964) 2.

^

Machiavelli (1961) 87.

Letter to Ricciardo Bechi,

March 9, 1498.

Strauss 38.

In reference to Discourses (XI. 2, 280

01).

Gilbert V.3, 1345.

The History.

William Alfred Eddy, Satires and Personal Writings
(London, 1932) 29-30.

Machiavelli (1961) 218.
Guicciardini, November, 1525.
Ridolfi 8.

"•

Letter to Francesco

^

McKay 7.
McKay 7-8.

VIII."

virtue and One^s Own Arms

Charles Van Doren.
Present, and Future

A History of Knowledge:

Past,

(New York, 1991) 109.

The New Encyclopedia Britannica. V.8, 351. "Moses."
The New Encyclopedia Britannica. V.8, 351.
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"Moses."

*■
ment.

An account of Moses can be found in the Old Testa
The Book of Exodus deals with the return of Moses to

Egypt and the journey of the Israelites to Mt. Sinai where
God gave Moses the Ten Commandments. The Book of Numbers
relates the journey from Mt, Sinai to Canaan, although the
Israelites were made to wander in the wilderness for forty
years before entering Canaan, because of their sin. The
Book of Deuteronomy tells of Moses' last days.
p

Cloulas 176.

Haight 175.

William Arrowsmith, Richmond Lattimore and Douglas
Parker, trans. Four Plays by Aristophanes (New York, 1984)
160, William Arrowsmith demonstrates the "mythological
rationale of the Old Education and the way in which the New
Education refuted it."

Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives.
(New York,
) 15.

John Dryden, trans.

Plutarch 6.

Plutarch 15.

"• Future reference to the Discourse on Remodeling the
Government of Florence will be abbreviated to Remodeling in
the text.

Gilbert V.l, 114.

A Discourse on Remodeling the

Government of Florence.
i'

■

.

Gilbert V.l, 109-10.

A Discourse on Remodeling the

Government of Florence.
14.

Hulliung 94.

15.

The New Encyclopedia Britannica. V.3, 831.

16.

Hibbert 233.

"Cyrus

II."

17.

Ridolfi 202. Alessandro became Duke of the Repub
lic of Florence (1531-37), and was murdered by his cousin in
1537. Whelpton 116; Ippolito became a cardinal. Both
Ippolito and Alessandro were thought "reprehensible" by
Francesco Guicciardini and the Florentines. Hibbert 248;
At the time Machiavelli wrote the Prince, they were still
very young children.
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•

/

'

Peter E. Bondenella, "Castruccio Castracani:
Machivelli's Archetypal Prince." Italica 49 (1972) 304.
Castracani was given mythical origins by Machiavelli.
Cloulas 51-2.

John Bartlett. Bartletts Familiar Quotations, 16th
Ed. Justin Kaplan, ed. (Boston, 1992) 304. From Lady Mary
Wortley Montagu's "To the Imitator of the First Satire of
Horace" 2.

Berlin 168.

22.

yijQ

Encyclopedia Britannica, V.3, 831.

"Cyrus

II."

Allan Gilbert makes the point in his introduction
to the History, that the idea "that government exists for
the common good" is "chief" among "Machiavelli's observa
tions on man as a political animal." Gilbert V.3, 1027; In
the Discourses, Machiavelli states that he is writing "for
the common benefit of all."

Machiavelli (1983) Preface I,

97.

Ramage 182.

The New Encyclopedia Britannica, V.3, 831.
"Cyrus II."
26.

Feinberg 185-6.

27.

Feinberg 185-6.

28.

Berlin l88.

29.

Berlin 159.

30.

Hulliung 245.
Machiavelli (1985) 22, n.l.

32.

Gilbert v.3, 1220.

The History.

33.

Gilbert V.3, 1222.

The History.

Gilbert V.3, 1123-25. Machiavelli refers to the
Duke of Athens who "gave himself a greater appearance of
religion and of kindness" by choosing to live "in the con
vent of the Minor Friars of Santa Croce," who sought [the

duke] to "make a slave of a city that had always lived
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free." Machiavelli makes strong arguments for liberty in
his appraisal of the duke and the threat he posed to the
city of Florence.
Gilbert V.l, 9.

From Allan Gilbert's introduction

to The Prince.
Beaumont 22.
Brown 3.

IX.

Fortune and The Arms of Others;

Cesare Borgia

The Encyclopedia of the Renaissance, Thomas G.
Bergin and Jennifer Speaks, eds. (New York, 1987) 368.
In his introduction to the History of Florence,
Allan Gilbert explicates the set speeches that punctuate
that work; "Avowedly fictitious are the frequent orations in
the Thucydian manner of the Florentine historians before
Machiavelli. These are developed beyond dramatic require
ments into expositions of social and political truths sug
gested by Florentine events." Gilbert V.3, 1027.

Gilbert V.3, 1307-09.
*■

The History.

Cloulas 17.

Mattingly (1960) 103.
Mattingly (1960) 104.
Ridolfi 71.

Mattingly (1960) 107.

^

Mattingly (1960) 107.
Sereno 164.

"

Cloulas 218.

12-

The New Encyclopedia Britannica, V.2, 386.

"Borgia, Cesare."
Machiavelli (1961) 64-5.

Eugene Ehrlich, Amo, Amas, Amat and More
York, 1985)

63.
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(New

Sereno 162.

Mattingly (I960) 104-05.

Will Durant.

The Renaissance.

(New York, 1953)

414-15.
18.

Durant 414-15.

19.

Schevill. 445.

20.

Schevill 448.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Cloulas 83.
Cloulas 129.
Cloulas 135.

Cloulas 136.

25.

Cloulas 184.

26.

Gilbert

V.3, 1456.

The History

27.

Gilbert

V.3, 1455.

The History

28.

Cloulas 334.

29.

Mattingly (1960) 104.

30.

Gilbert V.3, 1406.

The History

31.

Gilbert

V.3, 1062.

The History

32.

Cloulas 242.

33.

Mattingly (1960) 105.

34.

Mattingly (1960) 104.

35.

Cloulas 244.

36.

Cloulas 243-44.

As I can offer

Machiavelli attributed the death of Alexander to poison, the
issue is (although compelling) purely speculative.
Cloulas 247-48.

Cloulas 251.
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Cloulas 250.
Cloulas 256.

The Encyclopedia of the Renaissance 275-76;
Baldassare Castiglione served at the court of Guidobaldo da
Montefeltro for several years. The Courtier was published
in 1528. (p. 85-6).

The Encyclopedia of the Renaissance 403.
Cloulas 215-16,

,

Mattingly (1960) 105; Guidobaldo de Montefeltro
"demanded an indemnity of 200,000 ducats..." Cesare "prom
ised to give back everything except for the tapestries of
the history of Troy, which he had given to the Cardinal of
Rouen." Cloulas 256-57.

Allah Gilbert, trans. "The Legations" from
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (Durham, North
Carolina, 1965) VI, 145. In a second reference, Machiavelli
remarks that Cesare "is busy getting together men-at-arms...
he has sent somebody to Lombardy to enlist infantry."
(p. 147).
46.

Mattingly (1960) 104.

Allan Gilbert, trans. "The Art of War" from
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (Durham, North
Carolina, 1965) V2, 706. Machiavelli mentions Cesare's
attack on the castle of Forli to demonstrate why subdivi
sions within a castle offer poor defense against attack; In
a second reference, with regard to Urbino, betrayal, fear,
and the element of surprise won the day rather than actual
combat, in which one could praise the forces of Cesare.
Rather, Cesare enjoyed victory in Urbino as the result of
the threat of arms. (p. 712) References to Cesare Borgia in
the Discourses have already been discussed.

To cite but one example from numerous instances of
papal support, as late as March, 1503, Alexander seized the
fortune of Cardinal Giovanni Michieli, "150,000 ducats... as
well as some priceless articles," which contributed to the
"state of readiness" of Cesare's forces.

The death was

"deemed suspicious," and ambassador Giustiniani observed,
"the pope has the habit of fattening his cardinals before
poisoning them, the better to inherit their wealth"
Cloulas 240.
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Cloulas 229.

Gloulas 234.
Cloulas 237.

^2.

Cloulas 257.

Gilbert V.l, 154.
X.

The Legations.

Acquiring Through Crimes;

Strauss

Ancient and Modern

35, n.51,

Machiavelli (1961) 63. In reference to a remark
made by Francesco Guicciardini in regard to Machiavelli.
Beaumont 17.

*■

Beaumont 39.

While there is no parentheses in the

Italian text of The Prince, translators frequently do use
parenthesis with this remark, indicating that it is useful
in conveying the tone that Machiavelli intended which, in
its effect, sets the remark 'aside' in the same manner as
that used by Swift.
Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, eds. The Prince
(Cambridge, 1988) xxi-ii.

The New Encyclopedia Britannica, V.4, 166-67.
"Dominican."
Villari 17.

Gilbert V.3, 1261.

The History.

Gilbert V.3, 1197.

The History.

Gilbert V.3, 1124.

The History.

Villari 17.

XI.

Civil Principalitv;

The Medici

Machiavelli (1985) 34, n.l.

(Ch. 20, 85); Machiavelli's advice has strong paral
lels with the enmity between Lorenzo the Magnificent ah^i
Pope Sixtus IV, following the Pazzi conspiracy, in which the
pope was involved. That Lorenzo used it to his own

460

advantage can be determined from his speech to the leading
citizens of Florence; "... in his high-pitched, nasal voice

[he] dramatically assured them that he was himself the cause
of the pope's campaign against Florence [and] he was willing
to sacrifice himself and even his family if they thought the
exile or death of a Medici would prove the salvation of the

city," to which he received assurances, a "guard of twelve
men," and was elected "one of the Ten of War," (Hibbert 150
51) all of which contributed to his rising status and repu
tation in the city. When the matter was settled as a result
of Lorenzo's trip to Naples, "his position in Florence was
virtually unassailable. And he made the most of his oppor
tunity to strengthen it." (Hibbert 156) Machiavelli likely
intended that his advice reflect on the actions of Lorenzo,
to bring discredit to the family,
Machiavelli (1985) 77, n.l6. Harvey C. Mansfield,
Jr. notes that Septimius Severus "is called a criminal" in
the Discourses.

Gilbert Highet, The Anatomy of Satire

(Princeton,

New Jersey, 1962) 236.

^

Gilbert V.3, 1218.

The History,

Gilbert V.3, 1343.

The History.

^

Gilbert V.3, 1220. The History. From a set speech
given by Niccolo da Uzanno, who opposed the means used by
Cosimo, but urged that direct confrontation was unwise.
William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers
(1953) 94.

(Ch. 9,; 41). The examples of Gracchi and Giorgio
Scali are both prejudicial to liberty, while the qualities
of the prince are generally presented as positive; In the
Discourses, Machiavelli states that in the time of the
Gracchi, the "controversies" that arose between the people
and the senate (the Gracchi represented the interests of the
plebs) "became the causes that led to the destruction of
liberty." (I. 6, 118); Although Giorgio Scali was deserted
by the people, it was because of the "hatred" the people had
for him due to his "haughtiness," "insolence," and his part
in government that Machiavelli says "seemed tyrannical and

violent" to the people.

Gilbert V.3, 1222 and 1172.

History.
10.

GiIbert V.3, 1028.

The History.
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The

"•

Gilbert V.3, 1222.

The History.

Gilbert V.3, 1172-73.

Gilbert V.3, 1128.

The History,

The History.

Cloulas 336.

Machiavelli (1983) Preface I, 98.
XII.

Weak Princes and Ecclesiastical Principality
\

(Oh. 13, 57). Machiavelli is consistent in this
opinion throughout his works, and he attempted to put it
into practice in forming a militia while serving the govern
ment of the Republic of Florence; To offer but one example,
Machiavelli states in the Discourses that "Present day
princes and modern republics which have not their own troops
for offense and defense ought to be ashamed of themselves."
(I. 21, 168-69); He could not stray very far from this
principle in the Prince, and maintain the facade of credi
bility. Therefore, he praised Cesare Borgia for arms he
never really had—which other who read the Prince knew he
never really had—and thus ridiculed him with false acclaita.
Gilbert y.2, 703.

The Art of War.

Gilbert V.2, 709-10.

The Art of War.

4.

Gilbert V.2, 711.

The Art of War.

5.

Gilbert V.2, 712.

The Art of War.
(

6.

Gilbert V.3, 1246-68.

7.

Gilbert V.1, 136.

The History.

The Legations.

Machiavelli (1961) 242.

Gilbert V.3, 1365.
10.

Whelpton 124.

11.

Cloulas 54.

12.

Gilbert V.3, 1428.

November, 1526.

The History.

The History.

13.

Hibbert 162. Lorenzo was thought to be "rash and
short sighted, taking great risks for trivial gains."
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14.

Hibbert 205.

15.

Whelpton 125.

16.

Schevill 448.

17.

Ridolfi 225.
Schumann 150.

19.

Whelpton 120.

20.

Sir Richard Lodge, "A Sixteenth-Century Cavour."
De Lamar Jensen, ed. Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot, or Polit
ical Scientist? (Boston, 1960) 29.
Ridolfi 119.

22-

Ridolfi 135.

22-

Najamey 146-47.

In reference to Francesco

Vettori's letter to Machiavelli, July 12, 1513.
2^-

Skinner xi-xii.

2'-

Cloulas 156.

26.

27.

Cloulas 184.
Johnson 36.

2* (Ch. 11, 45); J.H. Whitfield makes the point that
Savonarola used the phrase, "nevertheless," in the same
manner as does Machiavelli. Savonarola "sweeps the theory
[of Monarchy] on one side with a Machiavellian neverthe
less.*' Whitfield 48; Although Machiavelli uses such phras
es in all of his works as part of his writing style, in the
Prince, he employs it as a device to separate what ought to
be from what is, the ideal and the reality. His description
of Caracalla offers another example of his use of "nonethe
less," to move the argument in a similar manner.
(Ch. 19, 79).
2®-

Cloulas 49.

2"-

Gilbert V.3, 1062.

The History.

21.

Gilbert V.3, 1233.

The History.

22-

Plutrarch 32.
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33.

Schevill 433.

Gilbert V.3, 1062.

The History.

Ridolfi 119,

36.

Machiavelli (1961) 166.

Morgante:
XIII.

A quote from Luigi Pulcis'

Letter to Francesco Vettori, January 31, 1515.

No Art But the Art of War.

Mattingly (1960) 107.

Allan Gilbert, trans.

"A Provision for Infantry"

from Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others
North Carolina, 1965) VI, 3.

(Durham,

Magill 213.

*■

Gilbert V.l, 3.

A Provision for Infantry.

Ridolfi 80.

(I. 4, 113). Regarding this statement, Allan
Gilbert notes, (in his translation of the Discourses) that
"good government precedes good military organization."
Gilbert V.l, 202, n.2. "No government is stable without
providing itself with a protector," Gilbert V.3, 1085) com
prised of citizens of the state or one's own subjects.
7.

Mattingly (1960) 105.

8.

Gilbert V.3, 1398.

9.

Hibbert 215.

The History.

10.

Gilbert V.3, 1146.

11.

Machiavelli (1985) 50, n.7.

12.

Cloulas 193.

13.

Machiavelli (1985) 53, n.l6.

14.

Machiavelli (1985) 56, n.5.

15.

Holy Bible (London and New York)

The History.

39-40.

464

I. Samuel 17

Gilbert VI, 53, n.3.

The Prince.

"• Machiavelli (18^1) 275.
To mention but a few, Moses is represented in
Chapters Six and Twenty-six in the Prince, and in the Dis
courses (II. 8, 296 and III. 30, 486). David is also men
tioned in the Discourses (I. 26, 176 and I. 19, 166).
Feinberg 216.

2"-

Holy Bible

I. Samuel 17:49-51, 378.

Arrowsmith 105. Hyperbolas "pre;suinably attempted
to avoid military service." (p. 163).
Feinberg 198.

Holy Bible.

1. Samuel 16: 13, 374-75.

—• Encyclopedia of Art. VIA. "Michelangelo
Buonarroti (1475-1564)." (New York, 1969) 2809-10.
/

Encyclopedia of Art.

V14, 2810.

H.W, Janson, The Sculpture of Donatello,
(Princeton, 1963) 86.
27

Janson 84.

28.

Encyclopedia of Art

29.

Janson, plates 33a: 33b.

30.

Gilbert V3, 1232.

31.

Mattingly (1941) 184-85.

32.

Geerken 361.

33.

Berlin 168.

34.

Hibbert,216.

2807.

The History.

Cloulas 183.
36.

Mattingly (1960) 106.

37.

Machiavelli (1961) 186.

465

January 31, 1515.

XIV.

Effectual Truth;

The Vices of Princes

Machiavelli (1983) Preface II, 268.
2.

Machiavelli (1983) Preface I, 98-9.

3.

Machiavelli (1983) Preface I, 97-8.

4.

Machiavelli (1983) Preface I, 98-9.

5.

Gilbert V3, 1233.

The History.

Allan Gilbert, trans. "The Discourses" from
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (Durham, North
Carolina, 1965) VI, (III. 8, 451).
Geerken 364. John H. Geerken notes that, unlike
Francesco Guicciardini's works, "Machiavelli's history was
never severed from politics."
Berlin 167.
Rubenstein 24.

Hibbert 125.

"■

Ridolfi 8.

!

Machiavelli (1983) 13.

Gilbert, V3, 1233.

The History.

Boyce 395.

Mattingly (1960) 106.
Cloulas 334.

"■

Cloulas 337.

Haight 175.
Hibbert 203.

Whelpton 112-13.

Whelpton gives Giovanni's age as

fourteen at the time he was made a cardinal.
Schevill 471-72.

Machiavelli (1983) 530, n.8.

466

Machiavelli (1983) I. 34, 194-95. Bernard Crick
'
notes that Machiavelli is "right to insist that the Roman
dictatorship was a constitutional office and that some such
institution is needed in all republics." (p. 533, n.25).
Machiavelli (1983) I. 12, 145-46. The Swiss were
involved in a long struggle for their independence and,
therefore, offer a historical parallel with Italy in regard
to those Italians, like Machiavelli, who desired indepen
dence and liberty in their own fatherland, particularly as
the Swiss recognized the importance of having their own arms

which Machiavelli admired as a general principle.
25.

Arrowsmith 20.

26.

Radcliff-Umstead 116.

27.

Jensen Ix.

28.

Allan Gilbert, trans. "Mandragola" from
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (Durham, North
Carolina, 1965) V2, 777. From the "Prolog."
Sices 2.
Johnson 32-3.

eds.

John Boardman, Jasper Griffin and Oswyn Murray,
The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford,

1986) 647.
32.

33.

Hulliung 245.
Johnson 8.

Johnson 8.

35-

Machiavelli (1961) 44.

George Peabody Gooch, "Politics and Morals,"
De Lamar Jensen, ed. Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot, or Polit
ical Scientist? (Boston, 1960) 88.
37.

Holy Bible, Isaiah 5:20, 821.
Antony Flew, ed. A Dictionary of Philosophy

(New

York, 1979) 307.

George Kennedy. The Art of Persuasion in Greece.
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1963) 13-14.

467

Arrowsmith 153.

Spatz 55.
Spatz 55.

Daphne Elizabeth O'Regan, "Rhetoric, Comedy, and
the Violence of Language in Aristophane^s Clouds" (New York
and Oxford, 1992) 93-4.
Spatz 54.
45.

Arrowsmith 154.
Arrowsmith 153.
Radcliff-Umstead 117.

Gilbert (B) 462-63.

^

Machiavelli (1983) Preface II., 268-69.
William S. Sahakian and Mabel Lewis Sahakian, Ideas
of the Great Philosophers (New York, 1966) 35-6.
51.

Sahakian 36.

52.

Sahakian 36.

53.

Schevill 462.

54.

Gilbert VI, 60. n.l.

The Prince.

55.

(Ch. 12, 53); In Allan Gilbert's translation of
the Prince, Louis XII is charged with the "plunder of
Italy." Gilbert VI, 50.
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I have appended the work in its entirety.

(See Appendix A).
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